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WEST NEEDS NEITHER YEREVAN NOR BAKU, IT NEEDS OIL AND GAS
by David Stepanyan
arminfo
Friday, November 2, 16:11
ArmInfo's interview with Alexander Skakov, Candidate of History,
coordinator of the Working Group of the Caucasus and Central Asia
section at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of
Science
President Serzh Sargsyan has lately blamed the world community for
applying double standards in the Karabakh peace process. He brought
the example of Kosovo, where the self-determination issue was settled
through military intervention on the international basis. Yerevan
had been abstracting away from such position before. What has changed
Armenia's position?
The frozen Nagorno Karabakh conflict is rapidly thawing. The incident
with Ramil Safarov is a link in this chain. In case the conflict is
finally unfrozen, Yerevan will have to either recognize the territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan without recognizing independence of Nagorno
Karabakh, or recognize NKR. It is at least silly to demand other
countries to recognize NKR, if even Armenia hasn't done it.
There will be no recognition by third countries. In compliance with
the International Law, any military actions of the Armenian armed
forces to protect Artsakh will be perceived as aggression against
Azerbaijan. The Armenian leadership should make a difficult but
inevitable and logical decision to recognize NKR as an independent
state, if it has no intention to refuse from NKR and lose its political
future. I think the statements that Armenia does not recognize NKR
not to torpedo the peace process do not work, because it is impossible
to torpedo something that does not exist.
Ramil Safarov's pardon gave the Armenian party another triumph card
in the negotiations for resolution of the Karabakh conflict. Can one
suppose that such demonstrative and unconstructive steps of Baku may
lead the negotiation process to a final deadlock?
I think the negotiations for settlement of the Karabakh conflict have
been locked in stalemate yet long ago. And Azerbaijani murderer Ramil
Safarov's release once again proved that. At the same time, there
is ongoing imitation of the negotiation process. I mean meetings of
the foreign ministers and even regular meetings of the presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Obviously, such meetings are unpromising.
Neither of the parties makes constructive steps. There are no grounds
to wait such steps. The inadequate response of both Europe and the
Minsk Group to Safarov pardon showed Baku that its steps will meet
not rebuff practically. As for Yerevan, it could make sure of the
perspectives of Armenia's 'European integration'.
The West needs neither Yerevan nor Baku, it needs oil and gas. In
addition, Brussels seeks to limit Moscow's ambitions. So, they
can sacrifice everything for those goals. The Kremlin's toothless
policy will inevitably lead the Russian leadership to new and painful
"Khasavyurts" i.e. to retreats and defeats that could be avoided in
case of political will.
Some analysts are sure that after the change of the president in
Russia, Moscow has certainly reduced the efforts in the Karabakh
peace process. Immediately after that Paris organized a meting of the
foreign ministers of the conflicting parties. Does it mean that Russia
has actually refused from mediation in the Karabakh peace process?
Certain political quarters in Russia had groundless hopes for a
breakthrough in the Karabakh peace process under the aegis of Moscow.
They should have put up those illusions. Neither Paris nor the OSCE
Minsk Group is able to achieve any breakthrough in such situation. So,
replacing Moscow with Paris will change nothing. To make a true
breakthrough in the Karabakh peace process, coordinated efforts of
the world community are needed. There are no such efforts so far,
and there will hardly be any in future. The world force centers are
torn in pieces and neither Karabakh nor the South Caucasus is among
their priorities.
Recently the Legislative Council of the Australian New South
Wales State has passed a resolution recognizing the NKR's right to
self-determination. Earlier, U.S. Rhode Island and Massachusetts
States passed similar resolutions. What do you think of such trends?
All the resolutions adopted by the U.S. and Australian states are
nothing but gestures or symbols at the given moment. Recognition of
NKR by Australia and USA is out of question. Even if anyone raises
the issue of NKR's resignation by Australia or U.S., the oil and gas
lobbyists will immediately block it. I reiterate that the Nagorno
Karabakh Republic must be recognized by the Republic of Armenia at
first. Before that no countries will recognize it.
