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THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH PROCESS: NEW 'RESET'?
Politkom.ru
Oct 30 2012
Russia
by Sergey Markedonov, guest visiting fellow of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (Washington, United States)
It is not inconceivable that the negotiating process in a settlement
of the Nagorno-Karabakh process [as published] will shortly resume.
The press office of the Armenian Foreign Ministry confirmed that
the foreign ministers of the two Caucasus republics involved in the
conflict will be meeting on 27 October in Paris. We recall that the
leaders of the foreign ministries of Azerbaijan and Armenia last met
on 18 July of this year. Their meeting also took place in the French
capital. Calling it a landmark en route to a settlement of the lengthy
confrontation did not seem possible. But the bilateral dialogue has
in and of itself for many years now been valuable....
Following the July meeting, the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group
issued, as usual, moderately optimistic statements regarding the future
of the negotiations. But an unforeseen occurrence soon became part
of the proceedings. On 31 August the Azerbaijani leadership pardoned
officer Ramil Safarov, who had been serving time in Hungary for the
slaying of Armenian serviceman Gurgen Margaryan and was extradited
home. The pardon coincided with an official hero-worshiping of
Safarov here. This had begun long before his arrival in Baku, as a
matter of fact, but the extradition exacerbated this proceeding to the
utmost. Official Yerevan ultimately announced that it was suspending
diplomatic relations with Hungary, and experts and politicians began
to debate a possible resumption of hostilities in the cooled-down
flashpoint of the South Caucasus.
And, in actual fact, the negotiations stagnated. At the end
of September the leaders of the foreign ministries of Armenia
and Azerbaijan, Edvard Nalbandyan and Elmar Mamedyarov, confined
themselves within the UN General Assembly framework merely to separate
meetings with the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group, but refrained
from personal contact. The parties did not stint on strongly-worded
statements addressed to each other here, which stoked the alarmism
of the experts. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that such apprehensions
emanate from a false proposition. It is based on the fact that the
sole alternative to the negotiating process is war. And this is why
each time that the negotiations fall through or have a zero result,
a plethora of publications on a new war between Armenia and Azerbaijan
no longer being all that far off ensues. At the same time, on the
other hand, such "alarms" are time after time confounded. This was the
case both after the meeting in Kazan last year and after the numerous
other meetings that preceded the summit in the capital of Tatarstan.
Yet there is no strict "negotiations-war" opposition. The situation
is far more complicated and multi-colored.
Let's begin with the statement of a politically incorrect proposition.
Baku and Yerevan are not today ready for a settlement of the conflict
which implies a renunciation of maximalist planks. For Baku this means
the restoration of Azerbaijani territorial integrity, for Yerevan,
the self-determination of Nagornyy Karabakh. Either in the form of a
second Armenian state or of an integral part of Armenia. The specific
options are not being actively investigated today, it is the actual
fact of the political and legal existence of the disputed territory
beyond Azerbaijani jurisdiction that is important. Even acknowledged
experts in world diplomacy probably could not find common points
of contact in these positions. But neither Baku nor Yerevan has the
resources to push through an agenda that they alone need here. Nor
do the international mediators have peace formulas with which both
parties are comfortable. And the ultimate result is a paradox. The
parties are not prepared for negotiations, they are conducting
them rather under the pressure of outside forces (although these
resources of influence are limited also). But nor are they prepared
for a military untying of the complicated geopolitical knots. Yerevan
considers itself the winning side, Baku lacks a crushing advantage
for a win. A vicious circle results, which may be expressed by the
formula: "Negotiate don't fight". No one is prepared to insert the
comma in this proposition. Consequently, an alternation of bellicose
rhetoric and peacemaking assertiveness.
