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WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO ARMENIA AFTER THE ELECTIONS?
Vestnik Kavkaza
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/articles/politics/26752.html
May 18 2012
Russia
Experts named factors that could influence the relationship between
Moscow and Yerevan
During the video-link Moscow-Yerevan "The results of the parliamentary
elections in Armenia. Russian-Armenian dialogue: a new stage?" Russian
and Armenian experts discussed the prospects of the two countries'
relations.
Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the Institute of the Caucasus,
political scientist In my opinion, the elections were extremely
interesting. The pre-electoral campaign, as well as elections
themselves, was rather active. There was a rather high level of
competition. There was fairly good access to media resources
and there were good opportunities to present programs to the
electorate. The struggle was lively, it was real and it was without
doubt very interesting to observe. The elections have revealed certain
tendencies which are rather uncommon for Armenian politics. Regarding
the results of elections, in my opinion in any case there will be a
coalition. Despite the fact that the ruling Republican Party received
the majority of the votes - they have 50 % + 1, the tradition of
coalition is very strong in Armenia and I believe that there will be
a coalition in one format or another.
In respect of domestic politics, the elections will seriously
influence the distribution of power among political parties and
the formation of the government. The Armenian parliament has a
rather important function: the government is being formed with its
serious participation. This would be a result of agreements within
the coalition. Thus, it will influence domestic politics as well
as the coming presidential elections in February. According to the
system, parliamentary elections are usually primaries for presidential
elections. The summer dead season will pass and from September-October
the real but informal presidential pre-electoral campaign will start.
Regarding the question which certainly interests people in the Moscow
studio, I am afraid I have nothing to say. Relations with Moscow will
not change. Relations will remain almost in the same framework as
before. This was clear even before elections. There are no significant
forces in Armenia calling for significant changes in the format of
relations with foreign forces including Russia or primarily with
Russia. Simply there is none. So there was no prospect of significant
changes in relations with Russia and I think that regardless of the
results of the elections and regardless of the actual result, we
can hardly expect a new dynamic. The foreign policy of Armenia will
remain complimentary. Armenia will continue not equating pro-Russian
and anti-Western sentiments with anti-Russian and pro-Western ones,
unlike some of its neighbors. Relations between Russia and Armenia,
at least on the part of Armenia, although I am convinced that on the
part of Russia there should be no significant changes either, will
remain in the same framework. With the years there will be certain
changes, but I would like to repeat once again that in general I do
not see any changes that can be caused by the results of elections.
Alexander Makarov, director of the Armenian branch of the Institute
of the CIS Countries
This campaign indeed was marked by an uncommon level of competition
between various political forces, between the forces that had signed
the coalition memorandum and the opposition, as well as within the
opposition itself. The non-homogeneous opposition, including the
parliamentary and non-parliamentary opposition, is in fact rather
interesting material for analysis. Regarding the results of the
elections, there were several intriguing scenarios. First, whether
the Republican Party will gain a relative or absolute majority in
the parliament. The answer is already known, the Republican Party has
gained more than 50% of the seats in the National Assembly. The second
intrigue was related to the insufficiently confident performance of
the non-parliamentary opposition. Based on various estimates, the
National Congress could hope for a somewhat larger representation in
the parliament. However, the main intrigue in the morning after the
elections was whether the National Congress would pass the necessary
7% barrier in order to be presented in the legislative body. The
third intrigue which remains even nowadays is the question of the
formation or non-formation of a coalition, of a scenario that the
party which received the majority of seats in the parliament, almost
50% of the votes, is going to follow. It remains until nowadays:
will a coalition be formed? What scenario will prevail? A majority
scenario or a scenario of the formation of a larger, oversized or
grand coalition which would include not only the Republican party
but also the forces with which the Republican party is hoping to
cooperate in the legislative field, as well as in the framework of
the expected and apparently beginning in the autumn of this year
pre-electoral campaign. This intrigue remains today. The assumption
that a coalition will be formed is based most probably on the fact that
on the eve of the presidential campaign and in the process of adopting
political decisions, a larger field of consensus is needed in order
to adopt political decisions. This could become a decisive factor in
terms of creating a coalition. Regarding problems of foreign policy,
if we take into account tendencies which have been present in this
direction in Armenia in the last several years, we should not expect
any changes in this regard in Armenia. Several key problems will remain
in the field of foreign priorities, including provision of regional
stability and security, finding a solution to the Nagorno- Karabakh
problem and in the framework of integration projects - bilateral
cooperation between Armenia and Russia, which maintains its high
status, as well as cooperation in a number of other schemes within
the CIS space. There is certainly a scenario of Russia-EU relations'
model, which has a certain economic character.
