Tweet
THE BATTLE OVER RED LINES AND DEADLINES
Today's Zaman
Oct 4 2012
Turkey
"The red line must be drawn on Iran's nuclear enrichment program,"
declared Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the general
debate of the 67th Session of the General Assembly of the UN, demanding
that the international community take concrete action in response to
the growing nuclear threat from Tehran.
As discussions about the Iranian nuclear program continue in the
media, it is becoming clear that some experts are trying to locate
the fuse to this ticking "bomb" in the South Caucasus region, notably
Azerbaijan, which they believe may have plans to assist Israel in
its military intervention.
It is clear that Israel's present strategy on Iran is to tell other
states what they should feel threatened by and what policies they
should implement to counter that threat. After international media
speculation restarted over Azerbaijan having promised to let Israel
use its territory, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry reiterated that
Baku "will not allow its territory to be used by third countries."
Over the past month, the situation in the South Caucasus has become
more complicated: The lines for peace are weakening, becoming red
lines of hostility. The controversial release of convicted army
lieutenant Ramil Safarov (jailed in Hungary for killing an Armenian
officer during a NATO-sponsored training course and given a hero's
welcome upon his return to Baku) demonstrates once again that when
deadlines for peace are unreasonably postponed, hostilities may
simmer for years. Such conditions make conflicting parties more
likely to accept third-party perceptions of threats as their own,
rendering them more open to playing "threat perception" games with
one another on the international stage.
Within the complex and complicated dynamics of the South Caucasus,
experts and politicians have sometimes misunderstood the dual risks of
"red lines" and "deadlines." The actors and factors may be unchanging,
but threat perception compels players to re-examine the conditions
of the game.
First of all, it is not Israeli rhetoric but the facts of Iranian
foreign policy that cause Azerbaijan to be wary of Tehran's
regional policy, which sometimes manifests as angry enmity. Clearly,
Azerbaijan's closeness to Israel angers Iran, which since the Iranian
Revolution has identified the Jewish state as "Little Satan." The
moniker of "Great Satan" is assigned to the US, and Iran identifies
Azerbaijan as "a friend of the Satans." Additionally, Iran's support
for the fundamental Islamist movement in Azerbaijan, along with
several attempted terrorist attacks, have weakened trust in Tehran.
But, on the other hand, Iran's close cooperation with Armenia has
troubled bilateral relations since the early 1990s. By the mid-1990s,
however, Azerbaijan had largely accepted this situation. But because
there is no economic benefit or logic to the deepening Iranian-Armenian
ties in the energy sector, the mutual benefits of this cooperation
raise questions. Even though Iran's main gas reserves are concentrated
in the south of the country, the northern part is more industrially
developed because, due to sanctions, it cannot develop infrastructure
(due to a lack of technology and capacity).
Thus, Iran cannot meet its domestic natural gas demands; however,
it can buy natural gas from Azerbaijan without any additional
investment and supply it to its northern regions rather than invest in
infrastructure that would also transport a limited volume of natural
gas to Armenia. In this sense, Azerbaijan is gradually turning away
from Iran, but not by allowing Israel to use its territory in a
possible military intervention; rather, it is doing so by demanding
the rights of the more than 20 million ethnic Azerbaijanis who live
in northern Iran. This was Iran's fear in the 1990s, and now this
red line is rapidly heating up.
Azerbaijan's calculations about Iran, and its attendant political
positions, are aligning it increasingly with the US. In July, US
Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher sent a letter to Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton urging the United States to back freedom for
ethnic Azeris in Iran, and, on Sept. 12, the congressman presented a
draft text stating that the Azeri people, currently divided between
Azerbaijan and Iran, have the right to self-determination and to
their own sovereign country if they so choose. Given that Congressman
Rohrabacher supported the Armenian genocide resolution in 2010 and
is one of the members of the Friends of Israel in Congress, this move
cannot be dismissed out of hand as non-objective.
Israel's intentions are also clear; Netanyahu is increasingly diverging
from the US's current stance on Iran and is therefore unilaterally
developing Israel's alliance profile in the South Caucasus. Israel
long ago presented itself as the security guarantor of Azerbaijan and
Georgia in the absence of the US in the region, warning that the Obama
administration will not see the Caucasus as a priority. There may also
be hope on the part of some Israelis that Iranian-Azerbaijani tensions
could provide its casus belli if Iran -- openly or "accidentally" --
uses military force against Azerbaijan.
This thinking may not be shared by many experts and officials in
Azerbaijan and Israel, but both sides are aware that in the event of
any possible military intervention in Iran, Tehran will likely attack
Azerbaijan's main energy fields.
In such circumstances, Iran's misguided policy on Azerbaijan has
inflamed the lines of conflict and made the Azerbaijani public more
eager to defend the rights of Azerbaijanis living in Iran; in the
meantime, the deadlines for conflict resolution have passed. Countries
in the Caucasus are suspended by a "balance of threat" perception.