What will be the influence of Azerbaijani President Aliyev's recent
statement, which slammed British Petroleum for "making false promises"
regarding Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) and Shah Deniz fields, on Great
Britain's stance on the Karabakh conflict"?
Resolution of the Karabakh conflict is not a priority for the UK.
Consequently, BP's problem will not have any serious impact on UK's
stance. London tries to limit its involvement in the problems of even
the continental Europe, leaving aside the Caucasus. Especially that
Great Britain has sad experience of involvement in settlement of the
South- Caucasus conflicts in early 20th century.
President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan has recently said that together
with European Union, the USA and Russia, Armenia has been waiting
for Turkey to change its position in the matter of normalization of
relations with Armenia. Then he congratulated his Turkish counterpart
Abdullah Gul on the Republic Day. What international trends may such
steps of the Armenian president reflect?
Unlike Armenia, Turkey having made several brave and promising steps
after 2008, then in fact turned its policy by 180 degrees. Having
declared the policy "zero problem with neighbours", in fact Turkey
caused problems with all its neighbours. Ambitions of Turkey are
not backed either by economic success of the country or the respect
by the world force centers. As a result of such a policy, in fact,
Turkey has remained alone, and even managed to damage the relations
with Russia which were successful for the last ten years.
The position of Armenia, which in fact is ready to normalize the
relations with Turkey without pre-conditions, is supported by the
European Union as well as the USA and Russia. Of course, these force
centres have always had their own sordid motives the Armenian-Turkish
reconciliation process. However, all of them support the process.
What geopolitical changes may the actual change of power in Georgia
lead to, considering that Georgia is in the center of the region
between Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey?
One should not wait for serious geopolitical changes from the new
power in Georgia. Georgia will go on being in the wake of the American
policy, although Washington demonstrated a positive result of its
supporting Tbilisi by creation of a precedent of the legitimate and
calm power change in the South Caucasus region. Against the background
of awkward actions of Moscow during the presidential election in South
Ossetia, the tactics of Washington wins and the sample of Georgia seems
to be attractive...The Georgians have managed to change power in their
own country without bloodshed, mass protest actions and total fraud.
I think that this sample is important not only for the South Caucasus,
but the whole post-Soviet territory. He also added that the policy
of the new leadership of Georgia will not change much and will become
more logical and predictable. But in case of a serious crisis in the
region linked with attacking Iran by the West and /or Israel, as well
as with resumption of battle actions in the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict,
Georgia will find itself in a rather vulnerable situation because of
unsettled Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts and availability
of influential Armenian and Azerbaijani national minorities at the
territory of the country. Finally, the situation in the North Caucasus
being so much self-confidently instigated by Saakashvili's regime,
may also become a threat for Georgia.
The new government of Georgia has expressed readiness to resume the
dialogue with Russia actively "working on de-occupation of Abkhazia
and South Osseria and trying to find a common language with the Abkhaz
and Ossetic peoples." Don't you see any contradictions in that thesis?
I see no special contradictions in the foreign policy program of the
new government of Georgia. Another matter that the given program
can hardly be implemented due to some objective reasons. The new
government of Georgia has expressed readiness to resume the dialogue
with Russia actively "working on de-occupation of Abkhazia and South
Ossetria and trying to find a common language with the Abkhaz and
Ossetic peoples." Tbilisi wants to separate the two problems that
were mechanically linked under Saakashvili. I mean the problem of
Georgian-Russian relations not narrowed down to the 'occupation'
thesis, and the problems with relations of Georgia and Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. If it is possible to do it and it is not late to do it,
it will be a serious step for Georgia, for stability in the region, and
for the reality feeling in the politics and international relations.
