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Gayane Novikova: The Armenian side must continue the negotiations over
the Nagorno Karabakh conflict resolution
Dr. Gayane Novikova, Director of the Center for Strategic Analysis,
Yerevan, Armenia; Visiting Scholar at the Davis Center for Russian and
Eurasian Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
http://www.spectrum.am/articles-en/2012/10/2739/
October 5, 2012
The extradition of Ramil Safarov, who was sentenced to life
imprisonment, from Hungary and his immediate pardon by the Azerbaijani
president, again questioned the ability of Azerbaijan to keep its
promises. In your opinion, is it reasonable to continue negotiations
over the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict with Baku?
The Armenian side must continue the negotiations over the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict resolution first and foremost because there is an
ongoing objective process, moving toward the establishment of new
state entities. Even in the relatively stable and safe (from a
security vantage point) European region in three states - Belgium,
Spain, and Great Britain - there are discussions on independence of
Flandreau, Catalonia, and Scotland, respectively. There were two
referenda on the separation of Québec from Canada. In 2011 a new state
- South Sudan - appeared on the world map. After twenty years of the
de facto existence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, and especially
against the background of the above-mentioned geopolitical shifts, the
possibility to change the NKR status from de facto to a de jure state
is not perceived as something strongly negative. Moreover, a voicing
of a possibility of recognizing the NKR has begun. Let me remind you
that two American states, Rhode Island and Massachusetts, have adopted
resolutions calling for President Obama and Congress to recognize the
NKR.
This slow-moving process of pre-recognition of the Nagorno Karabakh
Republic is a main threat for Azerbaijani domestic and foreign policy.
The `Safarov phenomenon' was aimed to provoke Armenia to take overt
and confrontational steps. Fortunately, in spite of the calls of some
`hotheads' in Armenia, it did not happen. The withdrawal of any of the
parties to the conflict from the negotiation table will be evaluated
by the concerned external actors as a manifestation of aggression by
the withdrawing side.
On October 10, the third anniversary of the signing of the
Armenian-Turkish protocols, which have never been ratified, will pass.
It is obvious that the reason for their non-ratification is Turkey's
obstinacy. The latter continues to link the opening of the border with
Armenia to the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Do you see
any prerequisite for reanimation of the process of normalization of
the relationship between Armenia and Turkey?
No, I don't see any prerequisite. Turkey has stated conditions, and is
still articulating conditions, for the reanimation of the
normalization process of bilateral relations with Armenia, first of
all, the opening of the border, by positive - from the Azerbaijani
view point - shifts in the Nagorno Karabakh negotiations. Let me
stress once again: in Turkey's policy the issue of opening the border
with Armenia is further and further postponed because of its domestic
problems and the day-by-day worsening developments in the Middle East.
Against this background, the settlement of the Armenian-Turkish
relationship undoubtedly will increase tension in its relations with
Azerbaijan; possibly it will negatively influence internal
developments in Turkey. Furthermore, no single external actor, more or
less involved in the processes in the South Caucasus, can put pressure
on Turkey in this very difficult period for every regional state. I
suppose that in the foreseeable future Turkey will limit its activity
to offering statements on the necessity to achieve progress in the
resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and on its firm support of
Azerbaijan. It cannot venture anything more or anything different.
In your opinion, will the issue of Nagorno Karabakh be a main theme in
the forthcoming presidential campaign in Armenia?
I hope that it will not. First, the resolution of this conflict is one
of the strategic priorities of our state in the security field. It is
dangerous to use this factor in electioneering. Second, it is almost
the only issue around which a relative consensus is reached in
Armenian society. Of course, each presidential candidate will include
this issue in his/her agenda; however, I am not certain that any
candidate has anything strongly different from the approaches his or
her contender or contenders offer. The most irrational suggestion,
such as an immediate recognition of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic by
Armenia, can be voiced only by those candidates with the lowest
support in the society and who are hoping to gain additional votes at
the cost of populist statements, including in the field of foreign
policy. Eventually, everyone understands that war is an alternative to
peace.
