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BAKU-TEHRAN: PERIODS OF TENSION
Vestnik Kavkaza
Nov 5 2012
Russia
Author: Marina Petrova, exclusive to VK
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, everything pointed
to the fact that Iran and Turkey would join the fight for influence
in the Caucasus and Central Asia. And despite the fact that both
countries officially deny it, as a result, this has happened. This
struggle has resulted in the confrontation between two models of
development. If Turkey was represented by secular Western-oriented
model of a democratic state, Iran was an Islamic anti-Western country
still allowing a certain amount of democracy. Most of the newly formed
Caucasian and Central Asian states were gravitated to the Turkish
state model and did not seek to get hold of a close relationship
with Iran. The Caucasus has long remained the area of intersection
of interests of Russia, Turkey and Iran, which at some point of the
history considered this region the territory of its influence, and
itself - the leader in the region. After the collapse of the Soviet
Union Tehran was able to recover this effect.
Given the ethnic and cultural, historical, linguistic, and strategic
aspects, it would be logical if both Turkey and Iran, in particular,
tried to enlist Azerbaijan in the Caucasus. It is the only Muslim
country among the three Caucasian countries and moreover, the largest
country among them, with its rich natural resources, in contrast to
Georgia and Armenia. Both states border on it. On the other hand,
Azerbaijan is able to count on the benefits of the Turkish-Iranian
competition for the attention of Baku.
However, the situation did not develop as smoothly as it could be
expected. Unlike Turkey, which once marked the priority of relations
with Baku to other former Soviet republics, Iran did not hurry
with this step. Turkey, after a short hesitation, took the side of
Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, while Iran seemed to
conduct illogical policy. Who, if not Teheran, should immediately
rush to help the brotherly people, Shiites, in their confrontation
with Christian Armenia?
Unfortunately for the Azerbaijanis this did not happen. At a time when
Iran has offered to mediate in the conflict, it did not support Baku in
any way. On the contrary, Tehran strongly strengthened and developed
cooperation with Armenia. While Turkey supported Azerbaijan in its
economic embargo on Yerevan, Iran became the main trade partner of
Armenia. The main reason for this seemingly irrational behavior of
Tehran is the so-called "issue of Azerbaijan."
Turkmenchay peace treaty in 1828 that ended the Russian-Persian war
of 1826-1828 divided the territory where Azerbaijanis lived between
the two empires. During the Soviet period the border between the
Soviet Union and Iran was finalized in 1921. In fact, for the people
of Azerbaijan the division of territory between the two countries was
a tragedy: broken families, torn cultural and trade ties. 70 years of
Soviet history meant that the Soviet and Iranian Azeris were almost
two different people: the mentality and way of life were completely
different. On the other hand, Azeris on both sides have sought to
maintain cultural and family ties with each other. Back in the late XIX
century, during the oil boom in Baku, Iranian Azerbaijanis crossed the
border in search of work in the oil industry. During the First World
War, the Iranian central government was so weak that the de facto the
border between empires erased, and nothing prevented contacts between
the representatives of one people living in different states. This
ended in 1921, and until the end of the 1980s actually Iranian and
Soviet Azerbaijanis lost the sight of each other.
However, "the Azerbaijani issue" remained relevant to Iran. In 1945,
in the wake of Iran's Azerbaijani national movement, the Republic of
Azerbaijan emerged, which, however, did not exist for a long time.
Immediately after the Soviet Union ceased to support it, the Iranian
authorities undertook steps to prevent further manifestations of
nationalism in the region, and Iranian Azerbaijan were divided into
two provinces in 1946. In 1993, they already were divided into three
provinces. This fact proves that the Iranian government has always
closely monitored this minority in order to avoid the slightest
consolidation of Azerbaijanis with separatist goals. During the
Islamic revolution in Iran, many of the country's minority stated
their desire for independence.
Azerbaijanis were the most numerous not Persian-speaking community
in the state, but their national movement in this period was
significantly less powerful than the Kurds, for example. On the
one hand, Azerbaijanis are Shiites, and turning Iran into a Shiite
Islamic republic not meant negative effects for them, unlike the
Kurds and Arabs of other religious beliefs. In addition, many Iranian
Azerbaijanis considered the territory of Iran is as belonging both
to themselves and to the Persians. For many years they were firmly
integrated into the Iranian social and political system and, it can
be said, considered themselves both Azerbaijanis and Iranians. Some
national political movement called not for separation and reunion
with the northern Azerbaijan, but for integrating it into Iran.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the Azerbaijani national
independence movements in Iran did not exist.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Republic of Azerbaijan
became independt, which, however, did not please Tehran. Iran was
experiencing uneasy times of economic downturn and ongoing social
tensions in a multicultural society. At this time, right at its border
an independent state appeared which had large reserves of oil and gas
and the titular nation of which was the largest Iranian diaspora. It
would seem that Tehran should support a new state of the brotherly
people in order not to get criticism from Iranian Azerbaijanis. But
Iranian authorities have gone a completely different way, trying at
every opportunity to oppose the policy of Azerbaijan, despite the
fact that not only the Iranian Azerbaijanis, but also the entire
population of the country required to take the side of Azerbaijan in
the conflict with Armenia.
Thus, the Iranian government sees Azerbaijan as a threat to its
regime. Looking to the future, Tehran suggested that if Azerbaijan
will thrive economically thanks to its rich natural resources and
become a strong, independent secular state, it would be a serious
threat to Iran with its national movements of minorities, as well as
the difficult economic and social situation. For this reason, Iran did
not support Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but rather
supported the Armenian side. Today, the Iranian-Azerbaijani relations
are experiencing another period of tension, which is sometimes
interrupted by brief moments of relaxation (such as the liberation of
Azerbaijani poets, who were arrested in Iran, from prison). Despite
all the official assurances of fraternal feelings and accusations of
third parties of deliberate provocations in order to upset the friendly
relations between the two nations, Iran's attitude to Azerbaijan is
more than cool: Iran does not forgive Azerbaijani close ties with
the West, especially Israel, and the secular nature of its development.
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/33330.html
Vestnik Kavkaza
Nov 5 2012
Russia
Author: Marina Petrova, exclusive to VK
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, everything pointed
to the fact that Iran and Turkey would join the fight for influence
in the Caucasus and Central Asia. And despite the fact that both
countries officially deny it, as a result, this has happened. This
struggle has resulted in the confrontation between two models of
development. If Turkey was represented by secular Western-oriented
model of a democratic state, Iran was an Islamic anti-Western country
still allowing a certain amount of democracy. Most of the newly formed
Caucasian and Central Asian states were gravitated to the Turkish
state model and did not seek to get hold of a close relationship
with Iran. The Caucasus has long remained the area of intersection
of interests of Russia, Turkey and Iran, which at some point of the
history considered this region the territory of its influence, and
itself - the leader in the region. After the collapse of the Soviet
Union Tehran was able to recover this effect.
Given the ethnic and cultural, historical, linguistic, and strategic
aspects, it would be logical if both Turkey and Iran, in particular,
tried to enlist Azerbaijan in the Caucasus. It is the only Muslim
country among the three Caucasian countries and moreover, the largest
country among them, with its rich natural resources, in contrast to
Georgia and Armenia. Both states border on it. On the other hand,
Azerbaijan is able to count on the benefits of the Turkish-Iranian
competition for the attention of Baku.
However, the situation did not develop as smoothly as it could be
expected. Unlike Turkey, which once marked the priority of relations
with Baku to other former Soviet republics, Iran did not hurry
with this step. Turkey, after a short hesitation, took the side of
Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, while Iran seemed to
conduct illogical policy. Who, if not Teheran, should immediately
rush to help the brotherly people, Shiites, in their confrontation
with Christian Armenia?
Unfortunately for the Azerbaijanis this did not happen. At a time when
Iran has offered to mediate in the conflict, it did not support Baku in
any way. On the contrary, Tehran strongly strengthened and developed
cooperation with Armenia. While Turkey supported Azerbaijan in its
economic embargo on Yerevan, Iran became the main trade partner of
Armenia. The main reason for this seemingly irrational behavior of
Tehran is the so-called "issue of Azerbaijan."
