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TURKISH-AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS: BEYOND MOTTOS
Today's Zaman
Sept 11 2012
Turkey
This week's closed workshop on "The Post-Ottoman Space: Soft Politics
and Hard Choices", held in Tbilisi and organized by the Turkish
Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) and Peace Research
Institute Oslo (PRIO), provided a fascinating opportunity for the
exploration of Turkey's role in the Caucasus.
The workshop title is arguably misleading in terms of Turkey's policy
directions, both historical and current. For starters, the notion of
a post-Ottoman space is immediately alienating to the South Caucasus
countries, which only briefly and in part belonged to the Ottoman
Empire. Moreover, the Safavid dynasty (1501-1722), made up of Azeri
Turks as well as Persians, rivaled the Ottomans.
These reflections were juxtaposed with Turkey's current foreign policy
in the Caucasus, and Azerbaijan-Turkish relations. Undoubtedly,
Turkish-Azerbaijan relations have been largely self-defined and
promoted via the motto "one nation, two states," which essentially
became the foreign policy strategy for the two countries. Most people
believe that this motto was coined in the 1990s, but in fact is much
older. It has its roots in the late Ottoman era, when the political
forces behind the independent Azerbaijan Democratic Republic declared
in the 1918-1920 period that their relations with Ottoman Empire
could be assessed as follows: "The Muslims of the Transcaucasus [i.e.,
Azerbaijanis] together with the Turks constitute one nationality."
However, after the Bolshevik occupation of Azerbaijan, this slogan was
forgotten, and only raised again when Azerbaijan regained independence
in 1991. But by this stage, Azerbaijan was facing a new dilemma:
Is the "one nation, two state" notion more suitably applied to Iran,
or to Turkey?
Azerbaijan's independence movement in the late 1980s began at the
state border with Iran, when Soviet Azerbaijanis moved over the
Iranian border in order to reunite with the Azerbaijanis living on
Iranian territory. Here we have one nation of Azerbaijanis, but not
two states. Iranian Azerbaijanis exist under Iranian rule. In regard
to Turkey, the "one nation, two state" slogan was very compelling in
terms of gaining regional influence with the support of a powerful
country like Turkey, bolstered by the historical linguistic, religious
and ethnic affinities. Furthermore, the soft power factors (media,
TV, expanding commercial relations, education and popular culture)
brought the two countries relations even closer. It is certainly true
that both countries did occasionally have inflated expectations of one
another, but the relationship was bolstered by increasing bilateral
energy cooperation. As a counterbalance to Russia and Iran, Turkey's
presence in the region was largely supported by the United States, and
US-Azerbaijan relationship developed with support from Turkey. Even so,
the two countries have diverged on a number of foreign policy issues,
with the three following examples as the biggest points of contention.
The first key difference arose with the Cyprus issue. Turkish political
elites pressured Baku about the need to recognize the independence
of the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
Indeed, Azerbaijan promised in advance of the Annan Plan on Cyprus
reunification, that if the Turks would accept it, Azerbaijan
would do everything for Turks. After the failure of the Annan plan,
whereby 76 percent of the Greek Cypriots rejected the UN proposal for
unification in April 2004, the Turkish elite perceived "everything" as
"recognizing independence." In reality, the situation was different --
even because of the direct flight from Baku to Lefkosha, the Cyprus
Republic blocked all the countries of the South Caucasus from starting
negotiations on the European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan in time.
In addition, Baku was worried that Cyprus would recognize the
independence of the de-facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The second difference was the Kosovo question. Turkey supported
Kosovo's independence as a newly emerging friendly, Muslim state in
Europe, while Azerbaijan fully supported Serbia. From Baku's point of
view, national interests did not mean forging alliances based solely
on religious or ethnic unity. This was an early signal to Turkey,
before the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement was on the agenda. One
point Baku missed is that after 2002, Turkey underwent a power shift
away from the Nationalists. Azerbaijan was lucky that despite this
development, nationalistic sentiments in Turkish society prevailed,
helping block Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.
The third and most serious crisis was the Turkish-Armenian
rapprochement. In hindsight, we can see that the signing of the Zurich
protocols in October 2009 actually strengthened the Azerbaijani-Turkish
relationship. The problem in the past was that societal relations were
based on an unthinking acceptance of the fraternal Azerbaijan-Turkey
axis, without ever really trying to understand each other's cultures.
Now we have reached a point where both countries understand the need
to deepen the relationship at the level of society; until 2009 both
sides "widened" rather than deepened the relationship. News coverage
of Azerbaijan's internal dynamics in the mainstream Turkish press
was extremely limited prior to the last three years, whereas the
Azerbaijan public has always closely followed developments in Turkey.
In addition, both countries understand that they must respect each
other's foreign policy choices and can benefit from close cooperation,
which will also soothe fears about threats to national interests, which
may be very divergent. For instance, these days the Azerbaijan-Israel
relationship is a close one, but the Baku-Tehran one is tense, while
Israel-Turkey relations are struggling, and Ankara's dealings with
Iran are more positive. However, the countries may be able to help
one another: Azerbaijan can help normalize Turkish-Israeli relations,
and Turkey can do same for Azerbaijan in Iran. One can argue that
the 2009 crisis between the two countries changed a lot of latent
problems. In 2010, the two countries signed the Agreement on Strategic
Partnership and Mutual Support, and developed and deepened their
existing bilateral relations in different areas (education, health,
industry). The Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) agreement was
the final move, proving that a crisis was an effective means of
understanding the true cost of friendship, beyond any motto.
