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TURKEY'S WEAKEST EXPORT
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/21/turkeys_weakest_export?page=full
TURKEY SAYS IT WANTS TO BE A MODEL FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
BUT SO FAR ITS ACTIONS LAG BEHIND ITS ACHIEVEMENTS.
BY GAMZE COÅ~^KUN | NOVEMBER 21, 2012
The Arab Spring has prompted a lot of talk about Turkey's possible
role as a model. Turkey's recent economic success and the relative
liberality of its institutions have made it a point of reference to
many in the Middle East.
Let's leave aside for the moment the issue of whether the Arabs really
need a role model, since they're perfectly capable of establishing
their own system without copying either Turkey or the West. Being a
model is not only about having a well-functioning democratic system
but also having the capacity to be able to foster it domestically
and internationally and to be able to put rhetoric and aims into
action. Does Turkey really offer a useful template for democratic
values and institution building?
First of all, it's worth taking a look at Turkey's capabilities.
While there has been considerable discussion of Turkey's role in the
region, a look at the country's diplomatic, economic, and soft-power
resources is sobering. Though Turkey has 25 diplomatic missions in
the Arab countries, at last count only six of the 135 staffers in
these missions actually spoke Arabic. Needless to say, this says
a lot about Turkey's ability -- and perhaps its willingness -- to
develop wide-ranging diplomatic relationships throughout the MENA
(Middle East and North Africa). Furthermore, although Turkey's trade
relations with the region are frequently cited, most of its exports
are based on natural resources and low-technology (56 percent),
followed by medium-technology goods (40.5 percent). Its share of
high-tech exports to the region remains low (3.5 percent in 2010).
This suggests that Turkey is not necessarily one of the main economic
competitors in the region, a factor that will tend to limit its
influence.
My previous employer, the Turkish think tank USAK, has published a
report offering some useful data for assessing Turkey's capacity as
an economic and diplomatic actor in the Arab world. A USAK report --
which includes the data mentioned above -- shows that there is much
that needs to be done if Turkey wishes to increase its credibility
as a regional role model. Currently, Turkey is far from having the
capabilities to take action in line with its rhetoric. This doesn't
exactly inspire confidence in Ankara's ability to project its influence
into more dysfunctional Middle Eastern states.
Let's take "soft power" for a moment. The report notes that, while
Turkish state TV began Arabic-language broadcasting to the Arab
countries in 2010, its presence on the airwaves still lags far behind
other Arabic satellite broadcasters -- not to mention Arabic-language
broadcasting from the western countries, Russia, and Iran. (The report
also notes that Turkish TV dramas are highly popular around the region
-- though some polling figures suggest that more conservative segments
of local populations often regard these shows as a bad influence.) Of
the 9,374 foreign students who chose to study in Turkey in 2011,
a mere 1,123 (12 percent of the total) were Arabs.
This suggests that the talk of Turkish soft power influence might
require a bit of qualification.
Despite its structural shortcomings, Turkey has undeniably been
working hard to develop its political and economic ties within the
broader region. (The photo above shows Turkey's Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan arriving in Cairo for an official visit on Nov. 17.)
Yet Ankara has offered little in the way of concrete measures to
promote democracy or safeguard human rights. Generally the Turkish
government prefers to stick to the principle of non-intervention and
non-interference in other countries' internal affairs. Although this
so-called zero problems policy has helped Turkey to establish good
relations with the MENA countries, the non-intervention aspect of
this policy has somewhat hindered Turkey's open emphasis on democracy
promotion. Most notably, the cases of Syria and Libya have exposed
the contradiction between Turkey's claim to support democracy and
its reluctance to undertake actions that would amount to concrete
support for pro-democracy forces within specific countries.
And that, perhaps, is somewhat symptomatic of a larger problem. When
Turkey mentions the subject of democracy promotion at all, it usually
does so in the context of cooperation with its partners in the West.
While this is understandable in light of Turkey's underdeveloped
capacity, such talk is also likely to undermine that entire
undertaking. Some segments of Arab society already perceive Turkey
as a tool of the United States and Europe -- in conjunction with a
widespread notion among Arabs that Turks tend to be "Western-minded"
whether they are liberals, Islamists, or conservatives. If cooperation
with the West is a given, then Turkish policymakers need to devise
clear strategies for neutralizing such accusations.
Not everything has to be done by the government, of course. In addition
to putting forth a clear national agenda, civil society organizations
can also play a key role in expanding Turkey's influence. Yet even
these options currently remain starkly limited.
Turkish non-government organizations lack the relevant know-how
and skills to exercise influence in the region. Notwithstanding
their well-meaning rhetoric about respect, dignity, sympathy, and
understanding, all too often Turkish NGOs seem to have difficulties
developing concrete plans or agendas and making them more public and
affecting the policy-makers.
Still, there is great potential for NGOs and the rapidly growing
civil society sector in Turkey to cooperate with the Arab countries.
NGOs can organize events on political, economic, and social topics,
share their experiences, and shape public opinion. They can identify
the needs of societies and even can help to find out the best policies
for the newly emerging governments to address the problems.
