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NEW SPRING FOR TURKISH-FRENCH RELATIONS?
Today's Zaman
May 15 2012
Turkey
For Turks, both those sitting in Ankara as well as ordinary citizens,
the failure of Nicolas Sarkozy to secure a second term as French
president was very much welcomed. Relations between Ankara and Paris
nosedived during Sarkozy's presidency as a result of his anti-Turkish
populism, and more recently when a Sarkozy-backed draft Armenian
genocide bill was passed by the lower and upper houses of the French
Parliament. Therefore, the victory of Francois Hollande in the May
6 presidential elections should bring an end to the increasingly
hostile rhetoric that was used by both sides hitherto and opens up
a fresh page in relations between the two countries. This will be a
win-win for both parties.
It would seem that there will be a good opportunity for a first meeting
between the two countries at the forthcoming NATO Summit, which is due
to take place in Chicago on May 19-20 and which Monsieur Hollande and
Turkish President Abdullah Gul will both be participating in. This
should hopefully be followed by a much longer and more in-depth
session either in Ankara or Paris, when a real bilateral agenda of
priorities can be laid out.
There is a strong belief in Turkey that Hollande has a good
understanding of the importance of Turkey, both strategically and
economically, to Europe. Sarkozy, of course, often underlined the
importance of Turkey as a partner to the EU, particularly in foreign
policy terms, yet he simply refused to accept that Turkey could at any
time be part of the EU. However, while Sarkozy may have strengthened
France's anti-Turkish position, he did not give birth to it. However,
Hollande, who has been overall rather quiet on his foreign policy
aims, outlined his view in a 2011 book -- "Le Reve Francais" --
that negotiations between the EU and Turkey must be 'fairly" pursued,
until their conclusion. Moreover, he has criticized Sarkozy on several
occasions over his opposition to Turkey's accession, which has severely
damaged bilateral ties between the two countries. Turkey's EU Minister,
Egemen BagıÅ~_, has recently said, "Ankara would like to see France
become one of the champions of Turkish integration into the EU as
it was under President Jacques Chirac." Perhaps this may be going
too far because I can never see France being a champion of Turkey's
membership, but one would hope that France will at least lift its
veto from the five negotiating chapters it has blocked. However,
this clearly also would not mean an open road for Ankara because,
firstly, some of the chapters under French veto have also been blocked
by Germany and Austria, and secondly, because of the Cyprus issue.
Furthermore, Turkey's eventual accession would still go to a referendum
in France, meaning that one of the toughest battles still needs to
be won -- changing the way many French people perceive Turkey.
Still, overall, there is good reason to be optimistic, and deeper
cooperation between Paris and Ankara should hopefully help reactivate
the EU's transformational power on Turkey in the field of democratic
reforms.
However, there still remains a question mark over one issue, which
should not be underestimated -- namely the Armenian genocide. Ankara
is waiting to see whether Hollande will follow through on his promise
to revive the law criminalizing denial of the genocide, in spite
of the verdict of the French Constitutional Court. While Monsieur
Hollande has some very close ties with the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation-Dashnaktsutyun (ARF-D), it still seems quite unlikely that
he would do this. First, because he seems to realize the importance
of resetting relations with Turkey, and secondly, because the decision
of the Constitutional Court destroying the Boyer Act was based on the
principle of law, which means there would be very little opportunity
for a second attempt. However, at the same time, it would seem rather
improbable that Hollande is going to make an official statement
saying that he is going to drop the matter; rather, he may keep the
issue alive, but it will be way down at the bottom of his list of
priorities. Indeed, recent speeches given by Monsieur Hollande on
this issue (for example, in Paris and Marseille) were only published
by an Armenian website, and not by the Socialist Party.
However, even if the decision is not challenged, with the 100th
anniversary of the Armenian genocide on the horizon, it would be
naïve to believe this issue is simply going to disappear because it
will not, and the Armenian diaspora in France will intensify pressure
leading up to the commemorations.
Clearly Monsieur Hollande has many challenges ahead, not least the
showdown with German Chancellor Angela Merkel over the euro crisis,
but one is cautiously optimistic that his entry into office will
represent a new spring in Turkish-French relations.
