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  • How Putin Outfoxed The West

    HOW PUTIN OUTFOXED THE WEST

    12/16/2013 04:44 PM

    Maintaining Russian Power

    By Christian Neef and Matthias Schepp

    In one of his many foreign-policy successes this year, Russian
    President Vladimir Putin has used power politics and blackmail to
    bring Ukraine back into Russia's sphere of influence. But what is
    the Kremlin leader's secret to success?

    Six weeks ago, two men walked across Moscow's Red Square, one wearing
    a coat and the other a bishop's robe. They proceeded to the Monument
    to Minin and Pozharsky in front of St. Basil's Cathedral.

    Kuzma Minin, a merchant, and Prince Dmitry Pozharsky were the leaders
    of an uprising against the Polish invasion of 1611. November 4, the day
    on which they liberated the center of Moscow more than 400 years ago,
    is now a national holiday, a symbol of how a united Russian people
    can defend itself against any foreign enemy.

    Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow and all of Russia, and Vladimir Putin,
    the secular ruler of the realm, placed a bouquet of red carnations
    at the monument. Back at the Kremlin, the church leader had prepared
    a surprise for the president, a certificate honoring Putin "for the
    preservation of greater Russia."

    "We know," Kirill said, launching into a hymn of praise for Putin,
    "that you, more than anyone else since the end of the 20th century, are
    helping Russia become more powerful and regain its old positions, as
    a country that respects itself and enjoys the respect of all others."

    President Vladimir Putin has led this country for the last 14 years,
    but 2013 has been his most successful year yet. Forbes has just placed
    him at the top of its list of the world's most powerful people,
    noting that he had "solidified his control over Russia." According
    to the magazine, Putin has replaced US President Barack Obama in the
    top spot because the Russian leader has gained the upper hand over
    his counterpart in Washington in the context of several conflicts
    and scandals.

    Indeed, at the moment, Putin seems to be succeeding at everything he
    does. In September, he convinced Syria to place its chemical weapons
    under international control. In doing so, he averted an American
    military strike against the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad
    and made Obama look like an impotent global policeman.

    In late July, Putin ignored American threats and granted temporary
    asylum to US whistleblower Edward Snowden, a move that stirred up
    tensions within the Western camp. The Germans and the French were
    also outraged over Washington's surveillance practices.

    Since then, Putin has scored one coup after the next. In the fall, when
    meaningful progress was made in talks with Tehran over a curtailment
    of Iran's nuclear program, Putin once again played a key role.

    And now, by exerting massive pressure on Viktor Yanukovych, he has
    persuaded the Ukrainian president to withdraw from an association
    agreement with the European Union that took years to prepare, just a
    few days before the scheduled signing at a summit of EU leaders. In
    doing so, he broughtUkraine back into Russia's sphere of influence,
    at least for now.

    Russian Power Play with Ukraine

    Many are impressed by Putin's self-assurance and his ability to
    question everything that is considered a political rule of the game
    outside Russia. Prominent American blogger Matt Drudge once called
    Putin the "leader of the free world," while another commentator
    dubbed him the "Chuck Norris of international politics." Norris,
    a star of action films like "The Way of the Dragon," has found a
    niche portraying hard-hitting, patriotic and deeply conservative
    loners. Men like Drudge admire Putin for seemingly ruling his giant
    country single-handedly, though often with ruthless methods.

    For others, however, Putin is a man who rules in the style of a
    19th-century despot, one who does not feel committed to the European
    political model. He favors a feudalistic approach instead, with a
    dominant state; courtiers who fulfill their ruler's every desire,
    no matter how arbitrary; an economy that purely serves the interests
    of politicians; and a motto that reads: "What's mine cannot be yours."

    And now the events in Ukraine and the role Putin has played in them
    raises the question, once again, of who the man in the Kremlin really
    is and what he wants. Is Ukraine, as it descends into turmoil, symbolic
    of a new turning point in the relationship between East and West?

    In recent years, Western capitals have viewed Russia as a difficult
    but stable country -- and, most of all, as one that had lost much
    of its significance on the world stage. The conflict over Ukraine
    illustrates that the fate of not only 143 million Russian citizens,
    but also that of most of Russia's neighboring countries within the
    former Soviet empire, hinges on Putin.