These kinds of efforts may also help to change mutual misperceptions
as well as sharing relevant Turkish experience of democracy and civil
liberties that can help both sides to foster their own democratic
transformations.
Turkey still has a long way to go in developing its own democratic
institutions. We still face enormous challenges in protecting
civil liberties and reforming our judicial system, to name but two
crucial elements on the path toward genuine democracy. There is still
considerable debate within Turkey about the extent of press freedom,
the imprisonment of dissidents, and so forth. This is unavoidable,
given that the road toward democracy is never perfect. But such issues
invariably create doubts about the consistency of the Turkish model
in the international community.
Turkey also faces problems when it comes to projecting its political
influence. Turkey still lacks an in-depth understanding of the
internal dynamics of the MENA countries (even if its knowledge of
the region is still better than that of its partners in Europe or
the United States). A major factor is the ongoing Kurdish conflict,
which creates an additional constraint in Turkey's dealings with Syria,
Iraq, and Iran. This not only makes it harder for Ankara to implement
its agenda, but also ends up creating many misperceptions about its
policies in the Arab world.
In short, Turkey faces many serious obstacles when it comes to
advertising the advantages of its system. Its pro-Western image,
its limited capacity to project influence, and the divide between
rhetoric and reality are all part of the problem. So, too, are its
social and political differences from the Arab countries in respect
to the understanding of society, ideology, secularism and Islam,
and so on. While I think it's basically true to assume that Turkey's
Muslim identity will help it to argue the virtues of democracy to the
Arab countries, these fundamental differences in culture are sure to
complicate matters.
There is no doubt that Turkey can make an impact and has a role to play
in the region. But its inherent weaknesses mean that actual ability to
become a role model and source of inspiration will remain constrained
for some time to come. Turkey has to analyze itsdeficiencies in this
respect if it seriously aims to have a credible regional role.
I believe that our country does have a constructive role to play
in the region. But its influence is likely to remain minimal unless
Turkey makes a much more concerted effort to assert its credibility
and effectiveness in the Middle Eastern transition process. The Arab
countries are unlikely to be impressed by high-minded Turkish rhetoric
unless we offer effective action to back it up.
/AFP/Getty Image
[arr-indent.gif] SUBJECTS: POLITICS, DEVELOPMENT, HUMANRIGHTS,
RELIGION, ECONOMICS, GLOBALIZATION, MEDIA, CULTURE,ISLAM, DIPL OMACY,
RACE/ETHNICITY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TURKEY, DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRACY
LAB, ARAB WORLD
Gamze CoÅ~_kun is an Ankara-based freelance researcher on the Middle
East.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/21/turkeys_weakest_export?page=full
TURKEY SAYS IT WANTS TO BE A MODEL FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
BUT SO FAR ITS ACTIONS LAG BEHIND ITS ACHIEVEMENTS.
BY GAMZE COÅ~^KUN | NOVEMBER 21, 2012
The Arab Spring has prompted a lot of talk about Turkey's possible
role as a model. Turkey's recent economic success and the relative
liberality of its institutions have made it a point of reference to
many in the Middle East.
Let's leave aside for the moment the issue of whether the Arabs really
need a role model, since they're perfectly capable of establishing
their own system without copying either Turkey or the West. Being a
model is not only about having a well-functioning democratic system
but also having the capacity to be able to foster it domestically
and internationally and to be able to put rhetoric and aims into
action. Does Turkey really offer a useful template for democratic
values and institution building?
First of all, it's worth taking a look at Turkey's capabilities.
While there has been considerable discussion of Turkey's role in the
region, a look at the country's diplomatic, economic, and soft-power
resources is sobering. Though Turkey has 25 diplomatic missions in
the Arab countries, at last count only six of the 135 staffers in
these missions actually spoke Arabic. Needless to say, this says
a lot about Turkey's ability -- and perhaps its willingness -- to
develop wide-ranging diplomatic relationships throughout the MENA
(Middle East and North Africa). Furthermore, although Turkey's trade
relations with the region are frequently cited, most of its exports
are based on natural resources and low-technology (56 percent),
followed by medium-technology goods (40.5 percent). Its share of
high-tech exports to the region remains low (3.5 percent in 2010).
This suggests that Turkey is not necessarily one of the main economic
competitors in the region, a factor that will tend to limit its
influence.
My previous employer, the Turkish think tank USAK, has published a
report offering some useful data for assessing Turkey's capacity as
an economic and diplomatic actor in the Arab world. A USAK report --
which includes the data mentioned above -- shows that there is much
that needs to be done if Turkey wishes to increase its credibility
as a regional role model. Currently, Turkey is far from having the
capabilities to take action in line with its rhetoric. This doesn't
exactly inspire confidence in Ankara's ability to project its influence
into more dysfunctional Middle Eastern states.
Let's take "soft power" for a moment. The report notes that, while
Turkish state TV began Arabic-language broadcasting to the Arab
countries in 2010, its presence on the airwaves still lags far behind
other Arabic satellite broadcasters -- not to mention Arabic-language
broadcasting from the western countries, Russia, and Iran. (The report
also notes that Turkish TV dramas are highly popular around the region
-- though some polling figures suggest that more conservative segments
of local populations often regard these shows as a bad influence.) Of
the 9,374 foreign students who chose to study in Turkey in 2011,
a mere 1,123 (12 percent of the total) were Arabs.