Tbilisi will try to stake on Moscow's excessive "care" for Sukhumi
and Tskhnivali. This policy is promising if the new leadership of
Georgia contributes to 'opening' of the former autonomies for the
external world, for the West. However, at first it is necessary to
seriously correct the so-called 'Law On Occupied Territories.' It
was more comfortable for Moscow to wage its policy under compromised
Mikheil Saakashvili. Working with the new leadership of Georgia will
be much more difficult. It is a serious challenge to Moscow's policy
in the region. Let's wait and see how the Kremlin will respond to it.
by David Stepanyan
arminfo
Friday, November 2, 16:11
ArmInfo's interview with Alexander Skakov, Candidate of History,
coordinator of the Working Group of the Caucasus and Central Asia
section at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of
Science
President Serzh Sargsyan has lately blamed the world community for
applying double standards in the Karabakh peace process. He brought
the example of Kosovo, where the self-determination issue was settled
through military intervention on the international basis. Yerevan
had been abstracting away from such position before. What has changed
Armenia's position?
The frozen Nagorno Karabakh conflict is rapidly thawing. The incident
with Ramil Safarov is a link in this chain. In case the conflict is
finally unfrozen, Yerevan will have to either recognize the territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan without recognizing independence of Nagorno
Karabakh, or recognize NKR. It is at least silly to demand other
countries to recognize NKR, if even Armenia hasn't done it.
There will be no recognition by third countries. In compliance with
the International Law, any military actions of the Armenian armed
forces to protect Artsakh will be perceived as aggression against
Azerbaijan. The Armenian leadership should make a difficult but
inevitable and logical decision to recognize NKR as an independent
state, if it has no intention to refuse from NKR and lose its political
future. I think the statements that Armenia does not recognize NKR
not to torpedo the peace process do not work, because it is impossible
to torpedo something that does not exist.
Ramil Safarov's pardon gave the Armenian party another triumph card
in the negotiations for resolution of the Karabakh conflict. Can one
suppose that such demonstrative and unconstructive steps of Baku may
lead the negotiation process to a final deadlock?
I think the negotiations for settlement of the Karabakh conflict have
been locked in stalemate yet long ago. And Azerbaijani murderer Ramil
Safarov's release once again proved that. At the same time, there
is ongoing imitation of the negotiation process. I mean meetings of
the foreign ministers and even regular meetings of the presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Obviously, such meetings are unpromising.
Neither of the parties makes constructive steps. There are no grounds
to wait such steps. The inadequate response of both Europe and the
Minsk Group to Safarov pardon showed Baku that its steps will meet
not rebuff practically. As for Yerevan, it could make sure of the
perspectives of Armenia's 'European integration'.
The West needs neither Yerevan nor Baku, it needs oil and gas. In
addition, Brussels seeks to limit Moscow's ambitions. So, they
can sacrifice everything for those goals. The Kremlin's toothless
policy will inevitably lead the Russian leadership to new and painful
"Khasavyurts" i.e. to retreats and defeats that could be avoided in
case of political will.
Some analysts are sure that after the change of the president in
Russia, Moscow has certainly reduced the efforts in the Karabakh
peace process. Immediately after that Paris organized a meting of the
foreign ministers of the conflicting parties. Does it mean that Russia
has actually refused from mediation in the Karabakh peace process?
Certain political quarters in Russia had groundless hopes for a
breakthrough in the Karabakh peace process under the aegis of Moscow.
They should have put up those illusions. Neither Paris nor the OSCE
Minsk Group is able to achieve any breakthrough in such situation. So,
replacing Moscow with Paris will change nothing. To make a true
breakthrough in the Karabakh peace process, coordinated efforts of
the world community are needed. There are no such efforts so far,
and there will hardly be any in future. The world force centers are
torn in pieces and neither Karabakh nor the South Caucasus is among
their priorities.
Recently the Legislative Council of the Australian New South
Wales State has passed a resolution recognizing the NKR's right to
self-determination. Earlier, U.S. Rhode Island and Massachusetts
States passed similar resolutions. What do you think of such trends?
All the resolutions adopted by the U.S. and Australian states are
nothing but gestures or symbols at the given moment. Recognition of
NKR by Australia and USA is out of question. Even if anyone raises
the issue of NKR's resignation by Australia or U.S., the oil and gas
lobbyists will immediately block it. I reiterate that the Nagorno
Karabakh Republic must be recognized by the Republic of Armenia at
first. Before that no countries will recognize it.
What will be the influence of Azerbaijani President Aliyev's recent
statement, which slammed British Petroleum for "making false promises"
regarding Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) and Shah Deniz fields, on Great
Britain's stance on the Karabakh conflict"?
