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Discussion in Arab World
Igor Muradyan
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/comments27195.html
Published: 15:49:29 - 27/08/2012
The Arab states in the Arab League which spoke in one voice about the
removal of the ruling regime in Syria were too encouraged by hopes for
subsidies from Saudi, as well as strong pressure by the West. But a
problem occurred because without direct intervention of the United
States and the leading European states removal of the Alawite regime
ruling Syria will not succeed, and to which extent is it Alawite when
it gets significant support of the mostly Sunni population of the
country? How did these developments affect the national Arab interests
(at least in terms of ambitions)?
Territories populated with Kurds are increasingly separating from
Syria and Iraq, and this process is acquiring a worldwide importance.
The Shiites in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon are not weak. They are getting
stronger. The Shiite belt has not been ripped, crushed. It is more
mobilized. As soon as the Shiite states and communities face a
catastrophe, they will become more united.
There are quite credible signs of unprecedented rapprochement and
mutual interest between Iraq and Iran. Let's not rush but there is a
lot of evidence that a sovereign Shiite state will be established in
South Iraq which will form an alliance with Iran. If fragmentation of
Syria succeeds, a state will be established in the West which will be
associated with mini-states of Shiites and Christians in Lebanon.
Even if the progress of the state of affairs stops at the level of a
new configuration, the Arab world has already sustained huge damage in
terms of geopolitical interests (if certainly the modern Arab elite
have geopolitical visions and interests).
The West is set to create a powerful and independent source of oil in
North Iraq, as well as a controlled and safe way for its
transportation to the Mediterranean Sea. In other words, for the first
time the Arab world is fragmented on an ethnic-energy basis.
The Egyptian elite should have been the first to react to these
developments because it traditionally feels responsible for the
destiny of the Arab world. The visit of the president of Egypt to
Tehran might be concerned with the problems of the Arab world rather
than bilateral relations. Cairo has understood that as a result of the
developments in Syria Egypt will remain tete-a-tete with Israel with
an uncertain behavior of Saudi Arabia and its satellites.
As French and British political scientists say, the Egyptian political
literature reflected unambiguously the interests of Arab states,
calling Turkey's expansion and pretensions more dangerous than Iran's
intentions. Unfortunately, the experts could not get acquainted with
the Egyptian literature and its periodicals adequately but now this
looks more interesting than the texts of authors related with
governmental and non-governmental institutes and centers of the West.
The situation in the region overlapped with highly unfavorable
internal circumstances in the United States, France, and partly the
UK. The leaders of these powers have no time to deal with the regional
problems. One may assume that not only Egypt but also other Arab
states are thinking on the next move in the game. Should they support
Kurds as a buffer on the way of Turkish and Iranian expansion? Should
they continue to rely on the U.S. and Europe for curbing Turkey and
Iran? Should they self-organize to resist foreign expansion towards
the region?
Any of these scenarios presupposes cross-cooperation with one partner
or counter-partner or another. If sooner or later a real leader
emerges in the Arab world, not one in the retro style, expectations of
occurrence of elements of Arab geopolitics may come true.
For the time being, it is understood that Saudi Arabia which lost in
Syria cannot further pretend to the role of the Arab leader. In this
case, one way or another, the Arab states may get interested in
relations with non-Arab states of neighboring regions. Only Egypt
could be such a leader which will have to cooperate with the Shiite
states and communities in the Arab world otherwise its role of leader
will be limited and incomplete. In addition, the role and stance of
Iran in the Arab world, as before, will remain stronger than those of
Turkey.
Syrian developments, apart from other results, will lead to formation
of a new balance of forces in the Near East. The West cannot ignore
this.
Igor Muradyan
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/comments27195.html
Published: 15:49:29 - 27/08/2012
The Arab states in the Arab League which spoke in one voice about the
removal of the ruling regime in Syria were too encouraged by hopes for
subsidies from Saudi, as well as strong pressure by the West. But a
problem occurred because without direct intervention of the United
States and the leading European states removal of the Alawite regime
ruling Syria will not succeed, and to which extent is it Alawite when
it gets significant support of the mostly Sunni population of the
country? How did these developments affect the national Arab interests
(at least in terms of ambitions)?
Territories populated with Kurds are increasingly separating from
Syria and Iraq, and this process is acquiring a worldwide importance.
The Shiites in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon are not weak. They are getting
stronger. The Shiite belt has not been ripped, crushed. It is more
mobilized. As soon as the Shiite states and communities face a
catastrophe, they will become more united.
There are quite credible signs of unprecedented rapprochement and
mutual interest between Iraq and Iran. Let's not rush but there is a
lot of evidence that a sovereign Shiite state will be established in
South Iraq which will form an alliance with Iran. If fragmentation of
Syria succeeds, a state will be established in the West which will be
associated with mini-states of Shiites and Christians in Lebanon.
Even if the progress of the state of affairs stops at the level of a
new configuration, the Arab world has already sustained huge damage in
terms of geopolitical interests (if certainly the modern Arab elite
have geopolitical visions and interests).
The West is set to create a powerful and independent source of oil in
North Iraq, as well as a controlled and safe way for its
transportation to the Mediterranean Sea. In other words, for the first
time the Arab world is fragmented on an ethnic-energy basis.
The Egyptian elite should have been the first to react to these
developments because it traditionally feels responsible for the
destiny of the Arab world. The visit of the president of Egypt to
Tehran might be concerned with the problems of the Arab world rather
than bilateral relations. Cairo has understood that as a result of the
developments in Syria Egypt will remain tete-a-tete with Israel with
an uncertain behavior of Saudi Arabia and its satellites.
As French and British political scientists say, the Egyptian political
literature reflected unambiguously the interests of Arab states,
calling Turkey's expansion and pretensions more dangerous than Iran's
intentions. Unfortunately, the experts could not get acquainted with
the Egyptian literature and its periodicals adequately but now this
looks more interesting than the texts of authors related with
governmental and non-governmental institutes and centers of the West.
The situation in the region overlapped with highly unfavorable
internal circumstances in the United States, France, and partly the
UK. The leaders of these powers have no time to deal with the regional
problems. One may assume that not only Egypt but also other Arab
states are thinking on the next move in the game. Should they support
Kurds as a buffer on the way of Turkish and Iranian expansion? Should
they continue to rely on the U.S. and Europe for curbing Turkey and
Iran? Should they self-organize to resist foreign expansion towards
the region?
Any of these scenarios presupposes cross-cooperation with one partner
or counter-partner or another. If sooner or later a real leader
emerges in the Arab world, not one in the retro style, expectations of
occurrence of elements of Arab geopolitics may come true.
For the time being, it is understood that Saudi Arabia which lost in
Syria cannot further pretend to the role of the Arab leader. In this
case, one way or another, the Arab states may get interested in
relations with non-Arab states of neighboring regions. Only Egypt
could be such a leader which will have to cooperate with the Shiite
states and communities in the Arab world otherwise its role of leader
will be limited and incomplete. In addition, the role and stance of
Iran in the Arab world, as before, will remain stronger than those of
Turkey.
Syrian developments, apart from other results, will lead to formation
of a new balance of forces in the Near East. The West cannot ignore
this.