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GEORGIA AFTER SAAKASHVILI: BETTER LIFE FOR ALL ITS NEIGHBORS
by Dmitry Babich
The Voice of Russia
Oct 3 2012
What effect will the defeat of president Saakashvili's "party of
power" at recent parliamentary elections in Georgia have on Georgia's
immediate neighbors? By neighbors one should mean not only Russia,
but also Turkey and Georgia's fellow former Soviet republics -
Armenia and Azerbaidjan?
Experts suggest not to hasten with optimistic predictions. First, a
"change of guard" in Tbilisi still has to happen. Saakashvili still
has several months of unlimited power before the "anti-presidential"
constitutional amendments take effect, transferring power from the
president to the newly elected parliament. Second, characterizations
of the leader of the election's victors - Bidzina Ivanishvili - as
"Moscow's man," although widespread in Western press, are at best
simplifications. At worst, they are simply not true.
Bidzina Ivanishvili during his electoral campaign promised to move
Georgia further into the EU and NATO (something Mr. Saakashvili
also promises to deliver). But Ivanishvili also promises to improve
relations with Russia (something Mr. Saakashvili is unable to deliver
after the war of 2008). These promises do not make Ivanishvili "the
Kremlin's stooge," as Le Figaro or The Wall Street Journal portray
him. In fact, they reflect common sense - something Russo-Georgian
relations have been lacking for an long time. However, some analysts
dismiss this "contradictory" promise of Bidzina Ivanishvili as
electoral posturing. But isn't this pessimism just a reflection of
anti-Russian stereotypes?
Russia did not hamper the movement of the former members of the
pro-Soviet Warsaw Pact into the EU during the 1990s and raised no
objection to it in 2004, when the EU's biggest expansion took place.
Russia objected to NATO membership for countries like Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Slovakia or Hungary. However, while voicing its concerns,
Moscow never drew any "red lines" for these countries. In fact their
integration into NATO, when it did happen, didn't prevent Russia from
seeking (and largely achieving) good relations with these countries.
Other stories (like relations with a new NATO member Poland) were less
rosy - but Russia can hardly be faulted for that. Of course, under
the aggressively pro-American and anti-Russian regime of Mikhail
Saakashvili, Georgia's membership in NATO could pose a threat to
Russia's security, and Russia will most likely oppose Georgia's
membership in military blocs. But Russia never objected to having
a peaceful and friendly Georgia in the EU. In fact, during a short
"detente" in Russo-Georgian relations in 1994-1996 Georgia already
had European integration as one of the chief objectives of Georgian
foreign policy, and Moscow never had problem with it.
In fact, a confrontational view of Georgian election (seeing it as a
fight between the pro-Western forces of "good" and "old Soviet" forces
of "evil") was most typical for Saakashvili and his cronies, and not
for the majority of Georgian people. Saakashvili's foreign policy was
a reflection of this simplified world view: he opens Georgia's borders
and markets to neighboring Turkey and aggressively seeks confrontation
with Russia. This policy led to the flooding of Georgia's markets
with cheap merchandise from Turkey coupled with numerous hurdles on
the Georgian-Russian border, which hampered trade and movement of
people between the two Orthodox Christian countries. In fact, Georgian
Orthodox church, frustrated with Mr. Saakashvili's divisive policies,
became one of the main electoral allies of Mr. Ivanishvili.
In fact, the confrontational policy of Mr. Saakashvili did not profit
any of Georgia's neighbors, Christians and Moslems combined. Armenia
became an indirect victim of the sealing of Russo-Georgian borders,
since most of Armenia's trade with Russia and other European countries
was done via Georgian territory. So, the shutting of Verkhny Lars,
a border pass between Russia and Georgia, immediately stopped the
movement of goods between Armenia and Europe. In fact, it forced
Yerevan to rely on its trade with neighboring Iran, which is itself
under international sanctions now. As for Azerbaijan, it had a dispute
with Saakashvili's Georgia over a territory on the border where the
famous Georgian monastery David Garedji is located.
Turkey, a seemingly obvious beneficiary of Saakashvili's policy,
is also not interested in viewing Georgia by Saakashvili's eyes -
as a battleground between Russia and NATO countries. This kind of
vision moulds Russia and Turkey in a nineteenth or even eighteenth
century paradigm - as two antagonistic imperial powers vying for the
sympathies of sly Georgian rulers, who pit one side against the other.
In the twentieth century, Turkey renounced this imperial tradition -
and it will not return to it for pragmatic reasons.
One of these reasons is that this kind of vision would make Georgia a
natural competitor for Turkey in a tricky business of hosting American
bases in case of new tensions in the Middle East. (Saakashvili granted
American citizens and especially the military the right of free access
to Georgian territory). Also, Georgia's NATO membership would oblige
Turkey to provide its "ally" in Tbilisi with military assistance in
case Tbilisi gets embroiled in one or two more local wars (Georgia
already got embroiled in 5 wars during the last 22 years).
So, Mr. Ivanishvili's promised vision of Georgia as a territory
of peace, not confrontation, may be much closer to the hearts of
Turks, Russians and Armenians than Saakashvili's continued crude
confrontation with Russia. The difference would be all the more obvious
if Mr. Ivanishvili backed up his words with some steps towards Moscow's
legitimate concerns in the spheres of security and economy.