Today's Zaman
Oct 4 2012
Turkey
"The red line must be drawn on Iran's nuclear enrichment program,"
declared Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the general
debate of the 67th Session of the General Assembly of the UN, demanding
that the international community take concrete action in response to
the growing nuclear threat from Tehran.
As discussions about the Iranian nuclear program continue in the
media, it is becoming clear that some experts are trying to locate
the fuse to this ticking "bomb" in the South Caucasus region, notably
Azerbaijan, which they believe may have plans to assist Israel in
its military intervention.
It is clear that Israel's present strategy on Iran is to tell other
states what they should feel threatened by and what policies they
should implement to counter that threat. After international media
speculation restarted over Azerbaijan having promised to let Israel
use its territory, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry reiterated that
Baku "will not allow its territory to be used by third countries."
Over the past month, the situation in the South Caucasus has become
more complicated: The lines for peace are weakening, becoming red
lines of hostility. The controversial release of convicted army
lieutenant Ramil Safarov (jailed in Hungary for killing an Armenian
officer during a NATO-sponsored training course and given a hero's
welcome upon his return to Baku) demonstrates once again that when
deadlines for peace are unreasonably postponed, hostilities may
simmer for years. Such conditions make conflicting parties more
likely to accept third-party perceptions of threats as their own,
rendering them more open to playing "threat perception" games with
one another on the international stage.
Within the complex and complicated dynamics of the South Caucasus,
experts and politicians have sometimes misunderstood the dual risks of
"red lines" and "deadlines." The actors and factors may be unchanging,
but threat perception compels players to re-examine the conditions
of the game.
First of all, it is not Israeli rhetoric but the facts of Iranian
foreign policy that cause Azerbaijan to be wary of Tehran's
regional policy, which sometimes manifests as angry enmity. Clearly,
Azerbaijan's closeness to Israel angers Iran, which since the Iranian
Revolution has identified the Jewish state as "Little Satan." The
moniker of "Great Satan" is assigned to the US, and Iran identifies
Azerbaijan as "a friend of the Satans." Additionally, Iran's support
for the fundamental Islamist movement in Azerbaijan, along with
several attempted terrorist attacks, have weakened trust in Tehran.
But, on the other hand, Iran's close cooperation with Armenia has
troubled bilateral relations since the early 1990s. By the mid-1990s,
however, Azerbaijan had largely accepted this situation. But because
there is no economic benefit or logic to the deepening Iranian-Armenian
ties in the energy sector, the mutual benefits of this cooperation
raise questions. Even though Iran's main gas reserves are concentrated
in the south of the country, the northern part is more industrially
developed because, due to sanctions, it cannot develop infrastructure
(due to a lack of technology and capacity).
Thus, Iran cannot meet its domestic natural gas demands; however,
it can buy natural gas from Azerbaijan without any additional
investment and supply it to its northern regions rather than invest in
infrastructure that would also transport a limited volume of natural
gas to Armenia. In this sense, Azerbaijan is gradually turning away
from Iran, but not by allowing Israel to use its territory in a
possible military intervention; rather, it is doing so by demanding
the rights of the more than 20 million ethnic Azerbaijanis who live
in northern Iran. This was Iran's fear in the 1990s, and now this
red line is rapidly heating up.
Azerbaijan's calculations about Iran, and its attendant political
positions, are aligning it increasingly with the US. In July, US
Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher sent a letter to Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton urging the United States to back freedom for
ethnic Azeris in Iran, and, on Sept. 12, the congressman presented a
draft text stating that the Azeri people, currently divided between
Azerbaijan and Iran, have the right to self-determination and to
their own sovereign country if they so choose. Given that Congressman
Rohrabacher supported the Armenian genocide resolution in 2010 and
is one of the members of the Friends of Israel in Congress, this move
cannot be dismissed out of hand as non-objective.
Israel's intentions are also clear; Netanyahu is increasingly diverging
from the US's current stance on Iran and is therefore unilaterally
developing Israel's alliance profile in the South Caucasus. Israel
long ago presented itself as the security guarantor of Azerbaijan and
Georgia in the absence of the US in the region, warning that the Obama
administration will not see the Caucasus as a priority. There may also
be hope on the part of some Israelis that Iranian-Azerbaijani tensions
could provide its casus belli if Iran -- openly or "accidentally" --
uses military force against Azerbaijan.
This thinking may not be shared by many experts and officials in
Azerbaijan and Israel, but both sides are aware that in the event of
any possible military intervention in Iran, Tehran will likely attack
Azerbaijan's main energy fields.
In such circumstances, Iran's misguided policy on Azerbaijan has
inflamed the lines of conflict and made the Azerbaijani public more
eager to defend the rights of Azerbaijanis living in Iran; in the
meantime, the deadlines for conflict resolution have passed. Countries
in the Caucasus are suspended by a "balance of threat" perception.