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WAS THERE ANY RECOGNITION ANYWAY?
Politkom.ru
Nov 1 2012
Russia
by Sergey Markedonov, visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, USA
[Translated from Russian]
Nagorno-Karabakh issues were discussed intensively during the past
week. There were two main reasons for this upsurge in interest among
politicians and experts. The first was the resumption of the process
of talks on a settlement of the conflict, which had been interrupted
by the notorious "Safarov affair." A meeting of the foreign ministers
of Armenia and Azerbaijan took place in Paris on Saturday 27 October.
The second was the discussion of the recognition of the independence
of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic by the Australian state of New
South Wales. Many publications carried news reports and comments
citing the Australian Ay Dat (which translates as "Armenian Court" and
"Armenian Question") committee. The committee itself announced that the
Legislative Council of the Parliament of the biggest state of Australia
adopted a resolution in which it "recognized the independence of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and the right to self-determination of its
people, who declared independence from the oppressor Azerbaijan 20
years ago"...
The well-known Internet site Kavkazskiy Uzel [www.kavkaz-uzel.ru]
published a selection of comments by various specialists, accompanied
by the following introduction: "Politicians and experts in Armenia
assessed highly the recent statement on the recognition of the
independence of Nagorno-Karabakh adopted by the Parliament of New South
Wales -- the biggest state of Australia. In this context political
experts believe that the document is of political significance but
will not lead to any immediate practical results."
Before turning to an examination of the content of the second reason
for the Nagorno-Karabakh discussion, I would like to make a small but
extremely necessary lyrical digression. And to talk a little about
personal impressions. At the end of last week the author of this
article had occasion to answer questions from various correspondents
many times. Practically all of them expressed surprise when in response
to their request to comment on the "act of recognition" they received
a polite refusal and an invitation to return to the subject after a
careful and detailed reading of the primary source. An observation of
fundamental importance, incidentally. In the modern information space
many documents, programs, and statements exist in two dimensions. In
themselves, and in treatments and interpretations.
And these versions and interpretations are often much more important
than the primary source itself! Not only journalists but also
professional political scientists do not read the primary materials
themselves and do not look into the content they have read. This was
the case, for instance, with Vladimir Putin's famous "Munich speech,"
published in 2007.
Practically from the first minute, thanks to hasty conclusions by
journalists, it was turned into the manifesto for a new "Cold War."
Yet an intelligent source-based analysis of this document would have
shown that stylistically Putin's speech largely chimes with the text
of Boris Yeltsin's speech at the Istanbul OSCE Summit in 1999 with
its famous thesis "You do not have the right to criticize Russia
over Chechnya!" Many turns of phrase were seemingly simply borrowed
creatively from his predecessor's speech. In short, in 2007 Putin
did not reveal any outstanding discoveries in relations between the
Russian Federation and the West. Yet in 1999 nobody talked about a
"Cold War-2." Something similar can be seen now when the talk turns
to the "updated Madrid Principles" for a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement,
the report of the Heidi Tagliavini Commission on the events of 2008,
and many other sources. The result is the artificial formation of
"sensitive issues," of sensations, in the almost complete absence
of high-quality opposition to these media projects. It is clear that
when it comes to complex ethno-political conflicts any expert comes
up against manifestations of op en or latent media campaigns. And this
is as normal for a conflict as blows to the face and the body are for
boxing, or holds and throws for wrestling. But the expert's job is not
to trail along behind various fakes but to try to get to the bottom
of the reasons for their appearance in the real state of affairs. In
the case of the discussion of the "recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic" by an Australian state, only a few specialists were up to the
situation. Thus, the well-known Yerevan political expert Iskandaryan
described this report as "suspicious," while the Russian expert
Yepifantsev did what any professional analyst or journalist should
have done, namely go to the primary source. In his view the text of
the resolution adopted in the state of New South Wales "is not an
act of recognition of the sovereignty of Nagorno-Karabakh" and is,
broadly speaking, declarative in nature. "Living under illusions is
sweet but futile. Let us return to reality," Yepifantsev urges. Well,
let us follow our colleague's advice and move from the sphere of
conjecture and speculation to the actual document.
