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SCENARIOS OF TURKISH ATTACK ON ARMENIA
New format for the South Caucasus
Developments in the Near East confirmed that the EU's concerns and
initiatives at forming a "belt" of security in the Mediterranean Sea
were grounded.
Europe is in a deep existential defense and needs more or less
comprehensible relations with and loyalty of the states located in the
neighboring regions. These problems are being handled under a "long
pause" in enlargement, economic crisis, curtailed defense expenditure,
decline in foreign political activity, growth of controversies among
the leading European states, and relations among small states sometimes
leads to political conflicts.
Supporters of the left liberal project are up for slowing down the
plans of right conservative centers, primarily in defense and security,
assuming that by launching this policy the rightists are trying to
strengthen their political positions. Nevertheless, the project is
being implemented, involving the Eastern Partnership.
The United States and Europe agree on this project, though in the
beginning France and Germany were suspicious about the Eastern
Partnership, Germany was equally suspicious about the Mediterranean
project where it does not have significant interests. Now, however,
the leading states of continental Europe have understood that they
may become marginal in Eastern policy and are now more active in this
direction than the initiators of Eastern Partnership.
Earlier it was understood that former ideas and concepts of the EU
and the United States on review and projection of political processes
in the South Caucasus as in a "unified" region are doomed to failure.
There is no such a political region as the South Caucasus but
interests of the Euro-Atlantic community in this region relating
certain geopolitical objectives.
Ten years ago it was already clear that as soon as integration of
the countries of the region with the EU and NATO starts, systemic
decisions based on internal cooperation in the region would prove
impossible. Azerbaijan fears integration with the European Union
because that will endorse claims for democracy and human rights,
leading to removal of the ruling regime. In Georgia relations with the
EU and NATO have already been set up, and hardly any deviant behavior
should be expected from them, independent from the ruling team.
In Armenia it was clear that nothing more interesting and innovative
should be expected, and those in government have been chosen,
understanding the fundamental interest of the Armenian society in
integration with NATO and the EU. Hence, each country of the region
(including Abkhazia) is assigned to a specific function, independent
from its relations with neighbors and its interests.
Nevertheless, the Euro-Atlantic community views Georgia and Armenia as
an interrelated bloc of integrated states. This is a rather vulnerable
topic considering the problems of Georgia with Russia and Armenia
with Turkey. A more or less acceptable way of simplification of
the situation is Georgian-Russian normalization, which would allow
stabilizing the region.
At the same time, the current points of view on the new format in
the South Caucasus are far from perfection, first of all in ideas
and plans. Attempts are made to avoid big military conflicts but big
regional wars are ahead, and they may take unexpected turns in terms
of its participants.
The impression is that a new Sarajevo is sought for, and the South
Caucasus is a suitable place for outbreak of the conflict of regional
importance. The problem is in the understanding of the framework
conditions and relations of the countries of Eastern Europe with
the EU and NATO, and what the two basic structures of the West will
undertake in case of war.
Currently they bet on the political reaction of the EU and NATO but the
United States understands that they will have to react immediately if
big states intervene in the war, which may lead to major geopolitical
corrections. The United States and Russia already have an experience
of intervention in 1992 when Turkey tried to hit Armenia.
Brent Scowcroft, special assistant to the U.S. president, telephoned
the head of General Staff of Turkey and told him that if they take
that step, he will not be able to save them from Russian rockets. In
answer to the remark of the chief of general staff "what if Russians
do not react?", Brent Scowcroft said in that case they would have to
react. Russia undertook decisive steps to contain Turkey's actions
then, which played a crucial role at the moment. However, thereby the
precedent of combination of the interests of Russia and the United
States was created in regard to Turkey's containment. (By the way,
the interests of Russia and the United States matched to some extent
over the prevention of Turkey's military intervention in the second
stage of the military conflict in Syria.)
NATO increasingly treats Eastern Partnership as an instrument for the
policy of the alliance and arena for integration with these states
in the spheres of defense and security. There are signs of agreement
of the policies of Russia and Turkey relating to the integration
of Armenia with NATO, and Ankara does not miss the opportunity to
initial the "Karabakh issue" in NATO. (It was the continuation of
the efforts of Russia and Turkey to push "handover" of Karabakh to
Azerbaijan in 2008.)
They fail thanks the stance of France, the United States and Greece
but apparently the Russian-Turkish cooperation over this issue
continues. Some NATO member states have drafted scenarios on the
possible policy of Russia in case of integration of Armenia with the
alliance. These drafts have not become official NATO documents but
they are used some of its interested member states.
