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PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: GEORGIA AHEAD OF THE CONTROVERSIAL EVENT
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=6652
24.09.2012
Sergei Minasyan
Candidate of Science (History), Head of the Department of the Political
Studies at the Institute of Caucasus
This autumn Georgia will face serious political challenge - regular
and very important parliamentary elections will be held. On August
1, 2012 the president of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili appointed the
day of parliamentary elections. According to law they should be held
in 60 days, i.e. on October 1. In our opinion this will be the most
crucial elections over the last decade of the Georgian history. Only
the 2003 elections can excel them in the aspect of their significance
as they triggered the "revolution of roses" and raised the incumbent
president and his team to power.
The upcoming elections are remarkable for several reasons. But the
most important is that they are connected with the end of Mikhail
Saakashvili's second presidential term. No matter what the incumbent
president of Georgia wants, next year his second presidential term
expires and he will have to leave. There is no other way. Neither
Georgia's public and political elite, nor some circles in the
western countries which still sympathize with him are ready to accept
Saakashvili's third term. After all even Vladimir Putin with whom they
like to compare Mikhail Saakashvili (of course discrediting his Russian
"colleague"), did not stand for the third presidential term in a raw...
In fact it may turn out for the first time in the post-Soviet history
of Georgia that its president after two presidential terms will pass
his post voluntarily (even if many believe it is a formal procedure)
to someone else. After that Georgia will become the fifth among the
recognized, unrecognized and semi-recognized countries in the South
Caucasus where the head of the state voluntarily gave his place
to its successor. There were such precedents in Armenia, Abkhazia,
Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia. And in Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev
who inherited presidency after his father's death, most probably, is
going to stand for the third presidential term, especially, taking
into consideration the fact that Azerbaijani constitution provides
no restrictions in this aspect.
Under such conditions the issue of further "employment" of Mikhail
Saakashvili becomes rather topical. In the opinion of many analysts
Saakashvili, giving up the highest elective office in the state,
will tend to preserve leverages of real power, taking advantage of the
recent changes made in the constitution of Georgia which delegate wider
authority to the parliament of the country. Though the constitutional
changes are coming into power after the presidential elections in
2013, but this fact even intensifies the political intrigue and the
significance of the October elections is increasing disproportionately.
The case is not only the political fate of Saakashvili and his
team-mates, but continuation of the policies of Georgia in the next
decade, or just the opposite (in case if the authorities failed
the elections) - its essential change by the leading oppositional
power "Georgian dream", headed by the Georgian billionaire Bidzina
Ivanishvili. That is why for Saakashvili and the ruling team the
results of the elections have double meaning in the context of both
provision of the political future of the incumbent president and
continuation (even partial) of the policies initiated in the November
2003 by the "revolution of roses".
Against this background it is natural that just like the leading
oppositional power "Georgian dream" (which initiated public electoral
campaign last year after Ivanishvili switched to the opposition)
the Georgian authorities also take seriously the elections set on
November 1. And the "arsenal" of the actions of the authorities is
rather diverse - from using the "administrative recourse", which is
so characteristic of the post-Soviet countries, to pretty drastic
(though expected) changes in Saakashvili's team.
What is meant here is first of all "formalization of informal" -
appointment of all-powerful Minister of Home Affairs Vano Merabishvili
who was born in the mostly Armenian populated Samtskhe-Javakheti
region to a post of the prime-minister this June. According to a
well-known Georgian political scientist Gia Nodia, for the first time
since the death of one of the "fathers" of the "revolution of roses" -
a former prime-minister of Georgia Zurab Zhvania - a real significance
of the post of a prime-minister "has been in accord with his formal
rank". Naturally, and this is accepted by the obvious advocates of
the authorities, appointment of Merabishivili symbolizes the fact
that the authorities has seriously underestimated political potential
of the oppositional "Georgian dream" and now they try to compensate
lost opportunities. But at the same time appointment of the former
head of the Ministry of Home Affairs who has acquired reputation for
terseness (unlike Saakashvili) and is known as an efficient manager,
has also brought up to date the conversations about the candidacy of
a possible successor of Saakashvili, thus drawing parallels with the
"job swap" according to the "Russian scenario" in 2008.
