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THE SLOW-STEP PROCESS OF THE RECOGNITION OF THE NKR AND THE ELECTIONS IN ARMENIA
Dr. Gayane Novikova
spectrum.am
Dr. Gayane Novikova, Director of the Center for Strategic Analysis,
Yerevan, Armenia; Visiting Scholar for the Davis Center for Russian
and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
The extradition of Ramil Safarov, who was sentenced to life
imprisonment, from Hungary and his immediate pardon by the Azerbaijani
president, again questioned the ability of Azerbaijan to keep its
promises. In your opinion, is it reasonable to continue negotiations
over the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict with Baku?
The Armenian side must continue the negotiations over the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict resolution first and foremost because there is an
ongoing objective process of the establishment of new state entities.
Even in the relatively stable and safe (from a security vantage point)
European region in three states - Belgium, Spain, and Great Britain -
there are discussions on independence of Flandreau, Catalonia, and
Scotland, respectively. There were two referenda on the separation of
Quebec from Canada. In 2011 a new state - South Sudan - appeared on
the world map. After twenty years of the de facto existence of the
Nagorno Karabakh Republic, and especially against the background of
the above-mentioned geopolitical shifts, the possibility to change
the NKR status from de facto to the de jure state is not perceived as
something strongly negative. Moreover, a voicing of a possibility of
the recognition of the NKR begins. Let me remind you that two American
states, Rhode Island and Massachusetts, have adopted resolutions
calling for President Obama and Congress to recognize the NKR.
This slow-moving process of pre-recognition of the Nagorno Karabakh
Republic is a main threat for Azerbaijani domestic and foreign policy.
The "Safarov phenomenon" was aimed to provoke Armenia to take overt
and confrontational steps. Fortunately, in spite of the calls of some
"hotheads" in Armenia, it did not happen. The withdrawal of any of the
parties to the conflict from the negotiation table will be evaluated
by the concerned external actors as a manifestation of aggression by
the withdrawing side.
On October 10, the third anniversary of the signing of the
Armenian-Turkish protocols which have never been ratified will pass.
It is obvious that the reason for their non-ratification is Turkey's
obstinacy. The latter continues to link the opening of the border with
Armenia to the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Do you
see any prerequisite for reanimation of the process of normalization
of the relationship between Armenia and Turkey?
No, I don't see any prerequisite. Turkey has stated conditions, and is
still articulating conditions, for the reanimation of the normalization
process of bilateral relations with Armenia, first of all, the opening
of the border, by the positive - from the Azerbaijani view point -
shifts in the Nagorno Karabakh negotiations. Let me stress once again:
in Turkey's policy the issue of opening the border with Armenia is
moving further and further ahead because of its domestic problems
and the day-by-day worsening developments in the Middle East. Against
this background, the settlement of the Armenian-Turkish relationship
undoubtedly will increase tension in its relations with Azerbaijan;
possibly it will negatively influence internal developments in
Turkey. Furthermore, no single external actor, more or less involved
in the processes in the South Caucasus can put pressure on Turkey in
this very difficult period for every regional state. I suppose that
in the foreseeable future Turkey will limit its activity to offering
statements on the necessity to achieve progress in the resolution of
the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and on its firm support of Azerbaijan. It
cannot venture anything more or anything different.
In your opinion, will the issue of Nagorno Karabakh be a main theme
in the forthcoming presidential campaign in Armenia?
I hope that it will not. First, the resolution of this conflict is one
of the strategic priorities of our state in the security field. It
is dangerous to use this factor in electioneering. Second, it is
almost the only issue around which a relative consensus is reached in
Armenian society. Of course, each presidential candidate will include
this issue in his/her agenda; however, I am not certain that any
candidate has anything strongly different from the approaches his or
her contender or contenders to offer. The most irrational suggestion,
such as an immediate recognition of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic
by Armenia, can be voiced only by those candidates with the lowest
support in the society and who are hoping to gain additional votes at
the cost of populist statements, including in the field of foreign
policy. Eventually, everyone understands that war is an alternative
to peace.
