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Politkom.ru , Russia
Dec 3 2013
Vladimir Putin in Armenia: Journey with Consequences
by Caucasus expert Sergey Minasyan
A state visit by Vladimir Putin to Armenia took place on 2 December
2013. The visit was brief but at the same time quite significant and
controversial. And the point is not that this was the first state
visit by the Russian president to Armenia during his "third term". The
timing and political context of the visit were the most important
thing. It should be noted that the inter-state outcome of Putin's
visit could in themselves be assessed as extremely positive for
Yerevan and Moscow. The parties signed a whole package of agreements
comprising 12 documents and they confirmed their positions on a number
of documents agreed previously this year. But at the same time no-one
concealed the fact that all of these agreements were primarily linked
(and caused) by Armenia's agreement to join the Customs Union, which
was initiated by the Kremlin.
Altogether, the Armenian-Russian accords reached in 2013 include among
other things: a reduction in prices for Russian gas supplied to
Armenia (envisaging a reduction in Russian duty of 35 per cent and a
tie to internal Russian prices) to 189 dollars for one thousand cubic
metres, more active military-technical cooperation (by allowing
Armenia the possibility of purchasing weapons and military hardware,
again at internal Russian prices, from Russian enterprises in the
military-industrial complex) and other accords in the socioeconomic
and humanitarian spheres. It was also stated separately that the
signing of a "road map" for Armenia to join the Customs Union and the
Single Economic Space was planned for 24 December.
However, the socio-political consequences of Putin's journey to
Armenia may be more profound and, what is more, absolutely not
unclouded. Putin's visit to Armenia was the first since the decision
taken by the Armenian authorities on 3 December on the Customs Union
(and, accordingly, Armenia's refusal to sign the association agreement
that had been under preparation for four years and join the free trade
zone with the EU). And Putin's visit also took place just a few days
after the Vilnius summit on the EU Eastern Partnership programme. And,
finally, the fact that the visit took place literally a day or two
after the second "Independence Square" protest in Kiev gives it
additional "piquancy".
As a result, Putin's visit was accompanied by protests by
representatives of various strata of Armenia's civil society and by
political activists, which were if not numerous then more or less the
first protests, unprecedented in Armenia's entire post-Soviet history.
Although we are talking about several hundred participants (who were
kept company by an almost identical number of journalists and
policemen) the range of those taking part was very wide -from
activists defending the rights of sexual minorities and even
latter-day Armenian "anarchists", to representatives of the
parliamentary opposition, students and local employees of
international organizations, foundations and diplomatic missions
accredited in Armenia.
This was entirely predictable against the background of the profound
disappointment of a section of Armenian society in the refusal to
initial the association agreement, especially against the backdrop of
the protests currently unfolding in Ukraine. Direct and indirect
pressure by the Kremlin on Armenia aimed at it rejecting the EU
Association Agreement has led, according to the 2013 results, to a
previously unseen sharp increase in the negative perception of the
current Russia and the Russian authorities by Armenian society and its
political elite. The internal political discourse surrounding the
subject of Armenian-Russian relations thus proved to be
unprecedentedly sharp, something that had not previously been observed
during the entire post-Soviet period. Although it should also be
admitted that no-one in Armenia had thought that the protests on 2
December would be so active.
Moreover, in reality the change in the perception of the Russian
regime by the political elite and public of Armenia does not
particularly depend on political preferences -pro-government or
opposition. The only difference is the degree of responsibility (or
irresponsibility) of the public assessments on the part of the
Armenian political elite: representatives of the ruling group often
cannot afford to say what the opposition and civil society maintain
about Russia's policies since it fears aggravating the already
suspicious attitude of the Kremlin even more.
In addition to the Russian pressure on Armenia over the question of it
joining the Customs Union, the announcement of large-scale supplies of
Russian weapons to Azerbaijan has also played a negative role in the
public attitudes of Armenian society and its elite towards Russia. The
perception of these processes started to be more sensitive in Armenia
in the middle of 2013 although the dynamics in Russo-Azerbaijani
military-technical cooperation were noticeable in previous years as
well. In 2013, Moscow even supplied modern types of weapons such as
Smerch heavy multiple rocket launchers, TOC-1A Solntsepek heavy
flamethrower systems, the T-90C and BMP-3 modified Russian tanks, and
other types of weapons, which not only technically surpass what was
supplied by Russia to its CSTO ally Armenia but are more modern than
the weapons with which the Russian troops in the Caucasus are
themselves equipped. Although Moscow tried to off-set its
multi-billions in arms supplies to Azerbaijan with free (or almost
free) arms transfers to Armenia in 2013, Armenia treated the
Russo-Azerbaijani military links with suspicion. This just intensified
even more the anti-Russian sentiment in Armenian society, which at
best considered these actions by Moscow as a manifestation of
mercenariness.
