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REGIONAL CONTEXT OF ELECTIONS IN GEORGIA: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
Politkom.ru
Oct 5 2012
Russia
[Translated from Russian]
by Candidate of Historical Sciences Sergey Minasyan, leader of Caucasus
Institute's Political Research Department (Yerevan, Armenia)
The results of the parliamentary elections in Georgia have proved
unexpected for everyone. Hardly anyone, apart, of course, from the
actual apologists for Bidzina Ivanishvili's triumphant Georgian Dream,
had expected such an unconditional opposition victory. However,
the chief mistake of the majority of experts monitoring the
preelection dynamics in Georgia was not their underestimation of
the electoral preferences of Georgian voters. Even several months
before the 1 October elections it was clear to practically everyone
that Saakashvili would noticeably "yield" to the opposition bloc,
particularly in the capital, and that he would not get a "clean"
win in these elections without employing the administrative-security
resource. The main problem for experts and commentators was their
substantial overestimation of the potential of just this administrative
resource, which suddenly proved ineffective during the elections.
It is possible that the administrative-security resource was
substantially shaken as a result of the scandal involving video
materials on torture in Georgian prisons, with the subsequent
dismissals of the internal affairs minister and the minister for
probation, which to all intents and purposes paralysed the security
structures that have traditionally been loyal to Saakashvili. Many
people in Georgia maintain that it is perfectly possible that the
administrative resource also failed to work because of the recently
unpublicized neutrality of Prime Minister Vano Merabishvili, who has
a huge influence on Georgia's security structures. Not that all of
this is all that important, for the elections have already taken place.
Saakashvili has acknowledged their results and has already voiced
readiness to work with the new government, which will be formed by
Ivanishvili's bloc.
However, this still does not mean that Mikheil Saakashvili and
his team have fully surrendered their political positions. First,
Saakashvili's presidential term expires only in 2013, and he himself
is free to schedule the date of the next elections, whether in January
or, say, next September. During this time Saakashvili theoretically
holds certain levers, right down to the dissolution of the newly
elected parliament under certain conditions. Second, Georgia's present
constitution, "adjusted" in accordance with the wishes of the current
president, contains many other loopholes and traps of various kinds,
which he can use in the struggle to preserve his own political future.
The possibility also cannot be ruled out that the very fact that he
acknowledged his party's defeat in the elections, which increased
his popularity in Western circles, was largely occasioned by hopes of
"reserve paths of retreat." In the end, Saakashvili may just sabotage
the activity of Ivanishvili's government throughout the time remaining
to him, creating a situation similar to the Ukrainian version of
relations between President Yushchenko and Premier Yanukovych or the
situation, say, that has been encountered in French political practice
in recent decades.
Let us try, nevertheless, to analyse "off the cuff" what regional
significance the parliamentary election results in Georgia might have
by examining the standard version of the development of events in
that country in the event of the full-blown formation of a full-blown
government by Ivanishvili's party.
First, we should expect a softening of the general background in
Russian-Georgian relations. There evidently will not be a full-blown
political "reconciliation" for a certain time to come, but economic
relations will, in all probability, be resumed. Naturally, issues
in the form of Georgia's proclaimed policy of NATO membership and
full-blown Euro-integration will remain unresolved. Ivanishvili has
reaffirmed the priority nature of these areas, adding at the same time
that he will pay his first official visit precisely to Washington. But
at the same time, to all appearances, if the so-called "North Caucasus
card," which also includes the problem of recognizing the genocide of
Cherkessians, is not consigned completely to oblivion, it will cease to
be actively played by Tbilisi. This policy of Tbilisi's may have been
rational under conditions of a complete impasse in Russian-Georgian
relations, but in the event of attempts to arrange relations with
Russia the new Georgian authorities will have to renounce Georgia's
public use of the "Cherkessian lever" if not to pressure Moscow then
to play on its nerves.
However, the most important and interesting thing can be expected in
the matter of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflict. Sukhumi and
Tskhinvali are already following the developments inside Georgia with
a sinking heart, fearing that in the event of the start of a new stage
of Russian-Georgian reconciliation their interests may be sacrificed
by Moscow. Predictable Saakashvili was far more advantageous and
convenient for them than Ivanishvili, who proclaims more flexible
approaches with regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On the other
hand, the fact that the negotiating format and expert consultation
on the Georgian side may be taken on by people who, in the eyes of
the Abkhazians and Ossetians, would be able to arouse trust and who
would have a deeper understanding of the specific nature of these
conflicts (Irakli Alasania, Davit Usupashvili, Paata Zakareishvili,
Ivlian Khaindrava, and other "republican intellectuals") cannot fail,
by definition, to entail a change in the format of Georgian policy
on this issue.
