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CALL FOR URGENT MEASURES FOR ENSURING THE LEGITIMACY OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN ARMENIA
http://hetq.am/eng/opinion/20973/call-for-urgent-measures-for-ensuring-the-legitimacy-of-electoral-processes-in-armenia.html
22:19, November 27, 2012
Executive Summary
In spite of democratic principles prescribed by Armenia's constitution,
the electoral process has failed to provide a means for free and fair
formations and/or changes of the political power.
Elections in Armenia are typically accompanied by a number of
violations that call into question the integrity of the administration
of the process and the legitimacy of the outcomes of elections. There
is an urgent need for Armenia to reestablish public trust in the
legitimacy of the government in order to ensure the success of its
political, economic and social reforms and rehabilitate its reputation
as a democratic country. As electoral violations, among other factors,
are caused by the deficiency of the Electoral Code, it is critical
to introduce certain amendments to this legal act before presidential
elections of 2013.
A legitimate democratic government requires free, fair, transparent
elections and the peaceful transfer of power and must pay more than
lip service to the notion that power rests with its citizens and thus
endeavor to ensure structures and processes that accurately represent
the will of the people.
This document describes the major problems of the Armenian electoral
legislation, raises questions concerning the legitimacy of elections
and suggests solutions to remove corrupt practices and ensure
acceptable outcomes for the upcoming elections.
Introduction
The Republic of Armenia is a constitutional democracy. "In the Republic
of Armenia the power belongs to the people. The people exercise their
power through free elections, referenda, as well as through state
and local self-governing bodies and public officials as provided
by the Constitution. The usurpation of power by any organization or
individual constitutes a crime" (RA Constitution, Article 2).In spite
of these strong provisions in the Armenian Constitution, since 1995 -
the year of its adoption - almost no national or local elections in
Armenia have taken place on the basis of the expression of the free
will of its citizens.
Elections in Armenia are usually accompanied by serious violations,
such as multiple voting, vote-buying, a 'carousel' of pre-elected
ballots, terror tactics and intimidation of voters, observers and
proxies, ballot box stuffing, and the falsification of results,
that are not adequately pursued by law enforcement bodies and or
sentencing by courts. Hence, elections are naturally followed by
turmoil and protests of people challenging the legitimacy of results.
The culmination of such practices was the presidential election of
2008, when the civic unrest against controversial elections was met
with the government's use of police and military force and which
resulted in the death of at least 10 people.
A recent Gallup poll indicates that only 13% percent of women and 12%
of men in Armenia are confident in the honesty of elections. This
lack of confidence places Armenia as one of the three lowest ranking
countries (along with Haiti and Mongolia), within the list of 125,
with the lowest trust.[1] Electoral processes are broadly perceived
to be a public ceremony and merely serve to appease the concerns and
certain principles of Western democracies.
In reality, Armenian elections have further entrenched the intransigent
oligarchic structure and guaranteed the continued reproduction of the
existing political forces in which there is no legitimate role for
citizens and their votes. Armenian citizens have become increasingly
disappointed in the electoral process and democratic institutions. The
'elected' authorities are not recognized as legitimate and, hence,
it is not surprising when those act against the interests of their
constituencies. Meanwhile, the recognition of the integrity of
electoral processes and the authority of elected persons by the
citizens of Armenia is critical to the development of democratic
processes and the progress of its political, economic and social
reforms.
Though a significant number of electoral violations have taken place
due to improper enforcement, the key mechanisms challenging the
legitimacy of elections are rooted in the Electoral Code of Armenia.
Multiple and continuous changes to the electoral legislation have
considerably improved the quality of administration of elections,
nevertheless, in general, they have resulted in the development
of a more sophisticated arsenal of fraudulent practices. Electoral
violations have merely become 'softer' and have replaced violence and
disorder with raw intimidation, vote-buying and hidden transgressions.
We believe that the current lack of legitimacy of the Armenian
authorities may be recovered solely through the ensured integrity
of subsequent elections that will simply require demonstration of
the political will of the incumbent administration and, among other
measures, changes to the Electoral Code.
Problem Definition
The Electoral Code has a number of deficiencies that affect the
quality of administration of elections and assurance of their free
and fair nature. One major reason for this is that the Armenian
lawmakers failed to address all the recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR
after the elections of 2007-2008.[2]Nevertheless, the most important
problems questioning the legitimacy of elections relate to the misuse
of administrative resources, inflated voter lists and distortion of
voting processes.[3]
Misuse of administrative resources
Most of the elections in Armenia demonstrate widespread abuse of
administrative resources that typically serve the interests of the
ruling party or the incumbent president. Though the Electoral Code
contains a few restrictions, such as the prohibition of engaging in
campaigns and distributing campaign materials for state and local
bodies and officers, employees of educational establishments, members
of the constitutional court, judges, employees of law enforcement
bodies and military, and for members of electoral commissions,[4]and
the further prohibition to use office space, means of transport and
communication, material and human resources,[5] these provisions
are very limited. The reality reveals a widespread abuse of
public resources that creates unequal conditions for political
parties/candidates and oftentimes affects the expression of the free
will of citizens.
