Tweet
ISRAELI-AZERBAIJANI ALLIANCE AND IRAN
[ Part 2.2: "Attached Text" ]
BY MAHIR KHALIFA-ZADEH MARCH 18, 2013
http://www.gloria-center.org/2013/03/israeli-azerbaijani-alliance-and-iran/
Azerbaijani soldiers during a military training. (Photo by Spc.
Stephen Solomon)
Azerbaijani soldiers during military training. (Photo by Spc. Stephen
Solomon)
This article discusses cooperation between Israel and the Republic
of Azerbaijan in order to neutralize foreign threats and ensure
regional security. Expanding and improving ties with Azerbaijan
has been part of Israel's newly adopted strategy toward non-Arab
Muslim states. Also addressed is Iran's attitude towards Azerbaijan
and thepolitical and ideological opposition between the two mainly
Shi'a-populated countries. Highlighted is the cooperation's strategic
importance for improving security and defense capabilities for both
Israel and Azerbaijan. Last, U.S. priorities in the South Caucasus
are viewed in the context of the Israeli-Azerbaijani alliance.
DOWNLOAD THE PDF VERSION OF THIS ARTICLE
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Historic sources and research confirm that Jews of both Persian (also
known as Caucasian Mountain Jews) as well as Ashkenazi origin have
lived in Azerbaijan for centuries.[1] The presence of Persian Jews
in Azerbaijan can be traced back over 2,000 years, to even before the
fifth century. Historically, Azerbaijan has been very welcoming toward
the Jews. During the periods of both the Russian and Soviet empires
Azerbaijan had no antisemitic traditions. In the nineteenth century,
under the Russian Empire, Jews of Ashkenazi descent began to settle in
Azerbaijan. Others arrived during World War II to escape the Nazis.[2]
. Many famous Jews were born and have studied in Azerbaijan, including
scientist of modern physics and Nobel Prize Laureate Lev Landau. Born
in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 1908, he enrolled in Baku State University
in 1922.[3]
During the nineteenth century, Baku became a center for the Zionist
movement in the Russian Empire. The first branch of Hovevei Zion
("Lovers of Zion") was established in Baku in 1891, and in 1910,
the first choir synagogue opened in the city.[4] Even earlier, in
1883, oil companies owned by the Rothschild family (of Jewish origin)
entered the scene in Baku, followed by Rockefeller's gigantic Standard
Oil Company.[5] Thus, the Jews lived in peace and friendship with
local Azeris and had successful businesses in the country.
During the period of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR,
1918-1920)-which formulated key ideological, political, and security
priorities for independent Azerbaijan-the Jewish Popular University
was established (1919) and Yiddish- and Hebrew-language periodicals
were published. Moreover, Dr. Yevsey Gindes, an Ashkenazi Jew, served
as Minister of Health in ADR's cabinet under the first prime minister,
Fatali Khan Khoyski.
Jews continued to arrive and settle in Azerbaijan during the Soviet
period as well. The Jews in Soviet Azerbaijan were not exposed to
the widespread discrimination that was typical in other parts of
the USSR. Thus, the Ashkenazi Jews formed a significant part of the
intellectual and technocratic elites in Soviet Azerbaijan.[6]
POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND IRAN'S PRIORITIES IN
THE REGION
The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 shifted South Caucasus politics
significantly and created a new political atmosphere in this part
of the world. As a result of the war, a completely new strategic
situation has emerged in the region.[7] Prior to the war, since 1994,
when Azerbaijan signed the "Contract of the Century" (agreement
with a consortium of international oil companies for the exploration
and exploitation of three offshore oil fields in the country), the
strategic situation in the South Caucasus could be characterized
as a period of large-scale Western penetration. The United States,
the European Union, and Turkey, began to play a significant role in
South Caucasian affairs, which had traditionally been orchestrated
by Iran and Russia.
Moreover, several strategic programs were launched by the Clinton
administration (and continued under the Bush administration) and the
EU. These included Partnership for Peace, the Silk Road Strategy Act,
Caspian Watch, the EU's Eastern Partnership, and others. The goal of
these programs was to strengthen the Western presence and minimize
both Iranian and Russian influence in this very sensitive part of
the world. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia slowly began to
drift toward NATO membership. In addition, South Caucasian countries,
particularly Azerbaijan and Georgia, started to develop strong ties
with the State of Israel.
In the meantime, Iran, as a key regional player, reacted very concerned
about the West's "aggressive advance" into the traditionally Iranian
and Russian sphere of influence. Iran's hostility toward the United
States and Israel pushed Tehran to stop or limit Western penetration as
well as Israel's cooperation with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Iran welcomed
the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, which it saw as a brilliant opportunity
to reverse the region's strategic atmosphere from pro-Western to a
much more pro-Russian atmosphere -hence a more pro-Iranian one also.
The Islamic Republic of Iran considers Russia to be a key ally in
resisting the United States. Tehran prefers to be under Russia's
strategic umbrella and cooperates with Moscow on global and regional
levels. Tehran supports the strengthening of Russia's influence in
the South Caucasus and Central Asia for strategic reasons.[8] In
face of possible U.S. and/or Israeli military options to stop the
Iranian nuclear program, Iran hopes Russia's dominance in the South
Caucasus and Central Asia would prevent the United States or NATO
from deploying military bases in close proximity to the Iranian border.
At the same time, Russia also needs Iran's cooperation in order
to secure both the South Caucasus and Central Asia under Moscow,
or under shared Iranian control. Tehran's strategic priorities in
the South Caucasus can thus be identified as follows:
1. To counter and reduce U.S. influence; 2. To oppose U.S., NATO,
and EU initiatives and long-term objectives; 3. To prevent the
deployment of U.S./NATO troops; 4. To block both Georgia and
Azerbaijan from moving toward NATO/EU membership; 5. To minimize
Israel's influence and cooperation with South Caucasian countries;
6. To align the security order with Iran's strategic interests;
7. To control Caspian energy resources and transportation routes;
8. To contain the rising influence of Turkey and the Turkey-Azerbaijani
alliance; 9. To prolong the Turkish-Armenian hostility; 10. To oppose
the Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan triangle of strategic cooperation;
11. To ensure Russia's dominance and the current status-quo; and
12. To support Russia's leading role in the Caspian-Caucasus region.
Last, it is beneficial for Iran to maintain the current status-quo
and to support Russia's dominance in the region. In this case, Iran
is able to ensure its paramount strategic goal: to limit or decrease
U.S. influence and prevent American attempts to redesign the region's
political landscape in order to secure Washington's dominance.
IRAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN
Notwithstanding, Iran and Azerbaijan are both Shi'i Muslim countries
and have a common historical and cultural heritage. History as well
as ideological and political factors have shaped relations between the
two countries and have influenced the policies of the Islamic Republic
of Iran toward the Republic of Azerbaijan. Iran was among the first
countries to recognize Azerbaijan's return to independence in 1991,
establishing diplomatic relations with Baku in March 22, 1992. Since
the Soviet disintegration, however, the unstable and complicated
Iranian-Azerbaijani relationship has demonstrated Tehran's discomfort
with Azerbaijan's existence as an independent and secular state. In
addition, Tehran resents Baku's strategic relations with Iran's key
enemies-the United States and Israel. It is clear from the actions of
the Iranian government that it considers Azerbaijan a direct challenge
or threat to its security and political future. This key point in
Tehran's calculations towards Azerbaijan has deep historical roots.
Historical Factors
>From ancient times, the Azeri Turks and Azerbaijan were both heart and
part of the Persian Empire. Azeri Turk dynasties like the Ghaznavids,
Safavids, Qajars, and others played a key role in expanding and
defending the Persian Empire, and the Azerbaijani city of Tabriz
served as capital of the Empire for centuries. Several Iranian shahs,
in fact, are of Azeri Turk origin.[9]
It was only in the nineteenth century with the 1828 Treaty of
Turkmenchay that Imperial Russia gained control of part of the Persian
Empire, the then semi-independent northern Azerbaijani khanates. These
territories became the nucleus for the modern republics of Azerbaijan
and Armenia. The Persian Empire officially renounced its claim to the
northern Azerbaijani khanates, leading to the division of Azerbaijan
into two: Northern Azerbaijan or Russian (Soviet) Azerbaijan and
Southern Azerbaijan or Iranian Azerbaijan.
Since the Soviet Union's collapse, this history has created an
illusion among Iranians that Tehran's government has the right to
take Azerbaijan back under its control, to intervene in Azerbaijani
politics, and to manipulate Azerbaijan's future in accordance with
Iran's interests. Baku's assertion of independence and its clear
unwillingness to be reincorporated into Iran has made for a rocky
relationship with Teheran.
Political Factors
On May 28, 1918, following the collapse of the Russian Empire,
Azerbaijan declared its independence and identified itself as the
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR, 1918-1920).[10] Iran attempted
to reincorporate Azerbaijan, but the ADR government refused and
established relations with the Entente governments in order to
secure its independence. The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic adapted a
secular and political system based on the principles of Western-style
democracy and established a multi-party parliament. ADR was thus
the first Western-style state in the Muslim world. It declared equal
rights to all citizens, including ethnic minorities, men, and women,
and granted Azerbaijani women the right to vote.
Today's Republic of Azerbaijan is a successor of ADR and shares its
political and ideological values. It is a secular and pro-Western
nation in the South Caucasus. The country's political development
has very much differed from that of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
though they both have predominantly Shi'i populations. In the eyes
of the government and the mullahs in Tehran, this is unacceptable.
Ideological Factors
Azerbaijan's secular and Western-style statehood is based on an
ideology that totally contradicts that of Iran. Tehran's mullah
government considers Shi'ism a unique ideology and a powerful force to
unite the nation. The Iranian government has thus strengthened Shi'i
ideology and suppressed the identities of the ethnic minorities in
the country, including Azeri Turks (Iranian Azeris). It has also
attempted to eliminate independent Azerbaijan's ideological and
political impact. Interestingly, Iran's Azeri Turk Safavid dynasty
officially converted Iran from Sunni to Shi'i at the beginning of the
sixteenth century. Shah Ismail Safavid, an Azeri Turk and founder of
the Safavid dynasty, is an important historical figure both in Iran
and in Azerbaijan.[11]
While Iran follows the Shi'i ideology, Azerbaijan has adopted a
Kemalist ideology. Azerbaijani nationalism is based on the ADR's
ideological and political values as well as on Azeri Turk or Turkish
identity. Thus, despite its common historical heritage with Iran,
the Republic of Azerbaijan had close ties with Kemalist Turkey and
shared the late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev's "one nation,
two states" ideology and strategy with the Turkish Republic.[12]
Even after the coming to power of an Islamist-oriented, post-Kemalist
government in Turkey, this relationship continues and it supports
Azerbaijan's sense of identity. On the other hand, the Azerbaijani
government considers nationalism and Kemalist ideology as well as the
"one nation, two states" strategy as powerful tools to contain Iran's
attempts to strengthen Shi'i ideology in Azerbaijan, which has created
a major ideological gap and opposition between the two countries.