    While pro-EU demonstrators built barricades not far from the seat
    of government in Kiev, the pro-Kremlin Moscow tabloid newspaper
    Komsomolskaya Pravda ran a cover story predicting the collapse of
    Ukraine. The pro-EU western parts of the country, formerly part of
    the Habsburg Empire, were marked in purple. Meanwhile, the eastern
    provinces, closely aligned with Russia for centuries, along with
    the Crimean Peninsula were marked in red. At about the same time,
    a lawmaker in Crimea urged Putin to send Russian forces to Ukraine
    to "protect us from NATO aggressors, Western secret agents and paid
    demonstrations."

    It was probably a mistake on the part of the West to stop treating
    Russia as a potent adversary in the last two decades. And the outrage
    over some of the things that have happened in Putin's realm has been
    justifiable. They have included, for example, the Kremlin's use of
    special police units to suppress the protests of tens of thousands
    of Muscovites over election fraud in the 2011 parliamentary vote,
    or the fact that Putin had two members of the female punk band Pussy
    Riot locked away for two years, merely because they had staged a
    protest performance in a Moscow church.

    The uprising of disappointed pro-EU Ukrainians against President
    Yanukovych is now revealing to the West the brutal methods with which
    Russia is beginning to defend its interests beyond its borders.

    Yanukovych's sudden change of course away from the EU was the result
    of a cold and calculating power play by the Russian president.

    Blocking the EU's Eastward Expansion

    The world is seeing a resurgence of Cold War sentiments. Following
    violent police crackdowns against protesters in Kiev, the United
    States is considering sanctions against Ukraine, US State Department
    spokeswoman Jennifer Psaki announced. Her boss, Secretary of State John
    Kerry, had said earlier that he was disgusted by the police brutality,
    saying that the response was "neither acceptable nor does it befit a
    democracy." His words were not only directed at Yanukovych, but also
    at the man pulling the strings, Vladimir Putin.

    Russia fired back. For the West, democracy isn't even the issue,
    Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed. He argued that the West
    merely wants to secure Ukraine as a trophy, so as to deal Russia a
    strategic blow.

    In Moscow last Tuesday, 444 of 450 members of the State Duma,
    the lower house of the Russian parliament, adopted a statement in
    which they accused Western politicians of "open interference ...in
    the internal affairs of the sovereign Ukraine." The remark was a
    reference to appearances by German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle,
    former Polish Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczyski and US Undersecretary
    of State Victoria Nuland on Kiev's Independence Square, where Nuland
    handed out sandwiches to demonstrators.

    "Unsanctioned rallies, blocking access to state authorities, as well
    as the seizure of administrative buildings, rioting, and destruction
    of historic monuments" -- a reference to the toppling of a statue of
    Lenin in downtown Kiev -- "lead to destabilization in the country
    and may cause serious negative economic and political consequences
    for the Ukrainian population," the Duma deputies wrote, noting that
    a "coup d'etat" was underway in Ukraine. Ukrainian state television
    referred to the European Union as an "anti-Russian" alliance because
    it was ignoring Moscow's interest by seeking closer ties with Ukraine.

    The deep divide between Russian and Western mindsets has become
    especially apparent in Eastern Europe in recent months, where the EU
    has been trying to advance its "Eastern Partnership" program since
    2009. In addition to Ukraine, the initiative relates to EU relations
    with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova. The West
    has been offering free-trade arrangements and financial support in
    return for reforms in the legal system, election laws and media in
    these six countries. Exports of Western goods would aim to foster
    closer ties between the eastern edge of the continent and the EU.

    Brussels and its junior partners were discussing steel tariffs, wheat
    exports and the purchase of Eastern European wine. When such ties
    suddenly became an issue of geopolitics, the West was shocked. For
    the first time since the beginning of its eastward expansion, the EU
    encountered bitter resistance -- from Russia.

    Exerting Pressure on Smaller Neighbors

    Still, it wasn't a complete surprise -- and the EU should have expected
    it. Since the early 1990s, Russia has been trying to keep the former
    Soviet republics within its sphere of influence. Ignoring setbacks,
    Putin is now using his power to achieve this goal. He threatens these
    countries, holds them hostage, blackmails them or plays them off each
    other. His actions, though cold and unscrupulous, have been highly
    successful. "He who pays the piper calls the tune," Putin said.

