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TURKISH PREMIER TO DISCUSS KARABAKH SETTLEMENT
Vestnik Kavkaza
Sept 11 2012
Russia
Marina Petrova. Exclusively to VK
Today the prime-minister of Turkey Recep Erdogan comes to Azerbaijan
where he together with the president Ilham Aliyev will chair the
session of the Strategic Cooperation Council. They plan to sign
five bilateral agreements and discuss problems of politics, economy,
military cooperation, and the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.
Ankara began to provide active foreign policy in the Caucasus
straight after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Turkey recognized
Azerbaijan~Rs independence a month before recognition of other
former Soviet republics. Ankara was full of illusions connected with
reviving of lost cultural ties between two nations. However, first
enthusiasm disappeared, and time places everything in context. After
20 years Azerbaijan didn~Rt approach Turkey as it approached Russia
in cultural and value aspects. And Ankara~Rs policy on the settlement
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict influenced it much.
Azerbaijan had never asked anybody, including Ankara, to interfere
in the conflict directly. The Azerbaijani leaders might hope only for
Turkey would explain the world the Azerbaijani point of view through
its Western contacts. Almost the whole world stood for Armenia in the
conflict in the early 1990s. Initially Turkey had a neutral position.
It enabled Ankara to be a mediator and conduct several rounds of talks,
and the foreign minister of Turkey Hikmet Cetin did his best for the
US paid attention to the conflict.
However, the moderate position of Turkey didn~Rt last long. In February
1992 bloody massacres of Azerbaijani population took place in the
town of Khojaly. Mass anti-Armenian demonstrations were held in Ankara.
People demanded military intervention on the side of Azerbaijan
from the Turkish authorities. The power couldn~Rt ignore people,
and a new pro-Azerbaijani position had been elaborated soon.
New Armenian advances, photos of numerous Azerbaijani refugees
abandoning their homes, occupation of Azerbaijani territories,
and mild, almost neutral position of official Ankara ~V all these
circumstances caused heavy criticism of the government by the Turkish
media and the opposition. The Turkish authorities had ambitious
targets to return their regional leadership in the Caucasus and Middle
Asia. In March 1992 the opposition demanded to send troops to the
Armenian border. The government couldn~Rt ignore the criticism.
In early March Ankara declared the examination of all planes flying to
Armenia through Turkish air space. Moreover, Turkey didn~Rt give way
to aid for Armenia through its territory, thus, it extended economic
embargo against the country. By the middle of March 1992 the prime
minister of Turkey Suleiman Demirel didn~Rt except even military
intervention on the Azerbaijani side.
However, there were several constraining factors which didn~Rt let
Turkey to take any decisive steps in the conflict. First of all, Turkey
depended on the American aid in the struggle against RKK in southeast
Anatolia. Due to serious Armenian lobby in the US Congress, America,
being officially neutral, actually stood on the side occupants. The
same Armenian lobby could easily convinced the Congress to reduce the
aid in the Turkish war against Kurds, if Ankara were involved in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or made other firm pro-Azerbaijani steps.
Furthermore, at that time Ankara intensively tried to gain accession
to the European Union which believed that the country was developing
democracy insufficiently. If Turkey dared at some military adventure
in the Caucasus, it would pay too much for this in Europe. The EU
demanded normalization of relations with Armenia from Turkey. It
would be impossible in the context of Ankara~Rs participation in
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Moreover, the stability in the
region was necessary for construction of new oil and gas pipelines
which had to transit Caspian and Middle-Asian energy resources to the
European markets through the Turkish territory, which would increase
its importance in Europe~Rs eyes.
In addition, Turkey had to maintain good relations with Russia in
the economic sphere even more than in the political one. After the
dissolution of the USSR Russia turned into an attractive market, and
Turkish companies flew into it. The trade turnover between Turkey and
Russia in 1992 was in several times more than the turnover between
Turkey and Azerbaijan and Middle Asian states combined. At the same
time, Russia exported armament to Turkey for its struggle against RKK.
Any military aid to Azerbaijan would mean to Ankara a serious worsening
of relations with Russia. It was absolutely unprofitable.
