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NATO LOOKS TO THE CAUCASUS
Sergey Markedonov
The National Interest
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/nato-looks-the-caucasus-6933
May 17 2012
Since early 2012, and especially in the run-up to the NATO Summit in
Chicago, news reports about the alliance's activities have frequently
mentioned the South Caucasus. In most cases, politicians and experts
analyzing NATO's approaches to this region focus on two major issues:
Georgia taking formal steps toward being considered for membership
and the "Russian factor," particularly Moscow's stubbornness on what
it sees as NATO's enlargement into Eurasia. Though this focus makes
the brief 2008 Russo-Georgian war and its geopolitical consequences
the dominant subject of discussion, NATO's role in the region is in
fact much broader.
An Evolving Policy
The alliance's policy in the Caucasus has never been static. Rather,
it has evolved under the influence of many factors, including the
strategic interests of the United States and its European allies as
well as the aspirations of the regional players. While the South
Caucasus previously was considered to be on the periphery of the
international agenda, after the Soviet Union's dissolution and the
subsequent formation of newly independent states, it became much more
important both to its neighbors and influential nonregional actors.
The former Transcaucasian republics suddenly became subjects of
international law. They identified their own national interests and
foreign-policy priorities. The formation of independent states in the
South Caucasus was accompanied by a search for new mechanisms to ensure
regional security and a new format for international cooperation.
In the 1990s, the alliance did not show significant interest in the
Caucasus. NATO's focal point then was the situation in Balkans,
provoked by the collapse of Yugoslavia. The prospects of NATO
enlargement were added to discussion only as a footnote after the
wide range of issues in the "powder keg of Europe." But after Bulgaria
and Romania joined NATO in 2004 and then the European Union in 2007,
the Caucasus began to be considered a new frontier for NATO and
the whole structure of European security. Other factors also have
fueled interest in the region. Foremost among them are the numerous
unresolved ethnic and political conflicts, as well as the proximity
to three major and ambitious Eurasian states: Russia, Turkey and Iran.
And then there is the region's crucial new role as a transport and
energy corridor.
Furthermore, the internationalization of the region has piqued the
interest the former Transcaucasian republics themselves. Each country,
however, has its own motivations. Georgia and Azerbaijan lost their
conflicts with their separatist provinces, which called their viability
into question.
Because of this question of national security, there is interest
in NATO as a counterweight to Russia. Armenia has been subject
to a blockade from both Azerbaijan and Turkey as a result of the
long-running Nagorno-Karabakh ethno-political conflict, impelling
Armenia to consider a Western alliance. It does not want to lose
initiative and give Azerbaijan a chance to monopolize the issue of
Euro-Atlantic integration. Armenian participation in NATO projects
promotes Brussels' interest, so that it need not make the alleged
"final choice" between the two Caucasian republics involved in the
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.
NATO's 2007-2008 response to the request for the "internationalization"
of the region formed extremely high (and sometimes unfounded)
expectations among the elites of the Caucasus republics, particularly
in Georgia and, to a lesser extent, Azerbaijan. These expectations were
based on miscalculations and an underestimation of relations between
Russia and the West, as well as connected to issues relating to Iran,
Afghanistan and antiterrorism.
This reevaluation led to inflated perceptions of NATO's potential
peacekeeping capacity. As a result, these expectations were shattered
by the alliance's actual behavior vis-a-vis Russia during the 2008
war, when Georgia suffered its most serious military and political
defeat since the dissolution of the USSR. NATO demonstrated to all the
Caucasus countries it was not willing to fight Russia for the sake
of Georgia's territorial integrity. This signal was immediately and
accurately read by a careful Azerbaijan, which thereafter strengthened
the multivector nature of its foreign policy and joined the Non-Aligned
Movement.
A New Outlook
Today, the Caucasian countries no longer suffer from old illusions.
NATO's promises, meanwhile, have become more cautious. Alliance
membership is still proposed for Georgia, but there are no specific
deadlines or concrete stages for its acquisition. For the most part,
NATO's current interests are dictated by other considerations. First,
the Caucasus republics have a role in operations in Afghanistan. This
May, President Barack Obama and his Afghan counterpart Hamid Karzai
signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement, which formalizes, among
other things, the withdrawal of coalition troops from the country by
2014. It is clear that the U.S. military wants to reduce the number
of possible losses by spreading risks among alliance members and
partners outside of NATO.