Felix Stanevsky, head of the Department of Caucasus, Institute of
the CIS Countries
In general, there are positive evaluations. I would even say - very
positive evaluations of the elections that took place in Armenia.
There is certainly some discontent on the part of the opposition
forces, which is natural. First of all, a certain direction in
Armenian public opinion continues to criticize the course of the
elections, but this is very natural and is characteristic of almost
all the countries in the world. An opposition is rarely satisfied with
election results. Regarding Russian-Armenian relations, I would like
to stress a certain curious fact. Starting from August 2011 a series
of elections took place on the territory of the South Caucasus. In
August the president of Abkhazia, Ankvab, was elected. Then in the
course of the winter and spring of 2012, four rounds of elections
took place in South Ossetia. Elections to the Russian State Duma took
place, then presidential elections in Russia, elections in South
Ossetia, then elections in Armenia took place. In July there will
be presidential elections in Karabakh, in October - parliamentary
elections in Georgia and in February - parliamentary elections in
Armenia and Georgia. This situation should suggest us to conduct
analysis of the future foreign policies of the countries of the South
Caucasus, including Armenia, in relation to these changes. One has to
say that although it seems that elections have so far been mostly only
stabilizing the situations before the elections, there are changes. I
am convinced that there are changes in Russia, they are obvious to me
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Regarding Armenia, in the opinion of
our correspondents in Yerevan, there are not going to be big changes
in relations between Russia and Armenia. But I would like to stress
something else. Yes, there will be no big changes. I also cannot see
any reason to construct overly-smart constructions, which will most
probably not be realized in regard to the future of Russian-Armenian
relations. But it seems to me that there will be new nuances in the
position of Armenia, as well as Russia in regard to the predicted
development of the situation in South Caucasus. Imagine, the South
Caucasus will inevitably be dragged into the whirlpool of changes in
the world related to the crisis in the Near and Middle East. This can
be predicted with certainty. In connection to this, the position of
Armenia and Russia in the future development of the crisis in Syria
and very probable new intensification of the Iranian crisis... I am
fully convinced that we should take into consideration not only the
changes which took place among the top officials in Russia, but also
among the top officials in France. The elections in France should also
be taken into account, since France is a member and co-chair of the
OSCE Minsk Group which is settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Are
there going to be new nuances? It seems to me that there could be. Are
there going to be new nuances or not only nuances in the politics of
the US in relation to the presidential elections in America to take
place in the coming fall? There is a global situation which will,
if not drastically change the situation in the world, in general
could seriously influence it. We should have a clear vision of ways of
developing Russian-Armenian cooperation in the field of foreign policy,
contacts between foreign ministries of both countries and between
foreign ministers in relation to new factors emerging on the wave of
elections in the South Caucasus and in countries which significantly
influence the development of the situation in the South Caucasus.