The situation with Northern Cyprus tied Turkish hand and foot in the
Karabakh front. Even though the cases of Nagorno-Karabakh and Cyprus
are absolutely different, the Turks didn~Rt forget what a negative
reaction of the international society was caused by their intervention
in 1974.
And finally the sad past of the Ottoman Empire, especially the events
of 1915 in Eastern Anatolia, wasn~Rt neglected. Even in the 1970s
the Armenian Diaspora began to insist on recognition of these events
as genocide of the Armenian population. Ankara was afraid that any
activities in the Karabakh direction would be considered by powerful
Western Armenian Diaspora as a new effort to massacre Armenians. It
might lead to worsening of relations with the whole world and put
Turkey to the situation of isolation. Turkey had to show its good will
toward independent Armenia. The situation made a strict anti-Armenian
and pro-Azerbaijani position impossible for Turkey. Suleiman Demirel
tried to calm down the society furious about the massacre in Khojaly
and stated that the military intervention of Turkey would only make
the whole world support Armenia.
As for the Azerbaijani reaction on the Turkish position, there were two
aspects. On the one hand, the Azerbaijani were disappointed by Ankara
which recently had stated on reconsolidation of brother nations. On
the other hand, official Baku understood importance of constraining
factors for the Turkish authorities. However, the Turkish image was
ruined mostly by the unsuccessful energy deal between Ankara and
Yerevan in November 1992. The main pressure leverage on Armenia was
energy embargo. And though the deal failed, the Azerbaijani population
didn~Rt forget about it. They could accept the Turkish passive position
in a way, but they couldn~Rt forgive Ankara cooperation with their
enemy. Soon Azerbaijan realized that Turkey lacks enthusiasm and
political will to be its supporter in the international arena.
Thus, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict dispelled illusions of some
Turkish officials who believed that it would be easy to gain authority
in the former Soviet space. Considering complicated relations between
Ankara, Washington, Europe, Moscow, and Middle East, Turkey couldn~Rt
provide independent policy in the region.
At the same time, Turkey has many times stated on a desire of intensive
involvement into the process of the Karabakh settlement and being
a mediator. Probably during the current meeting in Qabala the prime
minister Erdogan and the President Aliyev will touch on this painful
theme again.
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/31237.html
Vestnik Kavkaza
Sept 11 2012
Russia
Marina Petrova. Exclusively to VK
Today the prime-minister of Turkey Recep Erdogan comes to Azerbaijan
where he together with the president Ilham Aliyev will chair the
session of the Strategic Cooperation Council. They plan to sign
five bilateral agreements and discuss problems of politics, economy,
military cooperation, and the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.
Ankara began to provide active foreign policy in the Caucasus
straight after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Turkey recognized
Azerbaijan~Rs independence a month before recognition of other
former Soviet republics. Ankara was full of illusions connected with
reviving of lost cultural ties between two nations. However, first
enthusiasm disappeared, and time places everything in context. After
20 years Azerbaijan didn~Rt approach Turkey as it approached Russia
in cultural and value aspects. And Ankara~Rs policy on the settlement
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict influenced it much.
Azerbaijan had never asked anybody, including Ankara, to interfere
in the conflict directly. The Azerbaijani leaders might hope only for
Turkey would explain the world the Azerbaijani point of view through
its Western contacts. Almost the whole world stood for Armenia in the
conflict in the early 1990s. Initially Turkey had a neutral position.
It enabled Ankara to be a mediator and conduct several rounds of talks,
and the foreign minister of Turkey Hikmet Cetin did his best for the
US paid attention to the conflict.
However, the moderate position of Turkey didn~Rt last long. In February
1992 bloody massacres of Azerbaijani population took place in the
town of Khojaly. Mass anti-Armenian demonstrations were held in Ankara.
People demanded military intervention on the side of Azerbaijan
from the Turkish authorities. The power couldn~Rt ignore people,
and a new pro-Azerbaijani position had been elaborated soon.
New Armenian advances, photos of numerous Azerbaijani refugees
abandoning their homes, occupation of Azerbaijani territories,
and mild, almost neutral position of official Ankara ~V all these
circumstances caused heavy criticism of the government by the Turkish
media and the opposition. The Turkish authorities had ambitious
targets to return their regional leadership in the Caucasus and Middle
Asia. In March 1992 the opposition demanded to send troops to the
Armenian border. The government couldn~Rt ignore the criticism.
