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The President of Armenia is interested in promotion of European values
and mechanisms which can contribute to the establishment of solid
economic, political, and person-to-person relations between Armenia
and the EU
ArmInfo's interview with Gayane Novikova, Director of the Center for
Strategic Analysis, Yerevan, Armenia, Visiting Scholar at the Davis
Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University
by David Stepanyan
http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=5B1A18F0-309A-11E2-95F3F6327207157C
Saturday, November 17, 12:37
On November 12, 2012, Claude Bartolone, the President of the National
Assembly of France during the official visit of the President of
Armenia in Paris, stated that in France they evaluated highly the
activity of Serzh Sargsyan aimed toward European integration of
Armenia. In your opinion, does a Western- style "renovation" exist in
reality?
There is no univalent answer to this question. The President of
Armenia is interested in promotion of European values and mechanisms
which can contribute to the establishment of solid economic,
political, and person-to-person relations between Armenia and the
European states and institutions, including the European Union.
However, European integration is a long, difficult, and painful
process, which requires in-depth economic, legislative, and
humanitarian reforms. This means that a long period of time will pass
before visible and tangible results - in particular in the human
rights area and especially in the unresolved conflict arena - will
appear. Several other factors also should be kept in mind. First, the
European Union supports the programs which are prioritized by the
partner state. In the case of Armenia these programs focus upon
state-building reforms that rely upon a long-term perspective and are
not very visible to most people. Second, the evaluation of the results
should be based upon the depth and orientation of the reforms. Third,
presently we are not discussing Armenia's EU membership, but creation
of acceptable frameworks and procedures for a durable and progressive
partnership. Of course, there is also a whitewash, covered by the
phrase "certain progress has been made." However, the EU has relevant
punishment mechanisms. As an example I would like to remind you of the
EU decision not to hold the donor conference to help Armenia to
overcome the aftermath of the world economic crisis. Thus, a
constellation of such factors contests the view that viable reforms
are occurring along a linear pathway..
Previously President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan blamed the
international community in implying that a double-standards exists in
regard to the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict . He
referred to the Kosovo example. Now changes have occurred.. What
reason pushed Armenia to change its position?
Of course there are double-standards, defined by the interests of
direct and indirect parties to the conflict. The authors of the
so-called Kosovo model assumed that it cannot be considered and used
as a precedent for the resolution of other ethno-political and
territorial conflicts. However, Russia directly implemented this model
in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts. Armenia and Nagorno
Karabakh also applied it, even while emphasizing that significant
differences exist between the Nagorno Karabakh and Kosovo conflicts.
One of these differences is the following: the violence close to the
center of Europe was stopped by direct NATO military intervention
followed by a peacekeeping operation. These steps did not resolve the
conflict but made it more manageable.
Currently against the background of an increasingly aggressive
rhetoric by the Azerbaijani leadership and its sharp critique of the
OSCE Minsk Group for its "uselessness," the deployment of peacekeepers
in the area of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict could be considered as
rational. However, there are several important factors that speak
against doing so:
- there is no single conflict involving strong ethnic and territorial
components where the deployment of peacekeepers brought sustained
peace;
- there is no apparent interest by external actors to resikve the NK conflict;
- there are no guarantees in regard to the actions of peacekeepers in
the event of a sharp escalation of the conflict (not to mention that
the absence of a peace agreement between the parties to the conflict
constitutes a precondition for the peacekeeping operation).
Developments in the area of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict are unique
because a cease-fire was achieved by the direct parties to the
conflict and it remains in place without external involvement. Under
these conditions a potential exists to resolve the conflict in spite
of Azerbaijani provocations and the double-standard approaches of the
general international community. I am sure that Armenia and the
Nagorno Karabakh Republic should insist upon a continuation of
negotiations.
The legislative body of the New South Wales, the biggest Australian
state, adopted by a solid vote a resolution that recognized the
Nagorno Karabakh republic and its right to self-determination. Earlier
roughly the same resolutions were adopted by two U.S. states: Rhode
Island and Massachusetts. In your opinion, what kind of trend is
indicated by this international process?
I would call the range of events you have listed "an overture" to
international recognition of the NKR, which is in line with the
observable process of establishing new state entities, not only in
Africa (South Sudan). Against the background of discussions in regard
to the independence of Flandreau, Catalonia, and Scotland from,
respectively, Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom and two referenda
on the separation of Quebec from Canada (it is worth mentioning that
all are quite prosperous and relatively stable states), the
possibility to change NKR status from de facto to a de jure state is
not perceived as something strongly negative. After twenty years of a
de facto existence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, and especially
against the background of developments in Azerbaijan, as well as very
serious geopolitical shifts---all of these factors facilitate a
transformation of the discussions on the NKR's independence from the
theoretical to the practical level. These same factors account for the
very predictable nervous reaction of Azerbaijan, and this will
intensify.
What kind of geopolitical shifts can provoke in the region an actual
change of power in Georgia, taking into consideration its geographic
location between Russia, Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan?
