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SYRIA MATTERS
by Robert Olson
Today's Zaman
Oct 31 2012
Turkey
Two presidential debates, especially the last one on October 22 dealing
with foreign policy, stressed strongly that Syria matters. And not
just to Americans, but to Russia, China, Iran, Muslims and especially
to the peoples of the Middle East.
Syria matters because developments there over the past 20 months
indicate that much is at stake for all of the peoples and countries
mentioned above.
Syria matters to Russia and China and Iran. It matters to Russia
because Moscow wants to end the hegemonic role that the US has played
in region for the past 12 years, especially in Iran and Afghanistan.
It wants to emphasize that the era of unilateralism that the US has
exercised in the region since the end of World War II is over. Russia
also wants to assert more strongly its position in the eastern
Mediterranean and the role it seeks to play with regard to the large
deposits of oil and natural gas discovered in the economic zones of
Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Egypt. The major base that it has
to pursue these goals is in Tartus, Syria. It will pursue this policy
regardless of who rules Syria.
Syria also matters to China. China is the main supplier of arms and
weapon systems to Iran and a major trading partner. Beijing, which,
like Moscow, wants to assert that it too has a big geopolitical stake,
is demonstrating that America's unilateral epoch in the Middle East
has passed. China has large and growing investments and trade with
East African countries to which it wants unhindered access -- for
which the Arab countries are vital. Iran's interests in Syria and in
Lebanon have been clear to anyone listening to the political debates
during the past year. Syria is vital for Iran to be able to project
its geopolitical posture into the Eastern Mediterranean and to support
its Hezbollah ally in Lebanon. Hezbollah, and the many Shiites who
support it, is the strongest political power in Lebanon and a strong
opponent of Israel's expansionist policies both in Lebanon as well
as in the West Bank and Gaza and a strong supporter of Palestinian
claims against Israel. Syria has played a crucial role in Iran's
affairs since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran when the Islamic
leadership attempted to consolidate its legitimacy among Muslims by
criticizing the "Zionist entity" in the eastern Mediterranean.
But what happens in Syria matters most for the Muslim countries of the
Middle East, especially Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. There
are several reasons for this. When Bashar al-Assad falls, and even
if elements of the Ba'ath regime remain, what will occur along
political sectarian lines is of vital importance for the peoples of
Syria. There are two worst case scenarios that should give pause to
all policy makers involved in the conflict. One is that the remnants
of the Assad regime will withdraw to their home base in the mountains
along the Mediterranean stretching from southern Turkey to Lebanon and
take their weapons, including chemical, with them as well as much of
their air force as they are able. This would ignite a major sectarian
war with not just the Syrian Nationalists but with the Sunni Arabs,
including Jihadists and Salafists (zealous Muslims). If this were
to occur, it would put many of the non-Sunnis at peril and possible
major ethnic cleansing.
Some 40 percent of Syria's population are minorities of one
kind of another. The largest minorities are Christian (Greek
Orthodox-Armenian), 12 percent; Alawite (sectarian Shiites), 12
percent; Kurd (Sunni Muslim), 11 percent; Druze (Shiite sectarian),
3 percent; Ismaili (Shiite sectarian), 2 percent. The remaining 60
percent are Sunni Arabs.
The danger to the minorities, the bulk of who have supported the
Assad regime for the very reason they fear a predominately Sunni
regime coming to power. When the Ba'athist, largely Alawite, regime
came to power in 1963, it was supported by substantial numbers of
Christians, Druze, Ismailis and Kurds, although subsequently many of
them were purged.
But if the reports coming from Syria over the past several months are
correct, and they seem to be, that there is a large number of Muslim
Brothers, Jihadists and al-Qaeda elements, most of whom come from
the US-Gulf Arab allies, who have joined Syrian oppositional forces,
then their support for the Assad regime and/or neutrality of many
of the minorities is understandable and well founded. There is no
doubt that the radicalism of the oppositional forces has grown over
the past year. If the civil war continues, it is bound to grow more;
let us hope that it doesn't.
