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XPAT OPINION: AXE MURDERER DIPLOMACY IN HUNGARY
XPat Loop
Sept 5 2012
During the famous ping-pong diplomacy of the 1970s, the People's
Republic of China and the US exchanged visits by table tennis players
to pave the way for improved relations between the two countries. In
a slight modification of the original model, Hungary is sending an
axe murderer to follow up on previous improvements in the country's
relationship with gas-rich Azerbaijan.
The Hungarian government's extradition of convicted killer Ramil
Safarov to Azerbaijan - where he was immediately released and
celebrated - was generally interpreted as a move intended to further
bilateral relations between the two countries. It appears, however,
that it is more than just a piece in the Hungarian-Azeri bilateral
puzzle; it may well be a prominent step in the overall strategic
reorientation of Hungarian foreign policy towards the East.
It is fair to say that Hungary does not regularly court controversy
in its international relations. Especially under its cantankerous
President Vaclav Klaus, the Czech Republic was for example repeatedly
in the international news on account of her openly voiced euro
scepticism. Similarly, Poland under President Kaczynski had no qualms
holding up EU summits when the president felt his country was not
sufficiently taken into account by a particular agreement. Other
small countries - e.g. Greece under Papandreou the elder - had similar
reputations from time to time.
Hungary generally preferred to behave and be thought of as a quite,
nice and reliable international partner.
Correspondingly, our foreign policy is mostly boring and scarcely
figures in the popular interest. Hungarian foreign policy news
are few and often towards the back pages of newspapers. Though
Hungary was often in the international news with negative headlines
since Orban's return to the premiership, this did not fundamentally
alter the scandal-free workings of Hungarian diplomacy. Of all the
internationally relayed controversies since Fidesz took power, the
vast majority pertained to domestic, most often democracy-related
issues. While Orban was clearly more provocative on the international
scene than any of his predecessors - including himself - Hungary did
not get embroiled in any bilateral scandals.
A sudden storm
For the general public, therefore, the diplomatic scandal that
erupted between Hungary and Armenia came quite suddenly. Because
of the extradition to Azerbaijan and subsequent release of an Azeri
soldier imprisoned for murdering an Armenian in Budapest, the Armenian
government severed diplomatic ties with Hungary. One blogger pointed
out that this was the first instance since 1967 that the diplomatic
relationship between Hungary and another country were cut. We have not
been able to verify this piece of information, but what is definitely
true is that it is an extremely rare event. Certainly, Hungarians
are not used to seeing their national flag maltreated by foreigners,
not even in the neighbouring countries with which relationships are
occasionally tense, not to mention faraway countries of mutually
little interest.
Ties with Armenia were weak to begin with, of course, which is probably
why Armenia came to this decision so quickly and why Hungary has
reacted with such nonchalance to losing an international partner.
The practical impact of the decision appears negligible for now,
but the ethical implications and their effect on the perception of
Hungarian foreign policy are more far-reaching.
What actually happened
The man released, Ramil Safarov, was taking an English course in
Budapest in 2004 within the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace
programme. Not quite in line with the goals of the programme, he took
an axe and snuck into the room of a fellow student, the Armenian Gurgen
Margaryan, and murdered him in his sleep, with what the police termed
"unusual cruelty". Safarov claimed that Margaryan had insulted the
Azeri flag, which is a distinct possibility in light of the hostility
between the two nations.
The murder, however, was certainly not an immediate, affective
reaction, but rather one of the planned, cold-blooded variety, which
makes the brutality of its execution all the more chilling.
Safarov was given an appropriate life sentence which he began serving
in Hungary, until he was suddenly extradited to Azerbaijan last week,
where as a reward for his actions and subsequent "suffering" he was
welcomed with full honours and promptly released with a presidential
pardon. He also received an impressive promotion to boot. The
Armenians' shock and intense reaction is therefore understandable.
What did Hungary know?
Within Hungary, the most important question was why the government
extradited Safarov and whether it knew that the Azeri government
would release him. None of the potential answers are particularly
reassuring. Naturally, the government claimed that the Azeris had
promised to keep Safarov locked up, and it added that the transfer
was perfectly normal procedure within the framework of applicable
European law.
