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TURKEY HAS CREATED MORE DIVIDING LINES IN THE REGION - VAHRAM TER-MATEVOSYAN
news.am
November 08, 2012 | 14:40
YEREVAN.- Interview with Dr. Vahram Ter-Matevosyan who is a Senior
Research Fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the National
Academy of Sciences of Armenia.
There are indications that recently Turkey has slightly modified its
foreign policy. Could you, please, contextualize Turkey's foreign
policy priorities in the South Caucasus?
Quite understandably, Turkey pursues different interests vis-a-vis each
entity of the South Caucasian region. Hence, we can assert that there
is no unified and integrated foreign policy of Turkey in the South
Caucasus. The three UN member states, the two partially recognized
states and one non-recognized de-facto state, which is recognized
only in the level of the US and Australian state legislatures, have
different rankings in the list of policy priorities of Turkey.
Turkey's approach to these entities is largely based upon different
identities & interests. It is often said that Turkey incorporates
different identities in shaping its foreign policy - Middle Eastern,
European, Caucasian, Balkan, Mediterranean etc. I argue that this
assertion is partially accurate and moreover, each of those identities
possesses sub-identities and understanding Turkey's foreign policy
is quite difficult if those sub-identities are not properly considered.
No wonder, Turkey had any definite policy vis-a-vis those
sub-identities in its 2008 abruptly proposed, and dead at its birth,
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform.
Hence, Turkey's Caucasian identity has Georgian, Azerbaijani,
Abkhazian, Armenian and other visible and invisible facets. Turkey's
historical legacy confirmed the existence of different identities
and the current developments continue the inadvertent process of
self-assertion. Even for the Armenian case, the last report by the
European commission indicated for the first time the emergence of
"crypto-Armenians" in the Eastern regions of Turkey.
How would you explain NATO's position in the Armenian-Turkish
relations?
Turkey represents interests of one of the leadings security alliances
in the world. Being a member of the NATO does not logically lead to
the assumption that Turkey's policies in the South Caucasus are in
line with the NATO principles which view the South Caucasian region
as a strategically important one. From time to time, people pondering
upon the Turkish-Armenian relations and the security in the South
Caucasus tend to forget that Turkey has closed down not only the
border with Armenia, that Turkey not only enforced a political and
economic blockade upon Armenia, that Turkey not only illegally deprived
landlocked Armenia from sea access, but Turkey has also closed down a
border, which is a border between Armenia and NATO. It is therefore,
to think of cooperative security with closed borders is a difficult
enterprise to imagine.
Turkey's blockade and a strive to isolate Armenia even further not
only failed to resolve Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) conflict, but
pushed the parties of the conflict far aside from each other, as its
backtracking from the normalisation process further made Azerbaijan
intransigent and not at all inclined to concessions. For almost two
decades, Turkey's position has exacerbated the situation in the region
and created more dividing lines.
What about Turkey's general position concerning the conflicts in the
South Caucasus?
It is another aspect of Turkey's role in the region. Turkey's policies
towards Abkhazia and Karabakh (Artsakh) are formed through different
channels and therefore have different manifestations. Different
ethnic and lobbying groups influence Turkey's foreign policy vis-a-vis
Abkhazia and Karabakh differently. On different occasions, Turkey has
reassured its compliance with the territorial integrity of Georgia
and Azerbaijan. Has this been a consistent policy? Not really.
Turkish governments came to occupy an entirely distinct position
vis-a-vis Abkhazia, which Georgia considers as a break-away region.
That policy is contrary to what Turkey pursues in the case of
Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), which Azerbaijan considers as a break-away
region too. Turkey is increasingly deepening its economic cooperation
with Abkhazia simultaneously maintaining a strong presence in the
Georgian economy, whereas Turkey not only maintains its border with
Armenia closed, but also imposes political and economic blockade on
Armenia and unequivocally supports the unconstructive position of
Azerbaijan on the Karabakh (Artsakh) conflict.
news.am
November 08, 2012 | 14:40
YEREVAN.- Interview with Dr. Vahram Ter-Matevosyan who is a Senior
Research Fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the National
Academy of Sciences of Armenia.
There are indications that recently Turkey has slightly modified its
foreign policy. Could you, please, contextualize Turkey's foreign
policy priorities in the South Caucasus?
Quite understandably, Turkey pursues different interests vis-a-vis each
entity of the South Caucasian region. Hence, we can assert that there
is no unified and integrated foreign policy of Turkey in the South
Caucasus. The three UN member states, the two partially recognized
states and one non-recognized de-facto state, which is recognized
only in the level of the US and Australian state legislatures, have
different rankings in the list of policy priorities of Turkey.
Turkey's approach to these entities is largely based upon different
identities & interests. It is often said that Turkey incorporates
different identities in shaping its foreign policy - Middle Eastern,
European, Caucasian, Balkan, Mediterranean etc. I argue that this
assertion is partially accurate and moreover, each of those identities
possesses sub-identities and understanding Turkey's foreign policy
is quite difficult if those sub-identities are not properly considered.
No wonder, Turkey had any definite policy vis-a-vis those
sub-identities in its 2008 abruptly proposed, and dead at its birth,
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform.
Hence, Turkey's Caucasian identity has Georgian, Azerbaijani,
Abkhazian, Armenian and other visible and invisible facets. Turkey's
historical legacy confirmed the existence of different identities
and the current developments continue the inadvertent process of
self-assertion. Even for the Armenian case, the last report by the
European commission indicated for the first time the emergence of
"crypto-Armenians" in the Eastern regions of Turkey.
How would you explain NATO's position in the Armenian-Turkish
relations?
Turkey represents interests of one of the leadings security alliances
in the world. Being a member of the NATO does not logically lead to
the assumption that Turkey's policies in the South Caucasus are in
line with the NATO principles which view the South Caucasian region
as a strategically important one. From time to time, people pondering
upon the Turkish-Armenian relations and the security in the South
Caucasus tend to forget that Turkey has closed down not only the
border with Armenia, that Turkey not only enforced a political and
economic blockade upon Armenia, that Turkey not only illegally deprived
landlocked Armenia from sea access, but Turkey has also closed down a
border, which is a border between Armenia and NATO. It is therefore,
to think of cooperative security with closed borders is a difficult
enterprise to imagine.
Turkey's blockade and a strive to isolate Armenia even further not
only failed to resolve Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) conflict, but
pushed the parties of the conflict far aside from each other, as its
backtracking from the normalisation process further made Azerbaijan
intransigent and not at all inclined to concessions. For almost two
decades, Turkey's position has exacerbated the situation in the region
and created more dividing lines.
What about Turkey's general position concerning the conflicts in the
South Caucasus?
It is another aspect of Turkey's role in the region. Turkey's policies
towards Abkhazia and Karabakh (Artsakh) are formed through different
channels and therefore have different manifestations. Different
ethnic and lobbying groups influence Turkey's foreign policy vis-a-vis
Abkhazia and Karabakh differently. On different occasions, Turkey has
reassured its compliance with the territorial integrity of Georgia
and Azerbaijan. Has this been a consistent policy? Not really.
Turkish governments came to occupy an entirely distinct position
vis-a-vis Abkhazia, which Georgia considers as a break-away region.
That policy is contrary to what Turkey pursues in the case of
Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), which Azerbaijan considers as a break-away
region too. Turkey is increasingly deepening its economic cooperation
with Abkhazia simultaneously maintaining a strong presence in the
Georgian economy, whereas Turkey not only maintains its border with
Armenia closed, but also imposes political and economic blockade on
Armenia and unequivocally supports the unconstructive position of
Azerbaijan on the Karabakh (Artsakh) conflict.