* During the parliamentary elections of 2012, senior officials, such
as the president, prime-minister, ministers, and marzpets (regional
governors) were actively engaged in the election campaign in favor
of the Republican Party of Armenia along with carrying out their
official duties and using public resources (including the accompanying
personnel and other participating officials, transportation, work
time).[6] Media coverage for such campaigns was characterized as
"official information" rather than a campaign activity, thus adding
to the time allocated per political party and distorting the equality
of the publicity to the opposition parties.
* Leaders of educational establishments were instructed to ensure
the attendance of their faculty and students (including kindergarten
students) in the campaign meetings of senior officials, particularly
in the regions.[7] * Community leaders in a number of municipalities
took active part in elections as campaigners and proxies, putting
direct pressure on citizens and often guiding their voting.[8] *
The Electoral Code contains an exhaustible list of expenditures
that are required to be paid from the election fund of candidates
and made publicly accessible. This list however is limited to the
campaign materials distributed via mass media, the costs of offices
and meeting venues, posters and print materials, thus leaving out
other possible expenditures, such as outdoor events, transportation,
labor, and so forth resulting in the concealment of potential uses
of administrative resources. In addition, there is no mandatory
requirement to open an election fund.
* The Electoral Code restricts the voting for Armenian citizens
abroad. However, it creates the possibility for electronic voting
for the officers of the diplomatic and consular corps, their family
members and representative offices of Armenian companies.
Given the general restriction for citizens of Armenia, this special
treatment for public servants and Armenian company representatives
is somewhat controversial. This concern is exacerbated by the general
mistrust in the confidentiality of electronic voting.
* Electoral legislation prohibits candidates, political parties and
alliances of political parties to give (promise) - in person or via
someone else on their behalf, or in any other manner,gratuitously
or on preferential conditions - money, food, securities, goods or
services to voters. Meanwhile, in practice all these acts are done
also by the authorities themselves (e.g.
decision to waive due taxes) and, actually, start earlier than the
period of election campaigns.
Inflated voters' lists
Many people in Armenia have doubts about the legitimacy of elections
due to the lack of trust, among other issues, in the accuracy of
the voter lists. It is commonly perceived that these lists serve as
a means to manipulate voting results. The Electoral Code stipulates
that the voter lists include citizens of Armenia that are registered
at an address in the country. This includes people who left the
country years ago, but have not de-registered from the respective
lists of residents. Factors that aggravate the distrust of citizens
are the following:
* The number of voters during the Armenian parliamentary elections
of 2007 was approximately 2.3 million people,[9] the presidential
elections of 2008 - about 2.3 million[10] and the parliamentary
elections of 2012 - about 2.5 mln.[11] Explanations by the government
to the contrary, this increase in the number of voters is rather
dubious given the continuous process of emigration, which according to
the State Migration Service, amounts to approximately 25,000 people
annually[12] and during the first 10 months of 2011 reached about
81,000 persons.[13] * Monitoring of voters lists and electoral numbers
have revealed that in 54 communities the number of voters exceeded the
number of actual residents.[14] Voter lists also revealed a significant
number of facts of registration of people under strange addresses, such
as church yards, gas stations, and simple wrong addresses.[15] * Video
materials circulated on youtube showed the distribution of a number
of passports around precincts on voting day, during the parliamentary
elections of May 2012 that indicated their possible use for multiple
voting.[16] These cases were not pursued by law enforcement bodies
resulting in the interpretation that law enforcement officials were
aware of these activities and actively protecting them. In parallel,
there was a deficiency of new passports throughout the country that
strengthened the hypothesis that the printed passports have been used
for other purposes. On the other hand, the major measure designed
to exclude the possibility of multiple voting - the stamping of
passports - failed as the stamps, intended to last for 12 hours,
evaporated within one hour after the voting.
* The issue of the development of supplementary lists of voters
on the day of elections is also controversial. There were 15,363
people (people whose names were not listed in the record books, who
were not registered, who wanted to vote at places of their current
residence rather than traveling to the places of their permanent
registration, or who were patients receiving stationary treatment)
on these lists during the parliamentary elections of 2012, whereas
the lack of transparency in their development and the difficulty to
monitor raises serious concerns over the integrity of those lists.
* There is no possibility for the citizens Armenia to make sure that
their relatives and neighbors, who left Armenia many years ago, do not
'appear' and 'vote' during the elections. The existing possibilities
for the proxies, observers and mass media representatives to get
familiar with the signed lists, do not actually allow for collecting
complete information, analyzing and revealing potential violations.
Distortion of voting processes
In accordance with the Electoral Code, electoral commissions
count and record certain activities/numbers related to the voting
process, the level of consistency of which indicates the extent of
the efficient execution and legitimacy of processes, revealing the
risks of ballot box stuffing, falsification of signatures, 'carousel'
voting (circulating already voted ballots), etc. Consistency implies
that certain sets of electoral numbers shall "match", such as the
number of provided ballots with the sum of the canceled, valid and
invalid ballots; the number of signatures in record books with the
sum of the valid and invalid ballots; the number of envelopes of
established samples with the sum of valid and invalid ballots.