Last, Tehran's hostility toward Azerbaijan is deeply rooted in the
history. The fundamental and most influential factor in Tehran's
relations with Baku is that of two "divided" Azerbaijans. Iran fears
Iranian Azeris may establish their own Azerbaijani state-as occurred
in the early twentieth century[13]-or will become part of the Republic
of Azerbaijan.
The mullah regime in Tehran is greatly concerned that Azerbaijan's
success as a secular state could inspire or ignite Iranian Azeris to
bring about the downfall of the current regime in Iran. These fears
are exacerbated by the possibility of the West using Iranian Azeris
against Tehran. The Azerbaijani republic is thus a major factor in
Iran's long-term strategy and the Azeri national liberation movement
in Iran has become an element of global politics. In this context,
Iran has thus adopted an aggressive stance toward the neighboring
republic.[14]
IRANIAN PRIORITIES VIS-Ã~@-VIS AZERBAIJAN
Tensions between Baku and Tehran are manifest in more than one
area, though in particular in foreign policy and security issues. To
counteract the strong Russian and Iranian opposition, Azerbaijan has
maintained strategic relations with the United States, the European
Union, NATO, and Israel. Moreover, Baku continues to espouse a
pro-Western strategy, despite direct calls from Tehran to end its
cooperation with the "Great Satan" (United States) and "Small Satan"
(Israel).[15]
Tehran's official propaganda declares Israel as a main enemy of the
Islamic world. Azerbaijani policy, however, differs. It does not
view Israel as an enemy and considers it a friendly country, in which
Muslims and Jews can live in peace and friendship. At the same time,
Azerbaijan has developed close ties with Turkey, Iran's rival in
the Islamic world. Baku and Ankara cooperate and operate as a strong
alliance on the global and regional levels, which has angered Iran.
Thus, Azerbaijan's independence and its secular and democratic
nature of power as well as its pro-Western government are strong
exacerbating factors for Iran's policymakers. In light of this,
Iran's key priorities towards Azerbaijan can be identified as follows:
1. To spread the Iranian Islamic Revolution's ideas to Azerbaijan;
2. To intensify Shi'i ideology propaganda and expand the Islamic
network; 3. To destabilize the political situation in Azerbaijan in
an attempt to establish a pro-Islamic or Shi'i regime; 4. To damage
or discredit Azerbaijan's independence, as well as its secular and
democratic nature; 5. To intensify intelligence activity and expand its
espionage network; 6. To limit and minimize Azerbaijan's influence on
Iranian Azeris; 7. To support the separatism of local ethnic groups
(Talish, Lesgi, and others); 8. To halt Israel's cooperation with
Azerbaijan and Georgia; 9. To minimize U.S. influence and curtail
Azerbaijan's bid for EU/NATO membership; 10. To damage Azerbaijan's
international image and pro-Western foreign policy; 11. To contain
Azerbaijan's rise to regional power; 12. To exert constant pressure
on and intimidate Azerbaijan to use military force; 13. To provide
assistance to Azerbaijan's regional rival-Armenia-to maintain the
balance between the two countries, and to keep Azerbaijan engaged
in war with Armenia; 14. To support Russia's "cosmetic" attempts to
solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; 15. To preserve Azerbaijan under
Russia's dominance.
Last, as tensions between Iran and both the United States and Israel
has grown, Iran has increased pressure and threats to use military
force against Azerbaijan.[16] In face of America's military option to
stop the Iranian nuclear program, Iran has attempted to keep Azerbaijan
outside of the anti-Iranian alliance. There is also an ideological
dimension to Iran's desire to secure Azerbaijan's neutrality. As
the second largest Shi'i country in the world, if Azerbaijan were to
become a member of an anti-Iran alliance, this would significantly
decrease the mullah's ideological defense that only the Shi'a can
fight against enemies and stop "crusaders" and Jews.
AZERBAIJAN'S APPROACH TOWARD ISRAEL
Since the Soviet Union's disintegration, Azerbaijan has been under
direct pressure from Russia and Iran. Russia supports Armenia
politically, militarily, and economically, which helps Armenia to
occupy Nagorno-Karabakh-which is internationally recognized as
Azerbaijani land.[17] Iran has also provided support to Armenia
and blames Azerbaijan for its close links with the United States
and Israel.
Since the time of its restored national independence in 1991,
Azerbaijan has strived to become an important regional player and
to retake lands occupied by Armenia. In line with these goals and
as a result of Russian and Iranian pressure, the late Azerbaijani
President Heydar Aliyev oriented the country's strategic foreign
policy toward the West and Israel. In 1997, he met with Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who made a brief stop in Baku. The
two discussed the Iranian threat as well as Israeli-Azerbaijani
intelligence cooperation. The meeting was considered by some to be
the starting point for the alliance between the two countries.[18]
As a continuation of Heydar Aliyev's strategy, Azerbaijani President
Ilham Aliyev welcomed Israeli President Shimon Peres in Baku on in
June 2009. President Ilham Aliyev said, "I am happy to host you in
my country. This is a most important visit for Azerbaijan and we are
interested in expanding and strengthening the cooperation between
Azerbaijan and Israel in the areas of security, diplomacy and the
economy."[19]
Peres's visit took place despite strong opposition from Iran.[20]
President Aliyev's decision earned him great respect in Israel. "The
clear position of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on relations
with Israel, in particular his refusal to submit to the demands of
Iran to cancel the visit of Israeli President Shimon Peres to Baku
and his refusal to join any anti-Israel campaigns" have garnered
"sincere respect in Israel."[21]
Cooperation with Israel is vital for Azerbaijan for several strategic
reasons. First, both Azerbaijan and Israel face regional security
threats.[22] Despite official slogans of friendship and brotherhood
between two nations,[23] Azerbaijan very much fears Iranian threatens
to use force and expand its intelligence network in Baku and in other
parts of the country.[24] Moreover, Iran provides large-scale support
to Armenia, which seriously damages Azerbaijani-Iranian relations and
creates serious mistrust between the two countries.[25]Azerbaijani
political elites consider Israeli or Jewish support a key element in
countering the Armenian diaspora, particularly in the United States
and Europe. In 1997, during an official visit to the United States,
President Heydar Aliyev met with representatives of American Jewish
organizations in New York and openly asked them to help Azerbaijan.[26]
Azerbaijan is grateful to Israel for lending the pro-Israel lobby's
weight in Washington to improve Azeri-American relations.[27]
Another strategic factor was the successful experience of the
Turkish-Israeli partnership for over a decade, which inspired
Azerbaijani decisionmakers to form strategic ties with Israel.
Despite current problems in the Turkish-Israeli relationship, Ankara
"understands that its regional aspirations require correct relations
with [the] Jewish state."[28] Former Israeli Ambassador to Turkey Zvi
Elpeleg also noted, "I do not think that relations will deteriorate
because there are fundamental reasons why Turkey and Israel have the
same interests."[29] Azerbaijan has attempted to play the mediator
between the two countries following tensions and disagreements that
emerged as a result of the Mavi Marmara incident. Undoubtedly, this
type of mediation can expand Baku's role in Middle Eastern affairs
and strengthen Azerbaijan's international standing.
Baku welcomes the triangular security and defense partnership between
Turkey, Israel, and Azerbaijan. This model of cooperation has been
successful concerning energy affairs.[30] The strategic triangular
partnership could be an effective tool in strengthening and supporting
U.S. diplomacy, as well as counterbalancing the Iran-Russia axis in
the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Modernizing the Azerbaijani Army as part of this defense cooperation
is clearly the next and most important strategic dimension for Baku
in its relations with Jerusalem. From 1992 to 1994, Israel supported
Azerbaijan in a war with Armenia, supplying Stinger missiles and
other weapons to Azerbaijani troops.[31] Moreover, the Jews of
Azerbaijan fought together with Azeris against the Armenians during
this war. Albert Agarunov, an Azerbaijani Army officer and a Mountain
Jew, became a national hero in Azerbaijan following the war.[32]
More recently, in February 2012, as part of this bilateral defense
cooperation, Azerbaijan signed a deal to purchase $1.6 billion worth
of arms from Israel.[33]
Last, Azerbaijan views its relations with Israel as part of a long-term
strategy to develop close ties with the United States, in order
to contain Iranian and Russian threats. Though Israeli-Azerbaijani
cooperation has expanded to include foreign policy, the military,
economy, and intelligence, Azerbaijan does not have a diplomatic
mission in Israel for fear of jeopardizing its relations with
Muslim countries. Moreover, both sides do not want to publicize
their relations. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev described his
country's relationship with the Jewish state as being like an iceberg:
"nine-tenths of it is below the surface."[34]
ISRAEL'S PRIORITIES VIS-Ã~@-VIS AZERBAIJAN
According to Dr. Ariel Cohen of the Washington, D.C.-based Heritage
Foundation, "Israel's strategic priorities include developing good
diplomatic and economic relations with Caucasus and Central Asia
countries, preventing Iran from increasing its influence in the
region, and participating in energy projects, including oil and gas
imports to Israel."[35]35 In April 2012, Israeli Foreign Minister
Avigdor Lieberman paid an official visit to Baku. He met with
President Ilham Aliyev, with whom he discussed bilateral relations
and Iran. According to Israeli analysts, "Lieberman's visit comes
one month after the American magazine Foreign Policy reported that
Azerbaijan has given Israel access to Azerbaijani airbases, which is
considered an important step towards a possible attack on Iran."[36]
Both Azerbaijan and Israel rejected the allegations.
In Baku, Lieberman commented, "Such reports are from the sphere of
science fiction and do not correspond with the truth."[37] Undoubtedly,
Lieberman's visit once again confirmed the strategic character of the
Israeli-Azerbaijani relationship. According to Israeli news media,
"The foreign minister acknowledged that Israel and Azerbaijan-which
is strategically located on Iran's northern border-have good, stable
relations, and he described it as an 'important country which is now
a member of the UN Security Council.'"[38]
Israeli policymakers consider Azerbaijan and the Caspian littoral as
part of the Greater Middle East.[39] Israel, which for decades has
had to deal with hostile neighboring Arab states, has attempted to
improve its security as well as its foreign image and international
relations. As part of this strategy, Israel has tried to develop
relations with non-Arab Muslim states. "Expanding its influence
into an area of the world heavily Muslim but not Arab has long
been a strategic Israeli objective."[40] This strategy is designed
not only to improve relations with the Islamic world, but also to
demonstrate that Israel can have peaceful relations with Muslim
states. It has attempted to prove that there is no Israel-Muslim
or Jewish-Muslim confrontation. The collapse of the USSR provided
a brilliant opportunity for Israel to develop relations with the
newly independent former Soviet Muslim republics. As of this writing,
Israel has successfully established diplomatic relations with nine
non-Arab Muslim states.[41]In this light, Azerbaijan's experience
of the peaceful cohabitation of Azeris and Jews was attractive
for the Israeli political elite. This model served as a foundation
upon which to develop a long-term partnership. Israeli policymakers
enthusiastically responded to Azerbaijani attempts to establish close
bilateral ties.