If the Christians of Syria, especially, were to experience the same
calamities that have happened to the Christian communities in Iraq,
which have been reduced by half (400,000 to 500,000), it would lead to
the further decimation of Christians in the central Middle East. Since
many of these calamities are due to the US decision to pursue a war
of choice in Iraq, Americans are responsible for a good portion of
these sad events.
In this regard, Syria certainly matters for Turkey. If Turkey were to
invade Syria and/or establish a significant buffer region in Syria,
will it encompass much of the Kurdish regions of Syria as well as the
Armenians in Aleppo? Many of the 800,000 to 900,000 Armenians in Syria
were compelled to flee Turkey, many to Aleppo, after the genocide of
their compatriots in 1915. Does Turkey want to support the oppositional
forces in Turkey who might attempt to ethnically cleanse the region of
Armenians, as well as other Christians, in addition to Kurds? And to
carry out such actions just two years before the 100th anniversary of
the Ottoman 1915 genocide of Armenians? In addition, to what extent
would Turkey support Syrian oppositional forces against the Alawite
population? Can or will Turkey support Syrian oppositional forces
against the Alawites and, if so, how will it control the opposition
to such an action among the 400,000 to 500,000 Alawite population in
Turkey, especially in Hatay? And what of the estimated 17-18 million
Alevis in Turkey, 15 percent of whom are Kurdish, who share cultural
and religious sentiments with the Alawites of Syria?
Does Ankara expect them to remain quiescent?
An even bigger question confronting Turkey and the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AK Party) is how much of Syria and how much of the
Kurdish populated areas would they want to occupy? And if Turkey did
carry out a substantial invasion of northern Syria and incorporate
some of the Kurdish-populated areas under its military control, how
would this affect it ability to not only resolve the Kurdish question
in Turkey itself, but also to manage it without constant political
unrest and war with its own Kurdish population?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Robert Olson is a Middle East analyst and author of "The Ba'th and
Syria: 1947-1982."
by Robert Olson
Today's Zaman
Oct 31 2012
Turkey
Two presidential debates, especially the last one on October 22 dealing
with foreign policy, stressed strongly that Syria matters. And not
just to Americans, but to Russia, China, Iran, Muslims and especially
to the peoples of the Middle East.
Syria matters because developments there over the past 20 months
indicate that much is at stake for all of the peoples and countries
mentioned above.
Syria matters to Russia and China and Iran. It matters to Russia
because Moscow wants to end the hegemonic role that the US has played
in region for the past 12 years, especially in Iran and Afghanistan.
It wants to emphasize that the era of unilateralism that the US has
exercised in the region since the end of World War II is over. Russia
also wants to assert more strongly its position in the eastern
Mediterranean and the role it seeks to play with regard to the large
deposits of oil and natural gas discovered in the economic zones of
Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Egypt. The major base that it has
to pursue these goals is in Tartus, Syria. It will pursue this policy
regardless of who rules Syria.
Syria also matters to China. China is the main supplier of arms and
weapon systems to Iran and a major trading partner. Beijing, which,
like Moscow, wants to assert that it too has a big geopolitical stake,
is demonstrating that America's unilateral epoch in the Middle East
has passed. China has large and growing investments and trade with
East African countries to which it wants unhindered access -- for
which the Arab countries are vital. Iran's interests in Syria and in
Lebanon have been clear to anyone listening to the political debates
during the past year. Syria is vital for Iran to be able to project
its geopolitical posture into the Eastern Mediterranean and to support
its Hezbollah ally in Lebanon. Hezbollah, and the many Shiites who
support it, is the strongest political power in Lebanon and a strong
opponent of Israel's expansionist policies both in Lebanon as well
as in the West Bank and Gaza and a strong supporter of Palestinian
claims against Israel. Syria has played a crucial role in Iran's
affairs since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran when the Islamic
leadership attempted to consolidate its legitimacy among Muslims by
criticizing the "Zionist entity" in the eastern Mediterranean.