The co-chairmen of the Minsk Group have a stake in the latter. As
distinct from Georgia, the subject of Karabakh is bringing Russia
and the United States closer together. It has long compensated for
the differences on other items on the Caucasus agenda (Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, energy, NATO expansion). Whence also a common endeavor
to nudge the parties to the conflict toward negotiations. France,
on the other hand, has since Moscow's Kazan failure been attempting
to perform a lead role among the Big Three co-chairmen. First, in
order to show the growing interest of the European Union, which many
people have reproached for passivity in the Karabakh field. Second,
new French President Francois Hollande has his own reasons. He is
haunted by the laurels of "peacemaker" Nicolas Sarkozy. Of course,
the Nobel Peace Prize for united Europe made its contribution to the
awakening of interest in the Eurasian conflict. Be that as it may,
the co-chairmen are no less interested in negotiations than Yerevan
and Baku themselves, whose motivation is not all that high.
May some serious results be expected of the Paris meeting? If we
understand by such the achievement of compromise, no. If the mere
format of discussion is in itself considered a success, possibly. And,
in actual fact, the outburst of strongly-worded rhetoric of the time
of the "Safarov affair" has created a threat to the actual status
quo to a far greater extent than even a perfunctory meeting. It is
not inconceivable that the parties will agree on a meeting in the
format of the two presidents, and the co-chairmen will call this
a manifestation of "progress and good will". In reality, though,
the politicians and experts cannot overcome one further settled myth.
It is that the signing of the "renewed Madrid principles" will be a
real breakthrough. This would be the case did this document not contain
numerous incongruities and contradictions. And, on the contrary,
contained well-considered mechanisms of the materialization of common
approaches. After all, proclaiming the need for a public say on the
status of Nagornyy Karabakh is one thing, determining the makeup of its
participants, procedure, and legal consequences is quite another. Hopes
that some meeting (or a series of them) will ultimately bring the
long-awaited peace are thus to a considerable extent illusory. The
example of the Armenian-Turkish protocols signed in 2009 in Zurich is
too obvious to be ignored. But neither the mediators nor the parties to
the conflict are today looking that far ahead. They are supporting to
their utmost the current status quo. We should not here be expecting a
"reset" in Paris but recognizing as positive the certain cooling of
passions over the unresolved conflict is essential.
If, of course, special circumstances do not prevent the ministers'
negotiations.
[Translated from Russian]
From: A. Papazian
Politkom.ru
Oct 30 2012
Russia
by Sergey Markedonov, guest visiting fellow of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (Washington, United States)
It is not inconceivable that the negotiating process in a settlement
of the Nagorno-Karabakh process [as published] will shortly resume.
The press office of the Armenian Foreign Ministry confirmed that
the foreign ministers of the two Caucasus republics involved in the
conflict will be meeting on 27 October in Paris. We recall that the
leaders of the foreign ministries of Azerbaijan and Armenia last met
on 18 July of this year. Their meeting also took place in the French
capital. Calling it a landmark en route to a settlement of the lengthy
confrontation did not seem possible. But the bilateral dialogue has
in and of itself for many years now been valuable....
Following the July meeting, the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group
issued, as usual, moderately optimistic statements regarding the future
of the negotiations. But an unforeseen occurrence soon became part
of the proceedings. On 31 August the Azerbaijani leadership pardoned
officer Ramil Safarov, who had been serving time in Hungary for the
slaying of Armenian serviceman Gurgen Margaryan and was extradited
home. The pardon coincided with an official hero-worshiping of
Safarov here. This had begun long before his arrival in Baku, as a
matter of fact, but the extradition exacerbated this proceeding to the
utmost. Official Yerevan ultimately announced that it was suspending
diplomatic relations with Hungary, and experts and politicians began
to debate a possible resumption of hostilities in the cooled-down
flashpoint of the South Caucasus.
And, in actual fact, the negotiations stagnated. At the end
of September the leaders of the foreign ministries of Armenia
and Azerbaijan, Edvard Nalbandyan and Elmar Mamedyarov, confined
themselves within the UN General Assembly framework merely to separate
meetings with the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group, but refrained
from personal contact. The parties did not stint on strongly-worded
statements addressed to each other here, which stoked the alarmism
of the experts. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that such apprehensions
emanate from a false proposition. It is based on the fact that the
sole alternative to the negotiating process is war. And this is why
each time that the negotiations fall through or have a zero result,
a plethora of publications on a new war between Armenia and Azerbaijan
no longer being all that far off ensues. At the same time, on the
other hand, such "alarms" are time after time confounded. This was the
case both after the meeting in Kazan last year and after the numerous
other meetings that preceded the summit in the capital of Tatarstan.