In particular, claims have already emerged that Tbilisi may try to
implement a new policy of "everything but recognition," implying the
establishment of direct contact with the Abkhazian and South Ossetian
authorities, the signing of an agreement on the nonuse of force, and
even the opening of "Ergneti Market," which was closed down in 2004
and which once served as a very important lever to tie South Ossetia
economically to Georgia. But all of this, naturally, without Georgia
formally recognizing the independence of these republics. For now,
however, these are just vague leaks of information to the media, and it
is not clear to what extent a move of this kind can be implemented in
the event of the full-blown formation of a new government by Georgian
Dream with new views on the conflicts.
Theoretically, it is also possible to expect changes in the new
Georgian leadership's approaches to the question of the regions
with the ethnic minorities that live there -Samtskhe-Javakheti
with its Armenian population and Kvemo Kartli with its primarily
Azerbaijani population. During the present elections, as in all the
previous ones, it was in these regions that the regime was able to
utilize its administrative resource with complete success, picking
up in Samtskhe-Javakheti, for example, more than 70 per cent of
the votes (compared with a result of just over 40 per cent on the
scale of all of Georgia) and all the seats of the majority-system
deputies. This situation, which can hardly suit Georgian society
and the Georgian political elite, is accounted for by a whole slew
of factors. These include both apathy and the substantially greater
administrative-security control in these regions under Saakashvili,
making it possible effectively to falsify elections, as well as
the ban on the functioning of regional parties and sociopolitical
movements from among representatives of ethnic minorities capable
of more effectively representing local interests and entering into
alliances with republic-wide parties by attracting the support of
their own supporters locally. Some progress is possible on this issue.
During the election campaign in Samtskhe-Javakheti Ivanishvili also
promised to examine the question of granting the Armenian language
the status of a regional language, with a more flexible approach to
its use as the language of local administration and education. In
addition to factors promoting the better integration of ethnic
Armenians and Azerbaijanis into Georgia's political and cultural field
(through the creation of positive incentives and cadre cooptation),
the liberalization of the policy towards ethnic minorities and,
on the whole, a more open political atmosphere in Georgia after
the elections may also become an important argument in the hands of
the new government given a change of approach in the Abkhazian and
Ossetian conflicts.
We should expect the activation of Armenian-Georgian relations,
particularly when we consider the obvious factor of a possible
softening of relations between Tbilisi and Moscow and, accordingly,
a levelling of the "Russian limiter" in relations between Yerevan and
Tbilisi. On the other hand, the Georgian precedent of regime change
as the result of legitimate elections has aroused great interest and
even unfeigned liking in Armenian society and in the political elite
in the context of the presidential election expected in February
2013 and the incipient start of a tough and evidently also highly
competitive political struggle in Armenia.
To all appearances, the Georgian election results came as an unpleasant
surprise to the Azerbaijani authorities. Novruz Mamedov, spokesman
for Ilham Aliyev's administration, declared that "not only he but
also everyone to a certain degree is surprised that President Mikheil
Saakashvili's party was unable to secure the support of the Georgian
public." The Azerbaijani official's concern is understandable, for
elections are expected also in Azerbaijan in 2013, and the Georgian
example proved quite "out of place." Baku is also concerned about
the possibility of the normalization of relations between Russia
and Georgia, which creates better opportunities for Armenia in its
communications with its chief military-political ally.
It is also unclear what fate may await Azerbaijani investments in the
event of a possible economic redistribution in Georgia after the change
of government. It is no secret that Azerbaijan's economic penetration
of Georgia (for example, by enterprises of the Azerbaijani State Oil
Company) was implemented primarily with the shadowy participation of
certain persons in Saakashvili's closest entourage.
Some people in Baku fear that this may now be jeopardized.
However, the aforementioned regional geopolitical situation based on
the Georgian election results is becoming apparent only in the most
general outline and may change significantly. The new political season
in Georgia is still only beginning, and the starting conditions and
many players may still substantially correct and change their positions
and approaches and even change places. However, one thing is obvious:
The regional "echo" of the Georgian elections will reverberate for
a long time to come.
