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ILL WINDS BLOW FOR VIKTOR THE TROUBLEMAKER
By Dariusz Kalan
EU Observer
Sept 7 2012
Related
Axe murder complicates EU-Azerbaijan love affair
Hungarian PM to EU: 'We won't be a colony'
Azerbaijan tests EU credibility
BRUSSELS - Viktor Orban has been behaving like a classic
realpolitiker: instead of cooperating closely with the EU in its time
of crisis, he has chosen to develop contacts with rich and generous
regional powers from the East which do not impose any political
commitments on his country let alone show interest in its
constitutional transformation.
Shaken by its poor economic and angry at the EU's criticism his
reforms, Orban's Hungary has been chatting up non-democratic states
that demonstrate an openness for investment and financial aid. This
eastern focus already enjoys a firm conceptual footing--the so-called
Eastern Wind doctrine.
Over the last two years, Budapest's reinforced diplomatic efforts have
run from the Northeast through Central Asia and Transcaucasia to the
Persian Gulf. Missions of high officials made visits to Brunei, China,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Thailand, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan.
Azerbaijan too has featured prominently. It is not hard to see why. In
2011 the value of Hungary's trade exchange with Azerbaijan (â~B¬52.8mn)
was twice as big as with Georgia and almost five times higher than
with Armenia.
Orban himself was twice in Baku, and his collaborators more often. One
of his closest confidants, Peter Szijjarto, was promoted to the
position of vice-chairman of the Hungarian-Azerbaijani
Intergovernmental Economic Commission.
The intensification of Hungarian-Azerbaijani relations has been
especially noticeable in the last few months. In May, the Hungarian
Economic Center was established in Baku with the aim of supporting
small- and medium-sized businesses. A month later, Orban went to
Azerbaijan to meet president Ilham Aliyev, a move reciprocated by
Szijjarto in July. At the end of August, the weekly Figyelo revealed
that Baku had agreed to buy Hungary's public bonds worth â~B¬2-3 billion.
And it is not just narrow economic interests that drive the
government. Security issues play a role too. In September 2010, Orban
brought Hungary into the Azerbaijani-Georgian-Romanian project of AGRI
pipeline. In the same breath he maintains his support for the Nabucco
pipeline, which is the second possible route for Azerbaijani gas to
Europe.
The decision of his government to release Ramil Safarov, a former
lieutenant in the Azerbaijani army, who was sentenced to life
imprisonment on charges of premeditated murder with extreme cruelty of
an Armenian colleague, seemed to be the natural further step in
deepening friendly relations with Baku.
However, no one in Budapest predicted that this would result in an
immediate and firm reaction by Armenia, which severed diplomatic ties
with Hungary and put the army on a state of alert toward its neighbour
Azerbaijan, with whom it is locked in a frozen conflict.
The first declarations from Budapest suggest that Hungarian
authorities were not quite aware of the geopolitical consequences of
this prisoner transfer. They acted in accordance with the relevant
Convention of the Council of Europe. But so did Aliyev, who not only
pardoned Safarov--the new national hero in Azerbaijan--but also promoted
him to the rank of major and gave him a flat.
No matter, Hungary is already the greatest loser in the affair. If it
is true that Budapest has been cheated by Aliyev, who promised that
Safarov's sentence would be continued in Baku, Orban's naivety will be
brought to light. It will call into question the government's
competence to carry out the policy of such a broad opening to the
East.
Orban might, of course, receive an apology from Azerbaijan in the form
of further economic concessions, but this in turn will have a very
negative impact on the country's image in the West, making it
extremely hard for Hungary to throw off its reputation as a country
that subordinates its foreign policy to economic interests.
Moreover, if blame does shift to Baku, a worse scenario may come to
pass. Its machinations could be cited by Armenia in order to awaken
the frozen Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. For
Orban--it would be an image and political catastrophe.
The best hope is for Budapest to maintain the ambiguity about who is
responsible - hardly the behaviour of a reliable European partner.