With some painful delay, the relevant document, in which Azerbaijan's
government pledged to carry out the effective sentence, was presented
to the daily most friendly to Fidesz, Magyar Nemzet. This was an
interesting choice also because the paper's internet portal clearly
sought to downplay the issue even as the non-Fidesz media was abuzz
with it.
Another oddity was how long it took the government to react to
Safarov's release. It was only after an auspicious two-day delay
and considerable pounding from the press and the opposition that the
Hungarian government finally proclaimed that it was outraged by what
had occurred and promised to deliver this stern message to Azerbaijan's
ambassador in Budapest. Outrage generally registers somewhat quicker,
as Armenia's rapid reaction shows.
Still, it is not clear what the government knew in advance. The
absolute naïve scenario was called into doubt by Armenian President
Serzh Sargsyan, who claims Minister of Justice Tibor Navracsics
assured him a little while ago that Safarov would not be extradited.
Given Navracsics's long history of uneasy relationship with the truth,
Sargsyan's statement may well be true. Either way, being duped by
a country that Hungary has so assiduously courted over the past two
years also does not shed good light on the Fidesz-government. And the
Azeris' open acknowledgment of the Hungarian government's co-operation
in bringing Safarov home seems like mockery intended to pour fire on
the panoply of sinister speculations.
Courting Azerbaijan
What made the whole event especially suspicious were ruminations
that Hungary had reached a secret agreement with Azerbaijan that in
return for the release of Safarov the latter country would purchase
Hungarian government bonds worth billions of euros, thereby rendering
Hungary less reliant on the IMF for financing its debt.
Through Peter Szijjarto, the recently minted junior minister for
foreign and international economic policy, the government flatly
rejected any such connection and relegated it to the realm of fantasy.
The problem appears to be, however, that most commentators' fantasy is
just not creative enough to come up with an alternative explanation why
Safarov was released in spite of ample warning suggesting that he was
widely considered a national hero rather than a criminal in Azerbaijan.
If Szijjarto and Fidesz are saying the truth, then one must consider
the timing of Safarov's extradition extremely unfortunate, for there
is a narrative that meshes far better with the course of events than
the government's claim. Under Fidesz, the government has strongly
intensified relations with oil-rich Azerbaijan, including state visits
and agreements.
Whether or not there the was a specific quid pro quo involving Safarov
or whether his transfer was merely intended as a signal of general
goodwill between the two nations is largely irrelevant as long as
one assumes - reasonably - that without the context of intensifying
relations he would not have been extradited.
Signs of a new foreign policy?
Until now, Orban's repeated bashing of the West, his prophesies on
the decline of the latter and his insistence on reorienting Hungary
towards the East might have seemed like rhetoric, but Safarov's release
marks one of the most open steps in turning rhetoric into policy. The
decision is openly accommodating of the Azeri government's peculiar
attitude towards a nationalist killer, and makes clear - not for
the first time, witness the harassment of Tibetans during the visit
of the Chinese prime minister - that the Hungarian government will
gladly gloss over justice or human rights and similar considerations
in the interest of furthering Hungary's material interests through
bilateral ties.
The notion that Hungary's debt could be refinanced in the East - in
particular China- has been raised before, after all. Of course such
a "realist" view towards foreign policy is not necessarily unusual,
neither in the West nor in Hungary. The previous governments, it may
be worth recalling, were also busy cosying up to Russia and China, and
PM Ferenc Gyurcsany memorably raised eyebrows among Hungary's European
partners by committing to Russia's South Stream gas pipeline, arguing
that it would be built more quickly than the EU's Nabucco pipeline.
Nevertheless, a fair comparison should also note that despite
Azerbaijani entreaties to this effect, the previous government had
refused to let Safarov go. It appears possible therefore that the
Orban government wishes to give greater consistency and substantive
heft to the previously haphazard eastern strategy, and needs it to
be accompanied by commensurate gestures towards governments that
appreciate partners who are less concerned with traditional western
sensitivities.
