Washing Away Hate Crimes with Oil Is not the Only Path to Partnership
by Simon Maghakyan
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2012/09/19/washing-away-hate-crimes-with-oil-is-not-the-only-path-to-partnership/
September 19, 2012
An unremorseful murderer was predictably pardoned and promoted last
month after the Azerbaijani government secured military officer Ramil
Safarov's extradition from Hungary. Safarov had been serving a life
sentence in that country for axing to death his sleeping Armenian
colleague Gurgen Margaryan at a 2004 NATO Partnership for Peace
course.
While swift to imprison domestic dissidents, the authoritarian regime
of Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev spared no effort to release
Safarov-a hero for many fellow Azeris-by reportedly offering Hungary a
loan as large as $3.8 billion, enabled by the Caspian's energy riches.
Unrepentantly proud of his success, Aliyev set Safarov's picture as
his Facebook cover photo. Capitalizing on anti-Armenian sentiment,
fueled by the 1990's bloody war over Nagorno-Karabagh, is likely
Aliyev's sole opportunity to connect with a large number of
Azerbaijani citizens, whose subtlest criticism of the regime can
otherwise land them behind bars.
Aliyev's policy of securing short-term populist support, however, is
clearly poised-if not somewhat intended-to exacerbate the already
heavily tense relations with Yerevan.
Aliyev's policy of securing short-term populist support, however, is
clearly poised-if not somewhat intended-to exacerbate the already
heavily tense relations with Yerevan, which charges that anti-Armenian
hatred is Baku's official state policy. Armenia's response that it is
ready to fight, if attacked, has further demonstrated the serious
repercussions of the situation, prompting strong reaction against
Safarov's release from the mediators of the Karabagh conflict, France,
Russia, and the United States.
To demonstrate his deep concern, President Obama has `request[ed] an
explanation' from Hungary, implying that his administration was
surprised by the extradition. A leaked U.S. diplomatic dispatch
summarizing reactions to Safarov's April 2006 conviction, however,
reports that the Azerbaijani `Prosecutor General's office has already
announced its intention to seek extradition,' attesting to
Washington's knowledge of the extradition effort from day one.
Furthermore, a Reuters report published a week before Safarov's
release noted the possible Azerbaijani loan to Budapest, which should
have also raised a flag.
Instead of readily reacting to this potential development with a press
statement, Washington and its partners should and could have
proactively prevented the extradition by sending Budapest, whose
growing cooperation with Baku hasn't been secret, a strong message
that an extradition would further complicate Nagorno-Karabagh
negotiations. This willful negligence resonates with Washington's and
other mediators' failure to halt another anti-Armenian action when, on
Dec. 15, 2005, they were alerted to the Azerbaijani military's
destruction of the world's largest medieval Armenian cemetery in
Djulfa. Instead of demanding that Azerbaijan stop their ongoing
irreversible destruction of the world's largest complex of medieval
Armenian material heritage, the State Department kept silent until
after the cemetery was reduced to dust. In the meantime, it expressed
internal displeasure, according to a leaked cable, not with the
heavy-duty destruction, but with Armenia's written protest of it.
A State Department officer once summarized for me Washington's
interests in Azerbaijan: `Energy, security, and human rights.' The
first two-which include oil pipelines and possible attack grounds
against Iran-have undoubtedly overshadowed the latter, especially in
the context of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, which has already killed
tens of thousands and displaced many more, the majority of whom are
Azerbaijanis.
As a mediator of the conflict, Washington is expected to be neutral.
But tacitly or negligently allowing state-sponsored hate crimes does
not qualify as evenhandedness; it merely reinforces the prime cause of
the Karabagh conflict: the Armenian perception that Azerbaijan has
been systematically intolerant of everything Armenian without any
international repercussion.
Budapest's ill-advised decision to extradite Safarov and subsequent
hesitancy to strongly criticize the release, as well as Washington's
inability to proactively prevent the transfer, are seemingly
byproducts of self-interests. But a government needn't always
sacrifice its principles to forge a partnership, even with
authoritarian regimes. When the Armenian inscriptions on a church used
by minority Udis and nearby tombstones in Nij, Azerbaijan, were
polished out during a 2005 renovation supported by a Norwegian
non-profit, Oslo's Ambassador Steinar Gil strongly expressed his
outrage regarding the vandalism. Moreover, he actively publicized it,
demanded accountability, and convinced all fellow ambassadors to join
him in boycotting the reopening of the church. Azerbaijan, whose top
Muslim cleric called the renovation and reopening `triumph of
tolerance,' was expectedly unhappy.
`It is a question of principle,' Gil told me. Yet despite Gil's
persistent principled position on many human rights issues, Norway has
continued to be one of the largest investors in Azerbaijan's energy
sector.
