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ISRAEL AND AZERBAIJAN: GEOPOLITICAL REASONS FOR STRONGER TIES
Jerusalem Post
July 26, 2013 Friday
BYLINE: ANNA GEIFMAN AND DIMA COURSE
SECTION: FEATURES; Pg. 12
The South Caucasus region is of strategic value for Israel, due
to its geopolitical position and proximity to Iran. Azerbaijan, a
key player in the region, is a Shi'ite country that maintains close
working relations with the Jewish state. Strained relations between
Azerbaijan and Iran are an equally critical factor. Aside from the
fact that Israel is dealing with a classic situation of "the enemy
of my enemy is my friend," it benefits from selling the Azeris'
technical services, technologies and security systems. Moreover,
Israel has always been on the lookout for a moderate Muslim partner,
a role previously filled by Turkey - and Azerbaijan can fit that role.
It is hardly accidental that President Shimon Peres, accompanied by
three ministers and representatives of 60 Israeli industrial companies,
visited Baku in 2009. Then-foreign minister Avigdor Liberman made
a trip to Azerbaijan in April 2012. His counterpart, Azeri Foreign
Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, paid a return visit to Israel in April
2013. Currently, the bilateral relationship is good, and there are
prospects for even stronger ties between the two countries.
TURMOIL IN the Middle East affects the Caspian Sea region and
simultaneously provides opportunities for Israel, whose mutual interest
with Azerbaijan is to confront an increasingly radical Islam.
Though nominally Muslim, Azerbaijan's secular regime perceives
both Sunni and Shi'ite fundamentalists as an alarming threat. The
Sunni radicals connected to al-Qaida are willing to cooperate with
neighboring Dagestan's terrorist underground, which is periodically
activated in the northern parts of Azerbaijan. An even greater reason
for concern is the Shi'ite radicals; they are a tool for Iran's
Revolutionary Guards and seek radical changes in Azerbaijan, to turn
it into a pro-Iranian regime. Any contact with Israel therefore causes
anxiety in the Islamic Republic; for example, the 2009 Peres visit to
Baku led to complications between Baku and Tehran and the recalling
of the Iranian ambassador "for consultations."
There is also strong evidence that Iran is intent on undermining
domestic stability in Azerbaijan. In October 2011, the leader of the
pro-Iranian Islamic Party of Azerbaijan Movsum Samadov and several
of his comrades were sentenced to 10-12 years in jail for attempting
to overthrow the government by terrorist means. In February 2012,
dozens of militants were arrested in a rural area near Baku. Iran also
persistently threatens its northern neighbor; shortly after Samadov's
arrest, Iranian Chief-of-Staff Maj.-Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi promised
Azeri President Ilham Aliyev "a grim future."
It is therefore not surprising that, according to foreign sources,
Azerbaijan is a strategic bridgehead of Western and Israeli
anti-Iranian military and intelligence efforts. Tehran is nervous
about persistent, if officially denied, rumors about Israeli military
presence in Azerbaijan as a forward base against Iran. Regardless
of the validity of these rumors, Israeli authorities appreciate the
importance of cooperation with Azerbaijan, which seeks to hold its own
under the Iranian threat. In early 2012, this collaboration yielded
valuable results: the prevention of terrorist attacks against Israeli
diplomats in Baku.
ASIDE FROM Iran, Russia is a reason that Baku and Jerusalem should
strengthen their strategic partnership. Israel is upset about Russia's
subversive presence in the Middle East, namely its interactions with
Iran, acceptance of Hamas and persistent backing of the Syrian rebels.
Azerbaijan is also unhappy with Moscow's support for Armenia's
position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Yet, Israel may be swayed
into better relations with Russia due to potential benefits from
collaborative ventures in the technological sphere, as well as joint
fear of radical Islam; contrary to what may look like a partnership,
Russia's relations with Iran are quite strained.
In 2011, the "Center-2011" maneuvers took place in the Caspian Sea,
the largest such exercise since 2002. Some 1,000 Russian servicemen
and dozens of vessels and boats participated. Despite attempts on the
part of some commentators to explain the maneuvers as necessitated
by NATO's presence in Afghanistan and Turkey, it appears that the
"alleged enemy" was none other than Iran, or possibly its terror
proxy, Hezbollah. A similar exercise in the Caspian Sea took place
this April. Iran could react aggressively towards Azerbaijan in the
event of a Western attack on its nuclear program. For its part, Baku is
aware that Moscow is supportive of its secular regime and is friendly
towards the Azeri position with regard to the Caspian Sea division.