Monitoring of the numbers in the parliamentary elections of 2012
exposed discrepancies that raised questions regarding the integrity
of voting processes while analyses of electoral legislation revealed
that many illegalities are concealed by their respective legal clauses.
There were about 17,889 inconsistencies (among the number of provided
ballots, the number of canceled, valid and invalid ballots, the number
of signatures, the number of envelopes of established samples) revealed
in 1436 precincts, which is 72% of all in the country.[17] Meanwhile,
according to the Electoral Code only a limited set of inconsistencies
have been accounted for as inaccuracies. Inconsistencies related to
the surplus of provided ballots against the sum of canceled, valid
and invalid ballots (e.g.
occurred due to 'carousel' voting) or the surplus of signatures
in record books (e.g. occurred due to adding additional falsified
signatures) were nullified in accordance with legislation.
* The Head of the Central Electoral Commission explained, absolutely,
all the inconsistencies of electoral numbers, by wrongful insertion
of more than one ballot within envelopes - making the claim that
they were 'envelopes of a non-established sample'. However, as the
Electoral Code does not mandate the calculation of such envelopes, as
well as the ballots within those, doubts were raised, and still exist,
about their actual contents and the credibility of the explanation. *
The Electoral Code does not provide for an opportunity to challenge
the quality and legitimacy of elections based on the number of
inconsistencies revealed.
* Information on voters' participation reported once every three
hours is troubling as it indicates that there is not reasonable time
allocated for voters to duly complete the entire cycle of voting and
thus creates doubts about the legality of processes taking place
in electoral precincts. In a considerable number of precincts the
reported number of voters exceeded the reasonable service capacity of
the precinct: the voting of citizens in 713 precincts for at least
three hours continued at an unrealistically rapid pace, allocating
less than 60 seconds for each participant to complete the entire
process of voting.[18] This process consists of finding a name in
the register, signing by the name, getting two sets of ballots and
envelopes, entering the ballot box, finding and selecting the name of
the political party and candidate, folding and placing the ballots in
respective envelopes, reaching the ballot box, getting the envelopes
signed, and depositing envelopes in their respective boxes. This pace
was not realistic even for the military, who entered the precinct in
organized rows and participated only in proportional voting. On the
contrary, in 20 precincts, participation of voters indicated 'negative'
trends, whereas the number of participants reported for the given 3
hours was less than that of the previous reporting period.[19]
Solutions
In order to restore the trust of people in elections and ensure its
legitimacy, the Armenian government must take urgent measures for its
upcoming presidential elections by first and foremost addressing the
issues of the misuse of administrative resources, inflation of voters'
lists and the distortion of electoral processes and making respective
amendments in the Electoral Code.
In particular, we urge the authorities of Armenia to implement the
following measures:
Administrative resources
1. To put maximum restrictions on the use of administrative resources
during the election, limiting participation of senior officials in
elections campaigns, limiting the capacity of community leaders to
serve as proxies of candidates, making transparent all the expenditures
of candidates, strengthening mechanisms for punishments for the
abuse of administrative resources and removing the electronic voting
mechanisms for diplomatic and consular representations and missions.
This measure requires an amendment to Electoral Code Article 18 par.
4 (to ban involvement of juveniles in the campaign) and par 7. (to
restrict charity activities for a longer period), Article 22 par. 1
(to mandate candidates to suspend their official duties during
the campaign), Article 25 par. 1 (to mandate opening of election
funds), par. 6 (to fix maximum amounts for the election funds and for
contributions to those) and par. 7 (to expand the scope of data on
persons making contributions to election funds), Article 26 par. 2
(to mandate candidates to declare all campaign expenditures),
Article 27 par. 1 (to expand the scope of data on expenditures from
election funds), Article 32 par. 3 (to ban public servants acting
as proxies), Article 60 (to remove the electronic voting mechanism),
Article 87 par. 2 (to mandate all presidential candidates, including
the incumbent or the acting president, to suspend their official
duties before the conclusion of election results), Article 107 par. 2
(to mandate all MP candidates to suspend their official duties before
the conclusion of the election campaign).
Voter lists
1. To post at precincts and publicize via internet with the possibility
to download and search the voter lists with signatures and additional
lists to prevent the misuse of names of absent persons or multiple
voting.
Given the increasing distrust of the Armenian people towards the
authorities, publicizing of the voters' lists provides the only
alternative to rebuild the faith of citizens in the electoral process
and in the newly formed government, as it will allow people to verify
the names of actual voters and oversee the legality of processes.
While the contrary - the strict adherence to the 'no publicizing'
rule on the background of other violations is not understandable,
but rather is doubtful.[20] Though the publicity of actual voters'
names in record books is not advised by the Venice Commission, the
necessity of such a step in Armenia is conditioned with the utmost
public interest and will serve at least as an intermediate measure
before introducing other regulations to completely remove the concerns
related to the inflation of voter lists.