But it is obvious that too straightforward option of "putinization"
of Georgia (according to Gia Nodia) would be very undesirable for
both Saakashvili and his team. One way or another it will greatly
affect the efficiency of one of the most important "power" resources
of Saakashvili - mixture of a fantastic creative political PR and a
skillful usage of the image of a "democratic pro-western politician"
in the eyes of a considerable part of a global community. That is why
many observers in Georgia believe that in consequence of multi-shift
cabinet reshuffle and in case of a successful for the current
authorities results of the upcoming parliamentary and presidential
elections, a possible combination of a top authorities' posts will
be a little different.
E.g. Mikhail Saakashvili will take the post of the speaker of the
parliament (thus gradually turning into the Georgian "Deng Xiaoping"),
Vano Merabishvili will remain a prime-minister (considerably
consolidating his positions in a result of constitutional changes)
and the incumbent speaker of parliament David Bakradze will stand as
a candidate for presidency with considerably curbed authority. Another
option is proposal by Mikhail Saakashvili today's mayor of Tbilisi Giga
Ugulava as a candidate for presidency. He is the only representative of
Georgian political establishment who can be compared by the qualities
and position with Vano Merabishvili. But this option is possible only
in case if Saakashvili does not rely on an unconditional loyalty of
the prime-minister and would like to counterbalance him with no less
influential and active Ugulava.
The degree of practicability of such political combinations will be
proved by time. However, it is obvious that for the implementation of
such scenarios the current authorities will have to solve a crucial
short-term task - to secure convincing victory at the parliamentary
elections in two and a half months. And this seems to be rather
hard task for Saakashvili and his team under current conditions,
even taking into consideration a "classical" usage of administrative
resources and obvious power pressure in favour of a ruling party.
However wining the majority at the parliamentary election will be
ambivalent victory for the ruling elite. It would be much harder to
get the legitimization of such a victory which will be most probably
impossible without using the administrative resource. In other words
Saakashvili and his team will have to go through serious post-electoral
processes, because the opposition, which has been winning serious
public support for recent months, will hardly put up with expected
mass violations about which the leaders of "Georgian dream" are
cautioning their electorate and international observers.
The elections in 2012 differ from the previous elections considerably
because there are at once several factors directed against the current
authorities of Georgia. The strength and maturity of the opposition
(many political powers which cannot be called marginalized gathered
under the "umbrella" of Ivanishvili's movement), serious financial
possibilities of billionaire Ivanishvili, and West's "tiredness"
of Saakashvili's harsh and extravagant steps put themselves on the map.
However, even against this background Saakashvili still has an old
political ace up his sleeve (though used for many times but still in
demand) - demonstration of his phenomenal image of a strong-willed
leader which has no alternative against the background of "inadequate"
opposition. Till now it allowed Saakashvili to use his "administrative
resource" without paying too much attention to the opinion of the
international community and to successfully "manage" the elections.
But the degree of the efficiency of that ace supplemented by the
unrestrained political improvisation of the Georgian president will
become clear within the next two months.
As for the areas of compact settlement of the national minorities -
Armenians in Samtskhe-Javakhq and Azerbaijanis in Qvemo-Kartli - there
will be no special political developments before the elections. The
authorities will traditionally use those regions, which are under
the tough police and force control, as a kind of a saving-box for the
votes of the electorate of the Armenian and Azerbaijani origin. The
public control in these regions has always been lower than the police
control which allowed the authorities to openly use these regions
for ballot rigging. As for the effect the elections will have on the
population of the regions where mostly Armenians and Azerbaijanis
live it will become clear only in October. However this regards the
rest of Georgia as well...
"Globus" analytical journal, #9, 2012
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
~UTHE DYNAMICS AND TENDENCY OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF
ARMENIA AND THE US: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS [01.09.2011] ~UPOSSIBILITIES
OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: MYTHS AND
REALITIES[14.02.2011] ~UARMENIAN - GEORGIAN RELATIONS AFTER "FIVE DAYS"
WAR[15.10.2009] ~UARMENIA-TURKEY: NEW POLITICAL PHASE? [14.05.2009]
~USPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ON JANUARY 5, 2008 IN GEORGIA:
A VIEW FROM JAVAKHQ[07.02.2008]
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=6652
24.09.2012
Sergei Minasyan
Candidate of Science (History), Head of the Department of the Political
Studies at the Institute of Caucasus
This autumn Georgia will face serious political challenge - regular
and very important parliamentary elections will be held. On August
1, 2012 the president of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili appointed the
day of parliamentary elections. According to law they should be held
in 60 days, i.e. on October 1. In our opinion this will be the most
crucial elections over the last decade of the Georgian history. Only
the 2003 elections can excel them in the aspect of their significance
as they triggered the "revolution of roses" and raised the incumbent
president and his team to power.
The upcoming elections are remarkable for several reasons. But the
most important is that they are connected with the end of Mikhail
Saakashvili's second presidential term. No matter what the incumbent
president of Georgia wants, next year his second presidential term
expires and he will have to leave. There is no other way. Neither
Georgia's public and political elite, nor some circles in the
western countries which still sympathize with him are ready to accept
Saakashvili's third term. After all even Vladimir Putin with whom they
like to compare Mikhail Saakashvili (of course discrediting his Russian
"colleague"), did not stand for the third presidential term in a raw...
In fact it may turn out for the first time in the post-Soviet history
of Georgia that its president after two presidential terms will pass
his post voluntarily (even if many believe it is a formal procedure)
to someone else. After that Georgia will become the fifth among the
recognized, unrecognized and semi-recognized countries in the South
Caucasus where the head of the state voluntarily gave his place
to its successor. There were such precedents in Armenia, Abkhazia,
Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia. And in Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev
who inherited presidency after his father's death, most probably, is
going to stand for the third presidential term, especially, taking
into consideration the fact that Azerbaijani constitution provides
no restrictions in this aspect.
Under such conditions the issue of further "employment" of Mikhail
Saakashvili becomes rather topical. In the opinion of many analysts
Saakashvili, giving up the highest elective office in the state,
will tend to preserve leverages of real power, taking advantage of the
recent changes made in the constitution of Georgia which delegate wider
authority to the parliament of the country. Though the constitutional
changes are coming into power after the presidential elections in
2013, but this fact even intensifies the political intrigue and the
significance of the October elections is increasing disproportionately.
The case is not only the political fate of Saakashvili and his
team-mates, but continuation of the policies of Georgia in the next
decade, or just the opposite (in case if the authorities failed
the elections) - its essential change by the leading oppositional
power "Georgian dream", headed by the Georgian billionaire Bidzina
Ivanishvili. That is why for Saakashvili and the ruling team the
results of the elections have double meaning in the context of both
provision of the political future of the incumbent president and
continuation (even partial) of the policies initiated in the November
2003 by the "revolution of roses".
Against this background it is natural that just like the leading
oppositional power "Georgian dream" (which initiated public electoral
campaign last year after Ivanishvili switched to the opposition)
the Georgian authorities also take seriously the elections set on
November 1. And the "arsenal" of the actions of the authorities is
rather diverse - from using the "administrative recourse", which is
so characteristic of the post-Soviet countries, to pretty drastic
(though expected) changes in Saakashvili's team.
What is meant here is first of all "formalization of informal" -
appointment of all-powerful Minister of Home Affairs Vano Merabishvili
who was born in the mostly Armenian populated Samtskhe-Javakheti
region to a post of the prime-minister this June. According to a
well-known Georgian political scientist Gia Nodia, for the first time
since the death of one of the "fathers" of the "revolution of roses" -
a former prime-minister of Georgia Zurab Zhvania - a real significance
of the post of a prime-minister "has been in accord with his formal
rank". Naturally, and this is accepted by the obvious advocates of
the authorities, appointment of Merabishivili symbolizes the fact
that the authorities has seriously underestimated political potential
of the oppositional "Georgian dream" and now they try to compensate
lost opportunities. But at the same time appointment of the former
head of the Ministry of Home Affairs who has acquired reputation for
terseness (unlike Saakashvili) and is known as an efficient manager,
has also brought up to date the conversations about the candidacy of
a possible successor of Saakashvili, thus drawing parallels with the
"job swap" according to the "Russian scenario" in 2008.