This suggests that the talk of Turkish soft power influence might
require a bit of qualification.
Despite its structural shortcomings, Turkey has undeniably been
working hard to develop its political and economic ties within the
broader region. (The photo above shows Turkey's Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan arriving in Cairo for an official visit on Nov. 17.)
Yet Ankara has offered little in the way of concrete measures to
promote democracy or safeguard human rights. Generally the Turkish
government prefers to stick to the principle of non-intervention and
non-interference in other countries' internal affairs. Although this
so-called zero problems policy has helped Turkey to establish good
relations with the MENA countries, the non-intervention aspect of
this policy has somewhat hindered Turkey's open emphasis on democracy
promotion. Most notably, the cases of Syria and Libya have exposed
the contradiction between Turkey's claim to support democracy and
its reluctance to undertake actions that would amount to concrete
support for pro-democracy forces within specific countries.
And that, perhaps, is somewhat symptomatic of a larger problem. When
Turkey mentions the subject of democracy promotion at all, it usually
does so in the context of cooperation with its partners in the West.
While this is understandable in light of Turkey's underdeveloped
capacity, such talk is also likely to undermine that entire
undertaking. Some segments of Arab society already perceive Turkey
as a tool of the United States and Europe -- in conjunction with a
widespread notion among Arabs that Turks tend to be "Western-minded"
whether they are liberals, Islamists, or conservatives. If cooperation
with the West is a given, then Turkish policymakers need to devise
clear strategies for neutralizing such accusations.
Not everything has to be done by the government, of course. In addition
to putting forth a clear national agenda, civil society organizations
can also play a key role in expanding Turkey's influence. Yet even
these options currently remain starkly limited.
Turkish non-government organizations lack the relevant know-how
and skills to exercise influence in the region. Notwithstanding
their well-meaning rhetoric about respect, dignity, sympathy, and
understanding, all too often Turkish NGOs seem to have difficulties
developing concrete plans or agendas and making them more public and
affecting the policy-makers.
Still, there is great potential for NGOs and the rapidly growing
civil society sector in Turkey to cooperate with the Arab countries.
NGOs can organize events on political, economic, and social topics,
share their experiences, and shape public opinion. They can identify
the needs of societies and even can help to find out the best policies
for the newly emerging governments to address the problems.
These kinds of efforts may also help to change mutual misperceptions
as well as sharing relevant Turkish experience of democracy and civil
liberties that can help both sides to foster their own democratic
transformations.
Turkey still has a long way to go in developing its own democratic
institutions. We still face enormous challenges in protecting
civil liberties and reforming our judicial system, to name but two
crucial elements on the path toward genuine democracy. There is still
considerable debate within Turkey about the extent of press freedom,
the imprisonment of dissidents, and so forth. This is unavoidable,
given that the road toward democracy is never perfect. But such issues
invariably create doubts about the consistency of the Turkish model
in the international community.
Turkey also faces problems when it comes to projecting its political
influence. Turkey still lacks an in-depth understanding of the
internal dynamics of the MENA countries (even if its knowledge of
the region is still better than that of its partners in Europe or
the United States). A major factor is the ongoing Kurdish conflict,
which creates an additional constraint in Turkey's dealings with Syria,
Iraq, and Iran. This not only makes it harder for Ankara to implement
its agenda, but also ends up creating many misperceptions about its
policies in the Arab world.
In short, Turkey faces many serious obstacles when it comes to
advertising the advantages of its system. Its pro-Western image,
its limited capacity to project influence, and the divide between
rhetoric and reality are all part of the problem. So, too, are its
social and political differences from the Arab countries in respect
to the understanding of society, ideology, secularism and Islam,
and so on. While I think it's basically true to assume that Turkey's
Muslim identity will help it to argue the virtues of democracy to the
Arab countries, these fundamental differences in culture are sure to
complicate matters.
There is no doubt that Turkey can make an impact and has a role to play
in the region. But its inherent weaknesses mean that actual ability to
become a role model and source of inspiration will remain constrained
for some time to come. Turkey has to analyze itsdeficiencies in this
respect if it seriously aims to have a credible regional role.
I believe that our country does have a constructive role to play
in the region. But its influence is likely to remain minimal unless
Turkey makes a much more concerted effort to assert its credibility
and effectiveness in the Middle Eastern transition process. The Arab
countries are unlikely to be impressed by high-minded Turkish rhetoric
unless we offer effective action to back it up.
/AFP/Getty Image
[arr-indent.gif] SUBJECTS: POLITICS, DEVELOPMENT, HUMANRIGHTS,
RELIGION, ECONOMICS, GLOBALIZATION, MEDIA, CULTURE,ISLAM, DIPL OMACY,
RACE/ETHNICITY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TURKEY, DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRACY
LAB, ARAB WORLD
Gamze CoÅ~_kun is an Ankara-based freelance researcher on the Middle
East.