On the website of the Parliament of New South Wales (
https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/hansart.nsf/V3Ke
y/LC20121025&refNavID=HA8_1[1]) we can find with no particular
difficulty the text initiated by a deputy of this representative body,
Marie Ficcara. It was at her behest that the two-point text appeared
(of which the second point contains six subpoints). What is it about?
Point 1 simply notes that 2012 marks the 20th anniversary of the
declaration of independence of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. And
even this thesis contains a factual error, since on 2 September
1991 (that is, not 20 but 21 years ago) a joint session of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast Soviet and the Soviet of People's Deputies of
Shaumyanovskiy Rayon proclaimed the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic within
the borders of the former autonomous entity and Shaumyanovskiy Rayon.
At the same time the "declaration on the proclamation of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" was adopted. Then, on 10 December 1991,
two days after the signing of the Belovezhskaya Accords, a referendum
was held in Nagorno-Karabakh on the independence of the Republic,
with the question "Do you agree that the proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic should be an independent state autonomously determining its
forms of cooperation with other states and communities?" That is,
once again, there are no grounds here for a jubilee, although in
itself the two events described above played an enormous role in the
ethno-political dynamics of the post-Soviet South Caucasus.
The document's second point recognizes "the importance of the basic
human right to self-determination, freedom, and a democratic society,"
as well as the "right to self-determination of all peoples, including
those of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh." The document also notes
that the de facto state has made efforts toward creating a free
society through parliamentary elections and developing a "responsible
government [vlast]" (the word "government" [word published in English]
can be translated from English not only in the narrow sense, as
"pravitelstvo") [the Russian word "pravitelstvo" means "government"
in the narrow sense, whereas "vlast" means, more broadly, "power" or
"authorities"]. And the involvement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
in international ties is supported and welcomed. This is seen as a
guarantee of the successful resolution of existing regional problems.
And perhaps the most important thing is the call to the Australian
central authorities to officially recognize the independence of the
Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and strengthen "Australia's relationship
with the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and its citizens." And that is
logical, since recognition through the establishment of diplomatic
relations and treaties can only be done by the state -- an entity
in international law -- and not by an individual state or region
of the country, even if it possesses a wide range of powers. As one
item of UN information material ("UN Information Bureau. Conditions
of Admission to the United Nations") declares, "the recognition of a
new state or government is an act that only states or governments may
grant or withhold. It generally implies readiness to assume diplomatic
relations." Consequently all the conclusions concerning recognition on
the part of New South Wales are greatly exaggerated to say the least.
Bearing in mind that analogies are conditional, this resembles
the appeal by the People's Assembly of Gagauzia to the president
and parliament of the Republic of Moldova (September 2008)
concerning the recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian
independence (see the full text of the document at this address:
http://edingagauz.com/content/view/1040[2]/). However, no matter how
much anyone in Gagauzia might wish to see the two former autonomous
entities of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] as sovereign
states, the prerogatives on the question of their recognition,
irrespective of our attitude to this issue, resided and still reside
not in Comrat [capital of Gagauzia] but in Chisinau.
In this context I would like particularly to make one reservation.
Although the document from New South Wales is declarative in nature
and does not constitute recognition, it broadens the framework
of the discussion around the independence and statehood of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Regardless of what anyone may say about
the activeness of lobbyists and the impossibility of Australia's
recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as an entity. People will now cite
this document, it will become a subject of discussion and quotation.
Not always correctly or appropriately, of course. Nonetheless, in
the world after Yalta and Potsdam and in particular after Kosovo,
Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, against the background of the general
growth in separatist sentiments, a return to the "Karabakh question"
in one form or another is perfectly possible. And not only in the
post-Soviet space but far beyond it, because the issue of recognition
in the absence of strict legal and, most important, political criteria
could turn into an advantageous and profitable business. It would be
a good thing if only those who study and observe all these processes
knew the situation substantively, relying on primary sources and not
on their subsequent interpretations.