Washing away hate crimes with oil is not the only path to partnership with Baku.
by Simon Maghakyan
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2012/09/19/washing-away-hate-crimes-with-oil-is-not-the-only-path-to-partnership/
September 19, 2012
An unremorseful murderer was predictably pardoned and promoted last
month after the Azerbaijani government secured military officer Ramil
Safarov's extradition from Hungary. Safarov had been serving a life
sentence in that country for axing to death his sleeping Armenian
colleague Gurgen Margaryan at a 2004 NATO Partnership for Peace
course.
While swift to imprison domestic dissidents, the authoritarian regime
of Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev spared no effort to release
Safarov-a hero for many fellow Azeris-by reportedly offering Hungary a
loan as large as $3.8 billion, enabled by the Caspian's energy riches.
Unrepentantly proud of his success, Aliyev set Safarov's picture as
his Facebook cover photo. Capitalizing on anti-Armenian sentiment,
fueled by the 1990's bloody war over Nagorno-Karabagh, is likely
Aliyev's sole opportunity to connect with a large number of
Azerbaijani citizens, whose subtlest criticism of the regime can
otherwise land them behind bars.
Aliyev's policy of securing short-term populist support, however, is
clearly poised-if not somewhat intended-to exacerbate the already
heavily tense relations with Yerevan.
Aliyev's policy of securing short-term populist support, however, is
clearly poised-if not somewhat intended-to exacerbate the already
heavily tense relations with Yerevan, which charges that anti-Armenian
hatred is Baku's official state policy. Armenia's response that it is
ready to fight, if attacked, has further demonstrated the serious
repercussions of the situation, prompting strong reaction against
Safarov's release from the mediators of the Karabagh conflict, France,
Russia, and the United States.
To demonstrate his deep concern, President Obama has `request[ed] an
explanation' from Hungary, implying that his administration was
surprised by the extradition. A leaked U.S. diplomatic dispatch
summarizing reactions to Safarov's April 2006 conviction, however,
reports that the Azerbaijani `Prosecutor General's office has already
announced its intention to seek extradition,' attesting to
Washington's knowledge of the extradition effort from day one.
Furthermore, a Reuters report published a week before Safarov's
release noted the possible Azerbaijani loan to Budapest, which should
have also raised a flag.
Instead of readily reacting to this potential development with a press
statement, Washington and its partners should and could have
proactively prevented the extradition by sending Budapest, whose
growing cooperation with Baku hasn't been secret, a strong message
that an extradition would further complicate Nagorno-Karabagh
negotiations. This willful negligence resonates with Washington's and
other mediators' failure to halt another anti-Armenian action when, on
Dec. 15, 2005, they were alerted to the Azerbaijani military's
destruction of the world's largest medieval Armenian cemetery in
Djulfa. Instead of demanding that Azerbaijan stop their ongoing
irreversible destruction of the world's largest complex of medieval
Armenian material heritage, the State Department kept silent until
after the cemetery was reduced to dust. In the meantime, it expressed
internal displeasure, according to a leaked cable, not with the
heavy-duty destruction, but with Armenia's written protest of it.
A State Department officer once summarized for me Washington's
interests in Azerbaijan: `Energy, security, and human rights.' The
first two-which include oil pipelines and possible attack grounds
against Iran-have undoubtedly overshadowed the latter, especially in
the context of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, which has already killed
tens of thousands and displaced many more, the majority of whom are
Azerbaijanis.
As a mediator of the conflict, Washington is expected to be neutral.
But tacitly or negligently allowing state-sponsored hate crimes does
not qualify as evenhandedness; it merely reinforces the prime cause of
the Karabagh conflict: the Armenian perception that Azerbaijan has
been systematically intolerant of everything Armenian without any
international repercussion.
Budapest's ill-advised decision to extradite Safarov and subsequent
hesitancy to strongly criticize the release, as well as Washington's
inability to proactively prevent the transfer, are seemingly
byproducts of self-interests. But a government needn't always
sacrifice its principles to forge a partnership, even with
authoritarian regimes. When the Armenian inscriptions on a church used
by minority Udis and nearby tombstones in Nij, Azerbaijan, were
polished out during a 2005 renovation supported by a Norwegian
non-profit, Oslo's Ambassador Steinar Gil strongly expressed his
outrage regarding the vandalism. Moreover, he actively publicized it,
demanded accountability, and convinced all fellow ambassadors to join
him in boycotting the reopening of the church. Azerbaijan, whose top
Muslim cleric called the renovation and reopening `triumph of
tolerance,' was expectedly unhappy.
`It is a question of principle,' Gil told me. Yet despite Gil's
persistent principled position on many human rights issues, Norway has
continued to be one of the largest investors in Azerbaijan's energy
sector.
Washing away hate crimes with oil is not the only path to partnership with Baku.