A key element in the Azerbaijan-Israel relationship has been their
mutual concern over the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran presents the
most serious threat to Israel. As result, Jerusalem has launched a
strategy of active diplomacy in the region surrounding Iran. At a
May 2009 conference at the Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv
University, the former head of the Israeli Military Intelligence
Directorate Major General Aharon Ze'evi Farkash said, "It is very
important to form a coalition with the moderate Sunnite countries
which... [fear the] Iranian nuclear threat." In addition, according
to Israeli analyst Uzi Rabbi, "Israel must conduct active diplomacy
in the regions surrounding Iran," and "to resist Iranian aggression
several coalition alliances should be formed."[42]
Thus, Azerbaijan, with its strategic location along Iran's northern
border, plays an important part of Israel's foreign policy agenda
vis-a-vis the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Israeli
policymakers are aware of Azerbaijan's insecurity and mistrust towards
Iran because of Tehran's aid to Armenia, which occupies territory
internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan.
In this regard, Israel has repeatedly declared that Jerusalem supported
Azerbaijani territorial integrity. The former Israeli ambassador
to Turkey and the ex-deputy foreign minister, Pinkhaz Avivi, said,
"Our position is the following: We recognize the principle of
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. We don't try to hide the fact
that our relations with Azerbaijan are more intense and rewarding
than our relations with Armenia and that relations with Azerbaijan
are strategically important for us." He also added in an interview,
"We have common goals. We understand Azerbaijan's concern with its
Iranian neighbor better than anyone, and that's a good ground for
rapprochement. Our dialogue with Armenia, on other hand, has always
been interconnected with our relations with Turkey."[43]
Undoubtedly, Turkish cooperation is essential for Israel's foreign and
security policy. Israel considers the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance
as a favorable factor for deepening and enhancing security and
defense cooperation with Azerbaijan despite the cooling of Israel's
relations with Ankara. Israel, for its part, considers the expansion
of political and defense cooperation with Azerbaijan an influential
factor for improving its relations with Turkey. The Israeli military
industry is now a major provider of advanced aviation, anti-tank
artillery, and anti-infantry weapon systems to Azerbaijan. Furthermore,
Israeli Aeronautics Defense Systems have helped Azerbaijan assemble
unmanned aircrafts.[44] In February 2012, Israeli defense officials
reportedly confirmed a deal to sell unmanned military aircrafts as
well as antiaircraft and missile defense systems to Azerbaijan for
approximate $1.6 billion.[45]
Israel and Azerbaijan maintain intense cooperate on security issues
as well. In October 2001, President Heydar Aliyev met with Israel's
ambassador, Eitan Naeh, and confirmed that "their positions in the
fight against international terrorism... were identical." According
to Israeli experts, groups like Hizb al-Tahrir pose a threat both to
Jerusalem and to Baku. Israeli analysts also argue that some Wahhabi
organizations may be operating in Azerbaijan.[46] Security cooperation
between the two countries has entailed intelligence exchanges, data
analysis (including satellite information), briefings, and other
activities. Israel also trains Azerbaijani security and intelligence
services and provides security for the Azeri president on foreign
visits. Some sources also report that Israel has set up electronic
listening stations along the Caspian Sea and Iranian border.[47]
Israel's next priority is to counter the Iranian intelligence network
in Azerbaijan and in other Muslim countries of the CIS. Iran has
attempted to expand its political influence to its immediate neighbors
as well as to intensify intelligence operations, particularly in
Azerbaijan. According to Azerbaijani media reports, the national
security services have arrested 22 people who were sent by Iran to
carry out terrorist attacks against the U.S. and Israeli embassies,
as well as against Western-linked groups and companies in Baku. In
February 2012, the Azerbaijani Ministry of National Security announced
the arrest of a terrorist group allegedly working for Iran's secret
services. In January 2012, Azerbaijan's secret service arrested two
people accused of plotting to kill two teachers at a Jewish school
in Baku. In 2007, Azerbaijan arrested 15 people in connection with an
alleged Iranian-linked spy network accused of providing intelligence
on Western and Israeli activities.[48]
Azeri-Israeli security cooperation is vital and beneficial for both
Baku and Jerusalem. The failure of the Azerbaijani-Israeli alliance
to work together to counter Iran would be irresponsible and would
have unpredictable consequences for Baku and Jerusalem. Tehran's
attempts to expand its Shi'i and Iranian ideology could have a
catastrophic impact on Azerbaijan's potential to be an independent
and strong American ally in the region. It is clear that the fall of
secular Azerbaijan would badly damage Israel's security and America's
strategic interests. Moreover, this would strengthen Iran and create a
totally new balance of power in the Greater Middle East, particularly
in the South Caucasus and Caspian basin, as well as in Central Asia.
Last, Azerbaijani energy is a critical factor in Israel's strategic
calculations. In 2011, Azerbaijan exported as much as to 2.5
million tons (about 18.5 million barrels) of oil with total worth
of $2.1 billon to Israel. Last year trade turnover between Israel
and Azerbaijan reached $4 billion, making Azerbaijan Israel's top
trade partner within CIS countries.[49] According to Ariel Cohen,
Israel "... can benefit from projects designed to bring Caspian and
Central Asian oil and gas to Western markets as they allow Israel to
diversify supply and receive abundant energy at affordable price."[50]
Israeli-Azerbaijani energy cooperation has clearly become an extremely
important factor for Israel's energy security. This cooperation
allows for the diversification of supplies of oil and gas and for
exploration of Israel's energy resources. Baku provides Jerusalem
with over one-third of Israel's oil supply.[51] As a result of former
Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman's April 2012 visit to Baku, SOCAR
will start drilling in Med Ashdod, Israel's oil field, located 16
kilometers off the Mediterranean coast. The Israeli Ambassador to
Baku, Michael Lotem said, "The drilling will begin soon. The work is
at a very advanced stage and delivery of a drilling rig to the field
is now expected.[52] The project is SOCAR's first oil-production or
drilling operation outside of Azerbaijan. The contract allows SOCAR
to gain international experience and expand its operations in Turkey,
Georgia, Israel, and other countries.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
It is well-known that the United States has declared the Caspian
basin as vital to its national interests. In this context, the
Israeli-Azerbaijani partnership is an effective tool to strengthen
and support America's strategic presence in this very sensitive part
of the world. Furthermore, the Israeli-Azerbaijani alliance to counter
Iran has strategic importance for U.S. interests, particularly in the
Greater Middle East and Central Asia. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia are America's allies in the South Caucasus and the Caspian
basin. The strengthening of Azerbaijan's secular and pro-Western
independence should be a strategic priority for U.S. diplomacy in
the region.
However, the Obama administration's lack of focus on South Caucasus
affairs jeopardizes America's strategic interests in the region. Unlike
the Clinton administration and the Bush administration, the Obama
administration has not been active in managing Iranian and Russian
influence in this part of the world. As result of the Russo-Georgian
war of 2008, the Tehran-Moscow axis effectively decreased America's
influence in the Greater Caspian Basin. Now, the axis continues to
limit or minimize U.S. political activity and increases pressure on
Washington's allies.
Indeed, Azerbaijan is under double pressure from Iran and Russia
and needs strong U.S. support to secure its national independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Azerbaijan's pro-Western
independence ensures a U.S. strategic presence in the Caspian basin
and facilitates its power projection deep into Asia. In this context,
Azerbaijan is of the utmost geostrategic importance for the United
States. The loss of a secular and independent Azerbaijan, as previously
discussed, would badly damage both U.S. and EU strategic interests. The
United States should thus support Israeli-Azerbaijani cooperation in
order to counter the regional threat and to strengthen both countries'
security as reliable U.S. allies.
CONCLUSION
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the historically close and
warm relations between Jews and Azeris became a solid base for
mutual cooperation between the State of Israel and the Republic of
Azerbaijan. Both countries are strategically located but in hostile
environments. This has strengthened their rapprochement and led to
expanded cooperation.
Despite strong opposition from Tehran and Moscow, Azerbaijan has
established a close partnership with Israel. Today, Baku and Jerusalem
are partners on a wide range of issues. The insecurity and regional
threats have pushed both Azerbaijan and Israel to create a strategic
alliance that enhances security and defense capabilities.
However, the future of the Israeli-Azerbaijani relationship depends on
the political nature of the ruling power in Azerbaijan. Iran continues
its attempts to spread its Islamic Revolution ideology into Azerbaijan
through Shi'i propaganda, while expanding its intelligence network
in Baku and other major Azerbaijani cities.
The strengthening of pro-Islamist or Shi'i political forces would
have a catastrophic impact on Azerbaijan's political future as a
secular state and a strong Israeli and American ally. In this light,
the strengthening of ties in all areas is crucial in order to combat
Iranian influence. It is also of fundamental importance that the
Azeri-Jewish/Israeli-Azerbaijani alliance is cultivated as a long-term
and mutually advantageous relationship.
One idea for a joint project is the establishment of a university
named after Baku-born Nobel Prize laureate Lev Landau (Lev Landau
University). The university, financed by Israel or by both sides,
could offer Jewish studies as well as other disciplines. An Azeri
Studies center could also be opened at one of the major Israeli
universities, such as at Tel Aviv University.
Initiatives like these would contribute to the development of the
history and culture of both nations and would thus strengthen ties and
create a solid foundation for maintaining relations in the long-term.
With its pro-Western foreign policy, Azerbaijan is strategically
important for U.S. and Israeli interests in the Greater Middle East and
in the post-Soviet space. Ensuring Azerbaijan's future as a secular,
independent state should be a key priority for Israel and the United
States. It is likely that the new U.S. administration will intensify
efforts to support Azerbaijan's independence and territorial integrity
in order to position it under NATO's security umbrella and to protect
the strategic Western oil infrastructure in the Caspian basin. Richard
Morningstar's 2012 nomination as U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan was
a strategic move aimed to revive and push forward U.S. diplomacy in
the South Caucasus and Caspian basin.
With regard to any military option to stop Iran's nuclear program,
Azerbaijan continues to attempt to remain neutral. On a May 29,
2012, visit to Tehran, the Azerbaijani minister of defense said, "The
Republic of Azerbaijan, like always in the past, will never permit
any country to take advantage of its land, or air, against the Islamic
Republic of Iran, which we consider our brother and friend country."
Indeed, Baku would like to avoid any possible military clashes with
Iran and maintain its neutrality. However, Azerbaijan's actions
and pragmatic foreign policy indicate that Baku's position is more
pro-Western than pro-Iranian. Baku will thus continue to cooperate with
Israel in order to protect and advance Azerbaijani national interests.
