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7 LESSONS OF CUBAN CRISIS FOR KARABAKH CONFLICT - HUFFINGTON POST
tert.am
26.10.12
By Simon Saradzhyan and Artur Saradzhyan
The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 stands out as not only one of the most
dangerous moments in human history, but also as the most thoroughly
researched case of a confrontation between two great powers that ended
up being peacefully resolved. The wealth of evidence and quality of
analysis that have been produced by participants and scholars of the
October 1962 crisis make the latter an indispensable case study for
anyone interested in management of any inter-state conflict.
The current conflict over Nagorny Karabakh is no exception. There
are, of course, profound differences between the two conflicts --
the absence of nuclear weapons in the Armenian and Azeri arsenals
being the most obvious and important. And, yet, there are a number of
valuable lessons that parties to the Karabakh conflict should learn
from the 1962 crisis:
First, Armenian and Azeri leaders should review their militaries'
routines to weed out those contingency SOPs that may lead to escalation
of a crisis into a war against their orders. The 1962 crisis set
in motion a number of such routines that almost plunged the USA
and USSR into a war, including arming fighter aviation with nuclear
missiles and permission granted to commanders to use nuclear weapons
without approval by the head of state if under an attack that disrupts
communications with superiors. In addition to review and revision of
their own contingency routines, the parties to the Karabakh conflict
should familiarize themselves with their opponent's SOPs.
Second, parties to the Karabakh conflict should keep in mind that
escalation can acquire its own logic. Had US President John F. Kennedy
ordered a ground invasion of Cuba, the Soviets could have retaliated
by striking US nuclear missiles in Turkey, thereby escalating the
conflict to a nuclear war, according to Graham Allison, one of the most
thoughtful scholars of the 1962 crisis. Armenian and Azeri leaders
should consider directing strategic games specifically designed to
identify points of no return in different escalation scenarios.
Third, a hotline should be established in Yerevan and Baku. In October
1962 Kennedy and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev made a number of
urgent important decisions that had to be preceded by gauging the
opponent's reaction, but they had no way to communicate directly and
discreetly. Today, there is no publicly known hotline between the
presidential offices in Yerevan and Baku, so the leaders may also
be unable to communicate directly and candidly if a crisis ruptures
peacetime channels of communications. This needs to be rectified.
Fourth, neither Azeri nor Armenian side should harbor hopes that
the opponent will back down. Khrushchev knew about the American
superiority in strategic nuclear weapons and backed down when the
Cuban crisis peaked. Neither side in the Karabakh conflict enjoys
overwhelming military superiority, and therefore, should not count
on the opponent backing down in case of escalation.
Fifth, both sides should avoid cornering the opponent. That
Khrushchev was able to back down during the crisis was partly a
result of a deliberate strategy by Kennedy who built pressure,
but left a face-saving way out. Armenian and Azeri leaders should
not only consider which of their actions may corner the opponent,
but also how to avoid cornering themselves.
Sixth, Armenian and Azeri leaders also should factor in reaction of
key stakeholders on both sides of the conflict just as the USSR and
USA had to take into account interests of their allies in October
1962. For one, Baku should not assume that the self-proclaimed Nagorny
Karabakh Republic will blindly follow Republic of Armenia's lead.
Karabakh Armenians -- whose representatives dominate Armenia's power
establishment -- will not concede to any change that would threaten
their survival.
Seventh, Azeri and Armenian leaders should avoid adventurist moves. If
fully implemented, Khrushchev's decision to deploy nuclear missiles
in Cuba would have narrowed the U.S.-Soviet nuclear gap. However,
implementation of that decision was poorly planned and its failure
contributed to Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. Azeri and Armenian leaders
should avoid adventurism, keeping in mind that a failure may lead
not only to ouster, but also to exile in addition to disastrous
consequences for their countries.
