ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GEORGIAN PARLIAMENTARY POLLS
Vestnik Kavkaza
Oct 4 2012
Russia
by David Stepanyan, Yerevan. Exclusively for VK
Agavni Karakhanyan, Director of the Institute of Public Society
and Regional Development, told VK about changes and geopolitical
alterations of Georgia in the South Caucasus Region after the
elections.
- Victory of Georgian Dream at the parliamentary elections in Georgia
means upcoming changes in the country. What changes should Armenia and
Georgia expect in the light of changes in Georgian-Russian relations?
- The mentioned changes in Russian-Georgian relations are not so
obvious. I disagree with the idea that victory of opposition in
Georgia would bring radical changes in foreign policy. What grounds
do we have to expect changes? Only persistently built up thesis
about a new player on the Georgian political field Ivanishvili as a
"Kremlin project?" The topic of "Russian footprints" of Ivanishvili
was dropped on the field of electoral political battles by Georgian
authorities and has no documental proof, it was verbal, that is
messages of opposition leader and his supporters about the coalition's
"restoration of diplomatic relations with Russia and will solve the
problem with Russia for sure". But if many see "Russian recurrent
tunes" in these statements, why isn't the "transoceanic connection"
so obvious? This provokes an analogue with the "American dream"
of Georgian. During the electoral campaign, the opposition leader
emphasized prospects of cooperation with the US and Europe on many
occasions, stressing on the fact that he "quit his business in Russia
for the sake of freedom of Georgia". But there are reasons to believe
that Saakashvili would not just give up his power. He is seen off too
early. His team has not expired its political potential. Although the
society is disappointed and tired of the same people, Saakashvili's
party has a resource of power it may fully use until the presidential
elections. No surprise, Saakashvili said in his video message that
he was planning to assist the parliamentary majority in electing the
prime minister and forming a new government. For example, there is
the official admission of defeat which will surely be followed by
congratulations for the former political opponent "who will take the
fate of Georgia in his hands with hopesfor further democratization and
the course for integration in Europe and NATO. I believe Ivanishvili
will take the lead, but the electoral promises, as it often happens,
would be forgotten. Nothing spoils opposition as much as power. So
let's not be hasty. Let's wait.
- Acknowledgement of the fact that all problems of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia caused by the nationalistic pro-American course of Mikheil
Saakashvili develops. What prospects of mutually acceptable settlement
of conflicts do you expect with the change of power in Georgia?
- I would like to warn against over-exaggerated expectations in this
issue. The harsh, unconstructive policy of Saakashvili towards South
Ossetia and Abkhazia pushed them away from Georgian influence, it is
a fact. Regarding changes in this policy, lack of a political program
of the opposition bloc forces us to focus on the electoral rhetoric
of its leaders. There is not a hint in declarations that Georgia was
planning to "free" Abkhazia and South Ossetia and not considering them
part of its territory. It is hard to imagine victorious opposition to
announce that now, when it has taken power. Lack of harsh nationalistic
rhetoric and systemless of the oppositionist bloc which will most
likely split, does not mean that opposition leaders are unfamiliar
with the sense and understanding of national interests.
When developing policy for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the best
formula is that the problem remains, but relations develop. Such
serious issues are not resolved instantly. It takes time. With
account of the fact that the process is bilateral, the position of
the opposite side of conflicts cannot be neglected. For example,
Saakashvili is more suitable for Abkhazians, because chances that he
will find common grounds with Moscow are minimal.
- On September 23, the leader of the Georgian Dream said that his
coalition was considering restoration of railway and road connection
with Abkhazia. The declaration is of great interest for Armenia. What
are its prospects after the victory of the bloc at the elections on
October 1?
- It is hard to overestimate the role of restoring communications
with Abkhazia for Armenia. It would not be an exaggeration to say
that opening railway and road connection through Abkhazia will be
vital for our country. Talks and projects on restoration of old
communications in the region were numerous. But the "railway cordon"
on this way formed by the Georgian president cannot be broken yet. I
remind that one of supporters of opening railway connection through
Abkhazia is Turkey, a rapidly growing economy interested in direct
access to Russian markets, better to say the southern markets of
Russia. It may only be realized with restoration of communications
through Armenia, restoration of the Kars-Gyumri Railway line.