    To this day, Russia uses Transnistria, a state that broke away from
    the Republic of Moldova in a 1992 civil war, to torpedo Moldova's
    sovereignty, although no UN member state formally recognizes
    Transnistria today. Moscow also plays the role of protector in Abkhazia
    and South Ossetia, two regions that broke away from Georgia after
    the 2008 war, and it uses the puppet states to exert pressure on the
    government in Tbilisi.

    In the mind of Putin, a former KGB officer, a country that was once a
    Soviet state and no longer wishes to be Moscow's vassal can only become
    one of two things: a vassal of Washington, or a vassal of Brussels.

    Smaller states of the former Soviet Union that rebel against Moscow
    today can expect to face Putin's concentrated rage. In 2006, he banned
    imports of Georgian wine and mineral water when Mikhail Saakashvili,
    the country's pro-American president at the time, demanded the
    withdrawal of Russian troops.

    Ahead of a summit meeting in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius, where
    at least Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova planned to sign association
    agreements with the EU, Moscow boycotted Lithuanian milk products.

    Years earlier, Russia had shut down a strategically important oil
    pipeline to Lithuania, merely because the government in Vilnius
    planned to sell a large refinery to Warsaw instead of Moscow and
    cease its reliance on Russia.

    The manner in which Russia exerted pressure on Armenia this year was
    especially conspicuous. Like Ukraine, the small Caucasus republic had
    spent four years negotiating an association agreement with Brussels.

    The country's president and prime minister rejected Moscow's demand
    that Armenia join a Russian-led customs union, arguing that it was
    "geographically impossible" and "pointless" -- until September 3,
    when Putin summoned his Armenian counterpart, Serzh Sargsyan, to
    the Kremlin.

    Shortly after the talks, Sargsyan told reporters that Armenia was
    not going to sign the agreement with Brussels, after all, but that
    it would join the customs union. Moscow had threatened to raise
    its prices for Russian natural gas and had started selling arms to
    Armenia's archenemy, Azerbaijan. Putin also offered the Armenians
    help in expanding its railway system and a nuclear power plant that
    had been scheduled to be shut down.

    The Republic of Moldova was subjected to similar pressure. In
    September, Moscow had suddenly informed Moldova that it could no
    longer export its wine, the country's most important export product,
    to Russia. Putin's officials also reminded the government in Chisinau
    that hundreds of thousands of Moldovans earn a living as guest
    workers in Russia, and that close to 200,000 of them had no valid
    residency permits and could therefore be deported. Unlike Armenia,
    the Moldovan government chose to sign the EU treaty nonetheless.

    The pressure Moscow exerted on Ukraine before the EU summit in Vilnius
    exceeded all of its previous efforts. In the summer, the Russians
    blocked duty-free exports of pipes from Ukraine, as well as shipments
    by Ukrainian candy maker Roschen, claiming deficient quality of the
    goods. The move adversely affected two important Ukrainian oligarchs
    and was designed to persuade them to talk President Yanukovych out
    of the planned cooperative agreement with the EU.

    In October, not long before the Vilnius summit, Russia suddenly
    introduced new regulations for the transit of goods, causing long
    backups of trucks waiting at the Russian-Ukrainian border. Then it
    suspended imports of meat and railroad cars from Ukraine. Finally,
    the Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom demanded payment of
    a [email protected] billion ($1.8 billion) debt for gas that it had delivered at
    some point in the past.

    Pulling Strings in Kiev

    The Russian trade war was accompanied by an unprecedented propaganda
    offensive. President Putin dispatched his economic adviser Sergei
    Glazyev, a man with extremely nationalistic views, to Ukraine. He
    painted a disastrous scenario for the Ukrainians if they signed the
    agreement with the EU. Glazyev claimed that Ukraine would need at least
    ~@130 billion to comply with EU rules. This, he said, would sharply
    drive down the country's currency, so that Kiev would be unable to
    pay its debts, citizens would be without heat and the country would
    eventually be forced into bankruptcy.

    "Why does the Ukrainian leadership want to drive its country into
    economic suicide?" he asked. On the other hand, Glazyev noted,
    Ukraine would generate an additional $10 billion in revenues if it
    joined the Russian-led customs union.

    Glazyev was named Russia's "Person of the Year 2013" at a ceremony in
    Moscow's Cathedral of Christ the Savior on Nov. 28, the day the EU
    summit began in Vilnius, without Ukraine having signed the planned
    agreement. According to officials, Glazyev received the award for
    his contributions to "bringing Ukraine back into the economic union
    with Russia."