Today, the alliance has only two real "workhorses" in Afghanistan: the
United States and Britain. The engagement of other European allies is
minimal. In this context, the United States and NATO as a whole have a
very clear interest in building up the Georgian Afghanistan contingent
from its current 925 troops to 1,500 troops, as promised by Tbilisi.
And while Georgia and, to a lesser extent, Armenia, are focused on
supplying soldiers, Azerbaijan is especially important for its role
in transport logistics. Almost a third of all NATO cargo bound for
Afghanistan is now supplied via Azerbaijan. In fact, last December,
Azerbaijan Airlines replaced the Georgia's Sky Georgia as the cargo
carrier for the alliance's needs.
The unpredictable situations in Iran and Syria also increase the
geopolitical importance of the Caucasus for the alliance, especially
taking into account the common border shared by Iran and Azerbaijan,
a very controversial bilateral relationship between two those countries
and an active Israeli military partnership with Azerbaijan.
The United States and its NATO allies consider Euro-Atlantic
integration and engagement an important tool in the process of
democratization, as well as economic and military reform in the
region. This priority stands up to attacks by skeptics who question
its validity. For example, Georgia's NATO promotion is considered
to be tied to one "package" of metrics, which includes successful
parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012-2013.
The discussion of NATO's enlargement toward Eurasia and Russia's
southern borders has become very rhetorical-but the real issues are
more mundane. In addition, Brussels is extremely interested in the
involvement of the Caucasian republics in various EU projects. Through
such cooperation, it would be easier for the alliance to keep its
finger on the pulse of the political life in Georgia, Azerbaijan and
Armenia-even if, for the foreseeable future, this only results in
further prescriptions for getting into better shape before trying
out for the NATO team.
Sergey Markedonov is a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), Russia and Eurasia Program, in
Washington, DC.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Sergey Markedonov
The National Interest
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/nato-looks-the-caucasus-6933
May 17 2012
Since early 2012, and especially in the run-up to the NATO Summit in
Chicago, news reports about the alliance's activities have frequently
mentioned the South Caucasus. In most cases, politicians and experts
analyzing NATO's approaches to this region focus on two major issues:
Georgia taking formal steps toward being considered for membership
and the "Russian factor," particularly Moscow's stubbornness on what
it sees as NATO's enlargement into Eurasia. Though this focus makes
the brief 2008 Russo-Georgian war and its geopolitical consequences
the dominant subject of discussion, NATO's role in the region is in
fact much broader.
An Evolving Policy
The alliance's policy in the Caucasus has never been static. Rather,
it has evolved under the influence of many factors, including the
strategic interests of the United States and its European allies as
well as the aspirations of the regional players. While the South
Caucasus previously was considered to be on the periphery of the
international agenda, after the Soviet Union's dissolution and the
subsequent formation of newly independent states, it became much more
important both to its neighbors and influential nonregional actors.
The former Transcaucasian republics suddenly became subjects of
international law. They identified their own national interests and
foreign-policy priorities. The formation of independent states in the
South Caucasus was accompanied by a search for new mechanisms to ensure
regional security and a new format for international cooperation.
In the 1990s, the alliance did not show significant interest in the
Caucasus. NATO's focal point then was the situation in Balkans,
provoked by the collapse of Yugoslavia. The prospects of NATO
enlargement were added to discussion only as a footnote after the
wide range of issues in the "powder keg of Europe." But after Bulgaria
and Romania joined NATO in 2004 and then the European Union in 2007,
the Caucasus began to be considered a new frontier for NATO and
the whole structure of European security. Other factors also have
fueled interest in the region. Foremost among them are the numerous
unresolved ethnic and political conflicts, as well as the proximity
to three major and ambitious Eurasian states: Russia, Turkey and Iran.
And then there is the region's crucial new role as a transport and
energy corridor.