But it is obvious that too straightforward option of "putinization"
of Georgia (according to Gia Nodia) would be very undesirable for
both Saakashvili and his team. One way or another it will greatly
affect the efficiency of one of the most important "power" resources
of Saakashvili - mixture of a fantastic creative political PR and a
skillful usage of the image of a "democratic pro-western politician"
in the eyes of a considerable part of a global community. That is why
many observers in Georgia believe that in consequence of multi-shift
cabinet reshuffle and in case of a successful for the current
authorities results of the upcoming parliamentary and presidential
elections, a possible combination of a top authorities' posts will
be a little different.
E.g. Mikhail Saakashvili will take the post of the speaker of the
parliament (thus gradually turning into the Georgian "Deng Xiaoping"),
Vano Merabishvili will remain a prime-minister (considerably
consolidating his positions in a result of constitutional changes)
and the incumbent speaker of parliament David Bakradze will stand as
a candidate for presidency with considerably curbed authority. Another
option is proposal by Mikhail Saakashvili today's mayor of Tbilisi Giga
Ugulava as a candidate for presidency. He is the only representative of
Georgian political establishment who can be compared by the qualities
and position with Vano Merabishvili. But this option is possible only
in case if Saakashvili does not rely on an unconditional loyalty of
the prime-minister and would like to counterbalance him with no less
influential and active Ugulava.
The degree of practicability of such political combinations will be
proved by time. However, it is obvious that for the implementation of
such scenarios the current authorities will have to solve a crucial
short-term task - to secure convincing victory at the parliamentary
elections in two and a half months. And this seems to be rather
hard task for Saakashvili and his team under current conditions,
even taking into consideration a "classical" usage of administrative
resources and obvious power pressure in favour of a ruling party.
However wining the majority at the parliamentary election will be
ambivalent victory for the ruling elite. It would be much harder to
get the legitimization of such a victory which will be most probably
impossible without using the administrative resource. In other words
Saakashvili and his team will have to go through serious post-electoral
processes, because the opposition, which has been winning serious
public support for recent months, will hardly put up with expected
mass violations about which the leaders of "Georgian dream" are
cautioning their electorate and international observers.
The elections in 2012 differ from the previous elections considerably
because there are at once several factors directed against the current
authorities of Georgia. The strength and maturity of the opposition
(many political powers which cannot be called marginalized gathered
under the "umbrella" of Ivanishvili's movement), serious financial
possibilities of billionaire Ivanishvili, and West's "tiredness"
of Saakashvili's harsh and extravagant steps put themselves on the map.
However, even against this background Saakashvili still has an old
political ace up his sleeve (though used for many times but still in
demand) - demonstration of his phenomenal image of a strong-willed
leader which has no alternative against the background of "inadequate"
opposition. Till now it allowed Saakashvili to use his "administrative
resource" without paying too much attention to the opinion of the
international community and to successfully "manage" the elections.
But the degree of the efficiency of that ace supplemented by the
unrestrained political improvisation of the Georgian president will
become clear within the next two months.
As for the areas of compact settlement of the national minorities -
Armenians in Samtskhe-Javakhq and Azerbaijanis in Qvemo-Kartli - there
will be no special political developments before the elections. The
authorities will traditionally use those regions, which are under
the tough police and force control, as a kind of a saving-box for the
votes of the electorate of the Armenian and Azerbaijani origin. The
public control in these regions has always been lower than the police
control which allowed the authorities to openly use these regions
for ballot rigging. As for the effect the elections will have on the
population of the regions where mostly Armenians and Azerbaijanis
live it will become clear only in October. However this regards the
rest of Georgia as well...
"Globus" analytical journal, #9, 2012
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
~UTHE DYNAMICS AND TENDENCY OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF
ARMENIA AND THE US: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS [01.09.2011] ~UPOSSIBILITIES
OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: MYTHS AND
REALITIES[14.02.2011] ~UARMENIAN - GEORGIAN RELATIONS AFTER "FIVE DAYS"
WAR[15.10.2009] ~UARMENIA-TURKEY: NEW POLITICAL PHASE? [14.05.2009]
~USPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ON JANUARY 5, 2008 IN GEORGIA:
A VIEW FROM JAVAKHQ[07.02.2008]