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WHO CAN CONTROL ISRAEL'S ARMS DEALERS?
Turkey too resells American weapons and military secrets for a
profit-and that's a loss to our security.
By PHILIP GIRALDI ~U August 1, 2013
U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman George
M. Bell/Released
Ten years ago, FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds revealed that the
defense ministries of several major recipients of United States
military hardware were being scrutinized because they had been
falsifying end-user certificates, claiming that the equipment was
intended for their own use while at the same time arranging to
sell it to other militaries that were blocked from receiving the
sensitive technology. In May 2006, I described in a Deep Background
column for TAC how the two countries most heavily engaged in the
practice-Israel and Turkey-also benefited from their connections
with leading neoconservatives in Washington. Richard Perle and
Doug Feith in particular benefited financially from their ties to
defense industries in Israel while also serving as richly rewarded
"consultants" for Turkish interests. Feith's International Advisors
Inc., a registered agent for Turkey in 1989-1994, was paid $600,000 a
year by Turkish sources, while Richard Perle received $48,000 annually
as a consultant. Feith has also long been associated with Northrop
Grumman sales in the Middle East. While at the Pentagon in 1983,
Perle was criticized for endorsing the U.S. Army's purchase of an
armaments system from an Israeli company that had paid him $50,000
in consulting fees one year before.
Turkey, like Pakistan and Egypt, has a powerful and somewhat autonomous
military establishment. It does not have a law barring its active-duty
military officers from having potentially conflicting outside business
relationships. Indeed, much of its defense industry has traditionally
been run by senior-level retirees, with active-duty officers sometimes
having equity stakes in the various armaments companies. That basically
means that the people making the key decisions on procurement are
often able to deal with former colleagues, enabling both parties
to benefit from the process. It differs from the revolving door at
the Pentagon-where senior officers retire to the boards of defense
contractors and then work to sell arms to former colleagues who
themselves expect to climb on the gravy train someday-in that the
Turkish decision-makers might actually have a direct and immediate
beneficial interest in the result.
Israel operates similarly, though the arms trade is a much larger part
of its total economic activity. The country's main export is weapons,
ranking it as the sixth largestarms seller in the world by volume
but number one as a percentage of its overall economy. As in Turkey
and the U.S., the business is largely run by retired senior officers.
Unlike Turkey and the U.S., there have been a number of scandals
connected to Israeli weapons development and sales, including the
arrests of Israeli weapons dealers in Latin America and Africa. There
has also been illegal activity relating to the sale of restricted
technology. The Israelis sold the F-16-derived avionics of the Lavi
jet fighter that it was developing with U.S. funding to China, which
then produced its own version, while the electronics of the U.S.
Sidewinder air-to-air missile also went to Beijing, enabling it to
produce a clone called the PL-8. The PL-8 was later sold by China to
Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
India also benefited from U.S.-developed technology pirated and sold
by Israel when itpurchased the Israeli Phalcon version of the AWACS
plane. In 2010 Tel Aviv sold electronic-warfare systems for the F-16
fighter to Pakistan, nominally an enemy country with which Israel does
not have diplomatic relations. More recently, the Pentagon hasbalked
at giving Israel full maintenance access to the avionics on the F-35
air supremacy fighter planes that Israel will be receiving as part
of its annual aid package because of concern that the electronics
will be stolen.
In Sibel Edmonds's day, the Turks and Israelis were under investigation
by the FBI because U.S.-made weapons incorporating restricted
technologies were appearing in a number of countries not authorized to
receive them, many of which were located in Central and South Asia as
well as in Latin America. The weapons have also wound up in the hands
of criminal cartels and narcotics traffickers, mingling arms sales
with large-scale fraud, extortion, and drugs. In Turkey, these hidden
relationships and the accompanying networking are frequently referred
to as the "Deep State," meaning those non-elected powerful figures
who are able to provide cover for transnational illegal activity
and are well-placed enough to prevent any serious inquiry into their
dealings. The always in-demand weapons are frequently the specialty
items that make the rest of the relationship work, and the keys to
acquiring the arms are the end-user certificates. FBI investigators
believed that both the Turks and Israelis were falsely declaring their
intended use of the weapons to enable downstream sales elsewhere at
inflated prices to meet demand from countries and groups that could
not obtain them legally.