Furthermore, the internationalization of the region has piqued the
interest the former Transcaucasian republics themselves. Each country,
however, has its own motivations. Georgia and Azerbaijan lost their
conflicts with their separatist provinces, which called their viability
into question.
Because of this question of national security, there is interest
in NATO as a counterweight to Russia. Armenia has been subject
to a blockade from both Azerbaijan and Turkey as a result of the
long-running Nagorno-Karabakh ethno-political conflict, impelling
Armenia to consider a Western alliance. It does not want to lose
initiative and give Azerbaijan a chance to monopolize the issue of
Euro-Atlantic integration. Armenian participation in NATO projects
promotes Brussels' interest, so that it need not make the alleged
"final choice" between the two Caucasian republics involved in the
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.
NATO's 2007-2008 response to the request for the "internationalization"
of the region formed extremely high (and sometimes unfounded)
expectations among the elites of the Caucasus republics, particularly
in Georgia and, to a lesser extent, Azerbaijan. These expectations were
based on miscalculations and an underestimation of relations between
Russia and the West, as well as connected to issues relating to Iran,
Afghanistan and antiterrorism.
This reevaluation led to inflated perceptions of NATO's potential
peacekeeping capacity. As a result, these expectations were shattered
by the alliance's actual behavior vis-a-vis Russia during the 2008
war, when Georgia suffered its most serious military and political
defeat since the dissolution of the USSR. NATO demonstrated to all the
Caucasus countries it was not willing to fight Russia for the sake
of Georgia's territorial integrity. This signal was immediately and
accurately read by a careful Azerbaijan, which thereafter strengthened
the multivector nature of its foreign policy and joined the Non-Aligned
Movement.
A New Outlook
Today, the Caucasian countries no longer suffer from old illusions.
NATO's promises, meanwhile, have become more cautious. Alliance
membership is still proposed for Georgia, but there are no specific
deadlines or concrete stages for its acquisition. For the most part,
NATO's current interests are dictated by other considerations. First,
the Caucasus republics have a role in operations in Afghanistan. This
May, President Barack Obama and his Afghan counterpart Hamid Karzai
signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement, which formalizes, among
other things, the withdrawal of coalition troops from the country by
2014. It is clear that the U.S. military wants to reduce the number
of possible losses by spreading risks among alliance members and
partners outside of NATO.
Today, the alliance has only two real "workhorses" in Afghanistan: the
United States and Britain. The engagement of other European allies is
minimal. In this context, the United States and NATO as a whole have a
very clear interest in building up the Georgian Afghanistan contingent
from its current 925 troops to 1,500 troops, as promised by Tbilisi.
And while Georgia and, to a lesser extent, Armenia, are focused on
supplying soldiers, Azerbaijan is especially important for its role
in transport logistics. Almost a third of all NATO cargo bound for
Afghanistan is now supplied via Azerbaijan. In fact, last December,
Azerbaijan Airlines replaced the Georgia's Sky Georgia as the cargo
carrier for the alliance's needs.
The unpredictable situations in Iran and Syria also increase the
geopolitical importance of the Caucasus for the alliance, especially
taking into account the common border shared by Iran and Azerbaijan,
a very controversial bilateral relationship between two those countries
and an active Israeli military partnership with Azerbaijan.
The United States and its NATO allies consider Euro-Atlantic
integration and engagement an important tool in the process of
democratization, as well as economic and military reform in the
region. This priority stands up to attacks by skeptics who question
its validity. For example, Georgia's NATO promotion is considered
to be tied to one "package" of metrics, which includes successful
parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012-2013.
The discussion of NATO's enlargement toward Eurasia and Russia's
southern borders has become very rhetorical-but the real issues are
more mundane. In addition, Brussels is extremely interested in the
involvement of the Caucasian republics in various EU projects. Through
such cooperation, it would be easier for the alliance to keep its
finger on the pulse of the political life in Georgia, Azerbaijan and
Armenia-even if, for the foreseeable future, this only results in
further prescriptions for getting into better shape before trying
out for the NATO team.
Sergey Markedonov is a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), Russia and Eurasia Program, in
Washington, DC.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress