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WE MUST STOP SEEING AZERBAIJAN PURELY AS A SOURCE OF OIL AND NATURAL GAS
Today's Zaman
Oct 4 2012
Turkey
As new power balances are being set in the environment surrounding
Turkey, we are in the serious throes of the current chaotic process.
On the one hand, it is hard to predict where the multidimensional
instabilities caused by the human tragedy in Syria will lead, and
on the other, the risks of a regional crisis as shaped primarily by
this tragedy are gradually increasing. Turkey has started to see its
citizens die because of cross-border mortar attacks, and it has to
exert its best efforts to minimize the potential damage this crisis
might cause it.
Turkey's relations with Baghdad and Tehran are on a rapid path to
decay largely because of the Syrian crisis. And with a relatively
pro-Russian politician coming to power in Georgia, with which it has
enjoyed smooth relations so far, there is the risk of Turkey losing its
potential to further its ties with Georgia. Much has been written or
said about the changes and tension that the unfavorable developments
triggered by the Syrian crisis have caused in our relations with our
neighbors. Yet, Syria and the Middle East are not the only country
and region that Turkey should keep a watchful eye on.
Turkey is not only wasting a significant portion of its energy dealing
with the Syrian and Middle Eastern crises, but it also faces the risk
of failing to show due concern to the regions near its borders which
closely concern its interests and future. One, and perhaps the most
important, of these regions is certainly the Caucasus.
While visiting Baku to attend the second gathering of the Baku
International Humanitarian Forum, co-chaired by Azerbaijani President
Ilham Aliyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin, on Oct. 4-5, I felt
the need to have a cursory look at the developments in the region. I
can state in advance that the state of the developments that closely
relate to the stability of the Caucasus is very bleak. In particular,
Azerbaijan, with which we entertain such friendly relations that
we tend to refer to both nations as a "single nation, two states,"
increasingly faces the risk of being sandwiched by two dominant
regional powers due to the West's indifference. Azerbaijan is
squeezed by Iran, which now officially maintains a hostile attitude
toward Azerbaijan, and Russia, which is trying to expand its sphere of
influence south. Moreover, between Azerbaijan and Turkey lies Armenia,
which acts in line with the Kremlin's policies. Accordingly, we may
argue that there is the risk of Azerbaijan finding itself making
unfavorable alignments with regional powers in the near future in an
effort to get rid of this sense of getting squeezed.
As is known, the Kremlin has been consciously backing the deadlock
of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue for 22 years to block Azerbaijan's
access to the West via Turkey. On the other hand, Russia is on the
brink of becoming the sole dominant power in the Caucasus once again,
particularly in the wake of the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008
and after a pro-Russian candidate won the presidential election in
Georgia. The foregoing matters deserve close attention as they closely
relate to the region's future. It is no secret that Iran nurtures
hostile feelings towards Azerbaijan despite the 700-kilometer-long
border between the two countries and the fact that Iran's Azeri
population comprises 30 percent of its total population. This same
Iran's friendly ties with both Armenia and Russia can hardly be seen
as beneficial to either Turkey or Azerbaijan.
As my dear friend Joshua Walker pointed out in an article that appeared
in Caucasus International journal, Azerbaijan has tried to pursue
a policy of balance among the conflicting interests of its powerful
neighbors such as Russia, Iran and Turkey since its independence. With
its own national interests naturally added to the mix, the situation
has become all the more inextricable. And Turkey has failed to show
due attention to Azerbaijan perhaps because it has prioritized its
interests with Iran and Russia, with which it had good relations
until very recently. It is obvious that Azerbaijan feels the need to
partner with a non-regional power. Having tried to satisfy its need
by getting abnormally closer to Israel, Baku has become the third
capital to feel the heat from tensions between Iran and Israel most
strongly after Tehran and Tel Aviv. It is no coincidence that Baku
is another capital like New Delhi, Bangkok and Tbilisi in which Iran
and pro-Iranian terrorist organizations have attempted to assassinate
Israeli diplomats.
Azerbaijan has drawn so close to Israel that its arms purchases from
this country have reached the $1.6 billion mark, and the closer it
gets to Israel, the more Iran's dislike for Baku grows. In addition
to arms imports, Israel ranks second in Azerbaijan's exports and
fourth in its overall trade volume. As Iran grew more aggressive
with regard to the Caspian Sea, over which five littoral countries
failed to reach an agreement, the arms that Azerbaijan ordered from
Israel now include anti-ship missiles. Though Iran has officially
started to perceive Azerbaijan as an enemy because of its influence
over the 25 million Azeris living in Iran as well as the recent
Azerbaijani-Israeli rapprochement, it is Azerbaijan that feels the
greatest threat from Iran's quest to develop long-range missiles and
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore,
Azerbaijan lacks NATO's missile shield, which is currently available
to Turkey against Iranian missiles.