I would not exaggerate the significance and effects of a power change
in Georgia. I don't see any signals of a sharp change in its foreign
policy. It is obvious that Russian-Georgian relations will shift from
a hysterical level to a more pragmatic level. However, comprehensive
normalization is still far away. The new leadership offers a quite
acceptable partner for the West, as well as for Azerbaijan and Turkey
(although with some reservations).
Paata Zakareishvili, the Georgian State Minister for Reintegration,
commenting on negative statements from Baku in regard to the
possibility of the restoration of railway service through Abkhazia,
stated: "Georgia is not going to sacrifice its interests in favor of
others." Taking into consideration that it is still unclear what
benefits Georgia itself will receive, does this project have a chance
of success?
There is a significant difference between "to state" and "to do."
Zakareishvili's proposal is a clear claim to create projects which
could serve as alternatives to Russia's initiatives. It will allow an
expansion of contacts between representatives of Georgia and Abkhazia
and initiate the establishment -- or rebuilding - of
confidence-building measures, also through an activation of economic
ties. Furthermore, it will unequivocally increase the international
prestige of the newly-elected leadership of Georgia, which has stated
its willingness to collaborate with the Abkhazian side without
political preconditions. From this viewpoint the project offers direct
benefits for Georgia. The question is whether Georgia possesses the
adequately strong political will and power to withstand Azerbaijani
pressure, which as its strategic partner can not only put economic
pressure upon Georgia, but also provoke some disturbances in
Kvemo-Kartli, for example.
It is necessary to stress also that the opening of the railroad will
first of all strengthen Russia's position in the South Caucasus. In
light of unsettled Russian-Georgian relations it is dangerous for
Georgia itself.
Some experts consider the process of Armenian-Turkish rapprochement as
a problem of global security. In your opinion, what is the Zurich
process nowadays?
I don't think that the settlement of Armenian-Turkish relations is a
priority for Turkey taking into consideration current shifts in global
security, linked first of all to developments in the Middle East and
North Africa, as well as to internal and external problems faced by
this regional power. The Zurich process was initially viewed as a
mechanism to bridge a break in bilateral Armenian-Turkish relations;
however, it gradually lost its potential (founded on the principle
that the development of good-neighbourly relations is always a
positive goal). Re-animation of this process is from my viewpoint not
only absolutely meaningless, but also dangerous. It is necessary to
look for other frameworks and formats, and to consider "Zurich" as a
declaration of intention and nothing more.
and mechanisms which can contribute to the establishment of solid
economic, political, and person-to-person relations between Armenia
and the EU
ArmInfo's interview with Gayane Novikova, Director of the Center for
Strategic Analysis, Yerevan, Armenia, Visiting Scholar at the Davis
Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University
by David Stepanyan
http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=5B1A18F0-309A-11E2-95F3F6327207157C
Saturday, November 17, 12:37
On November 12, 2012, Claude Bartolone, the President of the National
Assembly of France during the official visit of the President of
Armenia in Paris, stated that in France they evaluated highly the
activity of Serzh Sargsyan aimed toward European integration of
Armenia. In your opinion, does a Western- style "renovation" exist in
reality?
There is no univalent answer to this question. The President of
Armenia is interested in promotion of European values and mechanisms
which can contribute to the establishment of solid economic,
political, and person-to-person relations between Armenia and the
European states and institutions, including the European Union.
However, European integration is a long, difficult, and painful
process, which requires in-depth economic, legislative, and
humanitarian reforms. This means that a long period of time will pass
before visible and tangible results - in particular in the human
rights area and especially in the unresolved conflict arena - will
appear. Several other factors also should be kept in mind. First, the
European Union supports the programs which are prioritized by the
partner state. In the case of Armenia these programs focus upon
state-building reforms that rely upon a long-term perspective and are
not very visible to most people. Second, the evaluation of the results
should be based upon the depth and orientation of the reforms. Third,
presently we are not discussing Armenia's EU membership, but creation
of acceptable frameworks and procedures for a durable and progressive
partnership. Of course, there is also a whitewash, covered by the
phrase "certain progress has been made." However, the EU has relevant
punishment mechanisms. As an example I would like to remind you of the
EU decision not to hold the donor conference to help Armenia to
overcome the aftermath of the world economic crisis. Thus, a
constellation of such factors contests the view that viable reforms
are occurring along a linear pathway..
Previously President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan blamed the
international community in implying that a double-standards exists in
regard to the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict . He
referred to the Kosovo example. Now changes have occurred.. What
reason pushed Armenia to change its position?
Of course there are double-standards, defined by the interests of
direct and indirect parties to the conflict. The authors of the
so-called Kosovo model assumed that it cannot be considered and used
as a precedent for the resolution of other ethno-political and
territorial conflicts. However, Russia directly implemented this model
in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts. Armenia and Nagorno
Karabakh also applied it, even while emphasizing that significant
differences exist between the Nagorno Karabakh and Kosovo conflicts.