There is also the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is a connecting
point between Azerbaijan and Israel. For Azerbaijan, Armenia is a
bitter enemy with whom there are no serious chances for reconciliation
in the foreseeable future, especially after the Armenian defeat of
the Azeri military in 1994. As far as Israel is concerned, Armenia
is one of Iran's closest partners; it is also probably a "loophole"
for Iran's acquisition of prohibited weapons and technologies from
several former Soviet republics.
AMONG THE hurdles for Israeli-Azeri relations may be the "Turkish
issue." In the past, all appeared simple, as Turkey was Azerbaijan's
closest ally and Israel's strategic partner. In the last few years,
however, the situation has become significantly complicated by
Turkish Islamization. Israel is currently interested in Azerbaijan's
independence from any Turkish influence.
Israel and Azerbaijan stand to benefit greatly from even stronger
ties. From the Israeli point of view, there is serious potential for
expanding economic ties - if only because Baku sells oil to Israel
and is already a client of the Israeli hi-tech and military industries.
Israel's drone planes are as much in demand in Azerbaijan as they are
elsewhere. Israel also sells its Azeri partner armored troop carriers,
multiple rocket launchers, Tavor rifles and ammunition.
However, since neither country has enough friends beyond its borders,
it should be clear that each partner may contribute to much-required
foreign lobbying for the sake of the other. Azerbaijan could be a
positive influence in Turkey, while Israel might prove equally helpful
in lobbying for the Azeris in the EU and the US. Though further
cooperation between Jerusalem and Baku will depend on geopolitical
developments, Israel would do well to capitalize on the opportunity.
Dr. Anna Geifman is a senior research fellow in the Department of
Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and Professor Emerita at
Boston University.
Dima Course is a PhD candidate in political studies at Bar-Ilan
University.
This article was originally published on the Begin-Sadat Center for
Strategic Studies website.
Jerusalem Post
July 26, 2013 Friday
BYLINE: ANNA GEIFMAN AND DIMA COURSE
SECTION: FEATURES; Pg. 12
The South Caucasus region is of strategic value for Israel, due
to its geopolitical position and proximity to Iran. Azerbaijan, a
key player in the region, is a Shi'ite country that maintains close
working relations with the Jewish state. Strained relations between
Azerbaijan and Iran are an equally critical factor. Aside from the
fact that Israel is dealing with a classic situation of "the enemy
of my enemy is my friend," it benefits from selling the Azeris'
technical services, technologies and security systems. Moreover,
Israel has always been on the lookout for a moderate Muslim partner,
a role previously filled by Turkey - and Azerbaijan can fit that role.
It is hardly accidental that President Shimon Peres, accompanied by
three ministers and representatives of 60 Israeli industrial companies,
visited Baku in 2009. Then-foreign minister Avigdor Liberman made
a trip to Azerbaijan in April 2012. His counterpart, Azeri Foreign
Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, paid a return visit to Israel in April
2013. Currently, the bilateral relationship is good, and there are
prospects for even stronger ties between the two countries.
TURMOIL IN the Middle East affects the Caspian Sea region and
simultaneously provides opportunities for Israel, whose mutual interest
with Azerbaijan is to confront an increasingly radical Islam.
Though nominally Muslim, Azerbaijan's secular regime perceives
both Sunni and Shi'ite fundamentalists as an alarming threat. The
Sunni radicals connected to al-Qaida are willing to cooperate with
neighboring Dagestan's terrorist underground, which is periodically
activated in the northern parts of Azerbaijan. An even greater reason
for concern is the Shi'ite radicals; they are a tool for Iran's
Revolutionary Guards and seek radical changes in Azerbaijan, to turn
it into a pro-Iranian regime. Any contact with Israel therefore causes
anxiety in the Islamic Republic; for example, the 2009 Peres visit to
Baku led to complications between Baku and Tehran and the recalling
of the Iranian ambassador "for consultations."