Today's Zaman
May 15 2012
Turkey
For Turks, both those sitting in Ankara as well as ordinary citizens,
the failure of Nicolas Sarkozy to secure a second term as French
president was very much welcomed. Relations between Ankara and Paris
nosedived during Sarkozy's presidency as a result of his anti-Turkish
populism, and more recently when a Sarkozy-backed draft Armenian
genocide bill was passed by the lower and upper houses of the French
Parliament. Therefore, the victory of Francois Hollande in the May
6 presidential elections should bring an end to the increasingly
hostile rhetoric that was used by both sides hitherto and opens up
a fresh page in relations between the two countries. This will be a
win-win for both parties.
It would seem that there will be a good opportunity for a first meeting
between the two countries at the forthcoming NATO Summit, which is due
to take place in Chicago on May 19-20 and which Monsieur Hollande and
Turkish President Abdullah Gul will both be participating in. This
should hopefully be followed by a much longer and more in-depth
session either in Ankara or Paris, when a real bilateral agenda of
priorities can be laid out.
There is a strong belief in Turkey that Hollande has a good
understanding of the importance of Turkey, both strategically and
economically, to Europe. Sarkozy, of course, often underlined the
importance of Turkey as a partner to the EU, particularly in foreign
policy terms, yet he simply refused to accept that Turkey could at any
time be part of the EU. However, while Sarkozy may have strengthened
France's anti-Turkish position, he did not give birth to it. However,
Hollande, who has been overall rather quiet on his foreign policy
aims, outlined his view in a 2011 book -- "Le Reve Francais" --
that negotiations between the EU and Turkey must be 'fairly" pursued,
until their conclusion. Moreover, he has criticized Sarkozy on several
occasions over his opposition to Turkey's accession, which has severely
damaged bilateral ties between the two countries. Turkey's EU Minister,
Egemen BagıÅ~_, has recently said, "Ankara would like to see France
become one of the champions of Turkish integration into the EU as
it was under President Jacques Chirac." Perhaps this may be going
too far because I can never see France being a champion of Turkey's
membership, but one would hope that France will at least lift its
veto from the five negotiating chapters it has blocked. However,
this clearly also would not mean an open road for Ankara because,
firstly, some of the chapters under French veto have also been blocked
by Germany and Austria, and secondly, because of the Cyprus issue.
Furthermore, Turkey's eventual accession would still go to a referendum
in France, meaning that one of the toughest battles still needs to
be won -- changing the way many French people perceive Turkey.
Still, overall, there is good reason to be optimistic, and deeper
cooperation between Paris and Ankara should hopefully help reactivate
the EU's transformational power on Turkey in the field of democratic
reforms.
However, there still remains a question mark over one issue, which
should not be underestimated -- namely the Armenian genocide. Ankara
is waiting to see whether Hollande will follow through on his promise
to revive the law criminalizing denial of the genocide, in spite
of the verdict of the French Constitutional Court. While Monsieur
Hollande has some very close ties with the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation-Dashnaktsutyun (ARF-D), it still seems quite unlikely that
he would do this. First, because he seems to realize the importance
of resetting relations with Turkey, and secondly, because the decision
of the Constitutional Court destroying the Boyer Act was based on the
principle of law, which means there would be very little opportunity
for a second attempt. However, at the same time, it would seem rather
improbable that Hollande is going to make an official statement
saying that he is going to drop the matter; rather, he may keep the
issue alive, but it will be way down at the bottom of his list of
priorities. Indeed, recent speeches given by Monsieur Hollande on
this issue (for example, in Paris and Marseille) were only published
by an Armenian website, and not by the Socialist Party.
However, even if the decision is not challenged, with the 100th
anniversary of the Armenian genocide on the horizon, it would be
naïve to believe this issue is simply going to disappear because it
will not, and the Armenian diaspora in France will intensify pressure
leading up to the commemorations.
Clearly Monsieur Hollande has many challenges ahead, not least the
showdown with German Chancellor Angela Merkel over the euro crisis,
but one is cautiously optimistic that his entry into office will
represent a new spring in Turkish-French relations.