But Iran is not the greatest threat to Azerbaijan. The ruthlessness
with which Russia invaded part of Georgia's territories in order to
protect its hegemonic interests in the region in 2008 is a risk and
threat that Baku must always keep an eye on. Azerbaijan knows full
well that when it makes its move to reclaim the Azerbaijani territory
occupied by Armenia after growing stronger thanks to the revenue
coming from its rich energy resources, Russia will be there to oppose
it. The increased activity of Russian warplanes in Armenian airspace is
perceived by Baku from this perspective. Russia's increasing influence
over the Caucasus is making the region more dangerous and less stable
for Azerbaijan. And this influences Azerbaijan in diverting significant
funds that would normally be spent for social and economic welfare
to armament. It is known that Azerbaijan's defense budget skyrocketed
by 89 percent between 2010 and 2011.
As noted by Walker, it is essential that the West recognize at once
the gravity of the emerging circumstances in the region and stop
seeing Azerbaijan just as a source of oil and natural gas. Indeed,
Azerbaijan's geopolitical importance with regards to regional power
balances is far greater than its energy resources. But what should the
West do? Of course, they must do whatever is needed to ensure that
Armenia puts an end to its occupation of 20 percent of Azerbaijan's
territory. They must exert all sorts of pressure on Armenia and its
supporters to make them stop this unfair occupation that drove hundreds
of thousands of people from their homes. Or to state it more directly,
they must ensure that Azerbaijan establishes its sovereignty over its
86,600 square meters of land as defined by the UN in 1992, so as to
include Nagorno-Karabakh as well.
It is very likely that this will prove to be a big favor to the
Armenians as well. Thanks to peace that will be established by
the return of Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied Azerbaijani lands,
Armenia will be able to end its ongoing regional isolation. In this
way, Armenia will be able to end the necessity of securing foreign
loans, which have amounted to 72 percent of the national income, as
well as put a stop to the massive migrations from the country. Why not?
From: Baghdasarian
Today's Zaman
Oct 4 2012
Turkey
As new power balances are being set in the environment surrounding
Turkey, we are in the serious throes of the current chaotic process.
On the one hand, it is hard to predict where the multidimensional
instabilities caused by the human tragedy in Syria will lead, and
on the other, the risks of a regional crisis as shaped primarily by
this tragedy are gradually increasing. Turkey has started to see its
citizens die because of cross-border mortar attacks, and it has to
exert its best efforts to minimize the potential damage this crisis
might cause it.
Turkey's relations with Baghdad and Tehran are on a rapid path to
decay largely because of the Syrian crisis. And with a relatively
pro-Russian politician coming to power in Georgia, with which it has
enjoyed smooth relations so far, there is the risk of Turkey losing its
potential to further its ties with Georgia. Much has been written or
said about the changes and tension that the unfavorable developments
triggered by the Syrian crisis have caused in our relations with our
neighbors. Yet, Syria and the Middle East are not the only country
and region that Turkey should keep a watchful eye on.
Turkey is not only wasting a significant portion of its energy dealing
with the Syrian and Middle Eastern crises, but it also faces the risk
of failing to show due concern to the regions near its borders which
closely concern its interests and future. One, and perhaps the most
important, of these regions is certainly the Caucasus.
While visiting Baku to attend the second gathering of the Baku
International Humanitarian Forum, co-chaired by Azerbaijani President
Ilham Aliyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin, on Oct. 4-5, I felt
the need to have a cursory look at the developments in the region. I
can state in advance that the state of the developments that closely
relate to the stability of the Caucasus is very bleak. In particular,
Azerbaijan, with which we entertain such friendly relations that
we tend to refer to both nations as a "single nation, two states,"
increasingly faces the risk of being sandwiched by two dominant
regional powers due to the West's indifference. Azerbaijan is
squeezed by Iran, which now officially maintains a hostile attitude
toward Azerbaijan, and Russia, which is trying to expand its sphere of
influence south. Moreover, between Azerbaijan and Turkey lies Armenia,
which acts in line with the Kremlin's policies. Accordingly, we may
argue that there is the risk of Azerbaijan finding itself making
unfavorable alignments with regional powers in the near future in an
effort to get rid of this sense of getting squeezed.