*Mahir Khalifa-zadeh, Ph.D. is a political analyst based in
Toronto, Canada. He is affiliated with the Montreal-based Center for
Research on Globalization and is a member of the Canadian Political
Science Association. He is also Professor of Political Science
at the International Eco-Energy Academy (Baku, Azerbaijan) and a
regular contributor to international journals on global politics
and security. His latest article is "Iran and the South Caucasus:
A Struggle for Influence" (Sweden, 2011).
NOTES
_________________________
[1] Joanna Sloame, "The Virtual Jewish History Tour: Azerbaijan,"
American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, The Jewish Virtual
Library,http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/vjw/Azerbaijan.html.
[2] Aryeh Tepper, "The Azeri Exception,"
Jewish Ideas Daily, October 29,2010,
http://www.jewishideasdaily.com/content/module/2010/10/29/main-featur
e/1/the-azeri-exception.
[3] Lev Davidovich Landau, MacTutor History
of Mathematics, University of St Andrews,Scotland,
http://www-history.mcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/Biographies/Landau_Lev.ht
ml; "The Nobel Prize in Physics 1962: LevLandau,"
Nobelprize.org, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physic
s/laureates/1962/landau.html.
[4] "History of Jews inAzerbaijan," Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Je ws_in_Azerbaijan.
[5] Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and
Identity Under Russian Rule (Hoover Institution Press, 1992), p.22,
http://ebookee.org/The-Azerbaijani-Turks-Power-and-Identity-Under-Russi
an-Rule_776519.html#3wBsPMWYsEpAcHCu.99.
[6] Alexander Murinson, Jews in Azerbaijan: a History Spanning Three
Millennia, Vision of Azerbaijan, http://www.visions.az/history,112/.
[7] Krzysztof Strachota and Wojciech Gorecki, "The Southern
Caucasus and Central Asia After the Russian-Georgian
War: the Geopolitical Consequences," Center for Eastern
Studies (CES) Commentary, No. 10, September 24, 2008,
http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_10.pdf.
[8] Mahir Khalifa-Zadeh, "Iran and the South Caucasus: A Struggle
for Influence," Journal of Central Asia and Caucasus, Vol. 12, No. 1
(2011), http://www.ca-c.org/journal/2011-01-eng/05.shtml.
[9] Shapour Ghasemi, "Safavid Empire 1502 - 1736, History
of Iran," Iran Chamber Society, September 24, 2012,
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/safavids/safavids.php;Ben
Madadi, "Origins of Azeri Turks," Iranian.com, January 27, 2008,
http://www.iranian.com/main/2008/origins-azeri-turks-0.
[10] U.S. Department of State, "Azerbaijan," Background Note:
Azerbaijan, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2909.htm.
[11] "History of Azerbaijan," Explore Azerbaijan,
http://exploreazerbaijan.com/?page_id=57; Ghasemi, "Safavid Empire."
[12] Saban Kardas, "Turkey and Azerbaijan: One Nation-Two
States?" Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 193, October
21,2009,http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35
630&cHash=560416055f.
[13] Nasib L. Nassibli, "Azerbaijan- Iran Relations: Challenges
and Prospects," Event Report, Kennedy School of Government,
HarvardUniversity,http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/12750/azerbaijan_
iran_relations.html.
[14] Nasib Nasibzade, "The Azeri Question in Iran:
A Crucial Issue for Iran's Future," Caspian Crossroads,
Winter1998,http://www.azeri.dk/en/articles/The%20Azeri%20Question%20in%20Iran.pdf;
"Rohrabacher Introduces Resolution Supporting Right of Azeri Self
Determination," Congressman Dana Rohrbacher website, September 12,2012,
http://rohrabacher.house.gov/uploadedfiles/bills-112hconres137ih.pdf.
[15] Nick O'Malley, "'Great Satan' Backs 'Small Satan': Obama
Reaffirms Stance Against Iran," The Sydney Morning Herald, March
6,2012,http://www.smh.com.au/world/great-satan-backs-small-satan-obama-reaffir
ms-stance-against-iran-20120306-1uf46.html.
[16] "Commander Urges Azerbaijan to Respect
Islamic Rules," Arabs Today (UK), August 10,2011,
http://www.arabstoday.net/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl
e&id=21867:commander-urges-azerbaijan-to-respect-islamic-rules-&catid=43:ara
b-world.
[17] "Russia Extends Lease on Military Base in
Armenia Through 2044," RIA Novosti, August 20, 2010,
http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100820/160276128.html.
[18] David Lev, "Iran Warns Azerbaijan: Keep
Mossad Out," Arutz Sheva, February 12, 2012,
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/152671.
[19] Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "President
Shimon Peres in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan for Historic
First Visit, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, June
28,2009,http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2009/President_Peres_v
isits_Azerbaijan_and_Kazakhstan_28_Jun_2009.htm.
[20] "Iran Recalls Azerbaijan Envoy
Following Peres Visit," JTA, June 29,2009,
http://www.jta.org/news/article/2009/06/29/1006211/iran-recalls-azerb
aijan-envoy-following-peres-visit.
[21] Ilya Bourtman, "Israel and Azerbaijan's Furtive Embrace," Middle
East Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer 2006), pp.
47-57,
http://www.meforum.org/987/israel-and-azerbaijans-furtive-embrace.
[22] Arye Gut, "Azerbaijan, Israel Have Become 'Strategic Allies',"
News.Az, June 28, 2011, http://news.az/articles/politics/39340.
[23] "Ilham Aliyev and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad Held an
Expanded Meeting," President of Azerbaijan website, News, November 17,
2010,http://en.president.az/articles/1103.
[24] "Iran Threatens Pre-emptive Action amid
Nuclear Tensions," NBC News, February 21,2012,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/46461790/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t
/iran-threatens-pre-emptive-action-amid-nuclear-tensions/.
[25] "Iran Provides Every Support to Armenia, Azerbaijani MP," News.Az,
February 14, 2012, http://www.news.az/articles/politics/54665.
[26] Speech of Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev on the official
reception in honor of President Heydar Aliyev on behalf of the
conference of presidents of major Jewish organizations-July 28,
1997," Heydar Aliyev Heritage International Online Library,
http://library.aliyev-heritage.org/en/7423863.html.
[27] Bourtman, "Israel and Azerbaijan's Furtive Embrace."
[28] Efraim Inbar, "Israeli-Turkish Tensions
and Beyond," Hurriyet Daily News, March 12,2010,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=israeli-tu
rkish-tensions-and-beyond-2010-03-12.
[29] Serkan DemirtaÅ~_, "Amid Sound and Fury, Turkey-Israel
Alliance Endures," Hurriyet Daily News, April 13, 2012,
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10705597.asp.
[30] Alexander Murinson, "Azerbaijan-Turkey-Israel
Relations: The Energy Factor," Middle East Review of
International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 12, No. 3 (September
2008),http://www.gloria-center.org/2008/09/murinson-2008-09-04/.
[31] Soner Cagaptay and Alexander Murinson, "Good Relations
Between Azerbaijan and Israel: A Model for Other Muslim States in
Eurasia?" The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 30,2005,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/good-relation
s-between-azerbaijan-and-israel-a-model-for-other-muslim-state.
[32] Address of Jewish Diaspora of Azerbaijan, Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), June 19, 2003,
http://www.osce.org/secretariat/42078.
[33] "Azerbaijan Rejects Iran Fears
over Israel 'Arms Buy'," Defense News, February,
29,2012,http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120229/DEFREG04/302290002/Azerbaij
an-Rejects-Iran-Fears-Over-Israel-8216-Arms-Buy-8217.
[34] Patrick Brennan, "Israeli-Azerbaijan Deal Leaked,
Bolton Blames Obama," National Review, March 29,2012,
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/294856/bolton-blames-obama-leaki
ng-israeli-azerbaijan-relationship-patrick-brennan.
[35] Ariel Cohen and Kevin DeCorla-Souza, "Eurasian Energy and Israel's
Choices," Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No.
88 (February 2011),http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/MSPS88.pdf.
[36] Lieberman Denies Israel Has Access to
Azerbaijan Air Bases," JewishJournal.com, April
23,2012,http://www.jewishjournal.com/israel/article/lieberman_denies_israel_has
_access_to_azerbaijan_air_bases_20120423/.
[37] "Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman
Visits North Azerbaijan on 20th Anniversary
of Diplomatic Relations," BayBak Azerbaijan, April
24,2012,http://en.baybak.com/israeli-foreign-minister-avigdor-lieberman-visits-
north-azerbaijan-on-20th-anniversary-of-diplomatic-relations.azr.
[38] Herb Keinon, "Reports Baku Gave Israel Airfields
Are Fiction," The Jerusalem Post, April 4, 2012,
http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=267268.
[39] Bulent Aras, "Post-Cold War Realities: Israel's Strategy in
Azerbaijan and Central Asia," Middle East Policy, January 1, 1998,
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-20297513.html, p.
6869.
[40] Bourtman, "Israel and Azerbaijan's Furtive Embrace."
[41] U.S. Department of State, "Israel," Background Notes,
http://www.state.gov.
[42] Artak Grigoryan, "Priority Directions in
the Foreign Policy of Israel: South Caucasus and
Central Asia," Noravank Foundation, September 22,
2009,http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=3623.
[43] "Pinkhaz Avivi: We Embrace the Potential of Economic
Ties with the South Caucasus," November 7, 2011, Vestnik
Kavkaza,http://vestnikkavkaza.net/interviews/politics/19641.html.
[44] "Azeris Get Israel UAVs Built Under License," UPI, October 7,2011,
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Azeris_get_Israel_UAVs_built_under_li
cense_999.html.
[45] "Israel Signs $1.6 Billion Arms Deal
with Azerbaijan," Haaretz.com, February 26,2012,
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-signs-1-6-billio
n-arms-deal-with-azerbaijan-1.414916.
[46] Bourtman, "Israel and Azerbaijan's Furtive Embrace."
[47] Shamkhal Abilov, "The Azerbaijan-Israel Relations: A
Non-diplomatic but Strategic Partnership," OAKA, Vol. 4, No.
8(2009),http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/gm3veLfV7Q5rP83jaIV34UObvarinb.
pdf, pp. 138-56.
[48] "Azerbaijan Arrests Alleged
Iran-hired Terrorists," Fox News, March 14,2012,
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/03/14/22-arrested-in-azerbaijan-in-
plot-on-us-israeli-embassies/.
[49] "Lieberman: The Trade Turnover Between Azerbaijan
and Israel Reaches $4 Billion," Contact.az, April 23,
2012,http://www.contact.az/docs/2012/Politics/04234650en.htm.
[50] Cohen and DeCorla-Souza, "Eurasian Energy and Israel's Choices."
[51] Jen Alic, "Azerbaijan's International Energy Aspirations
Raise Tensions in Middle East," Oilprice.com, May 15,2012,
http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Middle-East/Azerbaijans-International
-Energy-Aspirations-Raise-Tensions-in-Middle-East.html.
[52] Shahin Abbasov, "Azerbaijan: SOCAR to Use Israeli
Oil Field as Proving Ground," Eurasianet.org, May 8, 2012,
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65374.