Turkmenchay peace treaty in 1828 that ended the Russian-Persian war
of 1826-1828 divided the territory where Azerbaijanis lived between
the two empires. During the Soviet period the border between the
Soviet Union and Iran was finalized in 1921. In fact, for the people
of Azerbaijan the division of territory between the two countries was
a tragedy: broken families, torn cultural and trade ties. 70 years of
Soviet history meant that the Soviet and Iranian Azeris were almost
two different people: the mentality and way of life were completely
different. On the other hand, Azeris on both sides have sought to
maintain cultural and family ties with each other. Back in the late XIX
century, during the oil boom in Baku, Iranian Azerbaijanis crossed the
border in search of work in the oil industry. During the First World
War, the Iranian central government was so weak that the de facto the
border between empires erased, and nothing prevented contacts between
the representatives of one people living in different states. This
ended in 1921, and until the end of the 1980s actually Iranian and
Soviet Azerbaijanis lost the sight of each other.
However, "the Azerbaijani issue" remained relevant to Iran. In 1945,
in the wake of Iran's Azerbaijani national movement, the Republic of
Azerbaijan emerged, which, however, did not exist for a long time.
Immediately after the Soviet Union ceased to support it, the Iranian
authorities undertook steps to prevent further manifestations of
nationalism in the region, and Iranian Azerbaijan were divided into
two provinces in 1946. In 1993, they already were divided into three
provinces. This fact proves that the Iranian government has always
closely monitored this minority in order to avoid the slightest
consolidation of Azerbaijanis with separatist goals. During the
Islamic revolution in Iran, many of the country's minority stated
their desire for independence.
Azerbaijanis were the most numerous not Persian-speaking community
in the state, but their national movement in this period was
significantly less powerful than the Kurds, for example. On the
one hand, Azerbaijanis are Shiites, and turning Iran into a Shiite
Islamic republic not meant negative effects for them, unlike the
Kurds and Arabs of other religious beliefs. In addition, many Iranian
Azerbaijanis considered the territory of Iran is as belonging both
to themselves and to the Persians. For many years they were firmly
integrated into the Iranian social and political system and, it can
be said, considered themselves both Azerbaijanis and Iranians. Some
national political movement called not for separation and reunion
with the northern Azerbaijan, but for integrating it into Iran.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the Azerbaijani national
independence movements in Iran did not exist.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Republic of Azerbaijan
became independt, which, however, did not please Tehran. Iran was
experiencing uneasy times of economic downturn and ongoing social
tensions in a multicultural society. At this time, right at its border
an independent state appeared which had large reserves of oil and gas
and the titular nation of which was the largest Iranian diaspora. It
would seem that Tehran should support a new state of the brotherly
people in order not to get criticism from Iranian Azerbaijanis. But
Iranian authorities have gone a completely different way, trying at
every opportunity to oppose the policy of Azerbaijan, despite the
fact that not only the Iranian Azerbaijanis, but also the entire
population of the country required to take the side of Azerbaijan in
the conflict with Armenia.
Thus, the Iranian government sees Azerbaijan as a threat to its
regime. Looking to the future, Tehran suggested that if Azerbaijan
will thrive economically thanks to its rich natural resources and
become a strong, independent secular state, it would be a serious
threat to Iran with its national movements of minorities, as well as
the difficult economic and social situation. For this reason, Iran did
not support Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but rather
supported the Armenian side. Today, the Iranian-Azerbaijani relations
are experiencing another period of tension, which is sometimes
interrupted by brief moments of relaxation (such as the liberation of
Azerbaijani poets, who were arrested in Iran, from prison). Despite
all the official assurances of fraternal feelings and accusations of
third parties of deliberate provocations in order to upset the friendly
relations between the two nations, Iran's attitude to Azerbaijan is
more than cool: Iran does not forgive Azerbaijani close ties with
the West, especially Israel, and the secular nature of its development.
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/33330.html