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HOW TO SLICE THE PIE: REFORMING LEBANON'S ELECTORAL LAW
Maren Milligan
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
May 24 2012
In recent years, nearly every incoming government in Lebanon
has called for comprehensive electoral reform, and with a year
left before the next parliamentary elections, the issue is once
again center-stage. Interior Minister Marwan Charbel proposed a
new law in September calling for fundamental change: replacing the
current majoritarian (or "winner take all") system with proportional
representation. As June 7 approaches-when the legal window closes on
some reforms-politicians are staking out positions. What will come
of this proposal in the coming weeks? Do leaders' positions align
with voters' preferences? And how will recent violence affect debate?
Two issues have paralyzed progress: district size and the electoral
system itself. Given that parliament's 128 seats are divided among
multi-member districts with multi-confessional slates, district size
is contentious because it determines the confessional demography in
each constituency. Smaller districts (like the smaller administrative
unit, the qada') are more homogenous in their sectarian identity.
Proposals to shift to larger electoral districts (like the larger
muhafaza) would not change the number of MPs or parliament's sectarian
balance, but many minority politicians object on the basis that
demographic majorities in larger districts would have the power to
elect minority seats. They argue that MPs elected by voters from
another confession would not be "real" representatives of their
communities but rather "lackeys" of the majority sect.
The second contentious issue is the electoral system. In the current
"block vote" (BV) system, voters are given as many votes as there
are seats; candidates with the highest number of votes win. Because
Lebanon has no pre-printed ballot, the system operates similar to a
party block vote in which voters cast a single vote for a party slate.
Consequently, blocs often sweep seats in a district after winning a
simple majority or a simple plurality. List-proportional representation
(PR), in which parties receive seats proportionate to the number of
votes received (thus ensuring representation for less popular parties),
has repeatedly emerged as an alternative.
In May 2006, a 12-member expert panel known as the Boutros Commission
appointed by former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, proposed a mixed
system with PR at the muhafaza level and majoritarian voting at the
qada' level. The proposal languished for two years due to the July
War with Israel and the subsequent political crisis and, ultimately,
politicians agreed to return to the 1960 electoral law for the 2009
elections-majoritarian voting in the qada'. Only a few administrative
reforms, such as countrywide same-day voting, were passed. Politicians
rejected introducing pre-printed ballots-unsurprising considering
that varied formatting (font, name order) has been used to track
votes and pressure voters to vote the list "as it is."
Today, PR is again on the table. Charbel's law calls for PR on the
basis of 10 to 14 medium sized districts and "open" rather than
"closed" lists: rather than getting only one vote for the entire
list, voters can vote for a list and also cast two "preferential
votes" within the list. When seats are distributed among lists and
confessions, candidates that receive a greater number of preferential
votes are ranked higher. Preferential votes could thus give minorities
greater power to elect their representatives.
Proportional representation has long been an objective of Shi'a
representatives, long before the formation of Hizbullah in the
1980s-and even before Amal's in the 1970's. Yet, support for PR has
put the Shi'a political parties at odds with others. Saad Hariri,
leader of the largely Sunni Future Movement, has rejected PR and
placed an insurmountable roadblock to the debate by refusing to
discuss it until Hizbullah disarms. Hariri's support for the 2008 law
is expected given how Sunni demographic distribution maximizes seat
gain under BV in smaller districts. The clashes in Tariq al-Jadida may
have called greater attention to intra-Sunni dynamics, but the Future
Movement remains the dominant party-and is committed to maintaining
the electoral status quo.
Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party,
has also rejected the Charbel proposal, and instead advocated
single-member districts (by definition, majoritarian)-a shift from
the PSP position in 2005 that advocated a majoritarian system in
multi-member districts. The last time Lebanon had single-member
districts was under the 1953 law, which Jumblatt's father supported.
Other leaders with geographically concentrated bases-such as
independent Boutros Harb-support single member districts.
Unlike in previous years when leaders united around the qada', there is
no Christian consensus so far. Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement
(FPM) has expressed support for PR-which could be a quid pro quo
for Hizbullah's support for the qada' in 2009. But it might also
reflect Aoun's confidence that preferential votes of the open list
ballot would allow Christians to control their allocated seats. FPM
has also expressed support for another plan. Through the Maronite
"Bkirki Gathering," the Free Patriotic Movement joined parties on the
other side of the political divide to express support for majoritarian
voting using two- to three-member districts (even smaller than some
qada'), indicating Christians might be coalescing around this plan.