From: A. Papazian
[ Part 2.2: "Attached Text" ]
BY MAHIR KHALIFA-ZADEH MARCH 18, 2013
http://www.gloria-center.org/2013/03/israeli-azerbaijani-alliance-and-iran/
Azerbaijani soldiers during a military training. (Photo by Spc.
Stephen Solomon)
Azerbaijani soldiers during military training. (Photo by Spc. Stephen
Solomon)
This article discusses cooperation between Israel and the Republic
of Azerbaijan in order to neutralize foreign threats and ensure
regional security. Expanding and improving ties with Azerbaijan
has been part of Israel's newly adopted strategy toward non-Arab
Muslim states. Also addressed is Iran's attitude towards Azerbaijan
and thepolitical and ideological opposition between the two mainly
Shi'a-populated countries. Highlighted is the cooperation's strategic
importance for improving security and defense capabilities for both
Israel and Azerbaijan. Last, U.S. priorities in the South Caucasus
are viewed in the context of the Israeli-Azerbaijani alliance.
DOWNLOAD THE PDF VERSION OF THIS ARTICLE
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Historic sources and research confirm that Jews of both Persian (also
known as Caucasian Mountain Jews) as well as Ashkenazi origin have
lived in Azerbaijan for centuries.[1] The presence of Persian Jews
in Azerbaijan can be traced back over 2,000 years, to even before the
fifth century. Historically, Azerbaijan has been very welcoming toward
the Jews. During the periods of both the Russian and Soviet empires
Azerbaijan had no antisemitic traditions. In the nineteenth century,
under the Russian Empire, Jews of Ashkenazi descent began to settle in
Azerbaijan. Others arrived during World War II to escape the Nazis.[2]
. Many famous Jews were born and have studied in Azerbaijan, including
scientist of modern physics and Nobel Prize Laureate Lev Landau. Born
in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 1908, he enrolled in Baku State University
in 1922.[3]
During the nineteenth century, Baku became a center for the Zionist
movement in the Russian Empire. The first branch of Hovevei Zion
("Lovers of Zion") was established in Baku in 1891, and in 1910,
the first choir synagogue opened in the city.[4] Even earlier, in
1883, oil companies owned by the Rothschild family (of Jewish origin)
entered the scene in Baku, followed by Rockefeller's gigantic Standard
Oil Company.[5] Thus, the Jews lived in peace and friendship with
local Azeris and had successful businesses in the country.
During the period of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR,
1918-1920)-which formulated key ideological, political, and security
priorities for independent Azerbaijan-the Jewish Popular University
was established (1919) and Yiddish- and Hebrew-language periodicals
were published. Moreover, Dr. Yevsey Gindes, an Ashkenazi Jew, served
as Minister of Health in ADR's cabinet under the first prime minister,
Fatali Khan Khoyski.
Jews continued to arrive and settle in Azerbaijan during the Soviet
period as well. The Jews in Soviet Azerbaijan were not exposed to
the widespread discrimination that was typical in other parts of
the USSR. Thus, the Ashkenazi Jews formed a significant part of the
intellectual and technocratic elites in Soviet Azerbaijan.[6]
POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND IRAN'S PRIORITIES IN
THE REGION
The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 shifted South Caucasus politics
significantly and created a new political atmosphere in this part
of the world. As a result of the war, a completely new strategic
situation has emerged in the region.[7] Prior to the war, since 1994,
when Azerbaijan signed the "Contract of the Century" (agreement
with a consortium of international oil companies for the exploration
and exploitation of three offshore oil fields in the country), the
strategic situation in the South Caucasus could be characterized
as a period of large-scale Western penetration. The United States,
the European Union, and Turkey, began to play a significant role in
South Caucasian affairs, which had traditionally been orchestrated
by Iran and Russia.
Moreover, several strategic programs were launched by the Clinton
administration (and continued under the Bush administration) and the
EU. These included Partnership for Peace, the Silk Road Strategy Act,
Caspian Watch, the EU's Eastern Partnership, and others. The goal of
these programs was to strengthen the Western presence and minimize
both Iranian and Russian influence in this very sensitive part of
the world. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia slowly began to
drift toward NATO membership. In addition, South Caucasian countries,
particularly Azerbaijan and Georgia, started to develop strong ties
with the State of Israel.
In the meantime, Iran, as a key regional player, reacted very concerned
about the West's "aggressive advance" into the traditionally Iranian
and Russian sphere of influence. Iran's hostility toward the United
States and Israel pushed Tehran to stop or limit Western penetration as
well as Israel's cooperation with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Iran welcomed
the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, which it saw as a brilliant opportunity
to reverse the region's strategic atmosphere from pro-Western to a
much more pro-Russian atmosphere -hence a more pro-Iranian one also.
The Islamic Republic of Iran considers Russia to be a key ally in
resisting the United States. Tehran prefers to be under Russia's
strategic umbrella and cooperates with Moscow on global and regional
levels. Tehran supports the strengthening of Russia's influence in
the South Caucasus and Central Asia for strategic reasons.[8] In
face of possible U.S. and/or Israeli military options to stop the
Iranian nuclear program, Iran hopes Russia's dominance in the South
Caucasus and Central Asia would prevent the United States or NATO
from deploying military bases in close proximity to the Iranian border.
At the same time, Russia also needs Iran's cooperation in order
to secure both the South Caucasus and Central Asia under Moscow,
or under shared Iranian control. Tehran's strategic priorities in
the South Caucasus can thus be identified as follows:
1. To counter and reduce U.S. influence; 2. To oppose U.S., NATO,
and EU initiatives and long-term objectives; 3. To prevent the
deployment of U.S./NATO troops; 4. To block both Georgia and
Azerbaijan from moving toward NATO/EU membership; 5. To minimize
Israel's influence and cooperation with South Caucasian countries;
6. To align the security order with Iran's strategic interests;
7. To control Caspian energy resources and transportation routes;
8. To contain the rising influence of Turkey and the Turkey-Azerbaijani
alliance; 9. To prolong the Turkish-Armenian hostility; 10. To oppose
the Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan triangle of strategic cooperation;
11. To ensure Russia's dominance and the current status-quo; and
12. To support Russia's leading role in the Caspian-Caucasus region.
Last, it is beneficial for Iran to maintain the current status-quo
and to support Russia's dominance in the region. In this case, Iran
is able to ensure its paramount strategic goal: to limit or decrease
U.S. influence and prevent American attempts to redesign the region's
political landscape in order to secure Washington's dominance.
IRAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN
Notwithstanding, Iran and Azerbaijan are both Shi'i Muslim countries
and have a common historical and cultural heritage. History as well
as ideological and political factors have shaped relations between the
two countries and have influenced the policies of the Islamic Republic
of Iran toward the Republic of Azerbaijan. Iran was among the first
countries to recognize Azerbaijan's return to independence in 1991,
establishing diplomatic relations with Baku in March 22, 1992. Since
the Soviet disintegration, however, the unstable and complicated
Iranian-Azerbaijani relationship has demonstrated Tehran's discomfort
with Azerbaijan's existence as an independent and secular state. In
addition, Tehran resents Baku's strategic relations with Iran's key
enemies-the United States and Israel. It is clear from the actions of
the Iranian government that it considers Azerbaijan a direct challenge
or threat to its security and political future. This key point in
Tehran's calculations towards Azerbaijan has deep historical roots.
Historical Factors
>From ancient times, the Azeri Turks and Azerbaijan were both heart and
part of the Persian Empire. Azeri Turk dynasties like the Ghaznavids,
Safavids, Qajars, and others played a key role in expanding and
defending the Persian Empire, and the Azerbaijani city of Tabriz
served as capital of the Empire for centuries. Several Iranian shahs,
in fact, are of Azeri Turk origin.[9]
It was only in the nineteenth century with the 1828 Treaty of
Turkmenchay that Imperial Russia gained control of part of the Persian
Empire, the then semi-independent northern Azerbaijani khanates. These
territories became the nucleus for the modern republics of Azerbaijan
and Armenia. The Persian Empire officially renounced its claim to the
northern Azerbaijani khanates, leading to the division of Azerbaijan
into two: Northern Azerbaijan or Russian (Soviet) Azerbaijan and
Southern Azerbaijan or Iranian Azerbaijan.
Since the Soviet Union's collapse, this history has created an
illusion among Iranians that Tehran's government has the right to
take Azerbaijan back under its control, to intervene in Azerbaijani
politics, and to manipulate Azerbaijan's future in accordance with
Iran's interests. Baku's assertion of independence and its clear
unwillingness to be reincorporated into Iran has made for a rocky
relationship with Teheran.
Political Factors
On May 28, 1918, following the collapse of the Russian Empire,
Azerbaijan declared its independence and identified itself as the
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR, 1918-1920).[10] Iran attempted
to reincorporate Azerbaijan, but the ADR government refused and
established relations with the Entente governments in order to
secure its independence. The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic adapted a
secular and political system based on the principles of Western-style
democracy and established a multi-party parliament. ADR was thus
the first Western-style state in the Muslim world. It declared equal
rights to all citizens, including ethnic minorities, men, and women,
and granted Azerbaijani women the right to vote.
Today's Republic of Azerbaijan is a successor of ADR and shares its
political and ideological values. It is a secular and pro-Western
nation in the South Caucasus. The country's political development
has very much differed from that of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
though they both have predominantly Shi'i populations. In the eyes
of the government and the mullahs in Tehran, this is unacceptable.
Ideological Factors
Azerbaijan's secular and Western-style statehood is based on an
ideology that totally contradicts that of Iran. Tehran's mullah
government considers Shi'ism a unique ideology and a powerful force to
unite the nation. The Iranian government has thus strengthened Shi'i
ideology and suppressed the identities of the ethnic minorities in
the country, including Azeri Turks (Iranian Azeris). It has also
attempted to eliminate independent Azerbaijan's ideological and
political impact. Interestingly, Iran's Azeri Turk Safavid dynasty
officially converted Iran from Sunni to Shi'i at the beginning of the
sixteenth century. Shah Ismail Safavid, an Azeri Turk and founder of
the Safavid dynasty, is an important historical figure both in Iran
and in Azerbaijan.[11]
While Iran follows the Shi'i ideology, Azerbaijan has adopted a
Kemalist ideology. Azerbaijani nationalism is based on the ADR's
ideological and political values as well as on Azeri Turk or Turkish
identity. Thus, despite its common historical heritage with Iran,
the Republic of Azerbaijan had close ties with Kemalist Turkey and
shared the late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev's "one nation,
two states" ideology and strategy with the Turkish Republic.[12]
Even after the coming to power of an Islamist-oriented, post-Kemalist
government in Turkey, this relationship continues and it supports
Azerbaijan's sense of identity. On the other hand, the Azerbaijani
government considers nationalism and Kemalist ideology as well as the
"one nation, two states" strategy as powerful tools to contain Iran's
attempts to strengthen Shi'i ideology in Azerbaijan, which has created
a major ideological gap and opposition between the two countries.