Implementation of these recommendations will require amendments
to Electoral Code Article 7 par. 1 (to limit the voting right of
citizens having no registration in the country), Article 8 par 3
(to develop a list of both types of voters - those that deregister
from their previous address and reregister at a new address) and
par. 4 (to remove the mechanism of inclusion of citizens having no
registration in the country), Article 11 par. 1 (to mandate publicity
of voter lists, including deregistration and supplementary ones, in
respective precincts and via internet), Article 12 par.2 (to restrict
the possibility for development of supplementary voter lists on the
day of elections), Article 31 par. 1 (to provide observers and mass
media with access to the lists signed by voters), Article 33 par. 1
(to provide proxies with access to the lists signed by voters)
and Article 44 (to require signatures of the head and secretary of
precinct electoral commissions on the actual voters lists).
Voting process
1. To calculate and record all types of discrepancies in numbers
reflecting the quality of the voting process as inaccuracies as
well as to ensure that in cases of a certain percentage of observed
inaccuracies the results of the elections in the given precinct shall
be recognized to be invalid. To take measures to equip the inside
and outside entrances of precincts with videocameras to monitor the
whole process of elections.
These measures will stipulate amendments to Electoral Code Article 55
(to require videocameras to the list of accessories of the precinct),
Article 67 par. 7 (to require calculation of both ballots and
envelopes of non-established samples), Article 72 par. 1 (to remove the
requirement of nullification of any discrepancies in voting numbers),
Article 71 (to record all inconsistencies in electoral numbers),
Article 72 (to recognize precinct elections as invalid based on a
percentage of reported inaccuracies/discrepancies).
Summary
Citizens of Armenia are disappointed in the institute of elections
given the continuous failure to ensure the peaceful transfer of
governmental power through lawful, free and fair elections, putting
under question the legitimacy of any government remaining in or
acceding to power. The Government of Armenia needs to undertake
concrete and urgent measures to reestablish the public trust in the
electoral system and ensure free, fair and transparent presidential
elections starting from February 2013.
We hereby demand that the Armenian authorities demonstrate the
political will necessary to make amendments to the Electoral Code
in order to restrain the possibilities for misuse of administrative
resources, minimize applications of undue pressure on the formulation
and expression of the free will of citizens, restrict abuses of voter
lists, conceal violations and falsifications in order to remove the
controversy over the legitimacy of elections.
We also appeal to international organizations that are interested and
engaged in the democratic development of Armenia to urge the Armenian
authorities to make the amendments to the Electoral Code. Acceptance of
ill-administered election results by the international organizations
does not contribute to the credibility of those organizations, nor to
their respect, putting under question the western values of democracy.
Transparency International Anti-corruption Center NGO
Europe in Law Association NGO
Protection of Rights Without Borders NGO
Rule of the Right NGO
Helsinki Citizens' Assembly Vanadzor Office" NGO
_________________________
[1]http://www.gallup.com/poll/157997/women-worldwide-less-confident-men-elec
tions.aspx
[2]http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/26606 andhttp://www.osce.org/
odihr/elections/armenia/32115
[3] Some of these issues have been pointed out and discussed in
the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report published
in May 2012, available onhttp://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/91643
[4] Article 18, par. 6
[5] Article 22, par. 2
[6] The crowdsourcing internet resource of electoral
violations www.iditord.org has received reports on the campaigning
during official visits by President, Prime Minister, Deputy Minister
of Youth and Sports, Prosecutor General, Marzpets of Kotayk and Syunik
and mid-level officers working in law enforcement bodies.
[7]www.iditord.org has received reports on engagement of schools,
universities, health clinics, state institutions, operators of natural
monopolies in the meetings with high level officials.
[8]www.iditord.org has received reports on administrative resource
abuse by community leaders from Gyumri, Armavir, Nalbandyan,
Drakhtik, Agarak, Martiros, Gandzasar, Vahagni, Dimitrov, Karbi,
Voskehat communities.
[9]http://res.elections.am/images/doc/masnakarm.pdf
[10]http://res.elections.am/images/doc/verjnakan2008.pdf
[11]http://res.elections.am/images/doc/060512v.pdf
[12] Interview of GagikYeganyan, Head of Migration
Service, HaykakanZhamanak, April 4, 2012
[13] Interview of GagikYeganyan, Head of Migration
Service, HaykakanZhamanak, November 22, 2011
[14]http://elections.transparency.am/index.php?en_place,10
[15]"People are registered also in churchyard and in
facility-bases,"ChorrordInqnishkhanutyun, April 11, 2012
[16]http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Fadp6iwWeLM,http:
//www.youtube.com/watch?v=-sQ0TBbv9OY&feature=g-user-u
[17]http://elections.transparency.am/index.php?en_vote-result,21
[18]http://elections.transparency.am/index.php?en_participation,20
[19]http://elections.transparency.am/index.php?en_participerror,4
[20] Particularly, because of the failure of evaporating stamps at
2012 parliamentary elections the confidentiality of participation of
some voters was broken.