Continuing with the theme of elections, let us ask your opinion in
regard to concomitant circumstances surrounding the forthcoming
elections. There is an opinion that the 2013 presidential election
will be relatively quiet and low-key. After the May 2012 parliamentary
elections, the statements that Levon Ter-Petrosian, the leader of the
Armenian National Congress (ANC) will not run for the presidency are
heard more often. To whom will he give the baton? Are we witnessing,
in your opinion, the final stage of the dissolution of the ANC, which
began one year ago?
I agree that the Armenian National Congress to some extent has lost
its energy. It was unable to introduce a clear vision and a program,
as well as to use in full the protest trends and moods in some strata
of Armenian society. The ANC won only seven seats in Parliament - this
is a very conspicuous indicator. There is no one in the Ter-Petrosyan
circle to whom he could give the baton. It was the person of
Ter-Petrosian that served as the `magnet' - and not his program,
vision, or approach, that is everything that creates an ideological
platform for any political organization - that attracted (but did not
unite) the various forces in the ANC. He did not prepare any successor
who could replace him, and this is one of the weak sides of the ANC.
The forces that are part of the ANC, although they have support from
different segments of the society, entered into Parliament on the tide
of protest moods stimulated and used by the ANC after the presidential
elections of 2008. At that time the ANC was a relatively united
political force. I do not think that the ANC will be fully dissolved
in the foreseeable future, even though internal developments in this
organization indicate growing disagreement among its members. For all
the political forces under the ANC umbrella the existence of a protest
potential in the society and its `simmering' is of highest importance.
The ANC can acquire this potential to its advantage only through the
joint efforts of all its member parties and organizations.
The opinion exists that the `Prosperous Armenia' Party will not
confront the authorities and will prefer to wait until the next
presidential elections of 2018 to bring its own candidate to power.
The question is not whether `Prosperous Armenia' will confront the
Republican Party in the presidential election of 2013. It does not yet
have a real alternative figure to run for the presidency. Robert
Kocharian, the second President of Armenia, is still in the shadows
and, according to preliminary observations, has no intention to
participate in this race. Vardan Oskanian, the former minister of
foreign affairs and the founder of the Civilitas Foundation, found
himself the focus of a trial. The article published on September 28,
2012, in `The Washington Post' did not improve the image of either
Oskanian himself or the Foundation because it carried the wrong
message that non-governmental organizations in Armenia are under
strong pressure from the state apparatus. (I would argue that it is
inappropriate to compare the level of participation of Armenian NGOs
in the political and social life of the country with the developments
surrounding NGOs in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Pakistan or anywhere else!) I
would not exclude that the opening of the Oskanian case can be viewed
in reference to political constellations, but I am sure that the
former minister lacks the level of strong support among potential
voters that would allow viable competition with the
President-in-office in the forthcoming elections. There will be at
least three candidacies, representing the Republican Party, the
`Heritage,' and the Armenian Revolutionary Party `Dashnaktutyun.' For
`Prosperous Armenia,' for tactical reasons, it would be advisable to
take a timeout and to try, through dialogue with other representatives
of a `constructive opposition', to find and support a single candidate
in the 2018 elections.
Who could become Prime Minister? There are rumors that a confrontation
between the `Prosperous Armenia' and the ruling Republican Party was
defused after the parties reached an agreement that Tigran Sargsyan
will leave office after the presidential election?
`Prosperous Armenia,' which was established in 2004 as an alternative
to the ruling Republican Party with the main goal to split the
opposition, after only a few years has gained political strength and
weight (to a large extent because of the charitable activity of its
leader). Thus, the initial secondary political role already is not
enough for this party. It will undoubtedly make claims for leading
positions. It is worth mentioning that reaching a compromise on such
issues, through behind-the-scenes negotiations, is a quite common
practice, especially in societies without extensive historical
experience with a democratic transformation.