While Turkish interests are largely confined to the Near East and
adjacent areas in Europe, the Israelis operate worldwide. Israeli
arms dealers, security services, and consultants span the globe. They
dominate the airport security industry and have also been linked
to training, equipping, and intelligence-gathering for corrupt and
dictatorial regimes in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Security
companies sometimes work as stringers for Israeli intelligence and
may have ties to criminal groups includingburgeoning Russian-Israeli
organized crime in the United States.
The scale of Israeli legal and clandestine arms sales now appears to
far exceed anything that might have been imagined at the time when
Sibel Edmonds was translating documents. Israel's state controller,
to its credit, has reported that there are major deficiencies in the
supervision of the country's arms-exporting companies, suggesting
further that there have been abuses as a result. In a familiar
pattern, those who issue the licenses also regulate those whom they
license. The Israeli defense ministry approves arms exporters and
also has oversight authority regarding them through its Defense
Export Controls Agency (DECA). According to the state controller,
DECA has failed to "ensure proper enforcement" of international norms
and regulations on weapons sales.
As in Turkey, this failure to act is largely due to the fact that
the arms trafficking is highly profitable and widely perceived as an
acceptable perk for active and retired military officers. The Israeli
defense ministry has licensed 6,784 arms dealers, a figure that makes
this quite possibly the country's largest private business sector. The
ministry also disclosed that 6,684 individuals were involved in
"security exports" during 2012, organized in 1,006 companies and
312 independent businesses, with 1,900 marketing permits and 8,716
export licenses issued. Presumably some of the numbers overlap, and
the distinction between companies and independent businesses is by
no means clear, though it does suggest that regulation of a large
and politically sensitive industry has been perfunctory.
An Israeli district court has ordered that the names of some of
the licensees be made public amidst additional revelations from
the Defense Ministry that some companies involved in weapons deals
"do not appear" on the list of registered dealers, suggesting that
there is an underground industry operating alongside, and possibly
in collusion with, the legal one. The Ministry is resisting naming
any of the licensees "to protect the security of the state and its
foreign relations."
How the ongoing attempt by the Israeli courts and state controller to
bridle the arms-export industry develops will be interesting to follow,
as it pits the civilian rule of law against the most powerful component
in the Israeli state, the country's military. Patrick Tyler in his
recent book Fortress Israel likens Israel to a new Sparta, where a
dominant state militarism and an increasingly martial culture are the
driving forces behind expansionistic policies and reluctance to make
peace. The army is the largest landowner in Israel and is increasingly
engaged with the private sector and other institutions, including
the universities, where there is a flourishing security-knowledge
industry. For example, Prof. Yitzhak Ben Israel of the Social Sciences
Department of Tel Aviv University works on mathematical models for the
success rates of targeted killings. He uses a substitution formula to
predict how many people have to be killed to result in the collapse
of an organization or political party.
A key component of the militarized state is the drive to increase
the production and export of weapons while also becoming a global
security-services provider. This has led to a certain recklessness
about who is being trained, where the arms wind up, and what sensitive
technology might be exposed in the process. The Pentagon has long been
nervous about the freewheeling Israeli consultants and arms dealers
operating worldwide, particularly as those weapons and expertise
command the highest prices in areas of armed conflict. The United
States, as the primary source and funder for advanced weapons for
Israel, most definitely has a horse in the race as the arms flow
frequently produces political instability, and the technology that
is sold or bartered can endanger U.S. security. But it would be a
non-starter for the Defense Department to go head-to-head with an
indifferent Congress in any attempt to restrict Israel's access to
U.S. weaponry. So Israel will continue to sell and barter technology
and weapons, legally or illegally, and the question becomes to what
extent the Israeli government itself will put a brake on the unsavory
side of that activity.
Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, is executive director of the
Council for the National Interest.