From: Baghdasarian
http://hetq.am/eng/opinion/20973/call-for-urgent-measures-for-ensuring-the-legitimacy-of-electoral-processes-in-armenia.html
22:19, November 27, 2012
Executive Summary
In spite of democratic principles prescribed by Armenia's constitution,
the electoral process has failed to provide a means for free and fair
formations and/or changes of the political power.
Elections in Armenia are typically accompanied by a number of
violations that call into question the integrity of the administration
of the process and the legitimacy of the outcomes of elections. There
is an urgent need for Armenia to reestablish public trust in the
legitimacy of the government in order to ensure the success of its
political, economic and social reforms and rehabilitate its reputation
as a democratic country. As electoral violations, among other factors,
are caused by the deficiency of the Electoral Code, it is critical
to introduce certain amendments to this legal act before presidential
elections of 2013.
A legitimate democratic government requires free, fair, transparent
elections and the peaceful transfer of power and must pay more than
lip service to the notion that power rests with its citizens and thus
endeavor to ensure structures and processes that accurately represent
the will of the people.
This document describes the major problems of the Armenian electoral
legislation, raises questions concerning the legitimacy of elections
and suggests solutions to remove corrupt practices and ensure
acceptable outcomes for the upcoming elections.
Introduction
The Republic of Armenia is a constitutional democracy. "In the Republic
of Armenia the power belongs to the people. The people exercise their
power through free elections, referenda, as well as through state
and local self-governing bodies and public officials as provided
by the Constitution. The usurpation of power by any organization or
individual constitutes a crime" (RA Constitution, Article 2).In spite
of these strong provisions in the Armenian Constitution, since 1995 -
the year of its adoption - almost no national or local elections in
Armenia have taken place on the basis of the expression of the free
will of its citizens.
Elections in Armenia are usually accompanied by serious violations,
such as multiple voting, vote-buying, a 'carousel' of pre-elected
ballots, terror tactics and intimidation of voters, observers and
proxies, ballot box stuffing, and the falsification of results,
that are not adequately pursued by law enforcement bodies and or
sentencing by courts. Hence, elections are naturally followed by
turmoil and protests of people challenging the legitimacy of results.
The culmination of such practices was the presidential election of
2008, when the civic unrest against controversial elections was met
with the government's use of police and military force and which
resulted in the death of at least 10 people.
A recent Gallup poll indicates that only 13% percent of women and 12%
of men in Armenia are confident in the honesty of elections. This
lack of confidence places Armenia as one of the three lowest ranking
countries (along with Haiti and Mongolia), within the list of 125,
with the lowest trust.[1] Electoral processes are broadly perceived
to be a public ceremony and merely serve to appease the concerns and
certain principles of Western democracies.
In reality, Armenian elections have further entrenched the intransigent
oligarchic structure and guaranteed the continued reproduction of the
existing political forces in which there is no legitimate role for
citizens and their votes. Armenian citizens have become increasingly
disappointed in the electoral process and democratic institutions. The
'elected' authorities are not recognized as legitimate and, hence,
it is not surprising when those act against the interests of their
constituencies. Meanwhile, the recognition of the integrity of
electoral processes and the authority of elected persons by the
citizens of Armenia is critical to the development of democratic
processes and the progress of its political, economic and social
reforms.
Though a significant number of electoral violations have taken place
due to improper enforcement, the key mechanisms challenging the
legitimacy of elections are rooted in the Electoral Code of Armenia.
Multiple and continuous changes to the electoral legislation have
considerably improved the quality of administration of elections,
nevertheless, in general, they have resulted in the development
of a more sophisticated arsenal of fraudulent practices. Electoral
violations have merely become 'softer' and have replaced violence and
disorder with raw intimidation, vote-buying and hidden transgressions.
We believe that the current lack of legitimacy of the Armenian
authorities may be recovered solely through the ensured integrity
of subsequent elections that will simply require demonstration of
the political will of the incumbent administration and, among other
measures, changes to the Electoral Code.
Problem Definition
The Electoral Code has a number of deficiencies that affect the
quality of administration of elections and assurance of their free
and fair nature. One major reason for this is that the Armenian
lawmakers failed to address all the recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR
after the elections of 2007-2008.[2]Nevertheless, the most important
problems questioning the legitimacy of elections relate to the misuse
of administrative resources, inflated voter lists and distortion of
voting processes.[3]
Misuse of administrative resources
Most of the elections in Armenia demonstrate widespread abuse of
administrative resources that typically serve the interests of the
ruling party or the incumbent president. Though the Electoral Code
contains a few restrictions, such as the prohibition of engaging in
campaigns and distributing campaign materials for state and local
bodies and officers, employees of educational establishments, members
of the constitutional court, judges, employees of law enforcement
bodies and military, and for members of electoral commissions,[4]and
the further prohibition to use office space, means of transport and
communication, material and human resources,[5] these provisions
are very limited. The reality reveals a widespread abuse of
public resources that creates unequal conditions for political
parties/candidates and oftentimes affects the expression of the free
will of citizens.