- Russia and Iran will soon sign an agreement on construction of the
Kazvin-Resht-Astara Railway. Besides the RR, Azerbaijani Railways and
Iranian Railways are taking part in the project. Have the elections
results in Georgia introduced their changes to the geopolitical
project?
- It is all not that simple. The Communication corridor is always
essential for Moscow and Tehran, because this is not a matter of
economic pay-off, but strategic dividends. In this context, any
communication project is justified. The fact that any strategic route
would bypass Armenia is a matter of concerns of Yerevan only. It
is hard to imagine a situation where any regional player would quit
strategic calculations and projects just because someone else does
not fit in it. And finally, I would not link relate changes of the
North-South Corridor's direction and Armenian involvement in the
project with the switch of power in Georgia. The switch of power
presupposes certain offset of accents, maybe priorities, but not
scrapping of state interests.
- Georgia is the key transit state for Armenia and Azerbaijan. What
geopolitical transformations in South Caucasus should be expected
with the switch of power in Georgia?
- Geopolitical transformations in South Caucasus are relation to
possible changes of political economy in foreign affairs of Georgia
associated with the personality and achievements of the opposition
leader and upcoming prime minister. Possible changes of communications
of Georgia and Abkhazia are realistic and have the right for existence,
because they are base on economic pragmatism, interest, experience of
the future prime minister as a businessman and prospect of economic
configuration of the region. Economic motivation of Ivanishvili as a
financial and business activist will affect political decisions. We
have the right to expect new readings of foreign economic policy of
Georgia in the region and scrapping of the harsh policy of isolation
of conflict republics and stress on transit dividends of the current
authorities of Georgia. With doubtless disappointment of Azerbaijan
with smoothening of Georgia of harsh isolation of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, Turkish support of plans to restore communications in South
Caucasus should not be ruled out.
Armenia will be inevitably involved in the adjusted format of economic
relations of the region.
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/32174.html
From: A. Papazian
Vestnik Kavkaza
Oct 4 2012
Russia
by David Stepanyan, Yerevan. Exclusively for VK
Agavni Karakhanyan, Director of the Institute of Public Society
and Regional Development, told VK about changes and geopolitical
alterations of Georgia in the South Caucasus Region after the
elections.
- Victory of Georgian Dream at the parliamentary elections in Georgia
means upcoming changes in the country. What changes should Armenia and
Georgia expect in the light of changes in Georgian-Russian relations?
- The mentioned changes in Russian-Georgian relations are not so
obvious. I disagree with the idea that victory of opposition in
Georgia would bring radical changes in foreign policy. What grounds
do we have to expect changes? Only persistently built up thesis
about a new player on the Georgian political field Ivanishvili as a
"Kremlin project?" The topic of "Russian footprints" of Ivanishvili
was dropped on the field of electoral political battles by Georgian
authorities and has no documental proof, it was verbal, that is
messages of opposition leader and his supporters about the coalition's
"restoration of diplomatic relations with Russia and will solve the
problem with Russia for sure". But if many see "Russian recurrent
tunes" in these statements, why isn't the "transoceanic connection"
so obvious? This provokes an analogue with the "American dream"
of Georgian. During the electoral campaign, the opposition leader
emphasized prospects of cooperation with the US and Europe on many
occasions, stressing on the fact that he "quit his business in Russia
for the sake of freedom of Georgia". But there are reasons to believe
that Saakashvili would not just give up his power. He is seen off too
early. His team has not expired its political potential. Although the
society is disappointed and tired of the same people, Saakashvili's
party has a resource of power it may fully use until the presidential
elections. No surprise, Saakashvili said in his video message that
he was planning to assist the parliamentary majority in electing the
prime minister and forming a new government. For example, there is
the official admission of defeat which will surely be followed by
congratulations for the former political opponent "who will take the
fate of Georgia in his hands with hopesfor further democratization and
the course for integration in Europe and NATO. I believe Ivanishvili
will take the lead, but the electoral promises, as it often happens,
would be forgotten. Nothing spoils opposition as much as power. So
let's not be hasty. Let's wait.