Grigory Trofimchuk, first vice-president of the Center for Modeling
Strategic Development
At the moment Armenia is in its heyday in every regard. Armenia is
stable, there is a stable situation on the borders of Armenia. Inside
Armenia, as the former elections have shown, the situation is stable
as well. At the moment, and I would like stress this, Armenia is
among numerous countries on the territory of the CIS where there
is one large main ruling party and other parties which insure it,
also rather serious parties. There is the same situation in Russia
and almost the same system in Azerbaijan. As I have already said,
Armenia is part of this stable circle. I think that in such a situation
there can be certain dangers. First of all, because stability cannot
be permanent as we know. The foreign factor is also very important,
but at the moment Armenia is in the heyday of stability with regard to
foreign policy as well. It is clear that Armenia has certain issues
with Azerbaijan, certain issues with Turkey, but nevertheless these
are not military-political issues, meaning that there is peace on the
borders of Armenia, a dialogue between Yerevan and Tbilisi, stable
relations with Russia. These are also proof of the fact that there is
a peak of stability. During the last meeting between the president of
Armenia and the prime minister of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, he said in a
direct manner that with Armenia, and by the way this phrase was later
much commented upon in Armenia by representatives of the ruling party
as well as the opposition, not knowing how to treat it and twisting
it many times in one or another direction... Nevertheless, the prime
minister said very directly that there are special inter-allied
relations between Russia and Armenia. I would also like to stress
the word "inter-allied". It is a higher level of mutual trust and
cooperation. It is not even cooperation, since an ally is a higher
status. The only area in which our relations can be tested, and we
are not looking forward to this moment in any way but are trying to
distance ourselves from it, is a direct war. An ally is tested directly
in war. We would not like to test our alliance in such a format. That
is why, it seems to me, we should strengthen our relations with Armenia
not only in the framework of the CIS, but also in the framework of
the CSTO. So far, in my opinion, our relations in this sphere are
rather formal. I would like to highlight the fact that the Armenian
opposition is always demanding revolution. Against the background
of the syndrome of dissatisfaction that they are talking about, they
are demanding revolution. I would like to provide only one argument
in this regard, which in general takes the issue off the table of the
Armenian opposition: revolution will lead to the immediate surrender,
if one can use this word, of Karabakh. That is why I do not understand
why the current authorities of Armenia in the information propaganda
field of Armenia are not relating the opposition to this problem. If
this happened, then perhaps the current authorities of Armenia would
partially take some issues off the table concerning the opposition. In
my opinion, perhaps a subjective opinion, the leadership of the
Armenian National Congress is behaving strangely actively, despite
the fact that it received a number of seats in the new parliament,
especially the head of the congress, its status leader. If one can
draw such example, in Russia there would be a similar situation if
Yeltsin, if he was alive, would run again for the presidency and
Gaidar would campaign for him. It would be very absurd. Perhaps our
Armenian friends see it differently, but it is strange that the people
of Armenia do not raise this question. In my opinion, the opposition
has nothing to hold on to amidst the stability in Armenia. That is why
the discourse was mostly centered upon, as we remember, or at least
it seems so to us, Russian experts and observers, the explosion of
balloons on the square in Yerevan. There is nothing to hold on to,
only emptiness. There is a risk of projected war in Iran and Armenia
has to occupy a very well-defined position as an ally in this regard,
otherwise there will be an effort to utilize Armenia, especially due
to its very complex geography and geo-political situation. It also has
a very complex neighboring environment, which is so far stable. I am
also worried about our Russian, and I would like to stress this issue,
tranquility. I would like to touch upon a subject that was already
discussed here - the commitment of the EU to Armenia. Processes
of integration are ongoing and will continue, regardless of any
parliamentary or presidential elections. In Armenia it is talked
about today that the European Union will lead it to a deeper - and
this is the word they use, "deeper" - zone of free trade with the
EU. But I would like note one issue which is in my opinion extremely
important for our Armenian colleagues: if Greece, which is almost in
the center of the Mediterranean Sea and is surrounded by almost all
the seas and trade routes, is currently in decline and stagnation,
one can imagine what is going to happen to Armenia, which has no
geographical or political access when it will be introduced in this
format. So the question arises, and I am talking about the third risk
in my opinion: why is it being dragged there?
Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the Institute of the Caucasus,
political scientist
There are a lot of interesting developments around Armenia, and of
course global developments like the US elections or the Syrian crisis
influence the situation in Armenia and in the region in general. These
developments, as well as the relationship with Azerbaijan and the
tension in the Middle East, also influence Russia's position in the
region. It all happens around us. There's some 400 km between Armenia
and Iraq, less than 1000 between Armenia and Syria. We border on Iran.
All the regional developments have their impact on Armenia and on
our relationship with Russia. But for today, I don't believe that the
apocalyptic scenarios will come true. They say that tomorrow they'll
bomb Tehran. But I've been hearing things like that for more than
a year. The Syrian situation is very tense, but there's only a 50%
chance, in my opinion, of total collapse there too. And probably the
most important thing is that we're used to living in such a world.