Last, Tehran's hostility toward Azerbaijan is deeply rooted in the
history. The fundamental and most influential factor in Tehran's
relations with Baku is that of two "divided" Azerbaijans. Iran fears
Iranian Azeris may establish their own Azerbaijani state-as occurred
in the early twentieth century[13]-or will become part of the Republic
of Azerbaijan.
The mullah regime in Tehran is greatly concerned that Azerbaijan's
success as a secular state could inspire or ignite Iranian Azeris to
bring about the downfall of the current regime in Iran. These fears
are exacerbated by the possibility of the West using Iranian Azeris
against Tehran. The Azerbaijani republic is thus a major factor in
Iran's long-term strategy and the Azeri national liberation movement
in Iran has become an element of global politics. In this context,
Iran has thus adopted an aggressive stance toward the neighboring
republic.[14]
IRANIAN PRIORITIES VIS-Ã~@-VIS AZERBAIJAN
Tensions between Baku and Tehran are manifest in more than one
area, though in particular in foreign policy and security issues. To
counteract the strong Russian and Iranian opposition, Azerbaijan has
maintained strategic relations with the United States, the European
Union, NATO, and Israel. Moreover, Baku continues to espouse a
pro-Western strategy, despite direct calls from Tehran to end its
cooperation with the "Great Satan" (United States) and "Small Satan"
(Israel).[15]
Tehran's official propaganda declares Israel as a main enemy of the
Islamic world. Azerbaijani policy, however, differs. It does not
view Israel as an enemy and considers it a friendly country, in which
Muslims and Jews can live in peace and friendship. At the same time,
Azerbaijan has developed close ties with Turkey, Iran's rival in
the Islamic world. Baku and Ankara cooperate and operate as a strong
alliance on the global and regional levels, which has angered Iran.
Thus, Azerbaijan's independence and its secular and democratic
nature of power as well as its pro-Western government are strong
exacerbating factors for Iran's policymakers. In light of this,
Iran's key priorities towards Azerbaijan can be identified as follows:
1. To spread the Iranian Islamic Revolution's ideas to Azerbaijan;
2. To intensify Shi'i ideology propaganda and expand the Islamic
network; 3. To destabilize the political situation in Azerbaijan in
an attempt to establish a pro-Islamic or Shi'i regime; 4. To damage
or discredit Azerbaijan's independence, as well as its secular and
democratic nature; 5. To intensify intelligence activity and expand its
espionage network; 6. To limit and minimize Azerbaijan's influence on
Iranian Azeris; 7. To support the separatism of local ethnic groups
(Talish, Lesgi, and others); 8. To halt Israel's cooperation with
Azerbaijan and Georgia; 9. To minimize U.S. influence and curtail
Azerbaijan's bid for EU/NATO membership; 10. To damage Azerbaijan's
international image and pro-Western foreign policy; 11. To contain
Azerbaijan's rise to regional power; 12. To exert constant pressure
on and intimidate Azerbaijan to use military force; 13. To provide
assistance to Azerbaijan's regional rival-Armenia-to maintain the
balance between the two countries, and to keep Azerbaijan engaged
in war with Armenia; 14. To support Russia's "cosmetic" attempts to
solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; 15. To preserve Azerbaijan under
Russia's dominance.
Last, as tensions between Iran and both the United States and Israel
has grown, Iran has increased pressure and threats to use military
force against Azerbaijan.[16] In face of America's military option to
stop the Iranian nuclear program, Iran has attempted to keep Azerbaijan
outside of the anti-Iranian alliance. There is also an ideological
dimension to Iran's desire to secure Azerbaijan's neutrality. As
the second largest Shi'i country in the world, if Azerbaijan were to
become a member of an anti-Iran alliance, this would significantly
decrease the mullah's ideological defense that only the Shi'a can
fight against enemies and stop "crusaders" and Jews.
AZERBAIJAN'S APPROACH TOWARD ISRAEL
Since the Soviet Union's disintegration, Azerbaijan has been under
direct pressure from Russia and Iran. Russia supports Armenia
politically, militarily, and economically, which helps Armenia to
occupy Nagorno-Karabakh-which is internationally recognized as
Azerbaijani land.[17] Iran has also provided support to Armenia
and blames Azerbaijan for its close links with the United States
and Israel.
Since the time of its restored national independence in 1991,
Azerbaijan has strived to become an important regional player and
to retake lands occupied by Armenia. In line with these goals and
as a result of Russian and Iranian pressure, the late Azerbaijani
President Heydar Aliyev oriented the country's strategic foreign
policy toward the West and Israel. In 1997, he met with Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who made a brief stop in Baku. The
two discussed the Iranian threat as well as Israeli-Azerbaijani
intelligence cooperation. The meeting was considered by some to be
the starting point for the alliance between the two countries.[18]
As a continuation of Heydar Aliyev's strategy, Azerbaijani President
Ilham Aliyev welcomed Israeli President Shimon Peres in Baku on in
June 2009. President Ilham Aliyev said, "I am happy to host you in
my country. This is a most important visit for Azerbaijan and we are
interested in expanding and strengthening the cooperation between
Azerbaijan and Israel in the areas of security, diplomacy and the
economy."[19]
Peres's visit took place despite strong opposition from Iran.[20]
President Aliyev's decision earned him great respect in Israel. "The
clear position of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on relations
with Israel, in particular his refusal to submit to the demands of
Iran to cancel the visit of Israeli President Shimon Peres to Baku
and his refusal to join any anti-Israel campaigns" have garnered
"sincere respect in Israel."[21]
Cooperation with Israel is vital for Azerbaijan for several strategic
reasons. First, both Azerbaijan and Israel face regional security
threats.[22] Despite official slogans of friendship and brotherhood
between two nations,[23] Azerbaijan very much fears Iranian threatens
to use force and expand its intelligence network in Baku and in other
parts of the country.[24] Moreover, Iran provides large-scale support
to Armenia, which seriously damages Azerbaijani-Iranian relations and
creates serious mistrust between the two countries.[25]Azerbaijani
political elites consider Israeli or Jewish support a key element in
countering the Armenian diaspora, particularly in the United States
and Europe. In 1997, during an official visit to the United States,
President Heydar Aliyev met with representatives of American Jewish
organizations in New York and openly asked them to help Azerbaijan.[26]
Azerbaijan is grateful to Israel for lending the pro-Israel lobby's
weight in Washington to improve Azeri-American relations.[27]
Another strategic factor was the successful experience of the
Turkish-Israeli partnership for over a decade, which inspired
Azerbaijani decisionmakers to form strategic ties with Israel.
Despite current problems in the Turkish-Israeli relationship, Ankara
"understands that its regional aspirations require correct relations
with [the] Jewish state."[28] Former Israeli Ambassador to Turkey Zvi
Elpeleg also noted, "I do not think that relations will deteriorate
because there are fundamental reasons why Turkey and Israel have the
same interests."[29] Azerbaijan has attempted to play the mediator
between the two countries following tensions and disagreements that
emerged as a result of the Mavi Marmara incident. Undoubtedly, this
type of mediation can expand Baku's role in Middle Eastern affairs
and strengthen Azerbaijan's international standing.
Baku welcomes the triangular security and defense partnership between
Turkey, Israel, and Azerbaijan. This model of cooperation has been
successful concerning energy affairs.[30] The strategic triangular
partnership could be an effective tool in strengthening and supporting
U.S. diplomacy, as well as counterbalancing the Iran-Russia axis in
the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Modernizing the Azerbaijani Army as part of this defense cooperation
is clearly the next and most important strategic dimension for Baku
in its relations with Jerusalem. From 1992 to 1994, Israel supported
Azerbaijan in a war with Armenia, supplying Stinger missiles and
other weapons to Azerbaijani troops.[31] Moreover, the Jews of
Azerbaijan fought together with Azeris against the Armenians during
this war. Albert Agarunov, an Azerbaijani Army officer and a Mountain
Jew, became a national hero in Azerbaijan following the war.[32]
More recently, in February 2012, as part of this bilateral defense
cooperation, Azerbaijan signed a deal to purchase $1.6 billion worth
of arms from Israel.[33]
Last, Azerbaijan views its relations with Israel as part of a long-term
strategy to develop close ties with the United States, in order
to contain Iranian and Russian threats. Though Israeli-Azerbaijani
cooperation has expanded to include foreign policy, the military,
economy, and intelligence, Azerbaijan does not have a diplomatic
mission in Israel for fear of jeopardizing its relations with
Muslim countries. Moreover, both sides do not want to publicize
their relations. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev described his
country's relationship with the Jewish state as being like an iceberg:
"nine-tenths of it is below the surface."[34]
ISRAEL'S PRIORITIES VIS-Ã~@-VIS AZERBAIJAN
According to Dr. Ariel Cohen of the Washington, D.C.-based Heritage
Foundation, "Israel's strategic priorities include developing good
diplomatic and economic relations with Caucasus and Central Asia
countries, preventing Iran from increasing its influence in the
region, and participating in energy projects, including oil and gas
imports to Israel."[35]35 In April 2012, Israeli Foreign Minister
Avigdor Lieberman paid an official visit to Baku. He met with
President Ilham Aliyev, with whom he discussed bilateral relations
and Iran. According to Israeli analysts, "Lieberman's visit comes
one month after the American magazine Foreign Policy reported that
Azerbaijan has given Israel access to Azerbaijani airbases, which is
considered an important step towards a possible attack on Iran."[36]
Both Azerbaijan and Israel rejected the allegations.
In Baku, Lieberman commented, "Such reports are from the sphere of
science fiction and do not correspond with the truth."[37] Undoubtedly,
Lieberman's visit once again confirmed the strategic character of the
Israeli-Azerbaijani relationship. According to Israeli news media,
"The foreign minister acknowledged that Israel and Azerbaijan-which
is strategically located on Iran's northern border-have good, stable
relations, and he described it as an 'important country which is now
a member of the UN Security Council.'"[38]
Israeli policymakers consider Azerbaijan and the Caspian littoral as
part of the Greater Middle East.[39] Israel, which for decades has
had to deal with hostile neighboring Arab states, has attempted to
improve its security as well as its foreign image and international
relations. As part of this strategy, Israel has tried to develop
relations with non-Arab Muslim states. "Expanding its influence
into an area of the world heavily Muslim but not Arab has long
been a strategic Israeli objective."[40] This strategy is designed
not only to improve relations with the Islamic world, but also to
demonstrate that Israel can have peaceful relations with Muslim
states. It has attempted to prove that there is no Israel-Muslim
or Jewish-Muslim confrontation. The collapse of the USSR provided
a brilliant opportunity for Israel to develop relations with the
newly independent former Soviet Muslim republics. As of this writing,
Israel has successfully established diplomatic relations with nine
non-Arab Muslim states.[41]In this light, Azerbaijan's experience
of the peaceful cohabitation of Azeris and Jews was attractive
for the Israeli political elite. This model served as a foundation
upon which to develop a long-term partnership. Israeli policymakers
enthusiastically responded to Azerbaijani attempts to establish close
bilateral ties.