* During the parliamentary elections of 2012, senior officials, such
as the president, prime-minister, ministers, and marzpets (regional
governors) were actively engaged in the election campaign in favor
of the Republican Party of Armenia along with carrying out their
official duties and using public resources (including the accompanying
personnel and other participating officials, transportation, work
time).[6] Media coverage for such campaigns was characterized as
"official information" rather than a campaign activity, thus adding
to the time allocated per political party and distorting the equality
of the publicity to the opposition parties.
* Leaders of educational establishments were instructed to ensure
the attendance of their faculty and students (including kindergarten
students) in the campaign meetings of senior officials, particularly
in the regions.[7] * Community leaders in a number of municipalities
took active part in elections as campaigners and proxies, putting
direct pressure on citizens and often guiding their voting.[8] *
The Electoral Code contains an exhaustible list of expenditures
that are required to be paid from the election fund of candidates
and made publicly accessible. This list however is limited to the
campaign materials distributed via mass media, the costs of offices
and meeting venues, posters and print materials, thus leaving out
other possible expenditures, such as outdoor events, transportation,
labor, and so forth resulting in the concealment of potential uses
of administrative resources. In addition, there is no mandatory
requirement to open an election fund.
* The Electoral Code restricts the voting for Armenian citizens
abroad. However, it creates the possibility for electronic voting
for the officers of the diplomatic and consular corps, their family
members and representative offices of Armenian companies.
Given the general restriction for citizens of Armenia, this special
treatment for public servants and Armenian company representatives
is somewhat controversial. This concern is exacerbated by the general
mistrust in the confidentiality of electronic voting.
* Electoral legislation prohibits candidates, political parties and
alliances of political parties to give (promise) - in person or via
someone else on their behalf, or in any other manner,gratuitously
or on preferential conditions - money, food, securities, goods or
services to voters. Meanwhile, in practice all these acts are done
also by the authorities themselves (e.g.
decision to waive due taxes) and, actually, start earlier than the
period of election campaigns.
Inflated voters' lists
Many people in Armenia have doubts about the legitimacy of elections
due to the lack of trust, among other issues, in the accuracy of
the voter lists. It is commonly perceived that these lists serve as
a means to manipulate voting results. The Electoral Code stipulates
that the voter lists include citizens of Armenia that are registered
at an address in the country. This includes people who left the
country years ago, but have not de-registered from the respective
lists of residents. Factors that aggravate the distrust of citizens
are the following:
* The number of voters during the Armenian parliamentary elections
of 2007 was approximately 2.3 million people,[9] the presidential
elections of 2008 - about 2.3 million[10] and the parliamentary
elections of 2012 - about 2.5 mln.[11] Explanations by the government
to the contrary, this increase in the number of voters is rather
dubious given the continuous process of emigration, which according to
the State Migration Service, amounts to approximately 25,000 people
annually[12] and during the first 10 months of 2011 reached about
81,000 persons.[13] * Monitoring of voters lists and electoral numbers
have revealed that in 54 communities the number of voters exceeded the
number of actual residents.[14] Voter lists also revealed a significant
number of facts of registration of people under strange addresses, such
as church yards, gas stations, and simple wrong addresses.[15] * Video
materials circulated on youtube showed the distribution of a number
of passports around precincts on voting day, during the parliamentary
elections of May 2012 that indicated their possible use for multiple
voting.[16] These cases were not pursued by law enforcement bodies
resulting in the interpretation that law enforcement officials were
aware of these activities and actively protecting them. In parallel,
there was a deficiency of new passports throughout the country that
strengthened the hypothesis that the printed passports have been used
for other purposes. On the other hand, the major measure designed
to exclude the possibility of multiple voting - the stamping of
passports - failed as the stamps, intended to last for 12 hours,
evaporated within one hour after the voting.
* The issue of the development of supplementary lists of voters
on the day of elections is also controversial. There were 15,363
people (people whose names were not listed in the record books, who
were not registered, who wanted to vote at places of their current
residence rather than traveling to the places of their permanent
registration, or who were patients receiving stationary treatment)
on these lists during the parliamentary elections of 2012, whereas
the lack of transparency in their development and the difficulty to
monitor raises serious concerns over the integrity of those lists.
* There is no possibility for the citizens Armenia to make sure that
their relatives and neighbors, who left Armenia many years ago, do not
'appear' and 'vote' during the elections. The existing possibilities
for the proxies, observers and mass media representatives to get
familiar with the signed lists, do not actually allow for collecting
complete information, analyzing and revealing potential violations.
Distortion of voting processes
In accordance with the Electoral Code, electoral commissions
count and record certain activities/numbers related to the voting
process, the level of consistency of which indicates the extent of
the efficient execution and legitimacy of processes, revealing the
risks of ballot box stuffing, falsification of signatures, 'carousel'
voting (circulating already voted ballots), etc. Consistency implies
that certain sets of electoral numbers shall "match", such as the
number of provided ballots with the sum of the canceled, valid and
invalid ballots; the number of signatures in record books with the
sum of the valid and invalid ballots; the number of envelopes of
established samples with the sum of valid and invalid ballots.