Armenia is situated in a region where tension is an integral part
of the region's politics. Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Kurdistan are
nearby, sometimes armed conflicts happen, different internal problems
have different potentials to influence the big picture. These are
the frameworks in which Armenia has to exist. The Russian-Armenian
relationship is one of the pillars that helps Armenia survive in this
environment, and that is why it is so strong. They often talk about
the long history of our relations, the cultural ties and common
Christian heritage both in Russia and Armenia. This is all true,
but I don't think that it is the most important aspect as far as
professional politics is concerned. Georgians and Russians have all
these above-mentioned ties too, as well as Russians and Ukrainians,
Russians and Baltic peoples. Mutual interest works here. For Russia,
Armenia presents an opportunity to remain a significant player in the
South Caucasus and further to the south. And if Armenia disappears from
Russia's political map, this influence will vanish. And for Armenia,
Russia is a sort of safety belt as we are not on the best of terms
with Turkey and Azerbaijan now.
Felix Stanevsky, the head of the Caucasian studies department of the
CIS Institute
Russia's public attention towards the South Caucasus is insufficient.
This was shown during the recent events in South Ossetia. They passed
the Russian public by. It didn't notice something that it should be
most attentive about. I'm convinced that Russia hasn't thought through
its policy towards Azerbaijan and Armenia, and I believe there are
some mistakes in the relations between Russia and South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. We should analyze and correct these mistakes. But for that
we need Russian journalists to pay more attention to these problems,
as when there's no public pressure on those in power, they won't
attribute more attention to this sphere.
Grigory Trofimchuk, first vice-president of the Center for Modeling
Strategic Development
In my opinion Azerbaijan is seriously getting involved in the face-off
with Iran, I mean, it's being dragged into it. Azerbaijan arrests
Iranian spies, Iran takes some actions against Azeri citizens in
return. I don't think that Azerbaijan has already taken a side in the
future possible war between the West and Iran, but in this case no one
can help the country take this decision, even Russia. Azerbaijan has
to decide on its own using its instinct of self-preservation. If a war
in Iran starts, Azerbaijan will be the first one to get hurt. And of
course Azerbaijan doesn't want Iranian missiles to hit its territory.
And I think that the future strategic position of Azerbaijan will be
defined by common sense. And common sense dictates that Azerbaijan
and Armenia make this surprising and untraditional step and re-open
the negotiations on the eve of this future war and finally take
some decisions.
From: Baghdasarian
Vestnik Kavkaza
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/articles/politics/26752.html
May 18 2012
Russia
Experts named factors that could influence the relationship between
Moscow and Yerevan
During the video-link Moscow-Yerevan "The results of the parliamentary
elections in Armenia. Russian-Armenian dialogue: a new stage?" Russian
and Armenian experts discussed the prospects of the two countries'
relations.
Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the Institute of the Caucasus,
political scientist In my opinion, the elections were extremely
interesting. The pre-electoral campaign, as well as elections
themselves, was rather active. There was a rather high level of
competition. There was fairly good access to media resources
and there were good opportunities to present programs to the
electorate. The struggle was lively, it was real and it was without
doubt very interesting to observe. The elections have revealed certain
tendencies which are rather uncommon for Armenian politics. Regarding
the results of elections, in my opinion in any case there will be a
coalition. Despite the fact that the ruling Republican Party received
the majority of the votes - they have 50 % + 1, the tradition of
coalition is very strong in Armenia and I believe that there will be
a coalition in one format or another.
In respect of domestic politics, the elections will seriously
influence the distribution of power among political parties and
the formation of the government. The Armenian parliament has a
rather important function: the government is being formed with its
serious participation. This would be a result of agreements within
the coalition. Thus, it will influence domestic politics as well
as the coming presidential elections in February. According to the
system, parliamentary elections are usually primaries for presidential
elections. The summer dead season will pass and from September-October
the real but informal presidential pre-electoral campaign will start.
Regarding the question which certainly interests people in the Moscow
studio, I am afraid I have nothing to say. Relations with Moscow will
not change. Relations will remain almost in the same framework as
before. This was clear even before elections. There are no significant
forces in Armenia calling for significant changes in the format of
relations with foreign forces including Russia or primarily with
Russia. Simply there is none. So there was no prospect of significant
changes in relations with Russia and I think that regardless of the
results of the elections and regardless of the actual result, we
can hardly expect a new dynamic. The foreign policy of Armenia will
remain complimentary. Armenia will continue not equating pro-Russian
and anti-Western sentiments with anti-Russian and pro-Western ones,
unlike some of its neighbors. Relations between Russia and Armenia,
at least on the part of Armenia, although I am convinced that on the
part of Russia there should be no significant changes either, will
remain in the same framework. With the years there will be certain
changes, but I would like to repeat once again that in general I do
not see any changes that can be caused by the results of elections.