A key element in the Azerbaijan-Israel relationship has been their
mutual concern over the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran presents the
most serious threat to Israel. As result, Jerusalem has launched a
strategy of active diplomacy in the region surrounding Iran. At a
May 2009 conference at the Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv
University, the former head of the Israeli Military Intelligence
Directorate Major General Aharon Ze'evi Farkash said, "It is very
important to form a coalition with the moderate Sunnite countries
which... [fear the] Iranian nuclear threat." In addition, according
to Israeli analyst Uzi Rabbi, "Israel must conduct active diplomacy
in the regions surrounding Iran," and "to resist Iranian aggression
several coalition alliances should be formed."[42]
Thus, Azerbaijan, with its strategic location along Iran's northern
border, plays an important part of Israel's foreign policy agenda
vis-a-vis the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Israeli
policymakers are aware of Azerbaijan's insecurity and mistrust towards
Iran because of Tehran's aid to Armenia, which occupies territory
internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan.
In this regard, Israel has repeatedly declared that Jerusalem supported
Azerbaijani territorial integrity. The former Israeli ambassador
to Turkey and the ex-deputy foreign minister, Pinkhaz Avivi, said,
"Our position is the following: We recognize the principle of
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. We don't try to hide the fact
that our relations with Azerbaijan are more intense and rewarding
than our relations with Armenia and that relations with Azerbaijan
are strategically important for us." He also added in an interview,
"We have common goals. We understand Azerbaijan's concern with its
Iranian neighbor better than anyone, and that's a good ground for
rapprochement. Our dialogue with Armenia, on other hand, has always
been interconnected with our relations with Turkey."[43]
Undoubtedly, Turkish cooperation is essential for Israel's foreign and
security policy. Israel considers the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance
as a favorable factor for deepening and enhancing security and
defense cooperation with Azerbaijan despite the cooling of Israel's
relations with Ankara. Israel, for its part, considers the expansion
of political and defense cooperation with Azerbaijan an influential
factor for improving its relations with Turkey. The Israeli military
industry is now a major provider of advanced aviation, anti-tank
artillery, and anti-infantry weapon systems to Azerbaijan. Furthermore,
Israeli Aeronautics Defense Systems have helped Azerbaijan assemble
unmanned aircrafts.[44] In February 2012, Israeli defense officials
reportedly confirmed a deal to sell unmanned military aircrafts as
well as antiaircraft and missile defense systems to Azerbaijan for
approximate $1.6 billion.[45]
Israel and Azerbaijan maintain intense cooperate on security issues
as well. In October 2001, President Heydar Aliyev met with Israel's
ambassador, Eitan Naeh, and confirmed that "their positions in the
fight against international terrorism... were identical." According
to Israeli experts, groups like Hizb al-Tahrir pose a threat both to
Jerusalem and to Baku. Israeli analysts also argue that some Wahhabi
organizations may be operating in Azerbaijan.[46] Security cooperation
between the two countries has entailed intelligence exchanges, data
analysis (including satellite information), briefings, and other
activities. Israel also trains Azerbaijani security and intelligence
services and provides security for the Azeri president on foreign
visits. Some sources also report that Israel has set up electronic
listening stations along the Caspian Sea and Iranian border.[47]
Israel's next priority is to counter the Iranian intelligence network
in Azerbaijan and in other Muslim countries of the CIS. Iran has
attempted to expand its political influence to its immediate neighbors
as well as to intensify intelligence operations, particularly in
Azerbaijan. According to Azerbaijani media reports, the national
security services have arrested 22 people who were sent by Iran to
carry out terrorist attacks against the U.S. and Israeli embassies,
as well as against Western-linked groups and companies in Baku. In
February 2012, the Azerbaijani Ministry of National Security announced
the arrest of a terrorist group allegedly working for Iran's secret
services. In January 2012, Azerbaijan's secret service arrested two
people accused of plotting to kill two teachers at a Jewish school
in Baku. In 2007, Azerbaijan arrested 15 people in connection with an
alleged Iranian-linked spy network accused of providing intelligence
on Western and Israeli activities.[48]
Azeri-Israeli security cooperation is vital and beneficial for both
Baku and Jerusalem. The failure of the Azerbaijani-Israeli alliance
to work together to counter Iran would be irresponsible and would
have unpredictable consequences for Baku and Jerusalem. Tehran's
attempts to expand its Shi'i and Iranian ideology could have a
catastrophic impact on Azerbaijan's potential to be an independent
and strong American ally in the region. It is clear that the fall of
secular Azerbaijan would badly damage Israel's security and America's
strategic interests. Moreover, this would strengthen Iran and create a
totally new balance of power in the Greater Middle East, particularly
in the South Caucasus and Caspian basin, as well as in Central Asia.
Last, Azerbaijani energy is a critical factor in Israel's strategic
calculations. In 2011, Azerbaijan exported as much as to 2.5
million tons (about 18.5 million barrels) of oil with total worth
of $2.1 billon to Israel. Last year trade turnover between Israel
and Azerbaijan reached $4 billion, making Azerbaijan Israel's top
trade partner within CIS countries.[49] According to Ariel Cohen,
Israel "... can benefit from projects designed to bring Caspian and
Central Asian oil and gas to Western markets as they allow Israel to
diversify supply and receive abundant energy at affordable price."[50]
Israeli-Azerbaijani energy cooperation has clearly become an extremely
important factor for Israel's energy security. This cooperation
allows for the diversification of supplies of oil and gas and for
exploration of Israel's energy resources. Baku provides Jerusalem
with over one-third of Israel's oil supply.[51] As a result of former
Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman's April 2012 visit to Baku, SOCAR
will start drilling in Med Ashdod, Israel's oil field, located 16
kilometers off the Mediterranean coast. The Israeli Ambassador to
Baku, Michael Lotem said, "The drilling will begin soon. The work is
at a very advanced stage and delivery of a drilling rig to the field
is now expected.[52] The project is SOCAR's first oil-production or
drilling operation outside of Azerbaijan. The contract allows SOCAR
to gain international experience and expand its operations in Turkey,
Georgia, Israel, and other countries.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
It is well-known that the United States has declared the Caspian
basin as vital to its national interests. In this context, the
Israeli-Azerbaijani partnership is an effective tool to strengthen
and support America's strategic presence in this very sensitive part
of the world. Furthermore, the Israeli-Azerbaijani alliance to counter
Iran has strategic importance for U.S. interests, particularly in the
Greater Middle East and Central Asia. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia are America's allies in the South Caucasus and the Caspian
basin. The strengthening of Azerbaijan's secular and pro-Western
independence should be a strategic priority for U.S. diplomacy in
the region.
However, the Obama administration's lack of focus on South Caucasus
affairs jeopardizes America's strategic interests in the region. Unlike
the Clinton administration and the Bush administration, the Obama
administration has not been active in managing Iranian and Russian
influence in this part of the world. As result of the Russo-Georgian
war of 2008, the Tehran-Moscow axis effectively decreased America's
influence in the Greater Caspian Basin. Now, the axis continues to
limit or minimize U.S. political activity and increases pressure on
Washington's allies.
Indeed, Azerbaijan is under double pressure from Iran and Russia
and needs strong U.S. support to secure its national independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Azerbaijan's pro-Western
independence ensures a U.S. strategic presence in the Caspian basin
and facilitates its power projection deep into Asia. In this context,
Azerbaijan is of the utmost geostrategic importance for the United
States. The loss of a secular and independent Azerbaijan, as previously
discussed, would badly damage both U.S. and EU strategic interests. The
United States should thus support Israeli-Azerbaijani cooperation in
order to counter the regional threat and to strengthen both countries'
security as reliable U.S. allies.
CONCLUSION
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the historically close and
warm relations between Jews and Azeris became a solid base for
mutual cooperation between the State of Israel and the Republic of
Azerbaijan. Both countries are strategically located but in hostile
environments. This has strengthened their rapprochement and led to
expanded cooperation.
Despite strong opposition from Tehran and Moscow, Azerbaijan has
established a close partnership with Israel. Today, Baku and Jerusalem
are partners on a wide range of issues. The insecurity and regional
threats have pushed both Azerbaijan and Israel to create a strategic
alliance that enhances security and defense capabilities.
However, the future of the Israeli-Azerbaijani relationship depends on
the political nature of the ruling power in Azerbaijan. Iran continues
its attempts to spread its Islamic Revolution ideology into Azerbaijan
through Shi'i propaganda, while expanding its intelligence network
in Baku and other major Azerbaijani cities.
The strengthening of pro-Islamist or Shi'i political forces would
have a catastrophic impact on Azerbaijan's political future as a
secular state and a strong Israeli and American ally. In this light,
the strengthening of ties in all areas is crucial in order to combat
Iranian influence. It is also of fundamental importance that the
Azeri-Jewish/Israeli-Azerbaijani alliance is cultivated as a long-term
and mutually advantageous relationship.
One idea for a joint project is the establishment of a university
named after Baku-born Nobel Prize laureate Lev Landau (Lev Landau
University). The university, financed by Israel or by both sides,
could offer Jewish studies as well as other disciplines. An Azeri
Studies center could also be opened at one of the major Israeli
universities, such as at Tel Aviv University.
Initiatives like these would contribute to the development of the
history and culture of both nations and would thus strengthen ties and
create a solid foundation for maintaining relations in the long-term.
With its pro-Western foreign policy, Azerbaijan is strategically
important for U.S. and Israeli interests in the Greater Middle East and
in the post-Soviet space. Ensuring Azerbaijan's future as a secular,
independent state should be a key priority for Israel and the United
States. It is likely that the new U.S. administration will intensify
efforts to support Azerbaijan's independence and territorial integrity
in order to position it under NATO's security umbrella and to protect
the strategic Western oil infrastructure in the Caspian basin. Richard
Morningstar's 2012 nomination as U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan was
a strategic move aimed to revive and push forward U.S. diplomacy in
the South Caucasus and Caspian basin.
With regard to any military option to stop Iran's nuclear program,
Azerbaijan continues to attempt to remain neutral. On a May 29,
2012, visit to Tehran, the Azerbaijani minister of defense said, "The
Republic of Azerbaijan, like always in the past, will never permit
any country to take advantage of its land, or air, against the Islamic
Republic of Iran, which we consider our brother and friend country."
Indeed, Baku would like to avoid any possible military clashes with
Iran and maintain its neutrality. However, Azerbaijan's actions
and pragmatic foreign policy indicate that Baku's position is more
pro-Western than pro-Iranian. Baku will thus continue to cooperate with
Israel in order to protect and advance Azerbaijani national interests.