There is an agreed decision to ignore Russia's stance which has not
undertaken anything definite yet, not counting Moscow's interest in
Turkish policy on this issue.
However, Russia is much more worried about the relations of Armenia
with the EU, not NATO, because this integration is more specific
and better elaborated. It should be noted that the European Union
is gaining more importance in defense and security and practically
an integration of the Union with NATO is underway, despite Turkey's
position.
Russia has appeared in a more complicated international and
geopolitical situation. Russia cannot afford to ignore Turkey's
position and interests, as well as those of other big states of
Western Asia. Russia is trying its hardest not to appear in the same
line with Turkey, viewing it as a regional power but it does not
mean that Russia can ignore its opinion. Russia will have to build
equal relations with Turkey, which supposes use of "costly political
resources" which is actually taking place.
Russia has assumed before Turkey a commitment to prevention of
military enhancement of Armenia and enabling final and big defeat of
Azerbaijan. This is what Russia says in regard to balance of forces
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, the current balance of
forces will entail Armenia's defeat and is therefore not favorable
for Russia. Armenia must be stronger, and Russia has to take it into
account in its relations with Turkey.
This state of things favors the West because it pushes Armenia (as
well as Georgia) to integration. However, at the same time, the EU
and NATO have not elaborated sufficiently the basis for a European
security system in which the South Caucasus could also be involved.
In the current stage the West views security of the South Caucasus in
the following way: Turkish intervention in the war is not probable but
is not ruled out in case Azerbaijan undergoes a catastrophic defeat;
in case Turkey deploys air force against Armenia, the United States and
NATO will have time and reserve of opportunities to undertake political
moves; in case Turkey deploys land troops, the United States and NATO
will not undertake land-based actions against Turkey but will launch
an extensive air attack, only against the units of deployed troops.
At present Russia must recognize that not only its position deters war
in the South Caucasus but also the United States, NATO and the EU play
an increasing role to deterrence of the launch of military actions. In
this regard, the interests of Russia are in line with the interests
of the West but only within these scenarios. Russia will continue to
have a big influence on the South Caucasus but it no longer has an
exclusive role, it is simply unable to deal with these problems.
Igor Muradyan 11:50 17/08/2013 Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/politics/view/30717
New format for the South Caucasus
Developments in the Near East confirmed that the EU's concerns and
initiatives at forming a "belt" of security in the Mediterranean Sea
were grounded.
Europe is in a deep existential defense and needs more or less
comprehensible relations with and loyalty of the states located in the
neighboring regions. These problems are being handled under a "long
pause" in enlargement, economic crisis, curtailed defense expenditure,
decline in foreign political activity, growth of controversies among
the leading European states, and relations among small states sometimes
leads to political conflicts.
Supporters of the left liberal project are up for slowing down the
plans of right conservative centers, primarily in defense and security,
assuming that by launching this policy the rightists are trying to
strengthen their political positions. Nevertheless, the project is
being implemented, involving the Eastern Partnership.
The United States and Europe agree on this project, though in the
beginning France and Germany were suspicious about the Eastern
Partnership, Germany was equally suspicious about the Mediterranean
project where it does not have significant interests. Now, however,
the leading states of continental Europe have understood that they
may become marginal in Eastern policy and are now more active in this
direction than the initiators of Eastern Partnership.
Earlier it was understood that former ideas and concepts of the EU
and the United States on review and projection of political processes
in the South Caucasus as in a "unified" region are doomed to failure.
There is no such a political region as the South Caucasus but
interests of the Euro-Atlantic community in this region relating
certain geopolitical objectives.
Ten years ago it was already clear that as soon as integration of
the countries of the region with the EU and NATO starts, systemic
decisions based on internal cooperation in the region would prove
impossible. Azerbaijan fears integration with the European Union
because that will endorse claims for democracy and human rights,
leading to removal of the ruling regime. In Georgia relations with the
EU and NATO have already been set up, and hardly any deviant behavior
should be expected from them, independent from the ruling team.
In Armenia it was clear that nothing more interesting and innovative
should be expected, and those in government have been chosen,
understanding the fundamental interest of the Armenian society in
integration with NATO and the EU. Hence, each country of the region
(including Abkhazia) is assigned to a specific function, independent
from its relations with neighbors and its interests.
Nevertheless, the Euro-Atlantic community views Georgia and Armenia as
an interrelated bloc of integrated states. This is a rather vulnerable
topic considering the problems of Georgia with Russia and Armenia
with Turkey. A more or less acceptable way of simplification of
the situation is Georgian-Russian normalization, which would allow
stabilizing the region.