Continuing with the theme of elections, let us ask your opinion
in regard to concomitant circumstances surrounding the forthcoming
elections. There is an opinion that the 2013 presidential election
will be relatively quiet and low-key. After the May 2012 parliamentary
elections, the statements that Levon Ter-Petrosian, the leader of the
Armenian National Congress (ANC) will not run for the presidency are
heard more often. To whom will he give the baton? Are we witnessing,
in your opinion, the final stage of the dissolution of the ANC which
began a year ago?
I agree that the Armenian National Congress to some extent has
lost its energy. It was unable to introduce a clear vision and a
program, as well as to use in full the protest trends and moods in
some strata of Armenian society. The ANC won only seven seats in
Parliament - this is a very conspicuous indicator. There is no one
in the Ter-Petrosyan circle to whom he could give the baton. It was
the person of Ter-Petrosian that served as the 'magnet' - and not
his program, vision, or approach, that is everything that creates an
ideological platform for any political organization - that attracted
(but did not unite) the various forces in the ANC. He did not prepare
any successor who could replace him, and this is one of the weak
sides of the ANC. The forces that are part of the ANC although they
have support from different segments of the society, entered into
Parliament on the tide of protest moods stimulated and used by ANC
after the presidential elections of 2008. At that time the ANC was a
relatively united political force. I do not think that the ANC will
be fully dissolved in the foreseeable future, even though internal
developments in this organization indicate growing disagreement among
its members. For all the political forces under the ANC umbrella, the
existence of a protest potential in the society and its 'simmering'
is of highest importance. The ANC can acquire this potential only
through the joint efforts of all its member parties and organizations.
The opinion exists that the "Prosperous Armenia" Party will not
confront the authorities and will prefer to wait until the next
presidential elections of 2018 to bring its own candidate to power.
The question is not about whether "Prosperous Armenia" will confront
the Republican Party in the presidential election of 2013, or not. It
does not yet have a real alternative figure to run for the presidency.
Robert Kocharian, the second President of Armenia, is still in the
shadows, and, according to preliminary observations, has no intention
to participate in this race. Vardan Oskanian, the former minister of
foreign affairs and the founder of the Civilitas Foundation, found
himself the focus of a trial. The article published on September 28,
2012, in "The Washington Post" did not improve the image of either
Oskanian himself or the Foundation because it carried the wrong
message that non-governmental organizations in Armenia are under
strong pressure of the state apparatus. (I would argue that it is
inappropriate to compare the level of participation of Armenian NGOs
in the political and social life of the country with the developments
surrounding the NGOs in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Pakistan or anywhere
else!). I would not exclude that the opening of the Oskanian case
can be viewed in reference to political constellations, but I am
sure that the former minister lacks the level of strong support
among potential voters that would allow viable competition with
the President-in-office in the forthcoming elections. There will be
at least three candidacies, representing the Republican Party, the
"Heritage," and the Armenian Revolutionary Party "Dashnaktutyun." For
"Prosperous Armenia," for tactical reasons it would be advisable to
take a timeout and to try, through dialogue with other representatives
of a 'constructive opposition', to find and support a single candidate
in the 2018 elections.
Who could become Prime-Minister? There are rumors that a confrontation
between the "Prosperous Armenia" and the ruling Republican Party was
defused after the parties reached an agreement that Tigran Sargsyan
will leave office after the presidential election?
"Prosperous Armenia" which was established in 2004 as an alternative to
the ruling Republican Party with the main goal to split the opposition,
after only a few years has gained political strength and weight (to a
large extent because of the charitable activity of its leader). Thus,
the initial secondary political role already is not enough for this
party. It will undoubtedly make claims for leading positions. It is
worth mentioning that reaching a compromise on such issue, through
behind-the-scenes negotiations is a quite common practice, especially
in societies without extensive historical experience in a democratic
transformation.
