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7 Lessons Of Cuban Crisis For Karabakh Conflict

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  • 7 Lessons Of Cuban Crisis For Karabakh Conflict

    7 LESSONS OF CUBAN CRISIS FOR KARABAKH CONFLICT

    Huffington Post
    Oct 25 2012

    Simon Saradzhyan, Research fellow, Harvard's Belfer Center and Artur
    Saradzhyan

    The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 stands out as not only one of the most
    dangerous moments in human history, but also as the most thoroughly
    researched case of a confrontation between two great powers that ended
    up being peacefully resolved. The wealth of evidence and quality of
    analysis that have been produced by participants and scholars of the
    October 1962 crisis make the latter an indispensable case study for
    anyone interested in management of any inter-state conflict.

    The current conflict over Nagorny Karabakh is no exception. There
    are, of course, profound differences between the two conflicts --
    the absence of nuclear weapons in the Armenian and Azeri arsenals
    being the most obvious and important. And, yet, there are a number of
    valuable lessons that parties to the Karabakh conflict should learn
    from the 1962 crisis:

    First, Armenian and Azeri leaders should review their militaries'
    routines to weed out those contingency SOPs that may lead to escalation
    of a crisis into a war against their orders. The 1962 crisis set
    in motion a number of such routines that almost plunged the USA
    and USSR into a war, including arming fighter aviation with nuclear
    missiles and permission granted to commanders to use nuclear weapons
    without approval by the head of state if under an attack that disrupts
    communications with superiors. In addition to review and revision of
    their own contingency routines, the parties to the Karabakh conflict
    should familiarize themselves with their opponent's SOPs.

    Second, parties to the Karabakh conflict should keep in mind that
    escalation can acquire its own logic. Had U.S. President John F.

    Kennedy ordered a ground invasion of Cuba, the Soviets could have
    retaliated by striking U.S. nuclear missiles in Turkey, thereby
    escalating the conflict to a nuclear war, according to Graham Allison,
    one of the most thoughtful scholars of the 1962 crisis. Armenian and
    Azeri leaders should consider directing strategic games specifically
    designed to identify points of no return in different escalation
    scenarios.

    Third, a hotline should be established in Yerevan and Baku. In October
    1962 Kennedy and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev made a number of
    urgent important decisions that had to be preceded by gauging the
    opponent's reaction, but they had no way to communicate directly and
    discreetly. Today, there is no publicly known hotline between the
    presidential offices in Yerevan and Baku, so the leaders may also
    be unable to communicate directly and candidly if a crisis ruptures
    peacetime channels of communications. This needs to be rectified.

    Fourth, neither Azeri nor Armenian side should harbor hopes that
    the opponent will back down. Khrushchev knew about the American
    superiority in strategic nuclear weapons and backed down when the
    Cuban crisis peaked. Neither side in the Karabakh conflict enjoys
    overwhelming military superiority, and therefore, should not count
    on the opponent backing down in case of escalation.

    Fifth, both sides should avoid cornering the opponent. That
    Khrushchev was able to back down during the crisis was partly a
    result of a deliberate strategy by Kennedy who built pressure,
    but left a face-saving way out. Armenian and Azeri leaders should
    not only consider which of their actions may corner the opponent,
    but also how to avoid cornering themselves.

    Sixth, Armenian and Azeri leaders also should factor in reaction of
    key stakeholders on both sides of the conflict just as the USSR and
    USA had to take into account interests of their allies in October
    1962. For one, Baku should not assume that the self-proclaimed Nagorny
    Karabakh Republic will blindly follow Republic of Armenia's lead.

    Karabakh Armenians -- whose representatives dominate Armenia's power
    establishment -- will not concede to any change that would threaten
    their survival.

    Seventh, Azeri and Armenian leaders should avoid adventurist moves. If
    fully implemented, Khrushchev's decision to deploy nuclear missiles
    in Cuba would have narrowed the U.S.-Soviet nuclear gap. However,
    implementation of that decision was poorly planned and its failure
    contributed to Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. Azeri and Armenian leaders
    should avoid adventurism, keeping in mind that a failure may lead
    not only to ouster, but also to exile in addition to disastrous
    consequences for their countries.

    A new war over Karabakh would be much more devastating than the one
    fought 20 years ago. In fact some of the weapons -- that the sides
    have acquired -- can wreak havoc that would be as disastrous for these
    small nations as a limited U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchange would have
    been for the American and Soviet peoples in 1962. Institutionalizing
    lessons of the Cuban missile crisis would help leaders on both sides
    of the Karabakh conflict to avert an 'accidental' devastating war. If,
    of course, they wish to avoid it.

    http://www.huffingtonpost.com/simon-saradzhyan/7-lessons-of-cuban-crisis_b_2000943.html

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