Monitoring of the numbers in the parliamentary elections of 2012
exposed discrepancies that raised questions regarding the integrity
of voting processes while analyses of electoral legislation revealed
that many illegalities are concealed by their respective legal clauses.
There were about 17,889 inconsistencies (among the number of provided
ballots, the number of canceled, valid and invalid ballots, the number
of signatures, the number of envelopes of established samples) revealed
in 1436 precincts, which is 72% of all in the country.[17] Meanwhile,
according to the Electoral Code only a limited set of inconsistencies
have been accounted for as inaccuracies. Inconsistencies related to
the surplus of provided ballots against the sum of canceled, valid
and invalid ballots (e.g.
occurred due to 'carousel' voting) or the surplus of signatures
in record books (e.g. occurred due to adding additional falsified
signatures) were nullified in accordance with legislation.
* The Head of the Central Electoral Commission explained, absolutely,
all the inconsistencies of electoral numbers, by wrongful insertion
of more than one ballot within envelopes - making the claim that
they were 'envelopes of a non-established sample'. However, as the
Electoral Code does not mandate the calculation of such envelopes, as
well as the ballots within those, doubts were raised, and still exist,
about their actual contents and the credibility of the explanation. *
The Electoral Code does not provide for an opportunity to challenge
the quality and legitimacy of elections based on the number of
inconsistencies revealed.
* Information on voters' participation reported once every three
hours is troubling as it indicates that there is not reasonable time
allocated for voters to duly complete the entire cycle of voting and
thus creates doubts about the legality of processes taking place
in electoral precincts. In a considerable number of precincts the
reported number of voters exceeded the reasonable service capacity of
the precinct: the voting of citizens in 713 precincts for at least
three hours continued at an unrealistically rapid pace, allocating
less than 60 seconds for each participant to complete the entire
process of voting.[18] This process consists of finding a name in
the register, signing by the name, getting two sets of ballots and
envelopes, entering the ballot box, finding and selecting the name of
the political party and candidate, folding and placing the ballots in
respective envelopes, reaching the ballot box, getting the envelopes
signed, and depositing envelopes in their respective boxes. This pace
was not realistic even for the military, who entered the precinct in
organized rows and participated only in proportional voting. On the
contrary, in 20 precincts, participation of voters indicated 'negative'
trends, whereas the number of participants reported for the given 3
hours was less than that of the previous reporting period.[19]
Solutions
In order to restore the trust of people in elections and ensure its
legitimacy, the Armenian government must take urgent measures for its
upcoming presidential elections by first and foremost addressing the
issues of the misuse of administrative resources, inflation of voters'
lists and the distortion of electoral processes and making respective
amendments in the Electoral Code.
In particular, we urge the authorities of Armenia to implement the
following measures:
Administrative resources
1. To put maximum restrictions on the use of administrative resources
during the election, limiting participation of senior officials in
elections campaigns, limiting the capacity of community leaders to
serve as proxies of candidates, making transparent all the expenditures
of candidates, strengthening mechanisms for punishments for the
abuse of administrative resources and removing the electronic voting
mechanisms for diplomatic and consular representations and missions.
This measure requires an amendment to Electoral Code Article 18 par.
4 (to ban involvement of juveniles in the campaign) and par 7. (to
restrict charity activities for a longer period), Article 22 par. 1
(to mandate candidates to suspend their official duties during
the campaign), Article 25 par. 1 (to mandate opening of election
funds), par. 6 (to fix maximum amounts for the election funds and for
contributions to those) and par. 7 (to expand the scope of data on
persons making contributions to election funds), Article 26 par. 2
(to mandate candidates to declare all campaign expenditures),
Article 27 par. 1 (to expand the scope of data on expenditures from
election funds), Article 32 par. 3 (to ban public servants acting
as proxies), Article 60 (to remove the electronic voting mechanism),
Article 87 par. 2 (to mandate all presidential candidates, including
the incumbent or the acting president, to suspend their official
duties before the conclusion of election results), Article 107 par. 2
(to mandate all MP candidates to suspend their official duties before
the conclusion of the election campaign).
Voter lists
1. To post at precincts and publicize via internet with the possibility
to download and search the voter lists with signatures and additional
lists to prevent the misuse of names of absent persons or multiple
voting.
Given the increasing distrust of the Armenian people towards the
authorities, publicizing of the voters' lists provides the only
alternative to rebuild the faith of citizens in the electoral process
and in the newly formed government, as it will allow people to verify
the names of actual voters and oversee the legality of processes.
While the contrary - the strict adherence to the 'no publicizing'
rule on the background of other violations is not understandable,
but rather is doubtful.[20] Though the publicity of actual voters'
names in record books is not advised by the Venice Commission, the
necessity of such a step in Armenia is conditioned with the utmost
public interest and will serve at least as an intermediate measure
before introducing other regulations to completely remove the concerns
related to the inflation of voter lists.