[Translated from Russian]
Politkom.ru
Nov 1 2012
Russia
by Sergey Markedonov, visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, USA
[Translated from Russian]
Nagorno-Karabakh issues were discussed intensively during the past
week. There were two main reasons for this upsurge in interest among
politicians and experts. The first was the resumption of the process
of talks on a settlement of the conflict, which had been interrupted
by the notorious "Safarov affair." A meeting of the foreign ministers
of Armenia and Azerbaijan took place in Paris on Saturday 27 October.
The second was the discussion of the recognition of the independence
of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic by the Australian state of New
South Wales. Many publications carried news reports and comments
citing the Australian Ay Dat (which translates as "Armenian Court" and
"Armenian Question") committee. The committee itself announced that the
Legislative Council of the Parliament of the biggest state of Australia
adopted a resolution in which it "recognized the independence of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and the right to self-determination of its
people, who declared independence from the oppressor Azerbaijan 20
years ago"...
The well-known Internet site Kavkazskiy Uzel [www.kavkaz-uzel.ru]
published a selection of comments by various specialists, accompanied
by the following introduction: "Politicians and experts in Armenia
assessed highly the recent statement on the recognition of the
independence of Nagorno-Karabakh adopted by the Parliament of New South
Wales -- the biggest state of Australia. In this context political
experts believe that the document is of political significance but
will not lead to any immediate practical results."
Before turning to an examination of the content of the second reason
for the Nagorno-Karabakh discussion, I would like to make a small but
extremely necessary lyrical digression. And to talk a little about
personal impressions. At the end of last week the author of this
article had occasion to answer questions from various correspondents
many times. Practically all of them expressed surprise when in response
to their request to comment on the "act of recognition" they received
a polite refusal and an invitation to return to the subject after a
careful and detailed reading of the primary source. An observation of
fundamental importance, incidentally. In the modern information space
many documents, programs, and statements exist in two dimensions. In
themselves, and in treatments and interpretations.
And these versions and interpretations are often much more important
than the primary source itself! Not only journalists but also
professional political scientists do not read the primary materials
themselves and do not look into the content they have read. This was
the case, for instance, with Vladimir Putin's famous "Munich speech,"
published in 2007.
Practically from the first minute, thanks to hasty conclusions by
journalists, it was turned into the manifesto for a new "Cold War."
Yet an intelligent source-based analysis of this document would have
shown that stylistically Putin's speech largely chimes with the text
of Boris Yeltsin's speech at the Istanbul OSCE Summit in 1999 with
its famous thesis "You do not have the right to criticize Russia
over Chechnya!" Many turns of phrase were seemingly simply borrowed
creatively from his predecessor's speech. In short, in 2007 Putin
did not reveal any outstanding discoveries in relations between the
Russian Federation and the West. Yet in 1999 nobody talked about a
"Cold War-2." Something similar can be seen now when the talk turns
to the "updated Madrid Principles" for a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement,
the report of the Heidi Tagliavini Commission on the events of 2008,
and many other sources. The result is the artificial formation of
"sensitive issues," of sensations, in the almost complete absence
of high-quality opposition to these media projects. It is clear that
when it comes to complex ethno-political conflicts any expert comes
up against manifestations of op en or latent media campaigns. And this
is as normal for a conflict as blows to the face and the body are for
boxing, or holds and throws for wrestling. But the expert's job is not
to trail along behind various fakes but to try to get to the bottom
of the reasons for their appearance in the real state of affairs. In
the case of the discussion of the "recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic" by an Australian state, only a few specialists were up to the
situation. Thus, the well-known Yerevan political expert Iskandaryan
described this report as "suspicious," while the Russian expert
Yepifantsev did what any professional analyst or journalist should
have done, namely go to the primary source. In his view the text of
the resolution adopted in the state of New South Wales "is not an
act of recognition of the sovereignty of Nagorno-Karabakh" and is,
broadly speaking, declarative in nature. "Living under illusions is
sweet but futile. Let us return to reality," Yepifantsev urges. Well,
let us follow our colleague's advice and move from the sphere of
conjecture and speculation to the actual document.
