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SAFAROV CASE HAS ADDED NO CONFIDENCE TO NEGOTIATIONS ON NAGORNO KARABAKH
arminfo
Tuesday, September 18, 13:26
Despite expectations from Baku and Pan-Turan aspirations, the
Government of Hungary preferred condemning Safarov's pardon. The note
of protest to the Azerbaijani Embassy and Ambassador dated September
2 2012 shows that the actions of the Azerbaijani party contradict
the official promise to ensure execution of the sentence in the
motherland. Deputy Minister of Justice of Azerbaijan in his letter
dated Aug 15 2012 assured that Safarov could be paroled only in 25
years after the verdict. In Baku they reneged on their own promises,
Vladimir Kazimirov, Ambassador (retired), First Deputy Head of the
Association of Russian Diplomats, Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group
(Russia) in 1992-1996, writes in his notes.
The author of the notes is no longer engaged in peaceful resolution
of the Karabakh conflict, but Safavor case reminded about different
abilities of the parties to assume and fulfill commitments. Yet
in the wartime in 1991-1994 the mediators were often facing
Baku's unwillingness and refusals to fulfill even the documents
and agreements it had sighed. Azerbaijan often openly violated and
breached documents. A question arises as to whether official Baku is
able to fulfill any agreement? On April 30, 1993 at the initiative of
Azerbaijan, the UN SC adopted formula 822. Yerevan and Stepanakert
also adopted and confirmed that, while Baku didn't even respond. In
summer and autumn of 1993 Azerbaijan refused from ceasefire for many
times and even breached ceasefire after signing a relevant treaty.
Azerbaijan demand fulfillment of the UN Security Council's four
resolutions, specifically the provisions related to de-occupation,
while it has never fully or timely fulfilled any of their demands
or calls.
Kazimirov brings several documents signed and breached or cancelled by
Baku. Among them was the ceasefire arrangement achieved personally with
Aliyev and Kocharyan on Dec 16 1993, the protocol on ceasefire signed
in Moscow on Feb 18 1994. In a week after May 12 1994 ceasefire,
Azerbaijan signed "small treaty" confirming the ceasefire at the
request of Jan Eliasson, but canceled it in two days, Kazimirov writes.
The most scandalous case is connected with the agreement strengthening
the ceasefire regime signed by the three parties on February 4,
1995 under the aegis of OSCE. The document was coordinated with
Heidar Aliyev beforehand, but Baku neither observed it nor suggested
canceling, re-signing, correcting or making additions to it. Despite
suggestions of Yerevan and Stepanakert to redo the agreement, Baku
continues totally ignoring and even concealing existence of the given
agreement, Kazimirov notes. As for the OSCE, it displays no proper
insistence in that case.
There are many examples proving how unreliable is official Baku.
Suffice it to say that Baku does not want to recognize survival of the
ceasefire of 1994. Heydar Aliyev realized what a termless agreement
means and came out for peaceful resolution of the conflict. In the
meanwhile, Ilham Aliyev declares that the war is not over yet. In
Baku they call the line of the contact a frontline, and Armenia and
Karabakh enemies. Military rhetoric in Baku rattles, Kazimirov writes.
"Baku presents the consequence of the war - occupation of the
Azerbaijani regions - as the key problem of the conflict, while the
key problem is the status of Nagorno Karabakh. Baku conceals by all
means possible what really led to occupation in wartime and even denies
the shortest way to the release of the regions i.e. an agreement on
non-use of force. Heydar Aliyev knew that without a ceasefire treaty
it was impossible to start liquidating the conflict aftermaths and
adopted that line of the CIS Council of the Heads of the State in
his statement dated April 15 1994.
Azerbaijan pins too many hopes with the thesis challenging the status
quo. War is even more challenging, while the status quo implies
occupation, tension and conflicts, war policy, arms race, refusal to
remove snipers and inquire into incidents, the Russian diplomat writes.
From: Baghdasarian
arminfo
Tuesday, September 18, 13:26
Despite expectations from Baku and Pan-Turan aspirations, the
Government of Hungary preferred condemning Safarov's pardon. The note
of protest to the Azerbaijani Embassy and Ambassador dated September
2 2012 shows that the actions of the Azerbaijani party contradict
the official promise to ensure execution of the sentence in the
motherland. Deputy Minister of Justice of Azerbaijan in his letter
dated Aug 15 2012 assured that Safarov could be paroled only in 25
years after the verdict. In Baku they reneged on their own promises,
Vladimir Kazimirov, Ambassador (retired), First Deputy Head of the
Association of Russian Diplomats, Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group
(Russia) in 1992-1996, writes in his notes.
The author of the notes is no longer engaged in peaceful resolution
of the Karabakh conflict, but Safavor case reminded about different
abilities of the parties to assume and fulfill commitments. Yet
in the wartime in 1991-1994 the mediators were often facing
Baku's unwillingness and refusals to fulfill even the documents
and agreements it had sighed. Azerbaijan often openly violated and
breached documents. A question arises as to whether official Baku is
able to fulfill any agreement? On April 30, 1993 at the initiative of
Azerbaijan, the UN SC adopted formula 822. Yerevan and Stepanakert
also adopted and confirmed that, while Baku didn't even respond. In
summer and autumn of 1993 Azerbaijan refused from ceasefire for many
times and even breached ceasefire after signing a relevant treaty.
Azerbaijan demand fulfillment of the UN Security Council's four
resolutions, specifically the provisions related to de-occupation,
while it has never fully or timely fulfilled any of their demands
or calls.
Kazimirov brings several documents signed and breached or cancelled by
Baku. Among them was the ceasefire arrangement achieved personally with
Aliyev and Kocharyan on Dec 16 1993, the protocol on ceasefire signed
in Moscow on Feb 18 1994. In a week after May 12 1994 ceasefire,
Azerbaijan signed "small treaty" confirming the ceasefire at the
request of Jan Eliasson, but canceled it in two days, Kazimirov writes.
The most scandalous case is connected with the agreement strengthening
the ceasefire regime signed by the three parties on February 4,
1995 under the aegis of OSCE. The document was coordinated with
Heidar Aliyev beforehand, but Baku neither observed it nor suggested
canceling, re-signing, correcting or making additions to it. Despite
suggestions of Yerevan and Stepanakert to redo the agreement, Baku
continues totally ignoring and even concealing existence of the given
agreement, Kazimirov notes. As for the OSCE, it displays no proper
insistence in that case.
There are many examples proving how unreliable is official Baku.
Suffice it to say that Baku does not want to recognize survival of the
ceasefire of 1994. Heydar Aliyev realized what a termless agreement
means and came out for peaceful resolution of the conflict. In the
meanwhile, Ilham Aliyev declares that the war is not over yet. In
Baku they call the line of the contact a frontline, and Armenia and
Karabakh enemies. Military rhetoric in Baku rattles, Kazimirov writes.
"Baku presents the consequence of the war - occupation of the
Azerbaijani regions - as the key problem of the conflict, while the
key problem is the status of Nagorno Karabakh. Baku conceals by all
means possible what really led to occupation in wartime and even denies
the shortest way to the release of the regions i.e. an agreement on
non-use of force. Heydar Aliyev knew that without a ceasefire treaty
it was impossible to start liquidating the conflict aftermaths and
adopted that line of the CIS Council of the Heads of the State in
his statement dated April 15 1994.
Azerbaijan pins too many hopes with the thesis challenging the status
quo. War is even more challenging, while the status quo implies
occupation, tension and conflicts, war policy, arms race, refusal to
remove snipers and inquire into incidents, the Russian diplomat writes.
From: Baghdasarian