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RUSSIA AND TURKEY AGAINST NKR RECOGNITION
Igor Muradyan
http://www.lragir.am/index.php/eng/0/comments/view/27911
Comments - Wednesday, 31 October 2012, 17:48
Not a long time ago during discussions relating to the interests of
Armenia in the UN and the Council of Europe Russia voted like Turkey.
Russia and Turkey are doomed to not only controversies but also
strategic confrontation because changes in their geopolitical
situation, if any, indicated confrontation. However, there remains
agreement and political grounds of Russian-Turkish relations.
A long time ago the genuine Armenian Eurasians who have an impressive
experience of retreats and hangouts understand that the recognition of
the sovereignty of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic contradicts the interests
of Russia. In addition, not only the identical positions of Russia
and Turkey but also more principles approaches are meant relating to
strategic goals.
The statement of the head of the Russian MFA Sergey Lavrov
during the Georgian-Ossetian conflict on "a different situation
in Nagorno-Karabakh" and that recognition of independence is not
applicable had an important role not only in shaping public opinion
in Armenia but also the new domestic policy of its government.
Now even feeble efforts of international recognition of NKR irritate
and possibly also alert Russia. This is not just a matter of creation
of a precedent which may act as a reference point for the autonomies
in Russia but pose a more urgent threat - Russia's loss of initiative
in the regional policy. Russia is fine with the status quo in Karabakh
only until the balance of foreign participation in its settlement is
maintained and none of the foreign actors has an advantage.
It should be noted that certain political initiatives are not always
feasible and if the key time is lost, politics will take revenge. In
the 1990s the government of Armenia blew its chance and refused the
initiative of international recognition of NKR. Iran's initiatives
relating to the recognition of NKR by small Islamic states on which
Iran had influence were rejected as well.
Is there relevant information in the computer of the Armenian
foreign ministry or is this information the prerogative of retired
politicians? Evidently, though, the 1990s were more favorable for
the recognition of NKR, and most probably Russia's stance brought
the situation to a halt.
In the meantime, it has become known that the status quo in Karabakh
interests Moscow not in terms of defense of the Armenian interests
but in terms of the policy of waiting for a convenient opportunity
for an agreement with Turkey and Azerbaijan. The current Armenian
government experienced the consequences of this, and even the minister
of foreign affairs Eduard Nalbandyan felt how it became the hostage
of their illusions; in November 2008 President Medvedev acted as the
manager of organization of the Russian-Azerbaijani-Turkish plot. The
failure of Russia's basically anti-Armenian initiatives became one
of the major foreign political failures of Russia.
Even a cautious and non-representative process of international
recognition of NKR may pose threat to Russia, first of all because
the United States and France are not going to set hindrances to this
and will at least shut an eye on these events. In the course of time,
however, a situation may occur in which the United States and France,
as well as their partners may prefer using the process of recognition.
Why not? Everything is happening in an impeccable manner, without
casting a shadow on the leading states.
Currently, "limited recognition" of newly independent states is
perceived with irony and mockery but it is hard to tell what these
precedents will lead to. It is possible that the United States will
approve the process relating to NKR as opposed to the recognition of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
What will Russia undertake? Certainly, such an influential power has
a lot of political resources but apparently the most effective one
will be the use of the domestic political resources of Armenia, as
well as protrusion of the lack of an independence stance of the NKR
administrative government. at the same time, there will be evident
efforts to coerce Armenian community organizations in Russia to make
efforts to question the feasibility of the international recognition of
NKR. Azerbaijan would gladly sponsor Russia's policy. The Russian media
will most probably start discrediting NKR as a state worth recognition.
Therefore, Stepanakert urgently needs to carry out demonstrative and
realistic activities for changing its present reputation. Otherwise,
it will result in an untimely use of the current vulnerability on
behalf of those from who it is expected less of all.
Igor Muradyan
http://www.lragir.am/index.php/eng/0/comments/view/27911
Comments - Wednesday, 31 October 2012, 17:48
Not a long time ago during discussions relating to the interests of
Armenia in the UN and the Council of Europe Russia voted like Turkey.
Russia and Turkey are doomed to not only controversies but also
strategic confrontation because changes in their geopolitical
situation, if any, indicated confrontation. However, there remains
agreement and political grounds of Russian-Turkish relations.
A long time ago the genuine Armenian Eurasians who have an impressive
experience of retreats and hangouts understand that the recognition of
the sovereignty of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic contradicts the interests
of Russia. In addition, not only the identical positions of Russia
and Turkey but also more principles approaches are meant relating to
strategic goals.
The statement of the head of the Russian MFA Sergey Lavrov
during the Georgian-Ossetian conflict on "a different situation
in Nagorno-Karabakh" and that recognition of independence is not
applicable had an important role not only in shaping public opinion
in Armenia but also the new domestic policy of its government.
Now even feeble efforts of international recognition of NKR irritate
and possibly also alert Russia. This is not just a matter of creation
of a precedent which may act as a reference point for the autonomies
in Russia but pose a more urgent threat - Russia's loss of initiative
in the regional policy. Russia is fine with the status quo in Karabakh
only until the balance of foreign participation in its settlement is
maintained and none of the foreign actors has an advantage.
It should be noted that certain political initiatives are not always
feasible and if the key time is lost, politics will take revenge. In
the 1990s the government of Armenia blew its chance and refused the
initiative of international recognition of NKR. Iran's initiatives
relating to the recognition of NKR by small Islamic states on which
Iran had influence were rejected as well.
Is there relevant information in the computer of the Armenian
foreign ministry or is this information the prerogative of retired
politicians? Evidently, though, the 1990s were more favorable for
the recognition of NKR, and most probably Russia's stance brought
the situation to a halt.
In the meantime, it has become known that the status quo in Karabakh
interests Moscow not in terms of defense of the Armenian interests
but in terms of the policy of waiting for a convenient opportunity
for an agreement with Turkey and Azerbaijan. The current Armenian
government experienced the consequences of this, and even the minister
of foreign affairs Eduard Nalbandyan felt how it became the hostage
of their illusions; in November 2008 President Medvedev acted as the
manager of organization of the Russian-Azerbaijani-Turkish plot. The
failure of Russia's basically anti-Armenian initiatives became one
of the major foreign political failures of Russia.
Even a cautious and non-representative process of international
recognition of NKR may pose threat to Russia, first of all because
the United States and France are not going to set hindrances to this
and will at least shut an eye on these events. In the course of time,
however, a situation may occur in which the United States and France,
as well as their partners may prefer using the process of recognition.
Why not? Everything is happening in an impeccable manner, without
casting a shadow on the leading states.
Currently, "limited recognition" of newly independent states is
perceived with irony and mockery but it is hard to tell what these
precedents will lead to. It is possible that the United States will
approve the process relating to NKR as opposed to the recognition of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
What will Russia undertake? Certainly, such an influential power has
a lot of political resources but apparently the most effective one
will be the use of the domestic political resources of Armenia, as
well as protrusion of the lack of an independence stance of the NKR
administrative government. at the same time, there will be evident
efforts to coerce Armenian community organizations in Russia to make
efforts to question the feasibility of the international recognition of
NKR. Azerbaijan would gladly sponsor Russia's policy. The Russian media
will most probably start discrediting NKR as a state worth recognition.
Therefore, Stepanakert urgently needs to carry out demonstrative and
realistic activities for changing its present reputation. Otherwise,
it will result in an untimely use of the current vulnerability on
behalf of those from who it is expected less of all.