    Some might be surprised by Russia's blatant efforts to pressure Kiev.

    But Ukraine, whose name is derived from an Old East Slavic word that
    means "borderland," is Europe's second-largest country, and Putin
    needs it if he hopes to build his planned Eurasian economic empire.

    Kiev is also the historic cradle of the Russian nation, and the first
    East Slavic realm was established there in the 9th century. In his
    speeches, Glazyev repeatedly spoke of "our shared intellectual and
    historic tradition."

    At the same time, both Russians and Ukrainians are disdainful of each
    other. In Moscow, Ukrainians are called "Chochly," a reference to the
    unusual headdress of the medieval Dnieper Cossacks. Kiev residents
    refer to Russians as "Moskali," which is also a derogatory term. The
    Russians "have treated us as part of their property for the last 350
    years," Leonid Kravchuk, the first president of independent Ukraine,
    once said.

    Putin and Yanukovych are also not on good terms. The fact that
    the Russian president eventually strong-armed Yanukovych has to do
    with the mentality of the Ukrainian president. Yanukovych is a man
    who never likes to commit himself and always keeps a back door open
    somewhere. Putin had not believed that Yanukovych would actually sign
    the agreement with Brussels. But when it became apparent in the summer
    that he was prepared to do so after all, Moscow stepped in.

    Even Putin has actually been disinclined to use such coarse tactics.

    Russia is not "seeking a superpower status or trying to claim a
    global or regional hegemony," Putin said last Thursday in his annual
    state-of-the-nation address. However, the president still expects
    countries like Ukraine to remain within Moscow's orbit.

    'New World Leader of the Conservatives'

    Following Snowden, Syria, Iran and other foreign-policy coups,
    Putin now sees himself in a role that he finds equally gratifying:
    an "arbiter of global politics."

    "For Putin, all it took was 20 minutes with Obama on the sidelines
    of the G-20 summit in St. Petersburg to avert a bombing of Syria and
    to lay the groundwork for a solution to the Syrian chemical weapons
    problem," says a senior Russian diplomat.

    According to an unpublished, 44-page report by the Institute for
    Strategic Studies, the Kremlin's most powerful think tank, to which
    SPIEGEL has gained access, Putin's authority is now "so extensive
    that he can even influence a vote on Syria in the US Congress." The
    report praises Putin as the "new world leader of the conservatives."

    The report's authors write that the hour of conservatives has now
    come worldwide because "the ideological populism of the left" -- a
    reference to men like Obama and French President Francois Hollande --
    "is dividing society."

    According to the report, people yearn for security in a rapidly
    changing and chaotic world, and the overwhelming majority prefers
    stability over ideological experiments, classic family values over
    gay marriage, and the national-state over immigration. Putin, the
    authors write, stands for these traditional values, while the domestic
    policies of traditional democracies are hamstrung by the need for
    compromise. Last week, Putin himself stated that the objective of
    his conservatism is to "prevent a movement backward and downward,
    into the chaos of darkness."

    These observations on the shift in the public mood may be correct,
    but who wants to see Russia as a role model? The protesters on Kiev's
    Independence Square apparently do not.

    Putin's Russia is a poorly organized country whose power hinges on
    the price of oil remaining above $100 a barrel. The colossus in the
    East, with its nuclear weapons, mineral resources and foreign currency
    reserves of $515 billion resembles the pseudo-giant in the children's
    novel Jim Button and Luke the Engine Driver by German author Michael
    Ende: The closer one gets to him, the smaller he becomes.

    Russia looks very good on paper, with a budget that has been almost
    balanced for years and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 14 percent (compared
    with 80 percent for Germany). But growth rates of 6 percent and higher
    are a thing of the past. The Kremlin expects a growth rate of only
    1.3 percent this year, which is too low in light of the country's
    massive need for modernization.

    In his address to the nation, Putin conceded that bureaucracy and
    widespread corruption are stifling innovation and entrepreneurial
    spirit in Russia.

    To enhance this image and simultaneously counteract reporting critical
    of Russia in the Western media, last week, Putin established the
    media holding company "Russia Today," a modern propaganda machine
    intended to improve the country's image abroad. He also issued a
    decree to "dissolve" the deeply traditional RIA Novosti news agency,
    arguing that its columnists were too dependent on Western positions
    in their ideology.

