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Today's Zaman, Turkey
Aug 25 2013
New thinking for the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement?
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
[email protected]
The local media in Azerbaijan reported the appointment of a new US
co-chair -- Ambassador James Warlick -- to the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group earlier this
month as a sign of renewed political engagement from the US.
Given the current US-Russia tensions, it seems likely that Washington
would like to `punish' Moscow. But beyond the work of the Minsk Group,
there is a need first to `restore' negotiations between the parties.
However, there is no guarantee for a quick solution of the conflict,
or that the national interests of the US, Russia or France/EU have
changed in such a way that the group will be galvanized into new
action toward conflict resolution.
Azerbaijan always argues that more than 30,000 Armenians are living
peacefully in Azerbaijan, and Baku could help with the post-conflict
rehabilitation of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories.
But such thinking has, until now, been limited to a few publications
on post-conflict resolution. However, thinking becomes reality when
you turn it into strategy, and Azerbaijan should consider building and
implementing its engagement strategy with Karabakh Armenians. Within
Azerbaijan, the `isolation camp' has until now been stronger than the
`engagement camp' in regard to opening economic relations with
Karabakh Armenians in advance of the withdrawal of Armenian forces
from the occupied territories. Discouragingly, the engagement camp is
small, consisting mainly of intellectuals. The past 20 years of
negotiations suggest that the solution is largely dependent on the
conflict parties, mutual trust and the potential for cooperation.
The key issue for this strategy is that even if both sides can reach
an agreement, the `third party' (Karabakh Armenians) could block it.
This was seen in 1997-1998, when Armenian President Levon
Ter-Petrossian brought the country to the brink of a compromise which
then collapsed, largely due to the role of Karabakh Armenians who,
with the diaspora and some political groups, pushed the president to
resign. Ultimately, if the Armenian leadership will not make
concessions, official Baku needs to change its engagement with
Karabakh Armenians. The aim is to avoid a situation wherein either the
Armenian leadership or the Karabakh Armenian de facto authorities can
take the peace process hostage.
In this regard, Azerbaijan can develop an Engagement, Cooperation and
Coexistence Strategy with Karabakh Armenians. Karabakh Armenians are
living under the patronage of de facto separatist authorities outside
Azerbaijan and also under an information blockade. This strategy might
also be beneficial for Azerbaijan because it does not question the
principle of territorial integrity, nor does it force Azerbaijan to
recognize the self-proclaimed independence of Nagorno-Karabakh
separatists.
The strategy should consist of the following principles:
First, that Karabakh Armenians are citizens of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan
pledges not to threaten the physical security of its people, to
provide all security guarantees to them and to open up economic
opportunities. Under this approach, the Azerbaijani government should
reassure Armenians that the target of the threat is not the civilian
population, but the Armenian leadership. Otherwise, any statements
containing threats will be used in a PR campaign against Azerbaijan.
Military intervention should be an option in the event of failed
negotiations.
Second, that Karabakh Armenians can benefit from coexistence with
Azerbaijanis. The Azerbaijani government allocates money in the state
governmental budget to Karabakh Armenians, which they can access from
a `third country,' for example Azerbaijan's Tbilisi embassy. The
budget cannot be used for any activity by the de facto authorities.
For example, the Azerbaijani government is now repaying Soviet era
bank deposits to Azerbaijanis. Karabakh Armenians can also access
their deposits; all they need to do is show the record of the deposit
and their ID. This could be a simple way of beginning the engagement
process via a neutral financial procedure. The more difficult strategy
would be to create a state `Post-Rehabilitation Fund,' whereby the
government would allocate money for reconstruction after conflict
resolution. This would be one way of marketing the conflict resolution
strategy, in particular to Karabakh Armenians.
Third, one of the key goals is to strengthen the bargaining power of
the EU and US in the Karabakh conflict. This has been seen in the case
of Georgia, where the EU tried to build stronger ties with Abkhazia,
which, in turn, could be used to increase Abkhazia's contacts with
Georgia, or to nudge Sukhumi toward creative legal formulae on the
question of status in future negotiations. Before the 2008 August War,
Georgia did not have an `engagement without recognition' strategy. But
before declaring this policy in 2010, Georgia's fear was that the EU
or US support for NGO activities could legitimize the breakaway
entities. However, Azerbaijan can coordinate NGO activities, along
with the EU and US. In this way, Azerbaijan could ask the US and the
EU to refrain from implementing projects that could strengthen the
Karabakh authorities, and instead to focus on initiatives that will
increase the trust of Karabakh Armenians in Azerbaijan. After the
initial implementation of soft economic engagement and NGO projects
with Karabakh Armenians, the government could declare later the full
points of engagement policy and add security guarantees if the
conflict is resolved.
Obviously, there is a risk that nationalistic anxieties and the
exploitation of patriotic themes can serve as powerful political
instruments to legitimize curtailing further engagement in Karabakh.
But it is possible that this type of thinking also makes it impossible
to justify any engagement projects and/or moves toward
confidence-building. Possibly, the majority of Karabakh Armenians and
their supporters will be blamed for having `sold out national
interests for the sake of Azerbaijani funds.' But, it is possible that
such a strategy could change the trajectory of conflict resolution and
could facilitate a new endeavor on conflict resolution -- without
waiting for the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs to generate movement, or
for Yerevan's concessions.