Those who think that further steps in this direction will
raise protests in what is essentially a slightly less developed,
but nevertheless western country, might heed Orban's much debated
reminder uttered a few weeks ago: Hungarians are a people of "semi-
Asian origin" that need to be guided by force.
http://www.xpatloop.com/news/xpat_opinion_axe_murderer_diplomacy_in_hungary
XPat Loop
Sept 5 2012
During the famous ping-pong diplomacy of the 1970s, the People's
Republic of China and the US exchanged visits by table tennis players
to pave the way for improved relations between the two countries. In
a slight modification of the original model, Hungary is sending an
axe murderer to follow up on previous improvements in the country's
relationship with gas-rich Azerbaijan.
The Hungarian government's extradition of convicted killer Ramil
Safarov to Azerbaijan - where he was immediately released and
celebrated - was generally interpreted as a move intended to further
bilateral relations between the two countries. It appears, however,
that it is more than just a piece in the Hungarian-Azeri bilateral
puzzle; it may well be a prominent step in the overall strategic
reorientation of Hungarian foreign policy towards the East.
It is fair to say that Hungary does not regularly court controversy
in its international relations. Especially under its cantankerous
President Vaclav Klaus, the Czech Republic was for example repeatedly
in the international news on account of her openly voiced euro
scepticism. Similarly, Poland under President Kaczynski had no qualms
holding up EU summits when the president felt his country was not
sufficiently taken into account by a particular agreement. Other
small countries - e.g. Greece under Papandreou the elder - had similar
reputations from time to time.
Hungary generally preferred to behave and be thought of as a quite,
nice and reliable international partner.
Correspondingly, our foreign policy is mostly boring and scarcely
figures in the popular interest. Hungarian foreign policy news
are few and often towards the back pages of newspapers. Though
Hungary was often in the international news with negative headlines
since Orban's return to the premiership, this did not fundamentally
alter the scandal-free workings of Hungarian diplomacy. Of all the
internationally relayed controversies since Fidesz took power, the
vast majority pertained to domestic, most often democracy-related
issues. While Orban was clearly more provocative on the international
scene than any of his predecessors - including himself - Hungary did
not get embroiled in any bilateral scandals.
A sudden storm
For the general public, therefore, the diplomatic scandal that
erupted between Hungary and Armenia came quite suddenly. Because
of the extradition to Azerbaijan and subsequent release of an Azeri
soldier imprisoned for murdering an Armenian in Budapest, the Armenian
government severed diplomatic ties with Hungary. One blogger pointed
out that this was the first instance since 1967 that the diplomatic
relationship between Hungary and another country were cut. We have not
been able to verify this piece of information, but what is definitely
true is that it is an extremely rare event. Certainly, Hungarians
are not used to seeing their national flag maltreated by foreigners,
not even in the neighbouring countries with which relationships are
occasionally tense, not to mention faraway countries of mutually
little interest.
Ties with Armenia were weak to begin with, of course, which is probably
why Armenia came to this decision so quickly and why Hungary has
reacted with such nonchalance to losing an international partner.
The practical impact of the decision appears negligible for now,
but the ethical implications and their effect on the perception of
Hungarian foreign policy are more far-reaching.
What actually happened
The man released, Ramil Safarov, was taking an English course in
Budapest in 2004 within the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace
programme. Not quite in line with the goals of the programme, he took
an axe and snuck into the room of a fellow student, the Armenian Gurgen
Margaryan, and murdered him in his sleep, with what the police termed
"unusual cruelty". Safarov claimed that Margaryan had insulted the
Azeri flag, which is a distinct possibility in light of the hostility
between the two nations.
The murder, however, was certainly not an immediate, affective
reaction, but rather one of the planned, cold-blooded variety, which
makes the brutality of its execution all the more chilling.
Safarov was given an appropriate life sentence which he began serving
in Hungary, until he was suddenly extradited to Azerbaijan last week,
where as a reward for his actions and subsequent "suffering" he was
welcomed with full honours and promptly released with a presidential
pardon. He also received an impressive promotion to boot. The
Armenians' shock and intense reaction is therefore understandable.
What did Hungary know?
Within Hungary, the most important question was why the government
extradited Safarov and whether it knew that the Azeri government
would release him. None of the potential answers are particularly
reassuring. Naturally, the government claimed that the Azeris had
promised to keep Safarov locked up, and it added that the transfer
was perfectly normal procedure within the framework of applicable
European law.