    The new head of Russia Today, Dmitry Kiselyov, attracted attention when
    he said on a talk show that homosexuals should be banned from donating
    blood or sperm. "And their hearts, in case they die in a car accident,
    should be buried or burned as unfit for extending anyone's life,"
    Kiselyov added. He has also compared the EU's bailout of Cypriot banks
    with Hitler's expropriation of Jews. At the first company meeting of
    Russia Today, Kiselyov said that the most important characteristic
    for employees of the new state-run agency is not objectivity, but
    "love for Russia."

    The Rise of a 'Non-Liberal Empire'

    It's been a decade since Anatoly Chubais, the architect of the
    privatization of the Russian economy and still an influential
    powerbroker in the Kremlin elite, wrote an essay in which he called for
    a "liberal empire." He argued that Russia should bring the countries
    lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union back into its sphere of
    influence by enhancing its own appeal through democracy, freedom and
    the rule of law. The same applied to Ukraine.

    "Today the European Union is the liberal empire," says Moscow political
    scientist Vladimir Frolov. "Putin is offering a different, non-liberal
    empire," he adds, an empire that appeals to authoritarian rulers,
    such as Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Kazakh President
    Nursultan Nazarbayev, whose countries, like Armenian and Kyrgyzstan,
    plan to join Putin's Eurasian customs union.

    In Putin's model, only a leader knows what's best for his people. "The
    non-liberal empire helps to explain Russia's turning away from Europe
    by citing subversive European values," says Frolov, "and it allows
    the Kremlin to hold onto the illusion that it is playing in the same
    league as America, China and the EU."

    No Putin project embodies this illusion quite as much as the 2014
    Winter Olympics in Sochi. They symbolize both Putin's dream of a new
    greatness and his weakness. The Kremlin chief has had new highways,
    tunnels and railroads constructed in the Caucasus, as well as a
    state-of-the-art train station and two winter resorts. Corruption
    and nepotism were partly response for an explosion in costs -- from
    the original estimate of ~@9 billion to more than ~@37 billion. And
    only a national leader with Putin's ambitions, and only a country
    with megalomaniacal tendencies, could hit upon the idea of holding
    winter games in a Black Sea resort town with a subtropical climate.

    Russia intends to use the Olympics to present its unique features to
    a marveling world, which explains why the Kremlin had 14,000 people
    carry the Olympic torch along a 65,000-kilometer (40,600-mile) route
    throughout Russia -- both of which are record figures. Naturally,
    the torch relay began on Red Square, and of course the ceremony
    coincided with Putin's birthday. The Kremlin sent a diver with the
    torch to the bottom of Lake Baikal, the world's deepest freshwater
    lake. Cosmonauts carried it into space in a rocket, camel riders took
    it across the southern Russian steppes, sled dogs pulled it through
    the Arctic and an icebreaker ferried it to the North Pole.

    The Arctic Ocean is another place where the Kremlin is trying to
    impress the world. To gain access to the mineral resources hidden
    under the ocean floor, for which Russia is competing with other
    countries bordering the ocean, Putin instructed his defense minister
    last week to "expand Russia's military presence in the Arctic." This
    means rebuilding 10 Soviet-era bases in the Arctic Circle and beefing
    up Russia's Arctic military presence.

    How the EU Has Misread Putin and Ukraine

    Putin's strength is only relative because it feeds on the weakness
    of the West. Europe's policy toward Ukraine is a perfect example.

    Germany and the EU long believed that if they could convince Kiev
    to sign a few dozen liberal laws, not even a politician as slippery
    as Yanukovych could question the country's growing alignment with
    the West. Instead of offering more money and clear prospects of EU
    membership, at the end of the negotiations, they demanded the release
    of jailed former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.

    In taking this approach, the EU wasn't exactly demonstrating a unique
    insight into Ukrainian sensitivities. Tymoshenko doesn't have what
    it takes to be a martyr, and Ukrainians have only limited sympathy
    for her. Many recall her career as an oligarch in the 1990s and her
    populist approach as prime minister. Indeed, they see no significant
    difference between Tymoshenko and Yanukovych.

    But Yanukovych's mentality is similar to Putin's -- and therefore
    not at all like that of the EU. He isn't interested in values such
    as fairness, the balancing of interests and freedom for the individual.

    Like Putin, Yanukovych grew up in poor circumstances, where it was
    important to be stronger than others and capable of bluffing and
    pouncing quickly.