From: A. Papazian
by Dmitry Babich
The Voice of Russia
Oct 3 2012
What effect will the defeat of president Saakashvili's "party of
power" at recent parliamentary elections in Georgia have on Georgia's
immediate neighbors? By neighbors one should mean not only Russia,
but also Turkey and Georgia's fellow former Soviet republics -
Armenia and Azerbaidjan?
Experts suggest not to hasten with optimistic predictions. First, a
"change of guard" in Tbilisi still has to happen. Saakashvili still
has several months of unlimited power before the "anti-presidential"
constitutional amendments take effect, transferring power from the
president to the newly elected parliament. Second, characterizations
of the leader of the election's victors - Bidzina Ivanishvili - as
"Moscow's man," although widespread in Western press, are at best
simplifications. At worst, they are simply not true.
Bidzina Ivanishvili during his electoral campaign promised to move
Georgia further into the EU and NATO (something Mr. Saakashvili
also promises to deliver). But Ivanishvili also promises to improve
relations with Russia (something Mr. Saakashvili is unable to deliver
after the war of 2008). These promises do not make Ivanishvili "the
Kremlin's stooge," as Le Figaro or The Wall Street Journal portray
him. In fact, they reflect common sense - something Russo-Georgian
relations have been lacking for an long time. However, some analysts
dismiss this "contradictory" promise of Bidzina Ivanishvili as
electoral posturing. But isn't this pessimism just a reflection of
anti-Russian stereotypes?
Russia did not hamper the movement of the former members of the
pro-Soviet Warsaw Pact into the EU during the 1990s and raised no
objection to it in 2004, when the EU's biggest expansion took place.
Russia objected to NATO membership for countries like Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Slovakia or Hungary. However, while voicing its concerns,
Moscow never drew any "red lines" for these countries. In fact their
integration into NATO, when it did happen, didn't prevent Russia from
seeking (and largely achieving) good relations with these countries.
Other stories (like relations with a new NATO member Poland) were less
rosy - but Russia can hardly be faulted for that. Of course, under
the aggressively pro-American and anti-Russian regime of Mikhail
Saakashvili, Georgia's membership in NATO could pose a threat to
Russia's security, and Russia will most likely oppose Georgia's
membership in military blocs. But Russia never objected to having
a peaceful and friendly Georgia in the EU. In fact, during a short
"detente" in Russo-Georgian relations in 1994-1996 Georgia already
had European integration as one of the chief objectives of Georgian
foreign policy, and Moscow never had problem with it.
In fact, a confrontational view of Georgian election (seeing it as a
fight between the pro-Western forces of "good" and "old Soviet" forces
of "evil") was most typical for Saakashvili and his cronies, and not
for the majority of Georgian people. Saakashvili's foreign policy was
a reflection of this simplified world view: he opens Georgia's borders
and markets to neighboring Turkey and aggressively seeks confrontation
with Russia. This policy led to the flooding of Georgia's markets
with cheap merchandise from Turkey coupled with numerous hurdles on
the Georgian-Russian border, which hampered trade and movement of
people between the two Orthodox Christian countries. In fact, Georgian
Orthodox church, frustrated with Mr. Saakashvili's divisive policies,
became one of the main electoral allies of Mr. Ivanishvili.
In fact, the confrontational policy of Mr. Saakashvili did not profit
any of Georgia's neighbors, Christians and Moslems combined. Armenia
became an indirect victim of the sealing of Russo-Georgian borders,
since most of Armenia's trade with Russia and other European countries
was done via Georgian territory. So, the shutting of Verkhny Lars,
a border pass between Russia and Georgia, immediately stopped the
movement of goods between Armenia and Europe. In fact, it forced
Yerevan to rely on its trade with neighboring Iran, which is itself
under international sanctions now. As for Azerbaijan, it had a dispute
with Saakashvili's Georgia over a territory on the border where the
famous Georgian monastery David Garedji is located.
Turkey, a seemingly obvious beneficiary of Saakashvili's policy,
is also not interested in viewing Georgia by Saakashvili's eyes -
as a battleground between Russia and NATO countries. This kind of
vision moulds Russia and Turkey in a nineteenth or even eighteenth
century paradigm - as two antagonistic imperial powers vying for the
sympathies of sly Georgian rulers, who pit one side against the other.
In the twentieth century, Turkey renounced this imperial tradition -
and it will not return to it for pragmatic reasons.
One of these reasons is that this kind of vision would make Georgia a
natural competitor for Turkey in a tricky business of hosting American
bases in case of new tensions in the Middle East. (Saakashvili granted
American citizens and especially the military the right of free access
to Georgian territory). Also, Georgia's NATO membership would oblige
Turkey to provide its "ally" in Tbilisi with military assistance in
case Tbilisi gets embroiled in one or two more local wars (Georgia
already got embroiled in 5 wars during the last 22 years).
So, Mr. Ivanishvili's promised vision of Georgia as a territory
of peace, not confrontation, may be much closer to the hearts of
Turks, Russians and Armenians than Saakashvili's continued crude
confrontation with Russia. The difference would be all the more obvious
if Mr. Ivanishvili backed up his words with some steps towards Moscow's
legitimate concerns in the spheres of security and economy.
From: A. Papazian