FIVE WAYS TO FIX TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Aug 9 2013
by Mahir Zeynalov
Turkey's ambitious foreign policy is going through turbulent times.
Chaos and upheaval in the Middle East presented Turkey a golden
opportunity to act as a role model for these countries.
But as these uprisings turned violent, Turkey lost its ability to
talk to everyone and has become a party in this painful period of
transition.
Turkish diplomats insist that Ankara is on the right track in what they
call its so far "successful foreign policy" and argue that short-term
problems must not cast a shadow over the country's expected long-run
benefits for standing "on the right side of history."
The Arab Spring seems to be going in reverse. The military coup
in Egypt, similar ominous signs in Tunisia, a lawless Libya, war in
Syria that is tilting in favor of the regime and Iran's growing clout
and destabilizing policies in Lebanon and Iraq put Turkey in a more
dire situation. Here are five steps the foreign policy establishment
should take to avoid failure in the painful period ahead:
1) Recruit realists. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is a
liberal idealist who believes cooperation with other countries is
always beneficial and that Turkey could spearhead a union of nations
that could work towards a goal of restoring peace, prosperity and
security. Buoyed by his intense diplomatic overtures at the beginning
of his term in 2009, many Turkish diplomats and his advisers have
become staunch supporters of his policies.
A stark departure from past Turkish foreign policy, often marked with
clear-cut red lines, have heralded an era of a new Turkey reasserting
its power in the region. The new policy was to integrate national
interests with a human rights agenda. Most often, however, the human
rights agenda came ahead of national interests. It is always fine if
decision-makers can reconcile promoting freedom and human rights with
their national security interests. But the world is plagued with human
rights violations, making it impossible for one country to address
them all. At the end of the day, foreign ministers are statesmen,
not activists.
2) Establish crystal-clear red lines. In the past, Turkey was
successful in taking tangible steps in areas where it saw its
national security interests violated. This includes the Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK), Turks abroad (this includes Cyprus), Greece
and the so-called Armenian genocide. In all of these cases, Turkey
has never hesitated to take steps, including military ones. In 1999,
for instance, Turkey was on the brink of declaring war on Syria for
harboring PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. Today, more than 80 Turks were
killed in Syria-related incidents but Ankara failed to take steps to
deter similar future attacks.
In Davutoglu's foreign policy, no one knows what the red lines are.
Ankara says one thing today but fails to live up to its promises the
next. The past several years are awash with such examples. Turkey's
capabilities, both soft and hard power, are insufficient to match
Davutoglu's ambitious rhetoric.
3) Contain Iran. There is still a significant number of decision-makers
in Ankara naively thinking that the most effective way to contain
Iran's expanding influence is to talk. History has shown time and again
that Iran, as a revisionist country, never gives back in a diplomatic
bargaining deal. Despite Ankara's intensive diplomacy at the expense
of deteriorating ties with Washington to shield Tehran from a fourth
round of sanctions in the UN Security Council two years ago, Iranian
officials instead increased their threats against Turkey on an almost
daily basis and tied its hands on Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
In spite of all of this, Davutoglu traveled to Tehran on Monday to
meet with Iran's newly elected president, Hasan Rouhani. Davutoglu
said he expects a change of course in the country's Syria policy. On
the same day, Rouhani expressed "strong solidarity" between Iran and
the Syrian government against "foreign-led terrorism" in Syria.
4) Quit war talk. As an ascending power, Turkey's rising clout
would undoubtedly disturb its neighbors, questioning if Turkey's
rise is peaceful. Davutoglu, with his frequent statements of peace
and friendship, was very successful in reducing the perception of
threats among neighbors regarding Turkey. Removing Russia, Greece,
Iran and Iraq from the list of "national threats" also sent a signal
to neighbors that Turkey does not have ill intentions.
This position has significantly changed in the past two years.
Frustrated by governments Ankara considered friends not doing what
it advises, Syria's Assad being a prime example, Turkey toughened
its rhetoric yet failed to walk the talk. Erdogan and Davutoglu's
manifesto-like speeches resonate negatively in capitals of neighboring
countries, prompting a balancing act against Turkey's intentions they
calculate as malicious. Turkey's past glorious history is partly an
answer to why Turkish leaders are making "we will triumph" speeches.
But in an arena where too much power, or the perception of power,
always invites a counterbalance, being a smooth-talking soft leader
is always to the benefit of the country's interests. China is an
ample example in point.
5) Don't hesitate working with bad guys. Turks have suffered from
military coups more than anyone else and experience has shown
repeatedly that coup-makers and their supporters always proved
destructive to the country's development. Past military coups have made
Ankara quite experienced on how to position itself regarding military
coups in other nations. And rightly so, Turkey rallied against the
removal of Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi and made it clear that the
military coup was a wrong decision if the eventual goal is democracy.
Going too far, Erdogan bashed the army-backed interim government on a
daily basis and marshaled popular support for his anti-Egypt policies.
The Turkish government openly sided with the opposition Muslim
Brotherhood in its bid to restore Morsi.
Refusing to talk to "bad guys" is a principled stance and deserves
praise. But it is a smart move if there is rock solid evidence that
these "bad guys" will leave power or disappear very soon, without
significantly damaging the country's interests.
In the case of Egypt and other nations, it is obvious that
anti-democratic leaders and regimes can rule countries for decades.
Refusing to engage with them to a certain degree does not sound like
a smart strategy. Almost all of Ankara's partners in the Middle East
in the past decade were regimes that oppressed their people and ruled
the countries for decades with an iron fist. That was a right decision.
Foreign policy should not be driven by principles but by state
interests.