My answer to the first part of your question in regard to the future
Prime Minister is very simple: I don't know.
the Nagorno Karabakh conflict resolution
Dr. Gayane Novikova, Director of the Center for Strategic Analysis,
Yerevan, Armenia; Visiting Scholar at the Davis Center for Russian and
Eurasian Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
http://www.spectrum.am/articles-en/2012/10/2739/
October 5, 2012
The extradition of Ramil Safarov, who was sentenced to life
imprisonment, from Hungary and his immediate pardon by the Azerbaijani
president, again questioned the ability of Azerbaijan to keep its
promises. In your opinion, is it reasonable to continue negotiations
over the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict with Baku?
The Armenian side must continue the negotiations over the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict resolution first and foremost because there is an
ongoing objective process, moving toward the establishment of new
state entities. Even in the relatively stable and safe (from a
security vantage point) European region in three states - Belgium,
Spain, and Great Britain - there are discussions on independence of
Flandreau, Catalonia, and Scotland, respectively. There were two
referenda on the separation of Québec from Canada. In 2011 a new state
- South Sudan - appeared on the world map. After twenty years of the
de facto existence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, and especially
against the background of the above-mentioned geopolitical shifts, the
possibility to change the NKR status from de facto to a de jure state
is not perceived as something strongly negative. Moreover, a voicing
of a possibility of recognizing the NKR has begun. Let me remind you
that two American states, Rhode Island and Massachusetts, have adopted
resolutions calling for President Obama and Congress to recognize the
NKR.
This slow-moving process of pre-recognition of the Nagorno Karabakh
Republic is a main threat for Azerbaijani domestic and foreign policy.
The `Safarov phenomenon' was aimed to provoke Armenia to take overt
and confrontational steps. Fortunately, in spite of the calls of some
`hotheads' in Armenia, it did not happen. The withdrawal of any of the
parties to the conflict from the negotiation table will be evaluated
by the concerned external actors as a manifestation of aggression by
the withdrawing side.
On October 10, the third anniversary of the signing of the
Armenian-Turkish protocols, which have never been ratified, will pass.
It is obvious that the reason for their non-ratification is Turkey's
obstinacy. The latter continues to link the opening of the border with
Armenia to the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Do you see
any prerequisite for reanimation of the process of normalization of
the relationship between Armenia and Turkey?
No, I don't see any prerequisite. Turkey has stated conditions, and is
still articulating conditions, for the reanimation of the
normalization process of bilateral relations with Armenia, first of
all, the opening of the border, by positive - from the Azerbaijani
view point - shifts in the Nagorno Karabakh negotiations. Let me
stress once again: in Turkey's policy the issue of opening the border
with Armenia is further and further postponed because of its domestic
problems and the day-by-day worsening developments in the Middle East.
Against this background, the settlement of the Armenian-Turkish
relationship undoubtedly will increase tension in its relations with
Azerbaijan; possibly it will negatively influence internal
developments in Turkey. Furthermore, no single external actor, more or
less involved in the processes in the South Caucasus, can put pressure
on Turkey in this very difficult period for every regional state. I
suppose that in the foreseeable future Turkey will limit its activity
to offering statements on the necessity to achieve progress in the
resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and on its firm support of
Azerbaijan. It cannot venture anything more or anything different.
In your opinion, will the issue of Nagorno Karabakh be a main theme in
the forthcoming presidential campaign in Armenia?
I hope that it will not. First, the resolution of this conflict is one
of the strategic priorities of our state in the security field. It is
dangerous to use this factor in electioneering. Second, it is almost
the only issue around which a relative consensus is reached in
Armenian society. Of course, each presidential candidate will include
this issue in his/her agenda; however, I am not certain that any
candidate has anything strongly different from the approaches his or
her contender or contenders offer. The most irrational suggestion,
such as an immediate recognition of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic by
Armenia, can be voiced only by those candidates with the lowest
support in the society and who are hoping to gain additional votes at
the cost of populist statements, including in the field of foreign
policy. Eventually, everyone understands that war is an alternative to
peace.