[Translated from Russian]
From: Baghdasarian
Politkom.ru
Oct 5 2012
Russia
[Translated from Russian]
by Candidate of Historical Sciences Sergey Minasyan, leader of Caucasus
Institute's Political Research Department (Yerevan, Armenia)
The results of the parliamentary elections in Georgia have proved
unexpected for everyone. Hardly anyone, apart, of course, from the
actual apologists for Bidzina Ivanishvili's triumphant Georgian Dream,
had expected such an unconditional opposition victory. However,
the chief mistake of the majority of experts monitoring the
preelection dynamics in Georgia was not their underestimation of
the electoral preferences of Georgian voters. Even several months
before the 1 October elections it was clear to practically everyone
that Saakashvili would noticeably "yield" to the opposition bloc,
particularly in the capital, and that he would not get a "clean"
win in these elections without employing the administrative-security
resource. The main problem for experts and commentators was their
substantial overestimation of the potential of just this administrative
resource, which suddenly proved ineffective during the elections.
It is possible that the administrative-security resource was
substantially shaken as a result of the scandal involving video
materials on torture in Georgian prisons, with the subsequent
dismissals of the internal affairs minister and the minister for
probation, which to all intents and purposes paralysed the security
structures that have traditionally been loyal to Saakashvili. Many
people in Georgia maintain that it is perfectly possible that the
administrative resource also failed to work because of the recently
unpublicized neutrality of Prime Minister Vano Merabishvili, who has
a huge influence on Georgia's security structures. Not that all of
this is all that important, for the elections have already taken place.
Saakashvili has acknowledged their results and has already voiced
readiness to work with the new government, which will be formed by
Ivanishvili's bloc.
However, this still does not mean that Mikheil Saakashvili and
his team have fully surrendered their political positions. First,
Saakashvili's presidential term expires only in 2013, and he himself
is free to schedule the date of the next elections, whether in January
or, say, next September. During this time Saakashvili theoretically
holds certain levers, right down to the dissolution of the newly
elected parliament under certain conditions. Second, Georgia's present
constitution, "adjusted" in accordance with the wishes of the current
president, contains many other loopholes and traps of various kinds,
which he can use in the struggle to preserve his own political future.
The possibility also cannot be ruled out that the very fact that he
acknowledged his party's defeat in the elections, which increased
his popularity in Western circles, was largely occasioned by hopes of
"reserve paths of retreat." In the end, Saakashvili may just sabotage
the activity of Ivanishvili's government throughout the time remaining
to him, creating a situation similar to the Ukrainian version of
relations between President Yushchenko and Premier Yanukovych or the
situation, say, that has been encountered in French political practice
in recent decades.
Let us try, nevertheless, to analyse "off the cuff" what regional
significance the parliamentary election results in Georgia might have
by examining the standard version of the development of events in
that country in the event of the full-blown formation of a full-blown
government by Ivanishvili's party.
First, we should expect a softening of the general background in
Russian-Georgian relations. There evidently will not be a full-blown
political "reconciliation" for a certain time to come, but economic
relations will, in all probability, be resumed. Naturally, issues
in the form of Georgia's proclaimed policy of NATO membership and
full-blown Euro-integration will remain unresolved. Ivanishvili has
reaffirmed the priority nature of these areas, adding at the same time
that he will pay his first official visit precisely to Washington. But
at the same time, to all appearances, if the so-called "North Caucasus
card," which also includes the problem of recognizing the genocide of
Cherkessians, is not consigned completely to oblivion, it will cease to
be actively played by Tbilisi. This policy of Tbilisi's may have been
rational under conditions of a complete impasse in Russian-Georgian
relations, but in the event of attempts to arrange relations with
Russia the new Georgian authorities will have to renounce Georgia's
public use of the "Cherkessian lever" if not to pressure Moscow then
to play on its nerves.
However, the most important and interesting thing can be expected in
the matter of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflict. Sukhumi and
Tskhinvali are already following the developments inside Georgia with
a sinking heart, fearing that in the event of the start of a new stage
of Russian-Georgian reconciliation their interests may be sacrificed
by Moscow. Predictable Saakashvili was far more advantageous and
convenient for them than Ivanishvili, who proclaims more flexible
approaches with regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On the other
hand, the fact that the negotiating format and expert consultation
on the Georgian side may be taken on by people who, in the eyes of
the Abkhazians and Ossetians, would be able to arouse trust and who
would have a deeper understanding of the specific nature of these
conflicts (Irakli Alasania, Davit Usupashvili, Paata Zakareishvili,
Ivlian Khaindrava, and other "republican intellectuals") cannot fail,
by definition, to entail a change in the format of Georgian policy
on this issue.