On the website of the Parliament of New South Wales (
https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/hansart.nsf/V3Ke
y/LC20121025&refNavID=HA8_1[1]) we can find with no particular
difficulty the text initiated by a deputy of this representative body,
Marie Ficcara. It was at her behest that the two-point text appeared
(of which the second point contains six subpoints). What is it about?
Point 1 simply notes that 2012 marks the 20th anniversary of the
declaration of independence of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. And
even this thesis contains a factual error, since on 2 September
1991 (that is, not 20 but 21 years ago) a joint session of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast Soviet and the Soviet of People's Deputies of
Shaumyanovskiy Rayon proclaimed the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic within
the borders of the former autonomous entity and Shaumyanovskiy Rayon.
At the same time the "declaration on the proclamation of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" was adopted. Then, on 10 December 1991,
two days after the signing of the Belovezhskaya Accords, a referendum
was held in Nagorno-Karabakh on the independence of the Republic,
with the question "Do you agree that the proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic should be an independent state autonomously determining its
forms of cooperation with other states and communities?" That is,
once again, there are no grounds here for a jubilee, although in
itself the two events described above played an enormous role in the
ethno-political dynamics of the post-Soviet South Caucasus.
The document's second point recognizes "the importance of the basic
human right to self-determination, freedom, and a democratic society,"
as well as the "right to self-determination of all peoples, including
those of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh." The document also notes
that the de facto state has made efforts toward creating a free
society through parliamentary elections and developing a "responsible
government [vlast]" (the word "government" [word published in English]
can be translated from English not only in the narrow sense, as
"pravitelstvo") [the Russian word "pravitelstvo" means "government"
in the narrow sense, whereas "vlast" means, more broadly, "power" or
"authorities"]. And the involvement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
in international ties is supported and welcomed. This is seen as a
guarantee of the successful resolution of existing regional problems.
And perhaps the most important thing is the call to the Australian
central authorities to officially recognize the independence of the
Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and strengthen "Australia's relationship
with the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and its citizens." And that is
logical, since recognition through the establishment of diplomatic
relations and treaties can only be done by the state -- an entity
in international law -- and not by an individual state or region
of the country, even if it possesses a wide range of powers. As one
item of UN information material ("UN Information Bureau. Conditions
of Admission to the United Nations") declares, "the recognition of a
new state or government is an act that only states or governments may
grant or withhold. It generally implies readiness to assume diplomatic
relations." Consequently all the conclusions concerning recognition on
the part of New South Wales are greatly exaggerated to say the least.
Bearing in mind that analogies are conditional, this resembles
the appeal by the People's Assembly of Gagauzia to the president
and parliament of the Republic of Moldova (September 2008)
concerning the recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian
independence (see the full text of the document at this address:
http://edingagauz.com/content/view/1040[2]/). However, no matter how
much anyone in Gagauzia might wish to see the two former autonomous
entities of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] as sovereign
states, the prerogatives on the question of their recognition,
irrespective of our attitude to this issue, resided and still reside
not in Comrat [capital of Gagauzia] but in Chisinau.
In this context I would like particularly to make one reservation.
Although the document from New South Wales is declarative in nature
and does not constitute recognition, it broadens the framework
of the discussion around the independence and statehood of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Regardless of what anyone may say about
the activeness of lobbyists and the impossibility of Australia's
recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as an entity. People will now cite
this document, it will become a subject of discussion and quotation.
Not always correctly or appropriately, of course. Nonetheless, in
the world after Yalta and Potsdam and in particular after Kosovo,
Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, against the background of the general
growth in separatist sentiments, a return to the "Karabakh question"
in one form or another is perfectly possible. And not only in the
post-Soviet space but far beyond it, because the issue of recognition
in the absence of strict legal and, most important, political criteria
could turn into an advantageous and profitable business. It would be
a good thing if only those who study and observe all these processes
knew the situation substantively, relying on primary sources and not
on their subsequent interpretations.
[Translated from Russian]