Continuing with the theme of elections, let us ask your opinion in
regard to concomitant circumstances surrounding the forthcoming
elections. There is an opinion that the 2013 presidential election
will be relatively quiet and low-key. After the May 2012 parliamentary
elections, the statements that Levon Ter-Petrosian, the leader of the
Armenian National Congress (ANC) will not run for the presidency are
heard more often. To whom will he give the baton? Are we witnessing,
in your opinion, the final stage of the dissolution of the ANC, which
began one year ago?
I agree that the Armenian National Congress to some extent has lost
its energy. It was unable to introduce a clear vision and a program,
as well as to use in full the protest trends and moods in some strata
of Armenian society. The ANC won only seven seats in Parliament - this
is a very conspicuous indicator. There is no one in the Ter-Petrosyan
circle to whom he could give the baton. It was the person of
Ter-Petrosian that served as the `magnet' - and not his program,
vision, or approach, that is everything that creates an ideological
platform for any political organization - that attracted (but did not
unite) the various forces in the ANC. He did not prepare any successor
who could replace him, and this is one of the weak sides of the ANC.
The forces that are part of the ANC, although they have support from
different segments of the society, entered into Parliament on the tide
of protest moods stimulated and used by the ANC after the presidential
elections of 2008. At that time the ANC was a relatively united
political force. I do not think that the ANC will be fully dissolved
in the foreseeable future, even though internal developments in this
organization indicate growing disagreement among its members. For all
the political forces under the ANC umbrella the existence of a protest
potential in the society and its `simmering' is of highest importance.
The ANC can acquire this potential to its advantage only through the
joint efforts of all its member parties and organizations.
The opinion exists that the `Prosperous Armenia' Party will not
confront the authorities and will prefer to wait until the next
presidential elections of 2018 to bring its own candidate to power.
The question is not whether `Prosperous Armenia' will confront the
Republican Party in the presidential election of 2013. It does not yet
have a real alternative figure to run for the presidency. Robert
Kocharian, the second President of Armenia, is still in the shadows
and, according to preliminary observations, has no intention to
participate in this race. Vardan Oskanian, the former minister of
foreign affairs and the founder of the Civilitas Foundation, found
himself the focus of a trial. The article published on September 28,
2012, in `The Washington Post' did not improve the image of either
Oskanian himself or the Foundation because it carried the wrong
message that non-governmental organizations in Armenia are under
strong pressure from the state apparatus. (I would argue that it is
inappropriate to compare the level of participation of Armenian NGOs
in the political and social life of the country with the developments
surrounding NGOs in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Pakistan or anywhere else!) I
would not exclude that the opening of the Oskanian case can be viewed
in reference to political constellations, but I am sure that the
former minister lacks the level of strong support among potential
voters that would allow viable competition with the
President-in-office in the forthcoming elections. There will be at
least three candidacies, representing the Republican Party, the
`Heritage,' and the Armenian Revolutionary Party `Dashnaktutyun.' For
`Prosperous Armenia,' for tactical reasons, it would be advisable to
take a timeout and to try, through dialogue with other representatives
of a `constructive opposition', to find and support a single candidate
in the 2018 elections.
Who could become Prime Minister? There are rumors that a confrontation
between the `Prosperous Armenia' and the ruling Republican Party was
defused after the parties reached an agreement that Tigran Sargsyan
will leave office after the presidential election?
`Prosperous Armenia,' which was established in 2004 as an alternative
to the ruling Republican Party with the main goal to split the
opposition, after only a few years has gained political strength and
weight (to a large extent because of the charitable activity of its
leader). Thus, the initial secondary political role already is not
enough for this party. It will undoubtedly make claims for leading
positions. It is worth mentioning that reaching a compromise on such
issues, through behind-the-scenes negotiations, is a quite common
practice, especially in societies without extensive historical
experience with a democratic transformation.
My answer to the first part of your question in regard to the future
Prime Minister is very simple: I don't know.