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/who-will-control-israels-arms-dealers/
Turkey too resells American weapons and military secrets for a
profit-and that's a loss to our security.
By PHILIP GIRALDI ~U August 1, 2013
U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman George
M. Bell/Released
Ten years ago, FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds revealed that the
defense ministries of several major recipients of United States
military hardware were being scrutinized because they had been
falsifying end-user certificates, claiming that the equipment was
intended for their own use while at the same time arranging to
sell it to other militaries that were blocked from receiving the
sensitive technology. In May 2006, I described in a Deep Background
column for TAC how the two countries most heavily engaged in the
practice-Israel and Turkey-also benefited from their connections
with leading neoconservatives in Washington. Richard Perle and
Doug Feith in particular benefited financially from their ties to
defense industries in Israel while also serving as richly rewarded
"consultants" for Turkish interests. Feith's International Advisors
Inc., a registered agent for Turkey in 1989-1994, was paid $600,000 a
year by Turkish sources, while Richard Perle received $48,000 annually
as a consultant. Feith has also long been associated with Northrop
Grumman sales in the Middle East. While at the Pentagon in 1983,
Perle was criticized for endorsing the U.S. Army's purchase of an
armaments system from an Israeli company that had paid him $50,000
in consulting fees one year before.
Turkey, like Pakistan and Egypt, has a powerful and somewhat autonomous
military establishment. It does not have a law barring its active-duty
military officers from having potentially conflicting outside business
relationships. Indeed, much of its defense industry has traditionally
been run by senior-level retirees, with active-duty officers sometimes
having equity stakes in the various armaments companies. That basically
means that the people making the key decisions on procurement are
often able to deal with former colleagues, enabling both parties
to benefit from the process. It differs from the revolving door at
the Pentagon-where senior officers retire to the boards of defense
contractors and then work to sell arms to former colleagues who
themselves expect to climb on the gravy train someday-in that the
Turkish decision-makers might actually have a direct and immediate
beneficial interest in the result.
Israel operates similarly, though the arms trade is a much larger part
of its total economic activity. The country's main export is weapons,
ranking it as the sixth largestarms seller in the world by volume
but number one as a percentage of its overall economy. As in Turkey
and the U.S., the business is largely run by retired senior officers.
Unlike Turkey and the U.S., there have been a number of scandals
connected to Israeli weapons development and sales, including the
arrests of Israeli weapons dealers in Latin America and Africa. There
has also been illegal activity relating to the sale of restricted
technology. The Israelis sold the F-16-derived avionics of the Lavi
jet fighter that it was developing with U.S. funding to China, which
then produced its own version, while the electronics of the U.S.
Sidewinder air-to-air missile also went to Beijing, enabling it to
produce a clone called the PL-8. The PL-8 was later sold by China to
Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
India also benefited from U.S.-developed technology pirated and sold
by Israel when itpurchased the Israeli Phalcon version of the AWACS
plane. In 2010 Tel Aviv sold electronic-warfare systems for the F-16
fighter to Pakistan, nominally an enemy country with which Israel does
not have diplomatic relations. More recently, the Pentagon hasbalked
at giving Israel full maintenance access to the avionics on the F-35
air supremacy fighter planes that Israel will be receiving as part
of its annual aid package because of concern that the electronics
will be stolen.
In Sibel Edmonds's day, the Turks and Israelis were under investigation
by the FBI because U.S.-made weapons incorporating restricted
technologies were appearing in a number of countries not authorized to
receive them, many of which were located in Central and South Asia as
well as in Latin America. The weapons have also wound up in the hands
of criminal cartels and narcotics traffickers, mingling arms sales
with large-scale fraud, extortion, and drugs. In Turkey, these hidden
relationships and the accompanying networking are frequently referred
to as the "Deep State," meaning those non-elected powerful figures
who are able to provide cover for transnational illegal activity
and are well-placed enough to prevent any serious inquiry into their
dealings. The always in-demand weapons are frequently the specialty
items that make the rest of the relationship work, and the keys to
acquiring the arms are the end-user certificates. FBI investigators
believed that both the Turks and Israelis were falsely declaring their
intended use of the weapons to enable downstream sales elsewhere at
inflated prices to meet demand from countries and groups that could
not obtain them legally.