Alexander Makarov, director of the Armenian branch of the Institute
of the CIS Countries
This campaign indeed was marked by an uncommon level of competition
between various political forces, between the forces that had signed
the coalition memorandum and the opposition, as well as within the
opposition itself. The non-homogeneous opposition, including the
parliamentary and non-parliamentary opposition, is in fact rather
interesting material for analysis. Regarding the results of the
elections, there were several intriguing scenarios. First, whether
the Republican Party will gain a relative or absolute majority in
the parliament. The answer is already known, the Republican Party has
gained more than 50% of the seats in the National Assembly. The second
intrigue was related to the insufficiently confident performance of
the non-parliamentary opposition. Based on various estimates, the
National Congress could hope for a somewhat larger representation in
the parliament. However, the main intrigue in the morning after the
elections was whether the National Congress would pass the necessary
7% barrier in order to be presented in the legislative body. The
third intrigue which remains even nowadays is the question of the
formation or non-formation of a coalition, of a scenario that the
party which received the majority of seats in the parliament, almost
50% of the votes, is going to follow. It remains until nowadays:
will a coalition be formed? What scenario will prevail? A majority
scenario or a scenario of the formation of a larger, oversized or
grand coalition which would include not only the Republican party
but also the forces with which the Republican party is hoping to
cooperate in the legislative field, as well as in the framework of
the expected and apparently beginning in the autumn of this year
pre-electoral campaign. This intrigue remains today. The assumption
that a coalition will be formed is based most probably on the fact that
on the eve of the presidential campaign and in the process of adopting
political decisions, a larger field of consensus is needed in order
to adopt political decisions. This could become a decisive factor in
terms of creating a coalition. Regarding problems of foreign policy,
if we take into account tendencies which have been present in this
direction in Armenia in the last several years, we should not expect
any changes in this regard in Armenia. Several key problems will remain
in the field of foreign priorities, including provision of regional
stability and security, finding a solution to the Nagorno- Karabakh
problem and in the framework of integration projects - bilateral
cooperation between Armenia and Russia, which maintains its high
status, as well as cooperation in a number of other schemes within
the CIS space. There is certainly a scenario of Russia-EU relations'
model, which has a certain economic character.
Felix Stanevsky, head of the Department of Caucasus, Institute of
the CIS Countries
In general, there are positive evaluations. I would even say - very
positive evaluations of the elections that took place in Armenia.
There is certainly some discontent on the part of the opposition
forces, which is natural. First of all, a certain direction in
Armenian public opinion continues to criticize the course of the
elections, but this is very natural and is characteristic of almost
all the countries in the world. An opposition is rarely satisfied with
election results. Regarding Russian-Armenian relations, I would like
to stress a certain curious fact. Starting from August 2011 a series
of elections took place on the territory of the South Caucasus. In
August the president of Abkhazia, Ankvab, was elected. Then in the
course of the winter and spring of 2012, four rounds of elections
took place in South Ossetia. Elections to the Russian State Duma took
place, then presidential elections in Russia, elections in South
Ossetia, then elections in Armenia took place. In July there will
be presidential elections in Karabakh, in October - parliamentary
elections in Georgia and in February - parliamentary elections in
Armenia and Georgia. This situation should suggest us to conduct
analysis of the future foreign policies of the countries of the South
Caucasus, including Armenia, in relation to these changes. One has to
say that although it seems that elections have so far been mostly only
stabilizing the situations before the elections, there are changes. I
am convinced that there are changes in Russia, they are obvious to me
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Regarding Armenia, in the opinion of
our correspondents in Yerevan, there are not going to be big changes
in relations between Russia and Armenia. But I would like to stress
something else. Yes, there will be no big changes. I also cannot see
any reason to construct overly-smart constructions, which will most
probably not be realized in regard to the future of Russian-Armenian
relations. But it seems to me that there will be new nuances in the
position of Armenia, as well as Russia in regard to the predicted
development of the situation in South Caucasus. Imagine, the South
Caucasus will inevitably be dragged into the whirlpool of changes in
the world related to the crisis in the Near and Middle East. This can
be predicted with certainty. In connection to this, the position of
Armenia and Russia in the future development of the crisis in Syria
and very probable new intensification of the Iranian crisis... I am
fully convinced that we should take into consideration not only the
changes which took place among the top officials in Russia, but also
among the top officials in France. The elections in France should also
be taken into account, since France is a member and co-chair of the
OSCE Minsk Group which is settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Are
there going to be new nuances? It seems to me that there could be. Are
there going to be new nuances or not only nuances in the politics of
the US in relation to the presidential elections in America to take
place in the coming fall? There is a global situation which will,
if not drastically change the situation in the world, in general
could seriously influence it. We should have a clear vision of ways of
developing Russian-Armenian cooperation in the field of foreign policy,
contacts between foreign ministries of both countries and between
foreign ministers in relation to new factors emerging on the wave of
elections in the South Caucasus and in countries which significantly
influence the development of the situation in the South Caucasus.