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=323158
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Aug 9 2013
by Mahir Zeynalov
Turkey's ambitious foreign policy is going through turbulent times.
Chaos and upheaval in the Middle East presented Turkey a golden
opportunity to act as a role model for these countries.
But as these uprisings turned violent, Turkey lost its ability to
talk to everyone and has become a party in this painful period of
transition.
Turkish diplomats insist that Ankara is on the right track in what they
call its so far "successful foreign policy" and argue that short-term
problems must not cast a shadow over the country's expected long-run
benefits for standing "on the right side of history."
The Arab Spring seems to be going in reverse. The military coup
in Egypt, similar ominous signs in Tunisia, a lawless Libya, war in
Syria that is tilting in favor of the regime and Iran's growing clout
and destabilizing policies in Lebanon and Iraq put Turkey in a more
dire situation. Here are five steps the foreign policy establishment
should take to avoid failure in the painful period ahead:
1) Recruit realists. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is a
liberal idealist who believes cooperation with other countries is
always beneficial and that Turkey could spearhead a union of nations
that could work towards a goal of restoring peace, prosperity and
security. Buoyed by his intense diplomatic overtures at the beginning
of his term in 2009, many Turkish diplomats and his advisers have
become staunch supporters of his policies.
A stark departure from past Turkish foreign policy, often marked with
clear-cut red lines, have heralded an era of a new Turkey reasserting
its power in the region. The new policy was to integrate national
interests with a human rights agenda. Most often, however, the human
rights agenda came ahead of national interests. It is always fine if
decision-makers can reconcile promoting freedom and human rights with
their national security interests. But the world is plagued with human
rights violations, making it impossible for one country to address
them all. At the end of the day, foreign ministers are statesmen,
not activists.
2) Establish crystal-clear red lines. In the past, Turkey was
successful in taking tangible steps in areas where it saw its
national security interests violated. This includes the Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK), Turks abroad (this includes Cyprus), Greece
and the so-called Armenian genocide. In all of these cases, Turkey
has never hesitated to take steps, including military ones. In 1999,
for instance, Turkey was on the brink of declaring war on Syria for
harboring PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. Today, more than 80 Turks were
killed in Syria-related incidents but Ankara failed to take steps to
deter similar future attacks.
In Davutoglu's foreign policy, no one knows what the red lines are.
Ankara says one thing today but fails to live up to its promises the
next. The past several years are awash with such examples. Turkey's
capabilities, both soft and hard power, are insufficient to match
Davutoglu's ambitious rhetoric.
3) Contain Iran. There is still a significant number of decision-makers
in Ankara naively thinking that the most effective way to contain
Iran's expanding influence is to talk. History has shown time and again
that Iran, as a revisionist country, never gives back in a diplomatic
bargaining deal. Despite Ankara's intensive diplomacy at the expense
of deteriorating ties with Washington to shield Tehran from a fourth
round of sanctions in the UN Security Council two years ago, Iranian
officials instead increased their threats against Turkey on an almost
daily basis and tied its hands on Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
In spite of all of this, Davutoglu traveled to Tehran on Monday to
meet with Iran's newly elected president, Hasan Rouhani. Davutoglu
said he expects a change of course in the country's Syria policy. On
the same day, Rouhani expressed "strong solidarity" between Iran and
the Syrian government against "foreign-led terrorism" in Syria.
4) Quit war talk. As an ascending power, Turkey's rising clout
would undoubtedly disturb its neighbors, questioning if Turkey's
rise is peaceful. Davutoglu, with his frequent statements of peace
and friendship, was very successful in reducing the perception of
threats among neighbors regarding Turkey. Removing Russia, Greece,
Iran and Iraq from the list of "national threats" also sent a signal
to neighbors that Turkey does not have ill intentions.
This position has significantly changed in the past two years.
Frustrated by governments Ankara considered friends not doing what
it advises, Syria's Assad being a prime example, Turkey toughened
its rhetoric yet failed to walk the talk. Erdogan and Davutoglu's
manifesto-like speeches resonate negatively in capitals of neighboring
countries, prompting a balancing act against Turkey's intentions they
calculate as malicious. Turkey's past glorious history is partly an
answer to why Turkish leaders are making "we will triumph" speeches.
But in an arena where too much power, or the perception of power,
always invites a counterbalance, being a smooth-talking soft leader
is always to the benefit of the country's interests. China is an
ample example in point.
5) Don't hesitate working with bad guys. Turks have suffered from
military coups more than anyone else and experience has shown
repeatedly that coup-makers and their supporters always proved
destructive to the country's development. Past military coups have made
Ankara quite experienced on how to position itself regarding military
coups in other nations. And rightly so, Turkey rallied against the
removal of Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi and made it clear that the
military coup was a wrong decision if the eventual goal is democracy.
Going too far, Erdogan bashed the army-backed interim government on a
daily basis and marshaled popular support for his anti-Egypt policies.
The Turkish government openly sided with the opposition Muslim
Brotherhood in its bid to restore Morsi.
Refusing to talk to "bad guys" is a principled stance and deserves
praise. But it is a smart move if there is rock solid evidence that
these "bad guys" will leave power or disappear very soon, without
significantly damaging the country's interests.
In the case of Egypt and other nations, it is obvious that
anti-democratic leaders and regimes can rule countries for decades.
Refusing to engage with them to a certain degree does not sound like
a smart strategy. Almost all of Ankara's partners in the Middle East
in the past decade were regimes that oppressed their people and ruled
the countries for decades with an iron fist. That was a right decision.
Foreign policy should not be driven by principles but by state
interests.
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=323158