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=324516
From: A. Papazian
Aug 25 2013
New thinking for the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement?
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
[email protected]
The local media in Azerbaijan reported the appointment of a new US
co-chair -- Ambassador James Warlick -- to the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group earlier this
month as a sign of renewed political engagement from the US.
Given the current US-Russia tensions, it seems likely that Washington
would like to `punish' Moscow. But beyond the work of the Minsk Group,
there is a need first to `restore' negotiations between the parties.
However, there is no guarantee for a quick solution of the conflict,
or that the national interests of the US, Russia or France/EU have
changed in such a way that the group will be galvanized into new
action toward conflict resolution.
Azerbaijan always argues that more than 30,000 Armenians are living
peacefully in Azerbaijan, and Baku could help with the post-conflict
rehabilitation of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories.
But such thinking has, until now, been limited to a few publications
on post-conflict resolution. However, thinking becomes reality when
you turn it into strategy, and Azerbaijan should consider building and
implementing its engagement strategy with Karabakh Armenians. Within
Azerbaijan, the `isolation camp' has until now been stronger than the
`engagement camp' in regard to opening economic relations with
Karabakh Armenians in advance of the withdrawal of Armenian forces
from the occupied territories. Discouragingly, the engagement camp is
small, consisting mainly of intellectuals. The past 20 years of
negotiations suggest that the solution is largely dependent on the
conflict parties, mutual trust and the potential for cooperation.
The key issue for this strategy is that even if both sides can reach
an agreement, the `third party' (Karabakh Armenians) could block it.
This was seen in 1997-1998, when Armenian President Levon
Ter-Petrossian brought the country to the brink of a compromise which
then collapsed, largely due to the role of Karabakh Armenians who,
with the diaspora and some political groups, pushed the president to
resign. Ultimately, if the Armenian leadership will not make
concessions, official Baku needs to change its engagement with
Karabakh Armenians. The aim is to avoid a situation wherein either the
Armenian leadership or the Karabakh Armenian de facto authorities can
take the peace process hostage.
In this regard, Azerbaijan can develop an Engagement, Cooperation and
Coexistence Strategy with Karabakh Armenians. Karabakh Armenians are
living under the patronage of de facto separatist authorities outside
Azerbaijan and also under an information blockade. This strategy might
also be beneficial for Azerbaijan because it does not question the
principle of territorial integrity, nor does it force Azerbaijan to
recognize the self-proclaimed independence of Nagorno-Karabakh
separatists.
The strategy should consist of the following principles:
First, that Karabakh Armenians are citizens of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan
pledges not to threaten the physical security of its people, to
provide all security guarantees to them and to open up economic
opportunities. Under this approach, the Azerbaijani government should
reassure Armenians that the target of the threat is not the civilian
population, but the Armenian leadership. Otherwise, any statements
containing threats will be used in a PR campaign against Azerbaijan.
Military intervention should be an option in the event of failed
negotiations.
Second, that Karabakh Armenians can benefit from coexistence with
Azerbaijanis. The Azerbaijani government allocates money in the state
governmental budget to Karabakh Armenians, which they can access from
a `third country,' for example Azerbaijan's Tbilisi embassy. The
budget cannot be used for any activity by the de facto authorities.
For example, the Azerbaijani government is now repaying Soviet era
bank deposits to Azerbaijanis. Karabakh Armenians can also access
their deposits; all they need to do is show the record of the deposit
and their ID. This could be a simple way of beginning the engagement
process via a neutral financial procedure. The more difficult strategy
would be to create a state `Post-Rehabilitation Fund,' whereby the
government would allocate money for reconstruction after conflict
resolution. This would be one way of marketing the conflict resolution
strategy, in particular to Karabakh Armenians.
Third, one of the key goals is to strengthen the bargaining power of
the EU and US in the Karabakh conflict. This has been seen in the case
of Georgia, where the EU tried to build stronger ties with Abkhazia,
which, in turn, could be used to increase Abkhazia's contacts with
Georgia, or to nudge Sukhumi toward creative legal formulae on the
question of status in future negotiations. Before the 2008 August War,
Georgia did not have an `engagement without recognition' strategy. But
before declaring this policy in 2010, Georgia's fear was that the EU
or US support for NGO activities could legitimize the breakaway
entities. However, Azerbaijan can coordinate NGO activities, along
with the EU and US. In this way, Azerbaijan could ask the US and the
EU to refrain from implementing projects that could strengthen the
Karabakh authorities, and instead to focus on initiatives that will
increase the trust of Karabakh Armenians in Azerbaijan. After the
initial implementation of soft economic engagement and NGO projects
with Karabakh Armenians, the government could declare later the full
points of engagement policy and add security guarantees if the
conflict is resolved.
Obviously, there is a risk that nationalistic anxieties and the
exploitation of patriotic themes can serve as powerful political
instruments to legitimize curtailing further engagement in Karabakh.
But it is possible that this type of thinking also makes it impossible
to justify any engagement projects and/or moves toward
confidence-building. Possibly, the majority of Karabakh Armenians and
their supporters will be blamed for having `sold out national
interests for the sake of Azerbaijani funds.' But, it is possible that
such a strategy could change the trajectory of conflict resolution and
could facilitate a new endeavor on conflict resolution -- without
waiting for the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs to generate movement, or
for Yerevan's concessions.
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=324516
From: A. Papazian