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CSTO AND COMMUNICATION SECURITY
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=12291
01.08.2013
Based on a report presented at the "Regional Security" panel discussion
(26.06.2013)
Sevak Sarukhanyan Head of the Center for Political Studies, "Noravank"
Foundation, PhD
On June 26, 2013 a meeting of the CSTO Secretary General N.Bordyuzha
and Coordinator of the CSTO Analytical Association I.Panarin with
the Armenian experts was held at "Noravank" Foundation. Communication
security issue was among those on the agenda.
In particular, it was mentioned that currently the CSTO did not carry
out the function of protection of the communication infrastructures,
which were of vital importance for the organization's member countries
and which go through the territories of the third countries, but
according to N. Bordyuzha such function should not be excluded in
the future.
It can become an important step for the CSTO, because NATO carries
similar function today and it is ready to provide (in the military
aspect) security of the main international transportation corridors,
on the stable activity of which security of the member countries
depends. First of all it refers to the international energy corridors,
malfunctioning of which may deliver a serious blow to the security of
other countries, including NATO member countries. First of all this
refers to Strait of Ormuz and Suez Canal, which theoretically can be
"closed" by Iran and Egypt correspondingly but this does not happen
because of the supposed counteractions by the US and NATO.
Provision of the security of the communications going through the
territories of the third countries is an important issue for the
CSTO too but it has not been resolved yet. The main reason is that
the CSTO member countries (except Armenia) have no vital necessity to
protect communications going through the third countries - Russia and
Kazakhstan export energy carriers on a large scale, Kirgizstan and
Belarus have direct access to Kazakhstan and Russia correspondingly,
and they do not depend on the activity of international corridors. The
situation with the Republic of Armenia is different; it has no common
border with other CSTO countries and it imports gas from Russia through
the territory of Georgia. The instability in Georgia in the 1990s was
the main challenge to the energy security of Armenia because due to
the factual civil war and domestic conflicts Tbilisi could not provide
security of the transportation corridors going through its territory.
It is obvious that over the last decade the domestic political
situation in Georgia stabilized and Armenian-Georgian relations
develop in rather positive way. In this aspect the fact that Tbilisi
never conditioned the activity of North-South gas pipeline by its
relations with Moscow can be welcomed. But the gas pipeline coming
to Armenia through Georgia is still rather risky. The high-risk of
the gas pipeline is conditioned by a number of circumstances:
1. The gas pipeline going through the territory of Georgia can become a
subject to subversions as it was in the early 1990s during the Karabakh
war. Unfortunately there is no ultimate survey of how many times,
by whom and on which segments the pipeline was blown up but we found
publications about at least 3 explosions in 1993. Those explosions
obviously aimed to deliver blow to Armenia and to affect its fighting
efficiency. The attempts of such subversions are not excluded in the
future either, taking into consideration theoretical possibilities of
the Azerbaijani-Armenian military encounters. Today Georgia has become
a stable and developing country but it can hardly control the whole
length of the gas pipeline, taking into consideration the fact that
there is no such necessity because energy security of Georgia does
not depend on it. It should be mentioned that taking of the decision
by the CSTO on providing security of the strategic communications
can become a serious stimulus for Georgia to raise the level of gas
pipeline security and its protection.
2. After signing the EU Association Agreement with Armenia and
Georgia these states will take an energy system liberalization
track. Of course this policy may take a while but it is obvious
that Yerevan, as well as Tbilisi, sooner or later will join EU
"third energy package", which provides absolutely free access of the
"third parties" to the energy system. In this aspect the possibility
of privatization of the North-South gas pipeline by the government
of Georgia is rising and Tbilisi has avoided it in recent years. Let
us remind that the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan stated that they
wanted to buy the pipeline which (if it happens) may seriously affect
the energy security of Armenia.
There will be a possibility of "energy blackmail" which will be very
difficult to oppose by economic and legal means, especially taking
into consideration the fact that Baku will not sign Association
Agreement and will not be obliged to coordinate its actions with
Brussels. This is serious challenge to Armenia and Yerevan will have
to come to definite agreements with the EU concerning the future of
the North-South gas pipeline and it will be much easier if the CSTO
takes a decision on protection of the strategic communications.
At the same time, it should be mentioned that Armenia will face
a problem of protection of two other crucial infrastructures -
Iran-Armenia gas pipeline and Metsamor NPP. But these two objects
are not going through the territories of the third countries and this
reduces their vulnerability and gives an opportunity to provide their
security by national means.
At the same time it should be mentioned that the possible decision of
the CSTO on protection of the strategic communications is gainful not
only for Armenia - this decision will be a serious stimulus to turn the
CSTO into a real international military and political alliance and will
have a positive effect on the entire system of international security.
"Globus" analytical journal, #8, 2013
Return Another materials of author IRAN AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS[01.07.2013] "IRANIAN GAS CAN REPLACE RUSSIAN BUT IT IS
MUCH MORE EXPENSIVE"[10.06.2013] KARS-AKHLKALAKI-TBILISI RAILWAY
AND ITS REGIONAL PROSPECTS [25.04.2013] QAZVIN-RASHT-ASTARA OR
IRAN-ARMENIA? [21.02.2013] IRAN AND SANCTIONS[10.12.2012] SIGNIFICANCE
OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR ARMENIA [27.09.2012] ON THE REGIONAL POLICY OF
IRAN[28.06.2012] TURKISH FACTOR IN "LEVIATHAN" AND "APHRODITE" ENERGY
"WARS"[03.05.2012] POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN AND POSSIBLE IRAN-US
COLLISION[22.03.2012] IRAN AND DEVELOPMENTS IN SYRIA[26.01.2012]
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=12291
01.08.2013
Based on a report presented at the "Regional Security" panel discussion
(26.06.2013)
Sevak Sarukhanyan Head of the Center for Political Studies, "Noravank"
Foundation, PhD
On June 26, 2013 a meeting of the CSTO Secretary General N.Bordyuzha
and Coordinator of the CSTO Analytical Association I.Panarin with
the Armenian experts was held at "Noravank" Foundation. Communication
security issue was among those on the agenda.