My answer to the first part of your question in regard to a future
prime-minister is very simple: I don't know.
de89c6e9-ca81-4321-ad5b-a458f6a14438
Y2:de89c6e9-ca81-4321-ad5b-a458f6a14438
From: A. Papazian
Dr. Gayane Novikova
spectrum.am
Dr. Gayane Novikova, Director of the Center for Strategic Analysis,
Yerevan, Armenia; Visiting Scholar for the Davis Center for Russian
and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
The extradition of Ramil Safarov, who was sentenced to life
imprisonment, from Hungary and his immediate pardon by the Azerbaijani
president, again questioned the ability of Azerbaijan to keep its
promises. In your opinion, is it reasonable to continue negotiations
over the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict with Baku?
The Armenian side must continue the negotiations over the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict resolution first and foremost because there is an
ongoing objective process of the establishment of new state entities.
Even in the relatively stable and safe (from a security vantage point)
European region in three states - Belgium, Spain, and Great Britain -
there are discussions on independence of Flandreau, Catalonia, and
Scotland, respectively. There were two referenda on the separation of
Quebec from Canada. In 2011 a new state - South Sudan - appeared on
the world map. After twenty years of the de facto existence of the
Nagorno Karabakh Republic, and especially against the background of
the above-mentioned geopolitical shifts, the possibility to change
the NKR status from de facto to the de jure state is not perceived as
something strongly negative. Moreover, a voicing of a possibility of
the recognition of the NKR begins. Let me remind you that two American
states, Rhode Island and Massachusetts, have adopted resolutions
calling for President Obama and Congress to recognize the NKR.
This slow-moving process of pre-recognition of the Nagorno Karabakh
Republic is a main threat for Azerbaijani domestic and foreign policy.
The "Safarov phenomenon" was aimed to provoke Armenia to take overt
and confrontational steps. Fortunately, in spite of the calls of some
"hotheads" in Armenia, it did not happen. The withdrawal of any of the
parties to the conflict from the negotiation table will be evaluated
by the concerned external actors as a manifestation of aggression by
the withdrawing side.
On October 10, the third anniversary of the signing of the
Armenian-Turkish protocols which have never been ratified will pass.
It is obvious that the reason for their non-ratification is Turkey's
obstinacy. The latter continues to link the opening of the border with
Armenia to the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Do you
see any prerequisite for reanimation of the process of normalization
of the relationship between Armenia and Turkey?
No, I don't see any prerequisite. Turkey has stated conditions, and is
still articulating conditions, for the reanimation of the normalization
process of bilateral relations with Armenia, first of all, the opening
of the border, by the positive - from the Azerbaijani view point -
shifts in the Nagorno Karabakh negotiations. Let me stress once again:
in Turkey's policy the issue of opening the border with Armenia is
moving further and further ahead because of its domestic problems
and the day-by-day worsening developments in the Middle East. Against
this background, the settlement of the Armenian-Turkish relationship
undoubtedly will increase tension in its relations with Azerbaijan;
possibly it will negatively influence internal developments in
Turkey. Furthermore, no single external actor, more or less involved
in the processes in the South Caucasus can put pressure on Turkey in
this very difficult period for every regional state. I suppose that
in the foreseeable future Turkey will limit its activity to offering
statements on the necessity to achieve progress in the resolution of
the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and on its firm support of Azerbaijan. It
cannot venture anything more or anything different.
In your opinion, will the issue of Nagorno Karabakh be a main theme
in the forthcoming presidential campaign in Armenia?
I hope that it will not. First, the resolution of this conflict is one
of the strategic priorities of our state in the security field. It
is dangerous to use this factor in electioneering. Second, it is
almost the only issue around which a relative consensus is reached in
Armenian society. Of course, each presidential candidate will include
this issue in his/her agenda; however, I am not certain that any
candidate has anything strongly different from the approaches his or
her contender or contenders to offer. The most irrational suggestion,
such as an immediate recognition of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic
by Armenia, can be voiced only by those candidates with the lowest
support in the society and who are hoping to gain additional votes at
the cost of populist statements, including in the field of foreign
policy. Eventually, everyone understands that war is an alternative
to peace.