While Turkish interests are largely confined to the Near East and
adjacent areas in Europe, the Israelis operate worldwide. Israeli
arms dealers, security services, and consultants span the globe. They
dominate the airport security industry and have also been linked
to training, equipping, and intelligence-gathering for corrupt and
dictatorial regimes in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Security
companies sometimes work as stringers for Israeli intelligence and
may have ties to criminal groups includingburgeoning Russian-Israeli
organized crime in the United States.
The scale of Israeli legal and clandestine arms sales now appears to
far exceed anything that might have been imagined at the time when
Sibel Edmonds was translating documents. Israel's state controller,
to its credit, has reported that there are major deficiencies in the
supervision of the country's arms-exporting companies, suggesting
further that there have been abuses as a result. In a familiar
pattern, those who issue the licenses also regulate those whom they
license. The Israeli defense ministry approves arms exporters and
also has oversight authority regarding them through its Defense
Export Controls Agency (DECA). According to the state controller,
DECA has failed to "ensure proper enforcement" of international norms
and regulations on weapons sales.
As in Turkey, this failure to act is largely due to the fact that
the arms trafficking is highly profitable and widely perceived as an
acceptable perk for active and retired military officers. The Israeli
defense ministry has licensed 6,784 arms dealers, a figure that makes
this quite possibly the country's largest private business sector. The
ministry also disclosed that 6,684 individuals were involved in
"security exports" during 2012, organized in 1,006 companies and
312 independent businesses, with 1,900 marketing permits and 8,716
export licenses issued. Presumably some of the numbers overlap, and
the distinction between companies and independent businesses is by
no means clear, though it does suggest that regulation of a large
and politically sensitive industry has been perfunctory.
An Israeli district court has ordered that the names of some of
the licensees be made public amidst additional revelations from
the Defense Ministry that some companies involved in weapons deals
"do not appear" on the list of registered dealers, suggesting that
there is an underground industry operating alongside, and possibly
in collusion with, the legal one. The Ministry is resisting naming
any of the licensees "to protect the security of the state and its
foreign relations."
How the ongoing attempt by the Israeli courts and state controller to
bridle the arms-export industry develops will be interesting to follow,
as it pits the civilian rule of law against the most powerful component
in the Israeli state, the country's military. Patrick Tyler in his
recent book Fortress Israel likens Israel to a new Sparta, where a
dominant state militarism and an increasingly martial culture are the
driving forces behind expansionistic policies and reluctance to make
peace. The army is the largest landowner in Israel and is increasingly
engaged with the private sector and other institutions, including
the universities, where there is a flourishing security-knowledge
industry. For example, Prof. Yitzhak Ben Israel of the Social Sciences
Department of Tel Aviv University works on mathematical models for the
success rates of targeted killings. He uses a substitution formula to
predict how many people have to be killed to result in the collapse
of an organization or political party.
A key component of the militarized state is the drive to increase
the production and export of weapons while also becoming a global
security-services provider. This has led to a certain recklessness
about who is being trained, where the arms wind up, and what sensitive
technology might be exposed in the process. The Pentagon has long been
nervous about the freewheeling Israeli consultants and arms dealers
operating worldwide, particularly as those weapons and expertise
command the highest prices in areas of armed conflict. The United
States, as the primary source and funder for advanced weapons for
Israel, most definitely has a horse in the race as the arms flow
frequently produces political instability, and the technology that
is sold or bartered can endanger U.S. security. But it would be a
non-starter for the Defense Department to go head-to-head with an
indifferent Congress in any attempt to restrict Israel's access to
U.S. weaponry. So Israel will continue to sell and barter technology
and weapons, legally or illegally, and the question becomes to what
extent the Israeli government itself will put a brake on the unsavory
side of that activity.
Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, is executive director of the
Council for the National Interest.
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/who-will-control-israels-arms-dealers/