In particular, it was mentioned that currently the CSTO did not carry
out the function of protection of the communication infrastructures,
which were of vital importance for the organization's member countries
and which go through the territories of the third countries, but
according to N. Bordyuzha such function should not be excluded in
the future.
It can become an important step for the CSTO, because NATO carries
similar function today and it is ready to provide (in the military
aspect) security of the main international transportation corridors,
on the stable activity of which security of the member countries
depends. First of all it refers to the international energy corridors,
malfunctioning of which may deliver a serious blow to the security of
other countries, including NATO member countries. First of all this
refers to Strait of Ormuz and Suez Canal, which theoretically can be
"closed" by Iran and Egypt correspondingly but this does not happen
because of the supposed counteractions by the US and NATO.
Provision of the security of the communications going through the
territories of the third countries is an important issue for the
CSTO too but it has not been resolved yet. The main reason is that
the CSTO member countries (except Armenia) have no vital necessity to
protect communications going through the third countries - Russia and
Kazakhstan export energy carriers on a large scale, Kirgizstan and
Belarus have direct access to Kazakhstan and Russia correspondingly,
and they do not depend on the activity of international corridors. The
situation with the Republic of Armenia is different; it has no common
border with other CSTO countries and it imports gas from Russia through
the territory of Georgia. The instability in Georgia in the 1990s was
the main challenge to the energy security of Armenia because due to
the factual civil war and domestic conflicts Tbilisi could not provide
security of the transportation corridors going through its territory.
It is obvious that over the last decade the domestic political
situation in Georgia stabilized and Armenian-Georgian relations
develop in rather positive way. In this aspect the fact that Tbilisi
never conditioned the activity of North-South gas pipeline by its
relations with Moscow can be welcomed. But the gas pipeline coming
to Armenia through Georgia is still rather risky. The high-risk of
the gas pipeline is conditioned by a number of circumstances:
1. The gas pipeline going through the territory of Georgia can become a
subject to subversions as it was in the early 1990s during the Karabakh
war. Unfortunately there is no ultimate survey of how many times,
by whom and on which segments the pipeline was blown up but we found
publications about at least 3 explosions in 1993. Those explosions
obviously aimed to deliver blow to Armenia and to affect its fighting
efficiency. The attempts of such subversions are not excluded in the
future either, taking into consideration theoretical possibilities of
the Azerbaijani-Armenian military encounters. Today Georgia has become
a stable and developing country but it can hardly control the whole
length of the gas pipeline, taking into consideration the fact that
there is no such necessity because energy security of Georgia does
not depend on it. It should be mentioned that taking of the decision
by the CSTO on providing security of the strategic communications
can become a serious stimulus for Georgia to raise the level of gas
pipeline security and its protection.
2. After signing the EU Association Agreement with Armenia and
Georgia these states will take an energy system liberalization
track. Of course this policy may take a while but it is obvious
that Yerevan, as well as Tbilisi, sooner or later will join EU
"third energy package", which provides absolutely free access of the
"third parties" to the energy system. In this aspect the possibility
of privatization of the North-South gas pipeline by the government
of Georgia is rising and Tbilisi has avoided it in recent years. Let
us remind that the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan stated that they
wanted to buy the pipeline which (if it happens) may seriously affect
the energy security of Armenia.
There will be a possibility of "energy blackmail" which will be very
difficult to oppose by economic and legal means, especially taking
into consideration the fact that Baku will not sign Association
Agreement and will not be obliged to coordinate its actions with
Brussels. This is serious challenge to Armenia and Yerevan will have
to come to definite agreements with the EU concerning the future of
the North-South gas pipeline and it will be much easier if the CSTO
takes a decision on protection of the strategic communications.
At the same time, it should be mentioned that Armenia will face
a problem of protection of two other crucial infrastructures -
Iran-Armenia gas pipeline and Metsamor NPP. But these two objects
are not going through the territories of the third countries and this
reduces their vulnerability and gives an opportunity to provide their
security by national means.
At the same time it should be mentioned that the possible decision of
the CSTO on protection of the strategic communications is gainful not
only for Armenia - this decision will be a serious stimulus to turn the
CSTO into a real international military and political alliance and will
have a positive effect on the entire system of international security.
"Globus" analytical journal, #8, 2013
Return Another materials of author IRAN AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS[01.07.2013] "IRANIAN GAS CAN REPLACE RUSSIAN BUT IT IS
MUCH MORE EXPENSIVE"[10.06.2013] KARS-AKHLKALAKI-TBILISI RAILWAY
AND ITS REGIONAL PROSPECTS [25.04.2013] QAZVIN-RASHT-ASTARA OR
IRAN-ARMENIA? [21.02.2013] IRAN AND SANCTIONS[10.12.2012] SIGNIFICANCE
OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR ARMENIA [27.09.2012] ON THE REGIONAL POLICY OF
IRAN[28.06.2012] TURKISH FACTOR IN "LEVIATHAN" AND "APHRODITE" ENERGY
"WARS"[03.05.2012] POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN AND POSSIBLE IRAN-US
COLLISION[22.03.2012] IRAN AND DEVELOPMENTS IN SYRIA[26.01.2012]