Continuing with the theme of elections, let us ask your opinion
in regard to concomitant circumstances surrounding the forthcoming
elections. There is an opinion that the 2013 presidential election
will be relatively quiet and low-key. After the May 2012 parliamentary
elections, the statements that Levon Ter-Petrosian, the leader of the
Armenian National Congress (ANC) will not run for the presidency are
heard more often. To whom will he give the baton? Are we witnessing,
in your opinion, the final stage of the dissolution of the ANC which
began a year ago?
I agree that the Armenian National Congress to some extent has
lost its energy. It was unable to introduce a clear vision and a
program, as well as to use in full the protest trends and moods in
some strata of Armenian society. The ANC won only seven seats in
Parliament - this is a very conspicuous indicator. There is no one
in the Ter-Petrosyan circle to whom he could give the baton. It was
the person of Ter-Petrosian that served as the 'magnet' - and not
his program, vision, or approach, that is everything that creates an
ideological platform for any political organization - that attracted
(but did not unite) the various forces in the ANC. He did not prepare
any successor who could replace him, and this is one of the weak
sides of the ANC. The forces that are part of the ANC although they
have support from different segments of the society, entered into
Parliament on the tide of protest moods stimulated and used by ANC
after the presidential elections of 2008. At that time the ANC was a
relatively united political force. I do not think that the ANC will
be fully dissolved in the foreseeable future, even though internal
developments in this organization indicate growing disagreement among
its members. For all the political forces under the ANC umbrella, the
existence of a protest potential in the society and its 'simmering'
is of highest importance. The ANC can acquire this potential only
through the joint efforts of all its member parties and organizations.
The opinion exists that the "Prosperous Armenia" Party will not
confront the authorities and will prefer to wait until the next
presidential elections of 2018 to bring its own candidate to power.
The question is not about whether "Prosperous Armenia" will confront
the Republican Party in the presidential election of 2013, or not. It
does not yet have a real alternative figure to run for the presidency.
Robert Kocharian, the second President of Armenia, is still in the
shadows, and, according to preliminary observations, has no intention
to participate in this race. Vardan Oskanian, the former minister of
foreign affairs and the founder of the Civilitas Foundation, found
himself the focus of a trial. The article published on September 28,
2012, in "The Washington Post" did not improve the image of either
Oskanian himself or the Foundation because it carried the wrong
message that non-governmental organizations in Armenia are under
strong pressure of the state apparatus. (I would argue that it is
inappropriate to compare the level of participation of Armenian NGOs
in the political and social life of the country with the developments
surrounding the NGOs in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Pakistan or anywhere
else!). I would not exclude that the opening of the Oskanian case
can be viewed in reference to political constellations, but I am
sure that the former minister lacks the level of strong support
among potential voters that would allow viable competition with
the President-in-office in the forthcoming elections. There will be
at least three candidacies, representing the Republican Party, the
"Heritage," and the Armenian Revolutionary Party "Dashnaktutyun." For
"Prosperous Armenia," for tactical reasons it would be advisable to
take a timeout and to try, through dialogue with other representatives
of a 'constructive opposition', to find and support a single candidate
in the 2018 elections.
Who could become Prime-Minister? There are rumors that a confrontation
between the "Prosperous Armenia" and the ruling Republican Party was
defused after the parties reached an agreement that Tigran Sargsyan
will leave office after the presidential election?
"Prosperous Armenia" which was established in 2004 as an alternative to
the ruling Republican Party with the main goal to split the opposition,
after only a few years has gained political strength and weight (to a
large extent because of the charitable activity of its leader). Thus,
the initial secondary political role already is not enough for this
party. It will undoubtedly make claims for leading positions. It is
worth mentioning that reaching a compromise on such issue, through
behind-the-scenes negotiations is a quite common practice, especially
in societies without extensive historical experience in a democratic
transformation.
My answer to the first part of your question in regard to a future
prime-minister is very simple: I don't know.
de89c6e9-ca81-4321-ad5b-a458f6a14438
Y2:de89c6e9-ca81-4321-ad5b-a458f6a14438
From: A. Papazian