The writer is an analyst at the Polish Institute of International
Affairs in Warsaw
http://euobserver.com/opinion/117470
By Dariusz Kalan
EU Observer
Sept 7 2012
Related
Axe murder complicates EU-Azerbaijan love affair
Hungarian PM to EU: 'We won't be a colony'
Azerbaijan tests EU credibility
BRUSSELS - Viktor Orban has been behaving like a classic
realpolitiker: instead of cooperating closely with the EU in its time
of crisis, he has chosen to develop contacts with rich and generous
regional powers from the East which do not impose any political
commitments on his country let alone show interest in its
constitutional transformation.
Shaken by its poor economic and angry at the EU's criticism his
reforms, Orban's Hungary has been chatting up non-democratic states
that demonstrate an openness for investment and financial aid. This
eastern focus already enjoys a firm conceptual footing--the so-called
Eastern Wind doctrine.
Over the last two years, Budapest's reinforced diplomatic efforts have
run from the Northeast through Central Asia and Transcaucasia to the
Persian Gulf. Missions of high officials made visits to Brunei, China,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Thailand, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan.
Azerbaijan too has featured prominently. It is not hard to see why. In
2011 the value of Hungary's trade exchange with Azerbaijan (â~B¬52.8mn)
was twice as big as with Georgia and almost five times higher than
with Armenia.
Orban himself was twice in Baku, and his collaborators more often. One
of his closest confidants, Peter Szijjarto, was promoted to the
position of vice-chairman of the Hungarian-Azerbaijani
Intergovernmental Economic Commission.
The intensification of Hungarian-Azerbaijani relations has been
especially noticeable in the last few months. In May, the Hungarian
Economic Center was established in Baku with the aim of supporting
small- and medium-sized businesses. A month later, Orban went to
Azerbaijan to meet president Ilham Aliyev, a move reciprocated by
Szijjarto in July. At the end of August, the weekly Figyelo revealed
that Baku had agreed to buy Hungary's public bonds worth â~B¬2-3 billion.
And it is not just narrow economic interests that drive the
government. Security issues play a role too. In September 2010, Orban
brought Hungary into the Azerbaijani-Georgian-Romanian project of AGRI
pipeline. In the same breath he maintains his support for the Nabucco
pipeline, which is the second possible route for Azerbaijani gas to
Europe.
The decision of his government to release Ramil Safarov, a former
lieutenant in the Azerbaijani army, who was sentenced to life
imprisonment on charges of premeditated murder with extreme cruelty of
an Armenian colleague, seemed to be the natural further step in
deepening friendly relations with Baku.
However, no one in Budapest predicted that this would result in an
immediate and firm reaction by Armenia, which severed diplomatic ties
with Hungary and put the army on a state of alert toward its neighbour
Azerbaijan, with whom it is locked in a frozen conflict.
The first declarations from Budapest suggest that Hungarian
authorities were not quite aware of the geopolitical consequences of
this prisoner transfer. They acted in accordance with the relevant
Convention of the Council of Europe. But so did Aliyev, who not only
pardoned Safarov--the new national hero in Azerbaijan--but also promoted
him to the rank of major and gave him a flat.
No matter, Hungary is already the greatest loser in the affair. If it
is true that Budapest has been cheated by Aliyev, who promised that
Safarov's sentence would be continued in Baku, Orban's naivety will be
brought to light. It will call into question the government's
competence to carry out the policy of such a broad opening to the
East.
Orban might, of course, receive an apology from Azerbaijan in the form
of further economic concessions, but this in turn will have a very
negative impact on the country's image in the West, making it
extremely hard for Hungary to throw off its reputation as a country
that subordinates its foreign policy to economic interests.
Moreover, if blame does shift to Baku, a worse scenario may come to
pass. Its machinations could be cited by Armenia in order to awaken
the frozen Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. For
Orban--it would be an image and political catastrophe.
The best hope is for Budapest to maintain the ambiguity about who is
responsible - hardly the behaviour of a reliable European partner.
The writer is an analyst at the Polish Institute of International
Affairs in Warsaw
http://euobserver.com/opinion/117470