Meanwhile, the Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform, a civil society
initiative that has spearheaded voter education since 2006, advocates
adoption of PR (at either the national or intermediate district
level) as well as other reforms, like lowering the voting age to 18,
introducing a quota for women, and instituting a pre-printed ballot.
Despite the centrality of the issue-or perhaps because of it-there
has been little examination of the preferences of Lebanese voters. An
October 2011 public opinion survey1 offers some insights: Popular
support for reform is quite high, with 82 percent responding "yes"
and 12 percent "no" to the question "Do you think Lebanon needs a new
electoral law?" Only six percent were "not sure." When asked "What,
if anything, concerns you most about Lebanon's current electoral
law?" 45 percent of respondents answered "Electoral System (that is,
majoritarian/PR)," 10 percent responded "Electoral Constituency
(muhafazah/qada')," and 27 percent responded "Administration"
(lack of a pre-printed ballot, etc).2 This was fairly consistent
among confessions.
Given the centrality of system reform, what is the preferred electoral
system? At 50 percent, a majority of all respondents supported PR.
Unsurprisingly, 64 percent of Shi'a polled support PR. More
surprisingly, a majority of Greek Orthodox polled (53 percent) and
a plurality of Maronites polled (47 percent) support PR. This seems
to align with recent moves by some Christian zu'ama to support PR.
Still, support for majoritarianism within the Greek Orthodox and
Maronite respondents is not to be discounted at 26 percent for each.
The picture among the Sunni and the Druze respondents is less
clear-cut. Only 38 percent of Sunni respondents prioritized electoral
system reform (with 29 percent reporting no concerns with the current
electoral law and 26 percent reporting administrative concerns). A
low priority on changing the current system is understandable given
the way it translates Sunni demography into political power. But when
asked which electoral system was preferred, a plurality (45 percent)
of Sunnis answered PR-18 percent majoritarian, 18 percent Other/Mixed,
14 percent No Preference, and 5 percent Not Sure.
In contrast, Druze respondents prioritized electoral system reform
at the highest rate-59 percent but did not favor PR. The plurality
of Druze respondents (37 percent) answered Other/Mixed and another 33
percent answered majoritarian. The high rate of response for "other"
and "majoritarian" suggests that Jumblatt's proposal for single-member
districts might be well received.
Despite overwhelming support for electoral reform, these divergent
stances would be difficult to reconcile under the best circumstances.
With the deadline less than two weeks away, escalating political
conflict-including Sunday's clashes in Tariq al-Jadida-will likely
stymie electoral reform again, making those in favor of the current
system the de facto winners. The great irony of electoral reform is
that it requires those who benefit from the existing law to change it.
However, while changes to the electoral system or constituency size
would prove challenging at this stage, other crucial administrative
reforms prioritized by those polled (such as pre-printed ballots)
could be implemented. By eliminating the tyranny of the list and
protecting secrecy of the ballot, incremental administrative reform
could be an important step forward in comprehensive electoral reform.
Maren Milligan is a visiting assistant professor at Oberlin College
in Ohio.
[1] The poll was conducted by Shibley Telhami, the Sadat Chair for
Peace and Development at the University of Maryland and fielded by
Zogby International. The author is grateful for the support of the
Sadat Chair in this research. It is not yet available online. The
respondents included 500 individuals in Beirut (220), Babdaa (54),
'Alay (57), Chouf (20), Metn (85), and Tripoli (54) including the
following confessions: Sunni, Shi'a, Druze, Maronite, Greek Orthodox,
Greek Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Protestant and
Minorities. By the law of large numbers, we can be confident in the
conclusions regarding those confessions polled in excess of 30: Sunni,
Shi'a, Maronite, and Greek Orthodox. Since only 27 Druze respondents
were included, conclusions must be qualified. At 19 respondents,
conclusions regarding the Armenian population must be tentative at
best. Due to small numbers, Protestants and Minorities were dropped
from the analysis.
[2] The poll was part of a regional survey and the question regarding
confession asked: "Which best describes you? 1-Muslim-Shi'a 2.
Muslim-Sunni 3. Christian 4. Druze 5. Other (Please specify) 6.
Refuse." In self-description (in which "refuse" was an option),
respondents consistently identified themselves according to officially
recognized confessions. Confession was a statistically significant
indicator (at the .005 level) of electoral system preference when
multinomial logit analysis was conducted controlling for age, residency
(in/out of a city), education, income, gender and location.