Implementation of these recommendations will require amendments
to Electoral Code Article 7 par. 1 (to limit the voting right of
citizens having no registration in the country), Article 8 par 3
(to develop a list of both types of voters - those that deregister
from their previous address and reregister at a new address) and
par. 4 (to remove the mechanism of inclusion of citizens having no
registration in the country), Article 11 par. 1 (to mandate publicity
of voter lists, including deregistration and supplementary ones, in
respective precincts and via internet), Article 12 par.2 (to restrict
the possibility for development of supplementary voter lists on the
day of elections), Article 31 par. 1 (to provide observers and mass
media with access to the lists signed by voters), Article 33 par. 1
(to provide proxies with access to the lists signed by voters)
and Article 44 (to require signatures of the head and secretary of
precinct electoral commissions on the actual voters lists).
Voting process
1. To calculate and record all types of discrepancies in numbers
reflecting the quality of the voting process as inaccuracies as
well as to ensure that in cases of a certain percentage of observed
inaccuracies the results of the elections in the given precinct shall
be recognized to be invalid. To take measures to equip the inside
and outside entrances of precincts with videocameras to monitor the
whole process of elections.
These measures will stipulate amendments to Electoral Code Article 55
(to require videocameras to the list of accessories of the precinct),
Article 67 par. 7 (to require calculation of both ballots and
envelopes of non-established samples), Article 72 par. 1 (to remove the
requirement of nullification of any discrepancies in voting numbers),
Article 71 (to record all inconsistencies in electoral numbers),
Article 72 (to recognize precinct elections as invalid based on a
percentage of reported inaccuracies/discrepancies).
Summary
Citizens of Armenia are disappointed in the institute of elections
given the continuous failure to ensure the peaceful transfer of
governmental power through lawful, free and fair elections, putting
under question the legitimacy of any government remaining in or
acceding to power. The Government of Armenia needs to undertake
concrete and urgent measures to reestablish the public trust in the
electoral system and ensure free, fair and transparent presidential
elections starting from February 2013.
We hereby demand that the Armenian authorities demonstrate the
political will necessary to make amendments to the Electoral Code
in order to restrain the possibilities for misuse of administrative
resources, minimize applications of undue pressure on the formulation
and expression of the free will of citizens, restrict abuses of voter
lists, conceal violations and falsifications in order to remove the
controversy over the legitimacy of elections.
We also appeal to international organizations that are interested and
engaged in the democratic development of Armenia to urge the Armenian
authorities to make the amendments to the Electoral Code. Acceptance of
ill-administered election results by the international organizations
does not contribute to the credibility of those organizations, nor to
their respect, putting under question the western values of democracy.
Transparency International Anti-corruption Center NGO
Europe in Law Association NGO
Protection of Rights Without Borders NGO
Rule of the Right NGO
Helsinki Citizens' Assembly Vanadzor Office" NGO
_________________________
[1]http://www.gallup.com/poll/157997/women-worldwide-less-confident-men-elec
tions.aspx
[2]http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/26606 andhttp://www.osce.org/
odihr/elections/armenia/32115
[3] Some of these issues have been pointed out and discussed in
the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report published
in May 2012, available onhttp://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/91643
[4] Article 18, par. 6
[5] Article 22, par. 2
[6] The crowdsourcing internet resource of electoral
violations www.iditord.org has received reports on the campaigning
during official visits by President, Prime Minister, Deputy Minister
of Youth and Sports, Prosecutor General, Marzpets of Kotayk and Syunik
and mid-level officers working in law enforcement bodies.
[7]www.iditord.org has received reports on engagement of schools,
universities, health clinics, state institutions, operators of natural
monopolies in the meetings with high level officials.
[8]www.iditord.org has received reports on administrative resource
abuse by community leaders from Gyumri, Armavir, Nalbandyan,
Drakhtik, Agarak, Martiros, Gandzasar, Vahagni, Dimitrov, Karbi,
Voskehat communities.
[9]http://res.elections.am/images/doc/masnakarm.pdf
[10]http://res.elections.am/images/doc/verjnakan2008.pdf
[11]http://res.elections.am/images/doc/060512v.pdf
[12] Interview of GagikYeganyan, Head of Migration
Service, HaykakanZhamanak, April 4, 2012
[13] Interview of GagikYeganyan, Head of Migration
Service, HaykakanZhamanak, November 22, 2011
[14]http://elections.transparency.am/index.php?en_place,10
[15]"People are registered also in churchyard and in
facility-bases,"ChorrordInqnishkhanutyun, April 11, 2012
[16]http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Fadp6iwWeLM,http:
//www.youtube.com/watch?v=-sQ0TBbv9OY&feature=g-user-u
[17]http://elections.transparency.am/index.php?en_vote-result,21
[18]http://elections.transparency.am/index.php?en_participation,20
[19]http://elections.transparency.am/index.php?en_participerror,4
[20] Particularly, because of the failure of evaporating stamps at
2012 parliamentary elections the confidentiality of participation of
some voters was broken.
From: Baghdasarian