As is known, the Kremlin has been consciously backing the deadlock
of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue for 22 years to block Azerbaijan's
access to the West via Turkey. On the other hand, Russia is on the
brink of becoming the sole dominant power in the Caucasus once again,
particularly in the wake of the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008
and after a pro-Russian candidate won the presidential election in
Georgia. The foregoing matters deserve close attention as they closely
relate to the region's future. It is no secret that Iran nurtures
hostile feelings towards Azerbaijan despite the 700-kilometer-long
border between the two countries and the fact that Iran's Azeri
population comprises 30 percent of its total population. This same
Iran's friendly ties with both Armenia and Russia can hardly be seen
as beneficial to either Turkey or Azerbaijan.
As my dear friend Joshua Walker pointed out in an article that appeared
in Caucasus International journal, Azerbaijan has tried to pursue
a policy of balance among the conflicting interests of its powerful
neighbors such as Russia, Iran and Turkey since its independence. With
its own national interests naturally added to the mix, the situation
has become all the more inextricable. And Turkey has failed to show
due attention to Azerbaijan perhaps because it has prioritized its
interests with Iran and Russia, with which it had good relations
until very recently. It is obvious that Azerbaijan feels the need to
partner with a non-regional power. Having tried to satisfy its need
by getting abnormally closer to Israel, Baku has become the third
capital to feel the heat from tensions between Iran and Israel most
strongly after Tehran and Tel Aviv. It is no coincidence that Baku
is another capital like New Delhi, Bangkok and Tbilisi in which Iran
and pro-Iranian terrorist organizations have attempted to assassinate
Israeli diplomats.
Azerbaijan has drawn so close to Israel that its arms purchases from
this country have reached the $1.6 billion mark, and the closer it
gets to Israel, the more Iran's dislike for Baku grows. In addition
to arms imports, Israel ranks second in Azerbaijan's exports and
fourth in its overall trade volume. As Iran grew more aggressive
with regard to the Caspian Sea, over which five littoral countries
failed to reach an agreement, the arms that Azerbaijan ordered from
Israel now include anti-ship missiles. Though Iran has officially
started to perceive Azerbaijan as an enemy because of its influence
over the 25 million Azeris living in Iran as well as the recent
Azerbaijani-Israeli rapprochement, it is Azerbaijan that feels the
greatest threat from Iran's quest to develop long-range missiles and
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore,
Azerbaijan lacks NATO's missile shield, which is currently available
to Turkey against Iranian missiles.
But Iran is not the greatest threat to Azerbaijan. The ruthlessness
with which Russia invaded part of Georgia's territories in order to
protect its hegemonic interests in the region in 2008 is a risk and
threat that Baku must always keep an eye on. Azerbaijan knows full
well that when it makes its move to reclaim the Azerbaijani territory
occupied by Armenia after growing stronger thanks to the revenue
coming from its rich energy resources, Russia will be there to oppose
it. The increased activity of Russian warplanes in Armenian airspace is
perceived by Baku from this perspective. Russia's increasing influence
over the Caucasus is making the region more dangerous and less stable
for Azerbaijan. And this influences Azerbaijan in diverting significant
funds that would normally be spent for social and economic welfare
to armament. It is known that Azerbaijan's defense budget skyrocketed
by 89 percent between 2010 and 2011.
As noted by Walker, it is essential that the West recognize at once
the gravity of the emerging circumstances in the region and stop
seeing Azerbaijan just as a source of oil and natural gas. Indeed,
Azerbaijan's geopolitical importance with regards to regional power
balances is far greater than its energy resources. But what should the
West do? Of course, they must do whatever is needed to ensure that
Armenia puts an end to its occupation of 20 percent of Azerbaijan's
territory. They must exert all sorts of pressure on Armenia and its
supporters to make them stop this unfair occupation that drove hundreds
of thousands of people from their homes. Or to state it more directly,
they must ensure that Azerbaijan establishes its sovereignty over its
86,600 square meters of land as defined by the UN in 1992, so as to
include Nagorno-Karabakh as well.
It is very likely that this will prove to be a big favor to the
Armenians as well. Thanks to peace that will be established by
the return of Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied Azerbaijani lands,
Armenia will be able to end its ongoing regional isolation. In this
way, Armenia will be able to end the necessity of securing foreign
loans, which have amounted to 72 percent of the national income, as
well as put a stop to the massive migrations from the country. Why not?
From: Baghdasarian