Grigory Trofimchuk, first vice-president of the Center for Modeling
Strategic Development
At the moment Armenia is in its heyday in every regard. Armenia is
stable, there is a stable situation on the borders of Armenia. Inside
Armenia, as the former elections have shown, the situation is stable
as well. At the moment, and I would like stress this, Armenia is
among numerous countries on the territory of the CIS where there
is one large main ruling party and other parties which insure it,
also rather serious parties. There is the same situation in Russia
and almost the same system in Azerbaijan. As I have already said,
Armenia is part of this stable circle. I think that in such a situation
there can be certain dangers. First of all, because stability cannot
be permanent as we know. The foreign factor is also very important,
but at the moment Armenia is in the heyday of stability with regard to
foreign policy as well. It is clear that Armenia has certain issues
with Azerbaijan, certain issues with Turkey, but nevertheless these
are not military-political issues, meaning that there is peace on the
borders of Armenia, a dialogue between Yerevan and Tbilisi, stable
relations with Russia. These are also proof of the fact that there is
a peak of stability. During the last meeting between the president of
Armenia and the prime minister of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, he said in a
direct manner that with Armenia, and by the way this phrase was later
much commented upon in Armenia by representatives of the ruling party
as well as the opposition, not knowing how to treat it and twisting
it many times in one or another direction... Nevertheless, the prime
minister said very directly that there are special inter-allied
relations between Russia and Armenia. I would also like to stress
the word "inter-allied". It is a higher level of mutual trust and
cooperation. It is not even cooperation, since an ally is a higher
status. The only area in which our relations can be tested, and we
are not looking forward to this moment in any way but are trying to
distance ourselves from it, is a direct war. An ally is tested directly
in war. We would not like to test our alliance in such a format. That
is why, it seems to me, we should strengthen our relations with Armenia
not only in the framework of the CIS, but also in the framework of
the CSTO. So far, in my opinion, our relations in this sphere are
rather formal. I would like to highlight the fact that the Armenian
opposition is always demanding revolution. Against the background
of the syndrome of dissatisfaction that they are talking about, they
are demanding revolution. I would like to provide only one argument
in this regard, which in general takes the issue off the table of the
Armenian opposition: revolution will lead to the immediate surrender,
if one can use this word, of Karabakh. That is why I do not understand
why the current authorities of Armenia in the information propaganda
field of Armenia are not relating the opposition to this problem. If
this happened, then perhaps the current authorities of Armenia would
partially take some issues off the table concerning the opposition. In
my opinion, perhaps a subjective opinion, the leadership of the
Armenian National Congress is behaving strangely actively, despite
the fact that it received a number of seats in the new parliament,
especially the head of the congress, its status leader. If one can
draw such example, in Russia there would be a similar situation if
Yeltsin, if he was alive, would run again for the presidency and
Gaidar would campaign for him. It would be very absurd. Perhaps our
Armenian friends see it differently, but it is strange that the people
of Armenia do not raise this question. In my opinion, the opposition
has nothing to hold on to amidst the stability in Armenia. That is why
the discourse was mostly centered upon, as we remember, or at least
it seems so to us, Russian experts and observers, the explosion of
balloons on the square in Yerevan. There is nothing to hold on to,
only emptiness. There is a risk of projected war in Iran and Armenia
has to occupy a very well-defined position as an ally in this regard,
otherwise there will be an effort to utilize Armenia, especially due
to its very complex geography and geo-political situation. It also has
a very complex neighboring environment, which is so far stable. I am
also worried about our Russian, and I would like to stress this issue,
tranquility. I would like to touch upon a subject that was already
discussed here - the commitment of the EU to Armenia. Processes
of integration are ongoing and will continue, regardless of any
parliamentary or presidential elections. In Armenia it is talked
about today that the European Union will lead it to a deeper - and
this is the word they use, "deeper" - zone of free trade with the
EU. But I would like note one issue which is in my opinion extremely
important for our Armenian colleagues: if Greece, which is almost in
the center of the Mediterranean Sea and is surrounded by almost all
the seas and trade routes, is currently in decline and stagnation,
one can imagine what is going to happen to Armenia, which has no
geographical or political access when it will be introduced in this
format. So the question arises, and I am talking about the third risk
in my opinion: why is it being dragged there?
Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the Institute of the Caucasus,
political scientist
There are a lot of interesting developments around Armenia, and of
course global developments like the US elections or the Syrian crisis
influence the situation in Armenia and in the region in general. These
developments, as well as the relationship with Azerbaijan and the
tension in the Middle East, also influence Russia's position in the
region. It all happens around us. There's some 400 km between Armenia
and Iraq, less than 1000 between Armenia and Syria. We border on Iran.
All the regional developments have their impact on Armenia and on
our relationship with Russia. But for today, I don't believe that the
apocalyptic scenarios will come true. They say that tomorrow they'll
bomb Tehran. But I've been hearing things like that for more than
a year. The Syrian situation is very tense, but there's only a 50%
chance, in my opinion, of total collapse there too. And probably the
most important thing is that we're used to living in such a world.
Armenia is situated in a region where tension is an integral part
of the region's politics. Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Kurdistan are
nearby, sometimes armed conflicts happen, different internal problems
have different potentials to influence the big picture. These are
the frameworks in which Armenia has to exist. The Russian-Armenian
relationship is one of the pillars that helps Armenia survive in this
environment, and that is why it is so strong. They often talk about
the long history of our relations, the cultural ties and common
Christian heritage both in Russia and Armenia. This is all true,
but I don't think that it is the most important aspect as far as
professional politics is concerned. Georgians and Russians have all
these above-mentioned ties too, as well as Russians and Ukrainians,
Russians and Baltic peoples. Mutual interest works here. For Russia,
Armenia presents an opportunity to remain a significant player in the
South Caucasus and further to the south. And if Armenia disappears from
Russia's political map, this influence will vanish. And for Armenia,
Russia is a sort of safety belt as we are not on the best of terms
with Turkey and Azerbaijan now.
Felix Stanevsky, the head of the Caucasian studies department of the
CIS Institute
Russia's public attention towards the South Caucasus is insufficient.
This was shown during the recent events in South Ossetia. They passed
the Russian public by. It didn't notice something that it should be
most attentive about. I'm convinced that Russia hasn't thought through
its policy towards Azerbaijan and Armenia, and I believe there are
some mistakes in the relations between Russia and South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. We should analyze and correct these mistakes. But for that
we need Russian journalists to pay more attention to these problems,
as when there's no public pressure on those in power, they won't
attribute more attention to this sphere.
Grigory Trofimchuk, first vice-president of the Center for Modeling
Strategic Development
In my opinion Azerbaijan is seriously getting involved in the face-off
with Iran, I mean, it's being dragged into it. Azerbaijan arrests
Iranian spies, Iran takes some actions against Azeri citizens in
return. I don't think that Azerbaijan has already taken a side in the
future possible war between the West and Iran, but in this case no one
can help the country take this decision, even Russia. Azerbaijan has
to decide on its own using its instinct of self-preservation. If a war
in Iran starts, Azerbaijan will be the first one to get hurt. And of
course Azerbaijan doesn't want Iranian missiles to hit its territory.
And I think that the future strategic position of Azerbaijan will be
defined by common sense. And common sense dictates that Azerbaijan
and Armenia make this surprising and untraditional step and re-open
the negotiations on the eve of this future war and finally take
some decisions.
From: Baghdasarian