Resolution of the Karabakh conflict is not a priority for the UK.
Consequently, BP's problem will not have any serious impact on UK's
stance. London tries to limit its involvement in the problems of even
the continental Europe, leaving aside the Caucasus. Especially that
Great Britain has sad experience of involvement in settlement of the
South- Caucasus conflicts in early 20th century.
President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan has recently said that together
with European Union, the USA and Russia, Armenia has been waiting
for Turkey to change its position in the matter of normalization of
relations with Armenia. Then he congratulated his Turkish counterpart
Abdullah Gul on the Republic Day. What international trends may such
steps of the Armenian president reflect?
Unlike Armenia, Turkey having made several brave and promising steps
after 2008, then in fact turned its policy by 180 degrees. Having
declared the policy "zero problem with neighbours", in fact Turkey
caused problems with all its neighbours. Ambitions of Turkey are
not backed either by economic success of the country or the respect
by the world force centers. As a result of such a policy, in fact,
Turkey has remained alone, and even managed to damage the relations
with Russia which were successful for the last ten years.
The position of Armenia, which in fact is ready to normalize the
relations with Turkey without pre-conditions, is supported by the
European Union as well as the USA and Russia. Of course, these force
centres have always had their own sordid motives the Armenian-Turkish
reconciliation process. However, all of them support the process.
What geopolitical changes may the actual change of power in Georgia
lead to, considering that Georgia is in the center of the region
between Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey?
One should not wait for serious geopolitical changes from the new
power in Georgia. Georgia will go on being in the wake of the American
policy, although Washington demonstrated a positive result of its
supporting Tbilisi by creation of a precedent of the legitimate and
calm power change in the South Caucasus region. Against the background
of awkward actions of Moscow during the presidential election in South
Ossetia, the tactics of Washington wins and the sample of Georgia seems
to be attractive...The Georgians have managed to change power in their
own country without bloodshed, mass protest actions and total fraud.
I think that this sample is important not only for the South Caucasus,
but the whole post-Soviet territory. He also added that the policy
of the new leadership of Georgia will not change much and will become
more logical and predictable. But in case of a serious crisis in the
region linked with attacking Iran by the West and /or Israel, as well
as with resumption of battle actions in the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict,
Georgia will find itself in a rather vulnerable situation because of
unsettled Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts and availability
of influential Armenian and Azerbaijani national minorities at the
territory of the country. Finally, the situation in the North Caucasus
being so much self-confidently instigated by Saakashvili's regime,
may also become a threat for Georgia.
The new government of Georgia has expressed readiness to resume the
dialogue with Russia actively "working on de-occupation of Abkhazia
and South Osseria and trying to find a common language with the Abkhaz
and Ossetic peoples." Don't you see any contradictions in that thesis?
I see no special contradictions in the foreign policy program of the
new government of Georgia. Another matter that the given program
can hardly be implemented due to some objective reasons. The new
government of Georgia has expressed readiness to resume the dialogue
with Russia actively "working on de-occupation of Abkhazia and South
Ossetria and trying to find a common language with the Abkhaz and
Ossetic peoples." Tbilisi wants to separate the two problems that
were mechanically linked under Saakashvili. I mean the problem of
Georgian-Russian relations not narrowed down to the 'occupation'
thesis, and the problems with relations of Georgia and Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. If it is possible to do it and it is not late to do it,
it will be a serious step for Georgia, for stability in the region, and
for the reality feeling in the politics and international relations.
Tbilisi will try to stake on Moscow's excessive "care" for Sukhumi
and Tskhnivali. This policy is promising if the new leadership of
Georgia contributes to 'opening' of the former autonomies for the
external world, for the West. However, at first it is necessary to
seriously correct the so-called 'Law On Occupied Territories.' It
was more comfortable for Moscow to wage its policy under compromised
Mikheil Saakashvili. Working with the new leadership of Georgia will
be much more difficult. It is a serious challenge to Moscow's policy
in the region. Let's wait and see how the Kremlin will respond to it.