In particular, claims have already emerged that Tbilisi may try to
implement a new policy of "everything but recognition," implying the
establishment of direct contact with the Abkhazian and South Ossetian
authorities, the signing of an agreement on the nonuse of force, and
even the opening of "Ergneti Market," which was closed down in 2004
and which once served as a very important lever to tie South Ossetia
economically to Georgia. But all of this, naturally, without Georgia
formally recognizing the independence of these republics. For now,
however, these are just vague leaks of information to the media, and it
is not clear to what extent a move of this kind can be implemented in
the event of the full-blown formation of a new government by Georgian
Dream with new views on the conflicts.
Theoretically, it is also possible to expect changes in the new
Georgian leadership's approaches to the question of the regions
with the ethnic minorities that live there -Samtskhe-Javakheti
with its Armenian population and Kvemo Kartli with its primarily
Azerbaijani population. During the present elections, as in all the
previous ones, it was in these regions that the regime was able to
utilize its administrative resource with complete success, picking
up in Samtskhe-Javakheti, for example, more than 70 per cent of
the votes (compared with a result of just over 40 per cent on the
scale of all of Georgia) and all the seats of the majority-system
deputies. This situation, which can hardly suit Georgian society
and the Georgian political elite, is accounted for by a whole slew
of factors. These include both apathy and the substantially greater
administrative-security control in these regions under Saakashvili,
making it possible effectively to falsify elections, as well as
the ban on the functioning of regional parties and sociopolitical
movements from among representatives of ethnic minorities capable
of more effectively representing local interests and entering into
alliances with republic-wide parties by attracting the support of
their own supporters locally. Some progress is possible on this issue.
During the election campaign in Samtskhe-Javakheti Ivanishvili also
promised to examine the question of granting the Armenian language
the status of a regional language, with a more flexible approach to
its use as the language of local administration and education. In
addition to factors promoting the better integration of ethnic
Armenians and Azerbaijanis into Georgia's political and cultural field
(through the creation of positive incentives and cadre cooptation),
the liberalization of the policy towards ethnic minorities and,
on the whole, a more open political atmosphere in Georgia after
the elections may also become an important argument in the hands of
the new government given a change of approach in the Abkhazian and
Ossetian conflicts.
We should expect the activation of Armenian-Georgian relations,
particularly when we consider the obvious factor of a possible
softening of relations between Tbilisi and Moscow and, accordingly,
a levelling of the "Russian limiter" in relations between Yerevan and
Tbilisi. On the other hand, the Georgian precedent of regime change
as the result of legitimate elections has aroused great interest and
even unfeigned liking in Armenian society and in the political elite
in the context of the presidential election expected in February
2013 and the incipient start of a tough and evidently also highly
competitive political struggle in Armenia.
To all appearances, the Georgian election results came as an unpleasant
surprise to the Azerbaijani authorities. Novruz Mamedov, spokesman
for Ilham Aliyev's administration, declared that "not only he but
also everyone to a certain degree is surprised that President Mikheil
Saakashvili's party was unable to secure the support of the Georgian
public." The Azerbaijani official's concern is understandable, for
elections are expected also in Azerbaijan in 2013, and the Georgian
example proved quite "out of place." Baku is also concerned about
the possibility of the normalization of relations between Russia
and Georgia, which creates better opportunities for Armenia in its
communications with its chief military-political ally.
It is also unclear what fate may await Azerbaijani investments in the
event of a possible economic redistribution in Georgia after the change
of government. It is no secret that Azerbaijan's economic penetration
of Georgia (for example, by enterprises of the Azerbaijani State Oil
Company) was implemented primarily with the shadowy participation of
certain persons in Saakashvili's closest entourage.
Some people in Baku fear that this may now be jeopardized.
However, the aforementioned regional geopolitical situation based on
the Georgian election results is becoming apparent only in the most
general outline and may change significantly. The new political season
in Georgia is still only beginning, and the starting conditions and
many players may still substantially correct and change their positions
and approaches and even change places. However, one thing is obvious:
The regional "echo" of the Georgian elections will reverberate for
a long time to come.
[Translated from Russian]
From: Baghdasarian