A new war over Karabakh would be much more devastating than the one
fought 20 years ago. In fact some of the weapons -- that the sides
have acquired -- can wreak havoc that would be as disastrous for these
small nations as a limited U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchange would have
been for the American and Soviet peoples in 1962. Institutionalizing
lessons of the Cuban missile crisis would help leaders on both sides
of the Karabakh conflict to avert an 'accidental' devastating war. If,
of course, they wish to avoid it.
tert.am
26.10.12
By Simon Saradzhyan and Artur Saradzhyan
The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 stands out as not only one of the most
dangerous moments in human history, but also as the most thoroughly
researched case of a confrontation between two great powers that ended
up being peacefully resolved. The wealth of evidence and quality of
analysis that have been produced by participants and scholars of the
October 1962 crisis make the latter an indispensable case study for
anyone interested in management of any inter-state conflict.
The current conflict over Nagorny Karabakh is no exception. There
are, of course, profound differences between the two conflicts --
the absence of nuclear weapons in the Armenian and Azeri arsenals
being the most obvious and important. And, yet, there are a number of
valuable lessons that parties to the Karabakh conflict should learn
from the 1962 crisis:
First, Armenian and Azeri leaders should review their militaries'
routines to weed out those contingency SOPs that may lead to escalation
of a crisis into a war against their orders. The 1962 crisis set
in motion a number of such routines that almost plunged the USA
and USSR into a war, including arming fighter aviation with nuclear
missiles and permission granted to commanders to use nuclear weapons
without approval by the head of state if under an attack that disrupts
communications with superiors. In addition to review and revision of
their own contingency routines, the parties to the Karabakh conflict
should familiarize themselves with their opponent's SOPs.
Second, parties to the Karabakh conflict should keep in mind that
escalation can acquire its own logic. Had US President John F. Kennedy
ordered a ground invasion of Cuba, the Soviets could have retaliated
by striking US nuclear missiles in Turkey, thereby escalating the
conflict to a nuclear war, according to Graham Allison, one of the most
thoughtful scholars of the 1962 crisis. Armenian and Azeri leaders
should consider directing strategic games specifically designed to
identify points of no return in different escalation scenarios.
Third, a hotline should be established in Yerevan and Baku. In October
1962 Kennedy and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev made a number of
urgent important decisions that had to be preceded by gauging the
opponent's reaction, but they had no way to communicate directly and
discreetly. Today, there is no publicly known hotline between the
presidential offices in Yerevan and Baku, so the leaders may also
be unable to communicate directly and candidly if a crisis ruptures
peacetime channels of communications. This needs to be rectified.
Fourth, neither Azeri nor Armenian side should harbor hopes that
the opponent will back down. Khrushchev knew about the American
superiority in strategic nuclear weapons and backed down when the
Cuban crisis peaked. Neither side in the Karabakh conflict enjoys
overwhelming military superiority, and therefore, should not count
on the opponent backing down in case of escalation.
Fifth, both sides should avoid cornering the opponent. That
Khrushchev was able to back down during the crisis was partly a
result of a deliberate strategy by Kennedy who built pressure,
but left a face-saving way out. Armenian and Azeri leaders should
not only consider which of their actions may corner the opponent,
but also how to avoid cornering themselves.
Sixth, Armenian and Azeri leaders also should factor in reaction of
key stakeholders on both sides of the conflict just as the USSR and
USA had to take into account interests of their allies in October
1962. For one, Baku should not assume that the self-proclaimed Nagorny
Karabakh Republic will blindly follow Republic of Armenia's lead.
Karabakh Armenians -- whose representatives dominate Armenia's power
establishment -- will not concede to any change that would threaten
their survival.
Seventh, Azeri and Armenian leaders should avoid adventurist moves. If
fully implemented, Khrushchev's decision to deploy nuclear missiles
in Cuba would have narrowed the U.S.-Soviet nuclear gap. However,
implementation of that decision was poorly planned and its failure
contributed to Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. Azeri and Armenian leaders
should avoid adventurism, keeping in mind that a failure may lead
not only to ouster, but also to exile in addition to disastrous
consequences for their countries.
A new war over Karabakh would be much more devastating than the one
fought 20 years ago. In fact some of the weapons -- that the sides
have acquired -- can wreak havoc that would be as disastrous for these
small nations as a limited U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchange would have
been for the American and Soviet peoples in 1962. Institutionalizing
lessons of the Cuban missile crisis would help leaders on both sides
of the Karabakh conflict to avert an 'accidental' devastating war. If,
of course, they wish to avoid it.