For tables of statistics, go to
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/24/how-to-slice-pie-reforming-lebanon-s-electoral-law/awef
From: A. Papazian
Maren Milligan
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
May 24 2012
In recent years, nearly every incoming government in Lebanon
has called for comprehensive electoral reform, and with a year
left before the next parliamentary elections, the issue is once
again center-stage. Interior Minister Marwan Charbel proposed a
new law in September calling for fundamental change: replacing the
current majoritarian (or "winner take all") system with proportional
representation. As June 7 approaches-when the legal window closes on
some reforms-politicians are staking out positions. What will come
of this proposal in the coming weeks? Do leaders' positions align
with voters' preferences? And how will recent violence affect debate?
Two issues have paralyzed progress: district size and the electoral
system itself. Given that parliament's 128 seats are divided among
multi-member districts with multi-confessional slates, district size
is contentious because it determines the confessional demography in
each constituency. Smaller districts (like the smaller administrative
unit, the qada') are more homogenous in their sectarian identity.
Proposals to shift to larger electoral districts (like the larger
muhafaza) would not change the number of MPs or parliament's sectarian
balance, but many minority politicians object on the basis that
demographic majorities in larger districts would have the power to
elect minority seats. They argue that MPs elected by voters from
another confession would not be "real" representatives of their
communities but rather "lackeys" of the majority sect.
The second contentious issue is the electoral system. In the current
"block vote" (BV) system, voters are given as many votes as there
are seats; candidates with the highest number of votes win. Because
Lebanon has no pre-printed ballot, the system operates similar to a
party block vote in which voters cast a single vote for a party slate.
Consequently, blocs often sweep seats in a district after winning a
simple majority or a simple plurality. List-proportional representation
(PR), in which parties receive seats proportionate to the number of
votes received (thus ensuring representation for less popular parties),
has repeatedly emerged as an alternative.
In May 2006, a 12-member expert panel known as the Boutros Commission
appointed by former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, proposed a mixed
system with PR at the muhafaza level and majoritarian voting at the
qada' level. The proposal languished for two years due to the July
War with Israel and the subsequent political crisis and, ultimately,
politicians agreed to return to the 1960 electoral law for the 2009
elections-majoritarian voting in the qada'. Only a few administrative
reforms, such as countrywide same-day voting, were passed. Politicians
rejected introducing pre-printed ballots-unsurprising considering
that varied formatting (font, name order) has been used to track
votes and pressure voters to vote the list "as it is."
Today, PR is again on the table. Charbel's law calls for PR on the
basis of 10 to 14 medium sized districts and "open" rather than
"closed" lists: rather than getting only one vote for the entire
list, voters can vote for a list and also cast two "preferential
votes" within the list. When seats are distributed among lists and
confessions, candidates that receive a greater number of preferential
votes are ranked higher. Preferential votes could thus give minorities
greater power to elect their representatives.
Proportional representation has long been an objective of Shi'a
representatives, long before the formation of Hizbullah in the
1980s-and even before Amal's in the 1970's. Yet, support for PR has
put the Shi'a political parties at odds with others. Saad Hariri,
leader of the largely Sunni Future Movement, has rejected PR and
placed an insurmountable roadblock to the debate by refusing to
discuss it until Hizbullah disarms. Hariri's support for the 2008 law
is expected given how Sunni demographic distribution maximizes seat
gain under BV in smaller districts. The clashes in Tariq al-Jadida may
have called greater attention to intra-Sunni dynamics, but the Future
Movement remains the dominant party-and is committed to maintaining
the electoral status quo.
Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party,
has also rejected the Charbel proposal, and instead advocated
single-member districts (by definition, majoritarian)-a shift from
the PSP position in 2005 that advocated a majoritarian system in
multi-member districts. The last time Lebanon had single-member
districts was under the 1953 law, which Jumblatt's father supported.
Other leaders with geographically concentrated bases-such as
independent Boutros Harb-support single member districts.
Unlike in previous years when leaders united around the qada', there is
no Christian consensus so far. Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement
(FPM) has expressed support for PR-which could be a quid pro quo
for Hizbullah's support for the qada' in 2009. But it might also
reflect Aoun's confidence that preferential votes of the open list
ballot would allow Christians to control their allocated seats. FPM
has also expressed support for another plan. Through the Maronite
"Bkirki Gathering," the Free Patriotic Movement joined parties on the
other side of the political divide to express support for majoritarian
voting using two- to three-member districts (even smaller than some
qada'), indicating Christians might be coalescing around this plan.