There is also strong evidence that Iran is intent on undermining
domestic stability in Azerbaijan. In October 2011, the leader of the
pro-Iranian Islamic Party of Azerbaijan Movsum Samadov and several
of his comrades were sentenced to 10-12 years in jail for attempting
to overthrow the government by terrorist means. In February 2012,
dozens of militants were arrested in a rural area near Baku. Iran also
persistently threatens its northern neighbor; shortly after Samadov's
arrest, Iranian Chief-of-Staff Maj.-Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi promised
Azeri President Ilham Aliyev "a grim future."
It is therefore not surprising that, according to foreign sources,
Azerbaijan is a strategic bridgehead of Western and Israeli
anti-Iranian military and intelligence efforts. Tehran is nervous
about persistent, if officially denied, rumors about Israeli military
presence in Azerbaijan as a forward base against Iran. Regardless
of the validity of these rumors, Israeli authorities appreciate the
importance of cooperation with Azerbaijan, which seeks to hold its own
under the Iranian threat. In early 2012, this collaboration yielded
valuable results: the prevention of terrorist attacks against Israeli
diplomats in Baku.
ASIDE FROM Iran, Russia is a reason that Baku and Jerusalem should
strengthen their strategic partnership. Israel is upset about Russia's
subversive presence in the Middle East, namely its interactions with
Iran, acceptance of Hamas and persistent backing of the Syrian rebels.
Azerbaijan is also unhappy with Moscow's support for Armenia's
position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Yet, Israel may be swayed
into better relations with Russia due to potential benefits from
collaborative ventures in the technological sphere, as well as joint
fear of radical Islam; contrary to what may look like a partnership,
Russia's relations with Iran are quite strained.
In 2011, the "Center-2011" maneuvers took place in the Caspian Sea,
the largest such exercise since 2002. Some 1,000 Russian servicemen
and dozens of vessels and boats participated. Despite attempts on the
part of some commentators to explain the maneuvers as necessitated
by NATO's presence in Afghanistan and Turkey, it appears that the
"alleged enemy" was none other than Iran, or possibly its terror
proxy, Hezbollah. A similar exercise in the Caspian Sea took place
this April. Iran could react aggressively towards Azerbaijan in the
event of a Western attack on its nuclear program. For its part, Baku is
aware that Moscow is supportive of its secular regime and is friendly
towards the Azeri position with regard to the Caspian Sea division.
There is also the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is a connecting
point between Azerbaijan and Israel. For Azerbaijan, Armenia is a
bitter enemy with whom there are no serious chances for reconciliation
in the foreseeable future, especially after the Armenian defeat of
the Azeri military in 1994. As far as Israel is concerned, Armenia
is one of Iran's closest partners; it is also probably a "loophole"
for Iran's acquisition of prohibited weapons and technologies from
several former Soviet republics.
AMONG THE hurdles for Israeli-Azeri relations may be the "Turkish
issue." In the past, all appeared simple, as Turkey was Azerbaijan's
closest ally and Israel's strategic partner. In the last few years,
however, the situation has become significantly complicated by
Turkish Islamization. Israel is currently interested in Azerbaijan's
independence from any Turkish influence.
Israel and Azerbaijan stand to benefit greatly from even stronger
ties. From the Israeli point of view, there is serious potential for
expanding economic ties - if only because Baku sells oil to Israel
and is already a client of the Israeli hi-tech and military industries.
Israel's drone planes are as much in demand in Azerbaijan as they are
elsewhere. Israel also sells its Azeri partner armored troop carriers,
multiple rocket launchers, Tavor rifles and ammunition.
However, since neither country has enough friends beyond its borders,
it should be clear that each partner may contribute to much-required
foreign lobbying for the sake of the other. Azerbaijan could be a
positive influence in Turkey, while Israel might prove equally helpful
in lobbying for the Azeris in the EU and the US. Though further
cooperation between Jerusalem and Baku will depend on geopolitical
developments, Israel would do well to capitalize on the opportunity.
Dr. Anna Geifman is a senior research fellow in the Department of
Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and Professor Emerita at
Boston University.
Dima Course is a PhD candidate in political studies at Bar-Ilan
University.
This article was originally published on the Begin-Sadat Center for
Strategic Studies website.