Returning to the results of Putin's visit and considering them from
the point of view of the prospects for Armenian-Russian cooperation in
the immediate future, it is possible to repeat again and note that
they will remain "in the shadow" of the processes surrounding the
formation of the Customs Union. However, the prospects for Armenia's
real membership of the Customs Union are not yet as clear as Putin
tried to optimistically present them during his visit to Armenia. At
the time, Minsk and Astana responded quite warily to the Russian
initiative on including Armenia in the Customs Union, which may have
an effect on the negotiations on the conditions for Armenia finally
joining the organization.
Nor should it be forgotten alongside this that maintaining the
political balance between influential external actors will again be
very important aims of Armenia's foreign policy in the foreseeable
future. In the short term this will mean attempts to minimize the
political costs of refusing to sign the association agreement while
maintaining relations with the EU in their interim format (which was
also confirmed by the signing of the corresponding political
declaration between Yerevan and Brussels in Vilnius on 29 November),
and at the same time obtaining new guarantees and security resources
from Russia in return for its agreement to join the Customs Union. In
other words, even if Armenia joins the Customs Union as a
fully-fledged member, as a member of the CSTO it will keep its
advanced relations with the EU and NATO (in comparison with the other
members of the CSTO and the Customs Union) and will have a facilitated
visa regime with the EU. On the other hand, Armenia will seek to
extend the security guarantees provided by Russia and the CSTO, which
will enable it to maintain the status quo in the Karabakh conflict and
the military balance in the arms race with Azerbaijan (this is why it
is no coincidence that Putin's visit, at the suggestion of Armenia,
started in Armenia's second city -Gyumri -where the 102nd Russian
military base is also located).
Of course, the above does not guarantee that Armenia, in its attempt
to implement a new foreign policy "complementarity", will not affect
the current military-strategic format of Armenian-Russian relations.
However, this will to a large extent depend on how long the interest
of Russia itself lasts in the burden of its political presence in the
South Caucasus and in the post-Soviet space in general. On the other
hand, the resources and possibilities for official Yerevan to develop
the further format of relations with Moscow will to a large extend
depend on the growing trend for a negative perception of Russia's
regional policy by ever broader strata of Armenian society. After
Putin's state visit to Armenia on 2 December 2013, there is every
reason to think that this will now be the indispensable background to
Armenian-Russian relations.
[Translated from Russian]
Dec 3 2013
Vladimir Putin in Armenia: Journey with Consequences
by Caucasus expert Sergey Minasyan
A state visit by Vladimir Putin to Armenia took place on 2 December
2013. The visit was brief but at the same time quite significant and
controversial. And the point is not that this was the first state
visit by the Russian president to Armenia during his "third term". The
timing and political context of the visit were the most important
thing. It should be noted that the inter-state outcome of Putin's
visit could in themselves be assessed as extremely positive for
Yerevan and Moscow. The parties signed a whole package of agreements
comprising 12 documents and they confirmed their positions on a number
of documents agreed previously this year. But at the same time no-one
concealed the fact that all of these agreements were primarily linked
(and caused) by Armenia's agreement to join the Customs Union, which
was initiated by the Kremlin.
Altogether, the Armenian-Russian accords reached in 2013 include among
other things: a reduction in prices for Russian gas supplied to
Armenia (envisaging a reduction in Russian duty of 35 per cent and a
tie to internal Russian prices) to 189 dollars for one thousand cubic
metres, more active military-technical cooperation (by allowing
Armenia the possibility of purchasing weapons and military hardware,
again at internal Russian prices, from Russian enterprises in the
military-industrial complex) and other accords in the socioeconomic
and humanitarian spheres. It was also stated separately that the
signing of a "road map" for Armenia to join the Customs Union and the
Single Economic Space was planned for 24 December.
However, the socio-political consequences of Putin's journey to
Armenia may be more profound and, what is more, absolutely not
unclouded. Putin's visit to Armenia was the first since the decision
taken by the Armenian authorities on 3 December on the Customs Union
(and, accordingly, Armenia's refusal to sign the association agreement
that had been under preparation for four years and join the free trade
zone with the EU). And Putin's visit also took place just a few days
after the Vilnius summit on the EU Eastern Partnership programme. And,
finally, the fact that the visit took place literally a day or two
after the second "Independence Square" protest in Kiev gives it
additional "piquancy".
As a result, Putin's visit was accompanied by protests by
representatives of various strata of Armenia's civil society and by
political activists, which were if not numerous then more or less the
first protests, unprecedented in Armenia's entire post-Soviet history.
Although we are talking about several hundred participants (who were
kept company by an almost identical number of journalists and
policemen) the range of those taking part was very wide -from
activists defending the rights of sexual minorities and even
latter-day Armenian "anarchists", to representatives of the
parliamentary opposition, students and local employees of
international organizations, foundations and diplomatic missions
accredited in Armenia.