Yet there is no strict "negotiations-war" opposition. The situation
is far more complicated and multi-colored.
Let's begin with the statement of a politically incorrect proposition.
Baku and Yerevan are not today ready for a settlement of the conflict
which implies a renunciation of maximalist planks. For Baku this means
the restoration of Azerbaijani territorial integrity, for Yerevan,
the self-determination of Nagornyy Karabakh. Either in the form of a
second Armenian state or of an integral part of Armenia. The specific
options are not being actively investigated today, it is the actual
fact of the political and legal existence of the disputed territory
beyond Azerbaijani jurisdiction that is important. Even acknowledged
experts in world diplomacy probably could not find common points
of contact in these positions. But neither Baku nor Yerevan has the
resources to push through an agenda that they alone need here. Nor
do the international mediators have peace formulas with which both
parties are comfortable. And the ultimate result is a paradox. The
parties are not prepared for negotiations, they are conducting
them rather under the pressure of outside forces (although these
resources of influence are limited also). But nor are they prepared
for a military untying of the complicated geopolitical knots. Yerevan
considers itself the winning side, Baku lacks a crushing advantage
for a win. A vicious circle results, which may be expressed by the
formula: "Negotiate don't fight". No one is prepared to insert the
comma in this proposition. Consequently, an alternation of bellicose
rhetoric and peacemaking assertiveness.
The co-chairmen of the Minsk Group have a stake in the latter. As
distinct from Georgia, the subject of Karabakh is bringing Russia
and the United States closer together. It has long compensated for
the differences on other items on the Caucasus agenda (Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, energy, NATO expansion). Whence also a common endeavor
to nudge the parties to the conflict toward negotiations. France,
on the other hand, has since Moscow's Kazan failure been attempting
to perform a lead role among the Big Three co-chairmen. First, in
order to show the growing interest of the European Union, which many
people have reproached for passivity in the Karabakh field. Second,
new French President Francois Hollande has his own reasons. He is
haunted by the laurels of "peacemaker" Nicolas Sarkozy. Of course,
the Nobel Peace Prize for united Europe made its contribution to the
awakening of interest in the Eurasian conflict. Be that as it may,
the co-chairmen are no less interested in negotiations than Yerevan
and Baku themselves, whose motivation is not all that high.
May some serious results be expected of the Paris meeting? If we
understand by such the achievement of compromise, no. If the mere
format of discussion is in itself considered a success, possibly. And,
in actual fact, the outburst of strongly-worded rhetoric of the time
of the "Safarov affair" has created a threat to the actual status
quo to a far greater extent than even a perfunctory meeting. It is
not inconceivable that the parties will agree on a meeting in the
format of the two presidents, and the co-chairmen will call this
a manifestation of "progress and good will". In reality, though,
the politicians and experts cannot overcome one further settled myth.
It is that the signing of the "renewed Madrid principles" will be a
real breakthrough. This would be the case did this document not contain
numerous incongruities and contradictions. And, on the contrary,
contained well-considered mechanisms of the materialization of common
approaches. After all, proclaiming the need for a public say on the
status of Nagornyy Karabakh is one thing, determining the makeup of its
participants, procedure, and legal consequences is quite another. Hopes
that some meeting (or a series of them) will ultimately bring the
long-awaited peace are thus to a considerable extent illusory. The
example of the Armenian-Turkish protocols signed in 2009 in Zurich is
too obvious to be ignored. But neither the mediators nor the parties to
the conflict are today looking that far ahead. They are supporting to
their utmost the current status quo. We should not here be expecting a
"reset" in Paris but recognizing as positive the certain cooling of
passions over the unresolved conflict is essential.
If, of course, special circumstances do not prevent the ministers'
negotiations.
[Translated from Russian]
From: A. Papazian