*Mahir Khalifa-zadeh, Ph.D. is a political analyst based in
Toronto, Canada. He is affiliated with the Montreal-based Center for
Research on Globalization and is a member of the Canadian Political
Science Association. He is also Professor of Political Science
at the International Eco-Energy Academy (Baku, Azerbaijan) and a
regular contributor to international journals on global politics
and security. His latest article is "Iran and the South Caucasus:
A Struggle for Influence" (Sweden, 2011).
NOTES
_________________________
[1] Joanna Sloame, "The Virtual Jewish History Tour: Azerbaijan,"
American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, The Jewish Virtual
Library,http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/vjw/Azerbaijan.html.
[2] Aryeh Tepper, "The Azeri Exception,"
Jewish Ideas Daily, October 29,2010,
http://www.jewishideasdaily.com/content/module/2010/10/29/main-featur
e/1/the-azeri-exception.
[3] Lev Davidovich Landau, MacTutor History
of Mathematics, University of St Andrews,Scotland,
http://www-history.mcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/Biographies/Landau_Lev.ht
ml; "The Nobel Prize in Physics 1962: LevLandau,"
Nobelprize.org, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physic
s/laureates/1962/landau.html.
[4] "History of Jews inAzerbaijan," Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Je ws_in_Azerbaijan.
[5] Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and
Identity Under Russian Rule (Hoover Institution Press, 1992), p.22,
http://ebookee.org/The-Azerbaijani-Turks-Power-and-Identity-Under-Russi
an-Rule_776519.html#3wBsPMWYsEpAcHCu.99.
[6] Alexander Murinson, Jews in Azerbaijan: a History Spanning Three
Millennia, Vision of Azerbaijan, http://www.visions.az/history,112/.
[7] Krzysztof Strachota and Wojciech Gorecki, "The Southern
Caucasus and Central Asia After the Russian-Georgian
War: the Geopolitical Consequences," Center for Eastern
Studies (CES) Commentary, No. 10, September 24, 2008,
http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_10.pdf.
[8] Mahir Khalifa-Zadeh, "Iran and the South Caucasus: A Struggle
for Influence," Journal of Central Asia and Caucasus, Vol. 12, No. 1
(2011), http://www.ca-c.org/journal/2011-01-eng/05.shtml.
[9] Shapour Ghasemi, "Safavid Empire 1502 - 1736, History
of Iran," Iran Chamber Society, September 24, 2012,
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/safavids/safavids.php;Ben
Madadi, "Origins of Azeri Turks," Iranian.com, January 27, 2008,
http://www.iranian.com/main/2008/origins-azeri-turks-0.
[10] U.S. Department of State, "Azerbaijan," Background Note:
Azerbaijan, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2909.htm.
[11] "History of Azerbaijan," Explore Azerbaijan,
http://exploreazerbaijan.com/?page_id=57; Ghasemi, "Safavid Empire."
[12] Saban Kardas, "Turkey and Azerbaijan: One Nation-Two
States?" Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 193, October
21,2009,http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35
630&cHash=560416055f.
[13] Nasib L. Nassibli, "Azerbaijan- Iran Relations: Challenges
and Prospects," Event Report, Kennedy School of Government,
HarvardUniversity,http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/12750/azerbaijan_
iran_relations.html.
[14] Nasib Nasibzade, "The Azeri Question in Iran:
A Crucial Issue for Iran's Future," Caspian Crossroads,
Winter1998,http://www.azeri.dk/en/articles/The%20Azeri%20Question%20in%20Iran.pdf;
"Rohrabacher Introduces Resolution Supporting Right of Azeri Self
Determination," Congressman Dana Rohrbacher website, September 12,2012,
http://rohrabacher.house.gov/uploadedfiles/bills-112hconres137ih.pdf.
[15] Nick O'Malley, "'Great Satan' Backs 'Small Satan': Obama
Reaffirms Stance Against Iran," The Sydney Morning Herald, March
6,2012,http://www.smh.com.au/world/great-satan-backs-small-satan-obama-reaffir
ms-stance-against-iran-20120306-1uf46.html.
[16] "Commander Urges Azerbaijan to Respect
Islamic Rules," Arabs Today (UK), August 10,2011,
http://www.arabstoday.net/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl
e&id=21867:commander-urges-azerbaijan-to-respect-islamic-rules-&catid=43:ara
b-world.
[17] "Russia Extends Lease on Military Base in
Armenia Through 2044," RIA Novosti, August 20, 2010,
http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100820/160276128.html.
[18] David Lev, "Iran Warns Azerbaijan: Keep
Mossad Out," Arutz Sheva, February 12, 2012,
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/152671.
[19] Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "President
Shimon Peres in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan for Historic
First Visit, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, June
28,2009,http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2009/President_Peres_v
isits_Azerbaijan_and_Kazakhstan_28_Jun_2009.htm.
[20] "Iran Recalls Azerbaijan Envoy
Following Peres Visit," JTA, June 29,2009,
http://www.jta.org/news/article/2009/06/29/1006211/iran-recalls-azerb
aijan-envoy-following-peres-visit.
[21] Ilya Bourtman, "Israel and Azerbaijan's Furtive Embrace," Middle
East Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer 2006), pp.
47-57,
http://www.meforum.org/987/israel-and-azerbaijans-furtive-embrace.
[22] Arye Gut, "Azerbaijan, Israel Have Become 'Strategic Allies',"
News.Az, June 28, 2011, http://news.az/articles/politics/39340.
[23] "Ilham Aliyev and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad Held an
Expanded Meeting," President of Azerbaijan website, News, November 17,
2010,http://en.president.az/articles/1103.
[24] "Iran Threatens Pre-emptive Action amid
Nuclear Tensions," NBC News, February 21,2012,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/46461790/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t
/iran-threatens-pre-emptive-action-amid-nuclear-tensions/.
[25] "Iran Provides Every Support to Armenia, Azerbaijani MP," News.Az,
February 14, 2012, http://www.news.az/articles/politics/54665.
[26] Speech of Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev on the official
reception in honor of President Heydar Aliyev on behalf of the
conference of presidents of major Jewish organizations-July 28,
1997," Heydar Aliyev Heritage International Online Library,
http://library.aliyev-heritage.org/en/7423863.html.
[27] Bourtman, "Israel and Azerbaijan's Furtive Embrace."
[28] Efraim Inbar, "Israeli-Turkish Tensions
and Beyond," Hurriyet Daily News, March 12,2010,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=israeli-tu
rkish-tensions-and-beyond-2010-03-12.
[29] Serkan DemirtaÅ~_, "Amid Sound and Fury, Turkey-Israel
Alliance Endures," Hurriyet Daily News, April 13, 2012,
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10705597.asp.
[30] Alexander Murinson, "Azerbaijan-Turkey-Israel
Relations: The Energy Factor," Middle East Review of
International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 12, No. 3 (September
2008),http://www.gloria-center.org/2008/09/murinson-2008-09-04/.
[31] Soner Cagaptay and Alexander Murinson, "Good Relations
Between Azerbaijan and Israel: A Model for Other Muslim States in
Eurasia?" The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 30,2005,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/good-relation
s-between-azerbaijan-and-israel-a-model-for-other-muslim-state.
[32] Address of Jewish Diaspora of Azerbaijan, Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), June 19, 2003,
http://www.osce.org/secretariat/42078.
[33] "Azerbaijan Rejects Iran Fears
over Israel 'Arms Buy'," Defense News, February,
29,2012,http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120229/DEFREG04/302290002/Azerbaij
an-Rejects-Iran-Fears-Over-Israel-8216-Arms-Buy-8217.
[34] Patrick Brennan, "Israeli-Azerbaijan Deal Leaked,
Bolton Blames Obama," National Review, March 29,2012,
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/294856/bolton-blames-obama-leaki
ng-israeli-azerbaijan-relationship-patrick-brennan.
[35] Ariel Cohen and Kevin DeCorla-Souza, "Eurasian Energy and Israel's
Choices," Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No.
88 (February 2011),http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/MSPS88.pdf.
[36] Lieberman Denies Israel Has Access to
Azerbaijan Air Bases," JewishJournal.com, April
23,2012,http://www.jewishjournal.com/israel/article/lieberman_denies_israel_has
_access_to_azerbaijan_air_bases_20120423/.
[37] "Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman
Visits North Azerbaijan on 20th Anniversary
of Diplomatic Relations," BayBak Azerbaijan, April
24,2012,http://en.baybak.com/israeli-foreign-minister-avigdor-lieberman-visits-
north-azerbaijan-on-20th-anniversary-of-diplomatic-relations.azr.
[38] Herb Keinon, "Reports Baku Gave Israel Airfields
Are Fiction," The Jerusalem Post, April 4, 2012,
http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=267268.
[39] Bulent Aras, "Post-Cold War Realities: Israel's Strategy in
Azerbaijan and Central Asia," Middle East Policy, January 1, 1998,
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-20297513.html, p.
6869.
[40] Bourtman, "Israel and Azerbaijan's Furtive Embrace."
[41] U.S. Department of State, "Israel," Background Notes,
http://www.state.gov.
[42] Artak Grigoryan, "Priority Directions in
the Foreign Policy of Israel: South Caucasus and
Central Asia," Noravank Foundation, September 22,
2009,http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=3623.
[43] "Pinkhaz Avivi: We Embrace the Potential of Economic
Ties with the South Caucasus," November 7, 2011, Vestnik
Kavkaza,http://vestnikkavkaza.net/interviews/politics/19641.html.
[44] "Azeris Get Israel UAVs Built Under License," UPI, October 7,2011,
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Azeris_get_Israel_UAVs_built_under_li
cense_999.html.
[45] "Israel Signs $1.6 Billion Arms Deal
with Azerbaijan," Haaretz.com, February 26,2012,
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-signs-1-6-billio
n-arms-deal-with-azerbaijan-1.414916.
[46] Bourtman, "Israel and Azerbaijan's Furtive Embrace."
[47] Shamkhal Abilov, "The Azerbaijan-Israel Relations: A
Non-diplomatic but Strategic Partnership," OAKA, Vol. 4, No.
8(2009),http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/gm3veLfV7Q5rP83jaIV34UObvarinb.
pdf, pp. 138-56.
[48] "Azerbaijan Arrests Alleged
Iran-hired Terrorists," Fox News, March 14,2012,
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/03/14/22-arrested-in-azerbaijan-in-
plot-on-us-israeli-embassies/.
[49] "Lieberman: The Trade Turnover Between Azerbaijan
and Israel Reaches $4 Billion," Contact.az, April 23,
2012,http://www.contact.az/docs/2012/Politics/04234650en.htm.
[50] Cohen and DeCorla-Souza, "Eurasian Energy and Israel's Choices."
[51] Jen Alic, "Azerbaijan's International Energy Aspirations
Raise Tensions in Middle East," Oilprice.com, May 15,2012,
http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Middle-East/Azerbaijans-International
-Energy-Aspirations-Raise-Tensions-in-Middle-East.html.
[52] Shahin Abbasov, "Azerbaijan: SOCAR to Use Israeli
Oil Field as Proving Ground," Eurasianet.org, May 8, 2012,
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65374.
From: A. Papazian