At the same time, the current points of view on the new format in
the South Caucasus are far from perfection, first of all in ideas
and plans. Attempts are made to avoid big military conflicts but big
regional wars are ahead, and they may take unexpected turns in terms
of its participants.
The impression is that a new Sarajevo is sought for, and the South
Caucasus is a suitable place for outbreak of the conflict of regional
importance. The problem is in the understanding of the framework
conditions and relations of the countries of Eastern Europe with
the EU and NATO, and what the two basic structures of the West will
undertake in case of war.
Currently they bet on the political reaction of the EU and NATO but the
United States understands that they will have to react immediately if
big states intervene in the war, which may lead to major geopolitical
corrections. The United States and Russia already have an experience
of intervention in 1992 when Turkey tried to hit Armenia.
Brent Scowcroft, special assistant to the U.S. president, telephoned
the head of General Staff of Turkey and told him that if they take
that step, he will not be able to save them from Russian rockets. In
answer to the remark of the chief of general staff "what if Russians
do not react?", Brent Scowcroft said in that case they would have to
react. Russia undertook decisive steps to contain Turkey's actions
then, which played a crucial role at the moment. However, thereby the
precedent of combination of the interests of Russia and the United
States was created in regard to Turkey's containment. (By the way,
the interests of Russia and the United States matched to some extent
over the prevention of Turkey's military intervention in the second
stage of the military conflict in Syria.)
NATO increasingly treats Eastern Partnership as an instrument for the
policy of the alliance and arena for integration with these states
in the spheres of defense and security. There are signs of agreement
of the policies of Russia and Turkey relating to the integration
of Armenia with NATO, and Ankara does not miss the opportunity to
initial the "Karabakh issue" in NATO. (It was the continuation of
the efforts of Russia and Turkey to push "handover" of Karabakh to
Azerbaijan in 2008.)
They fail thanks the stance of France, the United States and Greece
but apparently the Russian-Turkish cooperation over this issue
continues. Some NATO member states have drafted scenarios on the
possible policy of Russia in case of integration of Armenia with the
alliance. These drafts have not become official NATO documents but
they are used some of its interested member states.
There is an agreed decision to ignore Russia's stance which has not
undertaken anything definite yet, not counting Moscow's interest in
Turkish policy on this issue.
However, Russia is much more worried about the relations of Armenia
with the EU, not NATO, because this integration is more specific
and better elaborated. It should be noted that the European Union
is gaining more importance in defense and security and practically
an integration of the Union with NATO is underway, despite Turkey's
position.
Russia has appeared in a more complicated international and
geopolitical situation. Russia cannot afford to ignore Turkey's
position and interests, as well as those of other big states of
Western Asia. Russia is trying its hardest not to appear in the same
line with Turkey, viewing it as a regional power but it does not
mean that Russia can ignore its opinion. Russia will have to build
equal relations with Turkey, which supposes use of "costly political
resources" which is actually taking place.
Russia has assumed before Turkey a commitment to prevention of
military enhancement of Armenia and enabling final and big defeat of
Azerbaijan. This is what Russia says in regard to balance of forces
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, the current balance of
forces will entail Armenia's defeat and is therefore not favorable
for Russia. Armenia must be stronger, and Russia has to take it into
account in its relations with Turkey.
This state of things favors the West because it pushes Armenia (as
well as Georgia) to integration. However, at the same time, the EU
and NATO have not elaborated sufficiently the basis for a European
security system in which the South Caucasus could also be involved.
In the current stage the West views security of the South Caucasus in
the following way: Turkish intervention in the war is not probable but
is not ruled out in case Azerbaijan undergoes a catastrophic defeat;
in case Turkey deploys air force against Armenia, the United States and
NATO will have time and reserve of opportunities to undertake political
moves; in case Turkey deploys land troops, the United States and NATO
will not undertake land-based actions against Turkey but will launch
an extensive air attack, only against the units of deployed troops.
At present Russia must recognize that not only its position deters war
in the South Caucasus but also the United States, NATO and the EU play
an increasing role to deterrence of the launch of military actions. In
this regard, the interests of Russia are in line with the interests
of the West but only within these scenarios. Russia will continue to
have a big influence on the South Caucasus but it no longer has an
exclusive role, it is simply unable to deal with these problems.
Igor Muradyan 11:50 17/08/2013 Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/politics/view/30717