- Acknowledgement of the fact that all problems of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia caused by the nationalistic pro-American course of Mikheil
Saakashvili develops. What prospects of mutually acceptable settlement
of conflicts do you expect with the change of power in Georgia?
- I would like to warn against over-exaggerated expectations in this
issue. The harsh, unconstructive policy of Saakashvili towards South
Ossetia and Abkhazia pushed them away from Georgian influence, it is
a fact. Regarding changes in this policy, lack of a political program
of the opposition bloc forces us to focus on the electoral rhetoric
of its leaders. There is not a hint in declarations that Georgia was
planning to "free" Abkhazia and South Ossetia and not considering them
part of its territory. It is hard to imagine victorious opposition to
announce that now, when it has taken power. Lack of harsh nationalistic
rhetoric and systemless of the oppositionist bloc which will most
likely split, does not mean that opposition leaders are unfamiliar
with the sense and understanding of national interests.
When developing policy for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the best
formula is that the problem remains, but relations develop. Such
serious issues are not resolved instantly. It takes time. With
account of the fact that the process is bilateral, the position of
the opposite side of conflicts cannot be neglected. For example,
Saakashvili is more suitable for Abkhazians, because chances that he
will find common grounds with Moscow are minimal.
- On September 23, the leader of the Georgian Dream said that his
coalition was considering restoration of railway and road connection
with Abkhazia. The declaration is of great interest for Armenia. What
are its prospects after the victory of the bloc at the elections on
October 1?
- It is hard to overestimate the role of restoring communications
with Abkhazia for Armenia. It would not be an exaggeration to say
that opening railway and road connection through Abkhazia will be
vital for our country. Talks and projects on restoration of old
communications in the region were numerous. But the "railway cordon"
on this way formed by the Georgian president cannot be broken yet. I
remind that one of supporters of opening railway connection through
Abkhazia is Turkey, a rapidly growing economy interested in direct
access to Russian markets, better to say the southern markets of
Russia. It may only be realized with restoration of communications
through Armenia, restoration of the Kars-Gyumri Railway line.
- Russia and Iran will soon sign an agreement on construction of the
Kazvin-Resht-Astara Railway. Besides the RR, Azerbaijani Railways and
Iranian Railways are taking part in the project. Have the elections
results in Georgia introduced their changes to the geopolitical
project?
- It is all not that simple. The Communication corridor is always
essential for Moscow and Tehran, because this is not a matter of
economic pay-off, but strategic dividends. In this context, any
communication project is justified. The fact that any strategic route
would bypass Armenia is a matter of concerns of Yerevan only. It
is hard to imagine a situation where any regional player would quit
strategic calculations and projects just because someone else does
not fit in it. And finally, I would not link relate changes of the
North-South Corridor's direction and Armenian involvement in the
project with the switch of power in Georgia. The switch of power
presupposes certain offset of accents, maybe priorities, but not
scrapping of state interests.
- Georgia is the key transit state for Armenia and Azerbaijan. What
geopolitical transformations in South Caucasus should be expected
with the switch of power in Georgia?
- Geopolitical transformations in South Caucasus are relation to
possible changes of political economy in foreign affairs of Georgia
associated with the personality and achievements of the opposition
leader and upcoming prime minister. Possible changes of communications
of Georgia and Abkhazia are realistic and have the right for existence,
because they are base on economic pragmatism, interest, experience of
the future prime minister as a businessman and prospect of economic
configuration of the region. Economic motivation of Ivanishvili as a
financial and business activist will affect political decisions. We
have the right to expect new readings of foreign economic policy of
Georgia in the region and scrapping of the harsh policy of isolation
of conflict republics and stress on transit dividends of the current
authorities of Georgia. With doubtless disappointment of Azerbaijan
with smoothening of Georgia of harsh isolation of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, Turkish support of plans to restore communications in South
Caucasus should not be ruled out.
Armenia will be inevitably involved in the adjusted format of economic
relations of the region.
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/32174.html
From: A. Papazian