Meanwhile, the Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform, a civil society
initiative that has spearheaded voter education since 2006, advocates
adoption of PR (at either the national or intermediate district
level) as well as other reforms, like lowering the voting age to 18,
introducing a quota for women, and instituting a pre-printed ballot.
Despite the centrality of the issue-or perhaps because of it-there
has been little examination of the preferences of Lebanese voters. An
October 2011 public opinion survey1 offers some insights: Popular
support for reform is quite high, with 82 percent responding "yes"
and 12 percent "no" to the question "Do you think Lebanon needs a new
electoral law?" Only six percent were "not sure." When asked "What,
if anything, concerns you most about Lebanon's current electoral
law?" 45 percent of respondents answered "Electoral System (that is,
majoritarian/PR)," 10 percent responded "Electoral Constituency
(muhafazah/qada')," and 27 percent responded "Administration"
(lack of a pre-printed ballot, etc).2 This was fairly consistent
among confessions.
Given the centrality of system reform, what is the preferred electoral
system? At 50 percent, a majority of all respondents supported PR.
Unsurprisingly, 64 percent of Shi'a polled support PR. More
surprisingly, a majority of Greek Orthodox polled (53 percent) and
a plurality of Maronites polled (47 percent) support PR. This seems
to align with recent moves by some Christian zu'ama to support PR.
Still, support for majoritarianism within the Greek Orthodox and
Maronite respondents is not to be discounted at 26 percent for each.
The picture among the Sunni and the Druze respondents is less
clear-cut. Only 38 percent of Sunni respondents prioritized electoral
system reform (with 29 percent reporting no concerns with the current
electoral law and 26 percent reporting administrative concerns). A
low priority on changing the current system is understandable given
the way it translates Sunni demography into political power. But when
asked which electoral system was preferred, a plurality (45 percent)
of Sunnis answered PR-18 percent majoritarian, 18 percent Other/Mixed,
14 percent No Preference, and 5 percent Not Sure.
In contrast, Druze respondents prioritized electoral system reform
at the highest rate-59 percent but did not favor PR. The plurality
of Druze respondents (37 percent) answered Other/Mixed and another 33
percent answered majoritarian. The high rate of response for "other"
and "majoritarian" suggests that Jumblatt's proposal for single-member
districts might be well received.
Despite overwhelming support for electoral reform, these divergent
stances would be difficult to reconcile under the best circumstances.
With the deadline less than two weeks away, escalating political
conflict-including Sunday's clashes in Tariq al-Jadida-will likely
stymie electoral reform again, making those in favor of the current
system the de facto winners. The great irony of electoral reform is
that it requires those who benefit from the existing law to change it.
However, while changes to the electoral system or constituency size
would prove challenging at this stage, other crucial administrative
reforms prioritized by those polled (such as pre-printed ballots)
could be implemented. By eliminating the tyranny of the list and
protecting secrecy of the ballot, incremental administrative reform
could be an important step forward in comprehensive electoral reform.
Maren Milligan is a visiting assistant professor at Oberlin College
in Ohio.
[1] The poll was conducted by Shibley Telhami, the Sadat Chair for
Peace and Development at the University of Maryland and fielded by
Zogby International. The author is grateful for the support of the
Sadat Chair in this research. It is not yet available online. The
respondents included 500 individuals in Beirut (220), Babdaa (54),
'Alay (57), Chouf (20), Metn (85), and Tripoli (54) including the
following confessions: Sunni, Shi'a, Druze, Maronite, Greek Orthodox,
Greek Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Protestant and
Minorities. By the law of large numbers, we can be confident in the
conclusions regarding those confessions polled in excess of 30: Sunni,
Shi'a, Maronite, and Greek Orthodox. Since only 27 Druze respondents
were included, conclusions must be qualified. At 19 respondents,
conclusions regarding the Armenian population must be tentative at
best. Due to small numbers, Protestants and Minorities were dropped
from the analysis.
[2] The poll was part of a regional survey and the question regarding
confession asked: "Which best describes you? 1-Muslim-Shi'a 2.
Muslim-Sunni 3. Christian 4. Druze 5. Other (Please specify) 6.
Refuse." In self-description (in which "refuse" was an option),
respondents consistently identified themselves according to officially
recognized confessions. Confession was a statistically significant
indicator (at the .005 level) of electoral system preference when
multinomial logit analysis was conducted controlling for age, residency
(in/out of a city), education, income, gender and location.
For tables of statistics, go to
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/24/how-to-slice-pie-reforming-lebanon-s-electoral-law/awef
From: A. Papazian