In early March Ankara declared the examination of all planes flying to
Armenia through Turkish air space. Moreover, Turkey didn~Rt give way
to aid for Armenia through its territory, thus, it extended economic
embargo against the country. By the middle of March 1992 the prime
minister of Turkey Suleiman Demirel didn~Rt except even military
intervention on the Azerbaijani side.
However, there were several constraining factors which didn~Rt let
Turkey to take any decisive steps in the conflict. First of all, Turkey
depended on the American aid in the struggle against RKK in southeast
Anatolia. Due to serious Armenian lobby in the US Congress, America,
being officially neutral, actually stood on the side occupants. The
same Armenian lobby could easily convinced the Congress to reduce the
aid in the Turkish war against Kurds, if Ankara were involved in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or made other firm pro-Azerbaijani steps.
Furthermore, at that time Ankara intensively tried to gain accession
to the European Union which believed that the country was developing
democracy insufficiently. If Turkey dared at some military adventure
in the Caucasus, it would pay too much for this in Europe. The EU
demanded normalization of relations with Armenia from Turkey. It
would be impossible in the context of Ankara~Rs participation in
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Moreover, the stability in the
region was necessary for construction of new oil and gas pipelines
which had to transit Caspian and Middle-Asian energy resources to the
European markets through the Turkish territory, which would increase
its importance in Europe~Rs eyes.
In addition, Turkey had to maintain good relations with Russia in
the economic sphere even more than in the political one. After the
dissolution of the USSR Russia turned into an attractive market, and
Turkish companies flew into it. The trade turnover between Turkey and
Russia in 1992 was in several times more than the turnover between
Turkey and Azerbaijan and Middle Asian states combined. At the same
time, Russia exported armament to Turkey for its struggle against RKK.
Any military aid to Azerbaijan would mean to Ankara a serious worsening
of relations with Russia. It was absolutely unprofitable.
The situation with Northern Cyprus tied Turkish hand and foot in the
Karabakh front. Even though the cases of Nagorno-Karabakh and Cyprus
are absolutely different, the Turks didn~Rt forget what a negative
reaction of the international society was caused by their intervention
in 1974.
And finally the sad past of the Ottoman Empire, especially the events
of 1915 in Eastern Anatolia, wasn~Rt neglected. Even in the 1970s
the Armenian Diaspora began to insist on recognition of these events
as genocide of the Armenian population. Ankara was afraid that any
activities in the Karabakh direction would be considered by powerful
Western Armenian Diaspora as a new effort to massacre Armenians. It
might lead to worsening of relations with the whole world and put
Turkey to the situation of isolation. Turkey had to show its good will
toward independent Armenia. The situation made a strict anti-Armenian
and pro-Azerbaijani position impossible for Turkey. Suleiman Demirel
tried to calm down the society furious about the massacre in Khojaly
and stated that the military intervention of Turkey would only make
the whole world support Armenia.
As for the Azerbaijani reaction on the Turkish position, there were two
aspects. On the one hand, the Azerbaijani were disappointed by Ankara
which recently had stated on reconsolidation of brother nations. On
the other hand, official Baku understood importance of constraining
factors for the Turkish authorities. However, the Turkish image was
ruined mostly by the unsuccessful energy deal between Ankara and
Yerevan in November 1992. The main pressure leverage on Armenia was
energy embargo. And though the deal failed, the Azerbaijani population
didn~Rt forget about it. They could accept the Turkish passive position
in a way, but they couldn~Rt forgive Ankara cooperation with their
enemy. Soon Azerbaijan realized that Turkey lacks enthusiasm and
political will to be its supporter in the international arena.
Thus, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict dispelled illusions of some
Turkish officials who believed that it would be easy to gain authority
in the former Soviet space. Considering complicated relations between
Ankara, Washington, Europe, Moscow, and Middle East, Turkey couldn~Rt
provide independent policy in the region.
At the same time, Turkey has many times stated on a desire of intensive
involvement into the process of the Karabakh settlement and being
a mediator. Probably during the current meeting in Qabala the prime
minister Erdogan and the President Aliyev will touch on this painful
theme again.
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/31237.html