    For Yanukovych, the planned rapprochement with the EU was purely a
    question of what he stood to gain from it. He wants to be re-elected
    in 2015, and there are two people, in particular, who could get in
    his way: Tymoshenko and heavyweight boxing champion Vitali Klitschko.

    The Germans have since dropped Tymoshenko like a hot potato, and now
    they are focusing their attention on the man who is supposedly the
    only leader of the opposition. Their goal is to build Klitschko into
    an adversary of Yanukovych. But they are ignoring the fact that there
    are actually three opposition leaders in Ukraine.

    They also fail to recognize that the opposition is not the true
    leader of the protests on Independence Square in Kiev, and that many
    Ukrainians actually see their party leaders, including Klitschko,
    as collaborators with the ruling elite. According to a poll, only 5
    percent of the protesters on Independence Square are there because
    opposition leaders called upon them to participate. In fact, most
    have come to the square for their own reasons.

    As long as the West sugarcoats the reality in Eastern Europe,
    Putin will hold onto his trump cards. He is more familiar with the
    situation, and he enjoys better leverage to influence the former
    Soviet republics. He also has no scruples when it comes to using
    ruthless tactics.

    Backtracking and Bluster

    It is Wednesday of last week as we meet for lunch with one of Putin's
    top advisers at an upscale Italian restaurant near the foreign ministry
    in Moscow. In Kiev, the protesters are building even higher barricades
    in a heavy snowstorm.

    The Kremlin official's eyes are bloodshot. The long nights at summit
    meetings and the 19 foreign trips he has been on with Putin this year
    have taken their toll. The official has brought along a message from
    Putin. Over a meal of pickled squid and salami, he explains that
    his boss is someone with whom "deals are possible as long as you
    talk to him." But talking to Putin to achieve compromises, he notes,
    is something the West does "far too little." Senior politicians like
    German Foreign Minister Westerwelle, he says, should not associate
    with the opposition in Kiev, and appearances on Independence Square are
    "not correct, from a diplomatic standpoint." After all, he points out,
    there are no Russian cabinet ministers there.

    The man is persuasive. Russian ministers have no need to hurry to Kiev,
    he says, since the Ukrainian president himself has been summoned to
    Moscow on an almost weekly basis. Nevertheless, this time, Putin may
    have miscalculated when it comes to Ukraine.

    When Kiev went to the barricades for the first time in 2004 and the
    Orange Revolution began, Ukrainians were protesting against election
    fraud. To Moscow, it was ultimately irrelevant whether Ukraine
    was run by men or women like former President Viktor Yushchenko,
    Tymoshenko or Yanukovych. They were all representatives of different
    clans who were fighting each other for the country's leadership --
    and they were people with whom Moscow could more or less come to terms.

    But now there are people protesting on Independence Square who
    feel cheated of their hopes for stronger ties with the EU because
    their leadership has allowed itself to be bought by Russia. To them,
    Europe is synonymous with democracy, self-determination and honesty,
    with an end to despotism and corruption.

    Moscow's clumsy attempt to put pressure on Kiev has changed the
    situation, says Russian political scientist Vladislav Inozemtsev.

    Ukrainian society, he notes, cares less about which member of the elite
    is currently in power than about the direction in which the country
    is headed. The number of pro-EU Ukrainians jumped dramatically this
    fall, says Inozemtsev.

    Yanukovych senses this. Last Thursday, he changed course and let it
    be known that he did intend to sign the EU treaty at some point. But
    it sounded like yet another one of his tricks, designed to finally
    get the protesters off the streets.

    He held a roundtable discussion on Friday afternoon, but it ended
    disappointingly when Yanukovych failed to concede to any of the
    opposition's demands. Instead, he had his staff make preparations
    for a major rally of his supporters. Nevertheless, his prime minister
    suggested the possibility of resigning, while former President Leonid
    Kuchma described Ukraine as "bankrupt."

    The game involving Kiev, Moscow and the EU hasn't been decided. It
    is already clear, however, that Putin has done Ukraine a disservice
    with his intervention and has reduced Yanukovych to a puppet. Russian
    political scientist Inozemtsev believes that Yanukovych's chances
    of winning the next election are slim. "It's highly unlikely in 2015
    that someone will be elected president who is prepared, once again,
    to exchange Europe for cheap Russian gas."

    Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

    http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/how-vladimir-putin-ruthlessly-maintains-russia-s-grip-on-the-east-a-939286.html

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