But what happens in Syria matters most for the Muslim countries of the
Middle East, especially Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. There
are several reasons for this. When Bashar al-Assad falls, and even
if elements of the Ba'ath regime remain, what will occur along
political sectarian lines is of vital importance for the peoples of
Syria. There are two worst case scenarios that should give pause to
all policy makers involved in the conflict. One is that the remnants
of the Assad regime will withdraw to their home base in the mountains
along the Mediterranean stretching from southern Turkey to Lebanon and
take their weapons, including chemical, with them as well as much of
their air force as they are able. This would ignite a major sectarian
war with not just the Syrian Nationalists but with the Sunni Arabs,
including Jihadists and Salafists (zealous Muslims). If this were
to occur, it would put many of the non-Sunnis at peril and possible
major ethnic cleansing.
Some 40 percent of Syria's population are minorities of one
kind of another. The largest minorities are Christian (Greek
Orthodox-Armenian), 12 percent; Alawite (sectarian Shiites), 12
percent; Kurd (Sunni Muslim), 11 percent; Druze (Shiite sectarian),
3 percent; Ismaili (Shiite sectarian), 2 percent. The remaining 60
percent are Sunni Arabs.
The danger to the minorities, the bulk of who have supported the
Assad regime for the very reason they fear a predominately Sunni
regime coming to power. When the Ba'athist, largely Alawite, regime
came to power in 1963, it was supported by substantial numbers of
Christians, Druze, Ismailis and Kurds, although subsequently many of
them were purged.
But if the reports coming from Syria over the past several months are
correct, and they seem to be, that there is a large number of Muslim
Brothers, Jihadists and al-Qaeda elements, most of whom come from
the US-Gulf Arab allies, who have joined Syrian oppositional forces,
then their support for the Assad regime and/or neutrality of many
of the minorities is understandable and well founded. There is no
doubt that the radicalism of the oppositional forces has grown over
the past year. If the civil war continues, it is bound to grow more;
let us hope that it doesn't.
If the Christians of Syria, especially, were to experience the same
calamities that have happened to the Christian communities in Iraq,
which have been reduced by half (400,000 to 500,000), it would lead to
the further decimation of Christians in the central Middle East. Since
many of these calamities are due to the US decision to pursue a war
of choice in Iraq, Americans are responsible for a good portion of
these sad events.
In this regard, Syria certainly matters for Turkey. If Turkey were to
invade Syria and/or establish a significant buffer region in Syria,
will it encompass much of the Kurdish regions of Syria as well as the
Armenians in Aleppo? Many of the 800,000 to 900,000 Armenians in Syria
were compelled to flee Turkey, many to Aleppo, after the genocide of
their compatriots in 1915. Does Turkey want to support the oppositional
forces in Turkey who might attempt to ethnically cleanse the region of
Armenians, as well as other Christians, in addition to Kurds? And to
carry out such actions just two years before the 100th anniversary of
the Ottoman 1915 genocide of Armenians? In addition, to what extent
would Turkey support Syrian oppositional forces against the Alawite
population? Can or will Turkey support Syrian oppositional forces
against the Alawites and, if so, how will it control the opposition
to such an action among the 400,000 to 500,000 Alawite population in
Turkey, especially in Hatay? And what of the estimated 17-18 million
Alevis in Turkey, 15 percent of whom are Kurdish, who share cultural
and religious sentiments with the Alawites of Syria?
Does Ankara expect them to remain quiescent?
An even bigger question confronting Turkey and the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AK Party) is how much of Syria and how much of the
Kurdish populated areas would they want to occupy? And if Turkey did
carry out a substantial invasion of northern Syria and incorporate
some of the Kurdish-populated areas under its military control, how
would this affect it ability to not only resolve the Kurdish question
in Turkey itself, but also to manage it without constant political
unrest and war with its own Kurdish population?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Robert Olson is a Middle East analyst and author of "The Ba'th and
Syria: 1947-1982."