With some painful delay, the relevant document, in which Azerbaijan's
government pledged to carry out the effective sentence, was presented
to the daily most friendly to Fidesz, Magyar Nemzet. This was an
interesting choice also because the paper's internet portal clearly
sought to downplay the issue even as the non-Fidesz media was abuzz
with it.
Another oddity was how long it took the government to react to
Safarov's release. It was only after an auspicious two-day delay
and considerable pounding from the press and the opposition that the
Hungarian government finally proclaimed that it was outraged by what
had occurred and promised to deliver this stern message to Azerbaijan's
ambassador in Budapest. Outrage generally registers somewhat quicker,
as Armenia's rapid reaction shows.
Still, it is not clear what the government knew in advance. The
absolute naïve scenario was called into doubt by Armenian President
Serzh Sargsyan, who claims Minister of Justice Tibor Navracsics
assured him a little while ago that Safarov would not be extradited.
Given Navracsics's long history of uneasy relationship with the truth,
Sargsyan's statement may well be true. Either way, being duped by
a country that Hungary has so assiduously courted over the past two
years also does not shed good light on the Fidesz-government. And the
Azeris' open acknowledgment of the Hungarian government's co-operation
in bringing Safarov home seems like mockery intended to pour fire on
the panoply of sinister speculations.
Courting Azerbaijan
What made the whole event especially suspicious were ruminations
that Hungary had reached a secret agreement with Azerbaijan that in
return for the release of Safarov the latter country would purchase
Hungarian government bonds worth billions of euros, thereby rendering
Hungary less reliant on the IMF for financing its debt.
Through Peter Szijjarto, the recently minted junior minister for
foreign and international economic policy, the government flatly
rejected any such connection and relegated it to the realm of fantasy.
The problem appears to be, however, that most commentators' fantasy is
just not creative enough to come up with an alternative explanation why
Safarov was released in spite of ample warning suggesting that he was
widely considered a national hero rather than a criminal in Azerbaijan.
If Szijjarto and Fidesz are saying the truth, then one must consider
the timing of Safarov's extradition extremely unfortunate, for there
is a narrative that meshes far better with the course of events than
the government's claim. Under Fidesz, the government has strongly
intensified relations with oil-rich Azerbaijan, including state visits
and agreements.
Whether or not there the was a specific quid pro quo involving Safarov
or whether his transfer was merely intended as a signal of general
goodwill between the two nations is largely irrelevant as long as
one assumes - reasonably - that without the context of intensifying
relations he would not have been extradited.
Signs of a new foreign policy?
Until now, Orban's repeated bashing of the West, his prophesies on
the decline of the latter and his insistence on reorienting Hungary
towards the East might have seemed like rhetoric, but Safarov's release
marks one of the most open steps in turning rhetoric into policy. The
decision is openly accommodating of the Azeri government's peculiar
attitude towards a nationalist killer, and makes clear - not for
the first time, witness the harassment of Tibetans during the visit
of the Chinese prime minister - that the Hungarian government will
gladly gloss over justice or human rights and similar considerations
in the interest of furthering Hungary's material interests through
bilateral ties.
The notion that Hungary's debt could be refinanced in the East - in
particular China- has been raised before, after all. Of course such
a "realist" view towards foreign policy is not necessarily unusual,
neither in the West nor in Hungary. The previous governments, it may
be worth recalling, were also busy cosying up to Russia and China, and
PM Ferenc Gyurcsany memorably raised eyebrows among Hungary's European
partners by committing to Russia's South Stream gas pipeline, arguing
that it would be built more quickly than the EU's Nabucco pipeline.
Nevertheless, a fair comparison should also note that despite
Azerbaijani entreaties to this effect, the previous government had
refused to let Safarov go. It appears possible therefore that the
Orban government wishes to give greater consistency and substantive
heft to the previously haphazard eastern strategy, and needs it to
be accompanied by commensurate gestures towards governments that
appreciate partners who are less concerned with traditional western
sensitivities.
Those who think that further steps in this direction will
raise protests in what is essentially a slightly less developed,
but nevertheless western country, might heed Orban's much debated
reminder uttered a few weeks ago: Hungarians are a people of "semi-
Asian origin" that need to be guided by force.
http://www.xpatloop.com/news/xpat_opinion_axe_murderer_diplomacy_in_hungary