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ARMENIA SHOULD PROMOTE INITIATIVES TO NATO
Igor Muradyan
http://www.lragir.am/index.php/eng/0/comments/view/28142
Comments - Friday, 23 November 2012, 10:51
The topic "NATO in the South Caucasus" is becoming more subjective
and meaningful but it is still far from being real presence of NATO.
Moscow still fears something not yet meaningful, more precisely from
a jump of the Alliance to strengthen its presence in the region. Of
course, the Russians have enough possibilities, information and
political resources to understand what may happen in the NATO regional
policy.
It is interesting that currently even after the famous decisions
adopted by the recent NATO summits, the Alliance headquarters do not
understand the definition of "NATO regional policy". We can hear from
some conservative experts (mainly Anglo-Saxons) that the Alliance
does not conduct a regional policy like NATO member states. Experts
from continental NATO members think that NATO will anyway have to
develop a regional policy.
Most probably, having identical tasks but different goals, the
"continental" and "oceanic" states would like to pull toward themselves
the centre of gravity of formation of NATO regional policy.
Currently, the Alliance reacts in a cautious and moderate way to
challenges occurring in the South Caucasus, which is associated with
the NATO policies in other regions. Major problems and conflicts
occur between NATO member states regarding regional issues.
Despite some "inspirational" remarks (not even statements), NATO
does not hurry to confirm its real, military presence in the South
Caucasus and in the Caspian Sea. So far, we deal with its "support"
to the regional countries.
If you believe the media, representatives of NATO are concerned with
threats against the energy sector in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey,
and, ostensibly, start thinking about how to protect oil fields and
pipelines. Apart from Azerbaijan's screams, of course, an important
role in these reflections is played by Turkey, and both countries see
this as an excuse for NATO's participation in solving their problems.
At the same time, when Azerbaijan speaks about threats, it means
Armenia, not Iran.
No matter how reserved the statements of NATO functionaries are,
the Alliance will have to react in some way to these circumstances.
Perhaps, these "challenges" will become a reason for the NATO
intervention in the region in some format.
Following this situation, Armenia can't but react in a decent way.
Armenia has claimed long-term intentions of cooperation with NATO
and its "rights" should not be ignored in the Alliance. Under these
conditions Azerbaijan should not have priority positions.
Armenia has essential factors in the direction of defense of its
positions in NATO. If Azerbaijan's functions have a tendency toward a
static position which is determined by decline of the oil "project"
and Afghanistan's withdrawal from the coalition, Armenia's role,
though still not defined but it has a more dynamic role, since its
role in the policy and strategy of "repression" of Turkey's expansion,
Turkey's distancing from Azerbaijan, as well as its role of a link
between NATO and CSTO keeps growing.
Though Armenia has become more active in its communications with
NATO, the alliance expects more subjective proposals and initiatives
from it. This is necessary for NATO not only for the development of
its policy in the South Caucasus but also for the implementation of
tougher games with the participation of different players.
Turkey's policy is increasingly becoming a factor in boosting
controversies in NATO, and it is justified now consider of relations
between Turkey and NATO as counter-partnership.
Tasked with the combination of Atlantic and Eurasian interests,
Russia could contribute to Armenia's policy toward NATO, and it
is no longer possible to be seen as fantasy and contradiction. The
political and military leadership of Armenia cannot take advantage of
real opportunities to work with NATO to ensure national security. It
is necessary to pass from the perception of external initiatives
(even very positive for our country) to our initiatives.
Igor Muradyan
http://www.lragir.am/index.php/eng/0/comments/view/28142
Comments - Friday, 23 November 2012, 10:51
The topic "NATO in the South Caucasus" is becoming more subjective
and meaningful but it is still far from being real presence of NATO.
Moscow still fears something not yet meaningful, more precisely from
a jump of the Alliance to strengthen its presence in the region. Of
course, the Russians have enough possibilities, information and
political resources to understand what may happen in the NATO regional
policy.
It is interesting that currently even after the famous decisions
adopted by the recent NATO summits, the Alliance headquarters do not
understand the definition of "NATO regional policy". We can hear from
some conservative experts (mainly Anglo-Saxons) that the Alliance
does not conduct a regional policy like NATO member states. Experts
from continental NATO members think that NATO will anyway have to
develop a regional policy.
Most probably, having identical tasks but different goals, the
"continental" and "oceanic" states would like to pull toward themselves
the centre of gravity of formation of NATO regional policy.
Currently, the Alliance reacts in a cautious and moderate way to
challenges occurring in the South Caucasus, which is associated with
the NATO policies in other regions. Major problems and conflicts
occur between NATO member states regarding regional issues.
Despite some "inspirational" remarks (not even statements), NATO
does not hurry to confirm its real, military presence in the South
Caucasus and in the Caspian Sea. So far, we deal with its "support"
to the regional countries.
If you believe the media, representatives of NATO are concerned with
threats against the energy sector in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey,
and, ostensibly, start thinking about how to protect oil fields and
pipelines. Apart from Azerbaijan's screams, of course, an important
role in these reflections is played by Turkey, and both countries see
this as an excuse for NATO's participation in solving their problems.
At the same time, when Azerbaijan speaks about threats, it means
Armenia, not Iran.
No matter how reserved the statements of NATO functionaries are,
the Alliance will have to react in some way to these circumstances.
Perhaps, these "challenges" will become a reason for the NATO
intervention in the region in some format.
Following this situation, Armenia can't but react in a decent way.
Armenia has claimed long-term intentions of cooperation with NATO
and its "rights" should not be ignored in the Alliance. Under these
conditions Azerbaijan should not have priority positions.
Armenia has essential factors in the direction of defense of its
positions in NATO. If Azerbaijan's functions have a tendency toward a
static position which is determined by decline of the oil "project"
and Afghanistan's withdrawal from the coalition, Armenia's role,
though still not defined but it has a more dynamic role, since its
role in the policy and strategy of "repression" of Turkey's expansion,
Turkey's distancing from Azerbaijan, as well as its role of a link
between NATO and CSTO keeps growing.
Though Armenia has become more active in its communications with
NATO, the alliance expects more subjective proposals and initiatives
from it. This is necessary for NATO not only for the development of
its policy in the South Caucasus but also for the implementation of
tougher games with the participation of different players.
Turkey's policy is increasingly becoming a factor in boosting
controversies in NATO, and it is justified now consider of relations
between Turkey and NATO as counter-partnership.
Tasked with the combination of Atlantic and Eurasian interests,
Russia could contribute to Armenia's policy toward NATO, and it
is no longer possible to be seen as fantasy and contradiction. The
political and military leadership of Armenia cannot take advantage of
real opportunities to work with NATO to ensure national security. It
is necessary to pass from the perception of external initiatives
(even very positive for our country) to our initiatives.