One of these differences is the following: the violence close to the
center of Europe was stopped by direct NATO military intervention
followed by a peacekeeping operation. These steps did not resolve the
conflict but made it more manageable.
Currently against the background of an increasingly aggressive
rhetoric by the Azerbaijani leadership and its sharp critique of the
OSCE Minsk Group for its "uselessness," the deployment of peacekeepers
in the area of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict could be considered as
rational. However, there are several important factors that speak
against doing so:
- there is no single conflict involving strong ethnic and territorial
components where the deployment of peacekeepers brought sustained
peace;
- there is no apparent interest by external actors to resikve the NK conflict;
- there are no guarantees in regard to the actions of peacekeepers in
the event of a sharp escalation of the conflict (not to mention that
the absence of a peace agreement between the parties to the conflict
constitutes a precondition for the peacekeeping operation).
Developments in the area of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict are unique
because a cease-fire was achieved by the direct parties to the
conflict and it remains in place without external involvement. Under
these conditions a potential exists to resolve the conflict in spite
of Azerbaijani provocations and the double-standard approaches of the
general international community. I am sure that Armenia and the
Nagorno Karabakh Republic should insist upon a continuation of
negotiations.
The legislative body of the New South Wales, the biggest Australian
state, adopted by a solid vote a resolution that recognized the
Nagorno Karabakh republic and its right to self-determination. Earlier
roughly the same resolutions were adopted by two U.S. states: Rhode
Island and Massachusetts. In your opinion, what kind of trend is
indicated by this international process?
I would call the range of events you have listed "an overture" to
international recognition of the NKR, which is in line with the
observable process of establishing new state entities, not only in
Africa (South Sudan). Against the background of discussions in regard
to the independence of Flandreau, Catalonia, and Scotland from,
respectively, Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom and two referenda
on the separation of Quebec from Canada (it is worth mentioning that
all are quite prosperous and relatively stable states), the
possibility to change NKR status from de facto to a de jure state is
not perceived as something strongly negative. After twenty years of a
de facto existence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, and especially
against the background of developments in Azerbaijan, as well as very
serious geopolitical shifts---all of these factors facilitate a
transformation of the discussions on the NKR's independence from the
theoretical to the practical level. These same factors account for the
very predictable nervous reaction of Azerbaijan, and this will
intensify.
What kind of geopolitical shifts can provoke in the region an actual
change of power in Georgia, taking into consideration its geographic
location between Russia, Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan?
I would not exaggerate the significance and effects of a power change
in Georgia. I don't see any signals of a sharp change in its foreign
policy. It is obvious that Russian-Georgian relations will shift from
a hysterical level to a more pragmatic level. However, comprehensive
normalization is still far away. The new leadership offers a quite
acceptable partner for the West, as well as for Azerbaijan and Turkey
(although with some reservations).
Paata Zakareishvili, the Georgian State Minister for Reintegration,
commenting on negative statements from Baku in regard to the
possibility of the restoration of railway service through Abkhazia,
stated: "Georgia is not going to sacrifice its interests in favor of
others." Taking into consideration that it is still unclear what
benefits Georgia itself will receive, does this project have a chance
of success?
There is a significant difference between "to state" and "to do."
Zakareishvili's proposal is a clear claim to create projects which
could serve as alternatives to Russia's initiatives. It will allow an
expansion of contacts between representatives of Georgia and Abkhazia
and initiate the establishment -- or rebuilding - of
confidence-building measures, also through an activation of economic
ties. Furthermore, it will unequivocally increase the international
prestige of the newly-elected leadership of Georgia, which has stated
its willingness to collaborate with the Abkhazian side without
political preconditions. From this viewpoint the project offers direct
benefits for Georgia. The question is whether Georgia possesses the
adequately strong political will and power to withstand Azerbaijani
pressure, which as its strategic partner can not only put economic
pressure upon Georgia, but also provoke some disturbances in
Kvemo-Kartli, for example.
It is necessary to stress also that the opening of the railroad will
first of all strengthen Russia's position in the South Caucasus. In
light of unsettled Russian-Georgian relations it is dangerous for
Georgia itself.
Some experts consider the process of Armenian-Turkish rapprochement as
a problem of global security. In your opinion, what is the Zurich
process nowadays?
I don't think that the settlement of Armenian-Turkish relations is a
priority for Turkey taking into consideration current shifts in global
security, linked first of all to developments in the Middle East and
North Africa, as well as to internal and external problems faced by
this regional power. The Zurich process was initially viewed as a
mechanism to bridge a break in bilateral Armenian-Turkish relations;
however, it gradually lost its potential (founded on the principle
that the development of good-neighbourly relations is always a
positive goal). Re-animation of this process is from my viewpoint not
only absolutely meaningless, but also dangerous. It is necessary to
look for other frameworks and formats, and to consider "Zurich" as a
declaration of intention and nothing more.