Today's Zaman
Sept 11 2012
Turkey
This week's closed workshop on "The Post-Ottoman Space: Soft Politics
and Hard Choices", held in Tbilisi and organized by the Turkish
Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) and Peace Research
Institute Oslo (PRIO), provided a fascinating opportunity for the
exploration of Turkey's role in the Caucasus.
The workshop title is arguably misleading in terms of Turkey's policy
directions, both historical and current. For starters, the notion of
a post-Ottoman space is immediately alienating to the South Caucasus
countries, which only briefly and in part belonged to the Ottoman
Empire. Moreover, the Safavid dynasty (1501-1722), made up of Azeri
Turks as well as Persians, rivaled the Ottomans.
These reflections were juxtaposed with Turkey's current foreign policy
in the Caucasus, and Azerbaijan-Turkish relations. Undoubtedly,
Turkish-Azerbaijan relations have been largely self-defined and
promoted via the motto "one nation, two states," which essentially
became the foreign policy strategy for the two countries. Most people
believe that this motto was coined in the 1990s, but in fact is much
older. It has its roots in the late Ottoman era, when the political
forces behind the independent Azerbaijan Democratic Republic declared
in the 1918-1920 period that their relations with Ottoman Empire
could be assessed as follows: "The Muslims of the Transcaucasus [i.e.,
Azerbaijanis] together with the Turks constitute one nationality."
However, after the Bolshevik occupation of Azerbaijan, this slogan was
forgotten, and only raised again when Azerbaijan regained independence
in 1991. But by this stage, Azerbaijan was facing a new dilemma:
Is the "one nation, two state" notion more suitably applied to Iran,
or to Turkey?
Azerbaijan's independence movement in the late 1980s began at the
state border with Iran, when Soviet Azerbaijanis moved over the
Iranian border in order to reunite with the Azerbaijanis living on
Iranian territory. Here we have one nation of Azerbaijanis, but not
two states. Iranian Azerbaijanis exist under Iranian rule. In regard
to Turkey, the "one nation, two state" slogan was very compelling in
terms of gaining regional influence with the support of a powerful
country like Turkey, bolstered by the historical linguistic, religious
and ethnic affinities. Furthermore, the soft power factors (media,
TV, expanding commercial relations, education and popular culture)
brought the two countries relations even closer. It is certainly true
that both countries did occasionally have inflated expectations of one
another, but the relationship was bolstered by increasing bilateral
energy cooperation. As a counterbalance to Russia and Iran, Turkey's
presence in the region was largely supported by the United States, and
US-Azerbaijan relationship developed with support from Turkey. Even so,
the two countries have diverged on a number of foreign policy issues,
with the three following examples as the biggest points of contention.
The first key difference arose with the Cyprus issue. Turkish political
elites pressured Baku about the need to recognize the independence
of the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
Indeed, Azerbaijan promised in advance of the Annan Plan on Cyprus
reunification, that if the Turks would accept it, Azerbaijan
would do everything for Turks. After the failure of the Annan plan,
whereby 76 percent of the Greek Cypriots rejected the UN proposal for
unification in April 2004, the Turkish elite perceived "everything" as
"recognizing independence." In reality, the situation was different --
even because of the direct flight from Baku to Lefkosha, the Cyprus
Republic blocked all the countries of the South Caucasus from starting
negotiations on the European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan in time.
In addition, Baku was worried that Cyprus would recognize the
independence of the de-facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The second difference was the Kosovo question. Turkey supported
Kosovo's independence as a newly emerging friendly, Muslim state in
Europe, while Azerbaijan fully supported Serbia. From Baku's point of
view, national interests did not mean forging alliances based solely
on religious or ethnic unity. This was an early signal to Turkey,
before the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement was on the agenda. One
point Baku missed is that after 2002, Turkey underwent a power shift
away from the Nationalists. Azerbaijan was lucky that despite this
development, nationalistic sentiments in Turkish society prevailed,
helping block Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.
The third and most serious crisis was the Turkish-Armenian
rapprochement. In hindsight, we can see that the signing of the Zurich
protocols in October 2009 actually strengthened the Azerbaijani-Turkish
relationship. The problem in the past was that societal relations were
based on an unthinking acceptance of the fraternal Azerbaijan-Turkey
axis, without ever really trying to understand each other's cultures.
Now we have reached a point where both countries understand the need
to deepen the relationship at the level of society; until 2009 both
sides "widened" rather than deepened the relationship. News coverage
of Azerbaijan's internal dynamics in the mainstream Turkish press
was extremely limited prior to the last three years, whereas the
Azerbaijan public has always closely followed developments in Turkey.
In addition, both countries understand that they must respect each
other's foreign policy choices and can benefit from close cooperation,
which will also soothe fears about threats to national interests, which
may be very divergent. For instance, these days the Azerbaijan-Israel
relationship is a close one, but the Baku-Tehran one is tense, while
Israel-Turkey relations are struggling, and Ankara's dealings with
Iran are more positive. However, the countries may be able to help
one another: Azerbaijan can help normalize Turkish-Israeli relations,
and Turkey can do same for Azerbaijan in Iran. One can argue that
the 2009 crisis between the two countries changed a lot of latent
problems. In 2010, the two countries signed the Agreement on Strategic
Partnership and Mutual Support, and developed and deepened their
existing bilateral relations in different areas (education, health,
industry). The Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) agreement was
the final move, proving that a crisis was an effective means of
understanding the true cost of friendship, beyond any motto.