This was entirely predictable against the background of the profound
disappointment of a section of Armenian society in the refusal to
initial the association agreement, especially against the backdrop of
the protests currently unfolding in Ukraine. Direct and indirect
pressure by the Kremlin on Armenia aimed at it rejecting the EU
Association Agreement has led, according to the 2013 results, to a
previously unseen sharp increase in the negative perception of the
current Russia and the Russian authorities by Armenian society and its
political elite. The internal political discourse surrounding the
subject of Armenian-Russian relations thus proved to be
unprecedentedly sharp, something that had not previously been observed
during the entire post-Soviet period. Although it should also be
admitted that no-one in Armenia had thought that the protests on 2
December would be so active.
Moreover, in reality the change in the perception of the Russian
regime by the political elite and public of Armenia does not
particularly depend on political preferences -pro-government or
opposition. The only difference is the degree of responsibility (or
irresponsibility) of the public assessments on the part of the
Armenian political elite: representatives of the ruling group often
cannot afford to say what the opposition and civil society maintain
about Russia's policies since it fears aggravating the already
suspicious attitude of the Kremlin even more.
In addition to the Russian pressure on Armenia over the question of it
joining the Customs Union, the announcement of large-scale supplies of
Russian weapons to Azerbaijan has also played a negative role in the
public attitudes of Armenian society and its elite towards Russia. The
perception of these processes started to be more sensitive in Armenia
in the middle of 2013 although the dynamics in Russo-Azerbaijani
military-technical cooperation were noticeable in previous years as
well. In 2013, Moscow even supplied modern types of weapons such as
Smerch heavy multiple rocket launchers, TOC-1A Solntsepek heavy
flamethrower systems, the T-90C and BMP-3 modified Russian tanks, and
other types of weapons, which not only technically surpass what was
supplied by Russia to its CSTO ally Armenia but are more modern than
the weapons with which the Russian troops in the Caucasus are
themselves equipped. Although Moscow tried to off-set its
multi-billions in arms supplies to Azerbaijan with free (or almost
free) arms transfers to Armenia in 2013, Armenia treated the
Russo-Azerbaijani military links with suspicion. This just intensified
even more the anti-Russian sentiment in Armenian society, which at
best considered these actions by Moscow as a manifestation of
mercenariness.
Returning to the results of Putin's visit and considering them from
the point of view of the prospects for Armenian-Russian cooperation in
the immediate future, it is possible to repeat again and note that
they will remain "in the shadow" of the processes surrounding the
formation of the Customs Union. However, the prospects for Armenia's
real membership of the Customs Union are not yet as clear as Putin
tried to optimistically present them during his visit to Armenia. At
the time, Minsk and Astana responded quite warily to the Russian
initiative on including Armenia in the Customs Union, which may have
an effect on the negotiations on the conditions for Armenia finally
joining the organization.
Nor should it be forgotten alongside this that maintaining the
political balance between influential external actors will again be
very important aims of Armenia's foreign policy in the foreseeable
future. In the short term this will mean attempts to minimize the
political costs of refusing to sign the association agreement while
maintaining relations with the EU in their interim format (which was
also confirmed by the signing of the corresponding political
declaration between Yerevan and Brussels in Vilnius on 29 November),
and at the same time obtaining new guarantees and security resources
from Russia in return for its agreement to join the Customs Union. In
other words, even if Armenia joins the Customs Union as a
fully-fledged member, as a member of the CSTO it will keep its
advanced relations with the EU and NATO (in comparison with the other
members of the CSTO and the Customs Union) and will have a facilitated
visa regime with the EU. On the other hand, Armenia will seek to
extend the security guarantees provided by Russia and the CSTO, which
will enable it to maintain the status quo in the Karabakh conflict and
the military balance in the arms race with Azerbaijan (this is why it
is no coincidence that Putin's visit, at the suggestion of Armenia,
started in Armenia's second city -Gyumri -where the 102nd Russian
military base is also located).
Of course, the above does not guarantee that Armenia, in its attempt
to implement a new foreign policy "complementarity", will not affect
the current military-strategic format of Armenian-Russian relations.
However, this will to a large extent depend on how long the interest
of Russia itself lasts in the burden of its political presence in the
South Caucasus and in the post-Soviet space in general. On the other
hand, the resources and possibilities for official Yerevan to develop
the further format of relations with Moscow will to a large extend
depend on the growing trend for a negative perception of Russia's
regional policy by ever broader strata of Armenian society. After
Putin's state visit to Armenia on 2 December 2013, there is every
reason to think that this will now be the indispensable background to
Armenian-Russian relations.
[Translated from Russian]