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TURKEY AND ARMENIA: WHAT'S NEXT?
Brookings Institution
Dec 18 2013
By: Omer TaÅ~_pınar
More...
The issue of Armenia enters the Turkish foreign policy agenda almost
exclusively in the context of Western attempts at legislating genocide
resolutions. The result is often a reactive nationalist defense.
In less than two years, by 2015, Turkey will find itself in a similar
dilemma. Once again, it will be external dynamics that will drive the
domestic and foreign policy debate, and quite predictably Turkey will
react with anger and resentment to Western attempts at commemorating
the centennial of the Armenian genocide. In order to avoid such an
ordeal, Ankara needs to think about Armenian-Turkish relations now,
before Western pressure builds up. The fact that Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu visited Yerevan last week is a step in the right
direction and needs to be congratulated. Instead of panicking shortly
before 2015, the Turkish government needs to pursue a multidimensional
strategy, starting now. The first dimension of the strategy should
be the opening of the border and the establishment of diplomatic
relations between the two countries.
As it is well known, shortly after the signature of the two protocols
aiming at achieving these two goals in 2009, Ankara decided to
index the ratifications of the protocols to the resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Linking the normalization of relations
to a "frozen conflict" had the impact of freezing the protocols as
well. It also showed that Turkey had no empathy for the Armenian
political leadership, which took a lot of heat from the diaspora for
dropping genocide recognition as a precondition for the normalization
of relations with Ankara.
In retrospect, the Turkish decision to establish a precondition
for normalization with Armenia was shortsighted because it
practically gave Azerbaijan de facto veto power over Turkish-Armenian
normalization. Instead, what Turkey should have done was to establish
diplomatic and economic relations with Armenia with the hope that
such a policy of engagement would in time create positive momentum
and leverage in favor of a resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh. It remains
unclear whether a breakthrough in this frozen conflict can be achieved
in the absence of Turkey gaining more leverage in relations with
Armenia. It looks like sequencing is the main problem here. The
Turkish side is reportedly ready to open the border, establish
diplomatic relations and even provide financial support to Armenia
in return for an Armenian withdrawal from two of the seven occupied
regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. This proposal looks like the
same one Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a few years ago
to his Armenian counterpart at the time, Robert Kocharyan. Kocharyan
had refused the Turkish demand on the grounds that there should be no
linkage between Nagorno-Karabakh and normalization with Turkey. It is
hard to see why today the Armenian reaction to a very similar Turkish
proposal would be any different.
Therefore, this most recent Turkish attempt at rapprochement with
Armenia is also likely to fail in the absence of a unilateral Turkish
gesture such as the opening of the border without preconditions. On
the other hand, since Turkey is always in some kind of election season,
it is almost impossible to see the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
invest serious political capital in rapprochement by taking such
a courageous step. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising
that the Armenian media saw Davutoglu's Yerevan visit as nothing
more than a public relations campaign. If Turkey is really serious
about normalizing relations with Armenia, it will have to take some
risks in relations with Azerbaijan. The key will be to convince Baku
that only the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations will create
positive momentum in solving the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.
Turkey needs to open the border first and expect its diplomatic and
economic engagement policy with Armenia to pay off in the long run.
The alternative is to continue with the current policy. The current
Turkish policy has produced no change in Nagorno-Karabakh in the last
20 years. It is time to think more creatively.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/15-turkey-armenia-next-taspinar
Brookings Institution
Dec 18 2013
By: Omer TaÅ~_pınar
More...
The issue of Armenia enters the Turkish foreign policy agenda almost
exclusively in the context of Western attempts at legislating genocide
resolutions. The result is often a reactive nationalist defense.
In less than two years, by 2015, Turkey will find itself in a similar
dilemma. Once again, it will be external dynamics that will drive the
domestic and foreign policy debate, and quite predictably Turkey will
react with anger and resentment to Western attempts at commemorating
the centennial of the Armenian genocide. In order to avoid such an
ordeal, Ankara needs to think about Armenian-Turkish relations now,
before Western pressure builds up. The fact that Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu visited Yerevan last week is a step in the right
direction and needs to be congratulated. Instead of panicking shortly
before 2015, the Turkish government needs to pursue a multidimensional
strategy, starting now. The first dimension of the strategy should
be the opening of the border and the establishment of diplomatic
relations between the two countries.
As it is well known, shortly after the signature of the two protocols
aiming at achieving these two goals in 2009, Ankara decided to
index the ratifications of the protocols to the resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Linking the normalization of relations
to a "frozen conflict" had the impact of freezing the protocols as
well. It also showed that Turkey had no empathy for the Armenian
political leadership, which took a lot of heat from the diaspora for
dropping genocide recognition as a precondition for the normalization
of relations with Ankara.
In retrospect, the Turkish decision to establish a precondition
for normalization with Armenia was shortsighted because it
practically gave Azerbaijan de facto veto power over Turkish-Armenian
normalization. Instead, what Turkey should have done was to establish
diplomatic and economic relations with Armenia with the hope that
such a policy of engagement would in time create positive momentum
and leverage in favor of a resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh. It remains
unclear whether a breakthrough in this frozen conflict can be achieved
in the absence of Turkey gaining more leverage in relations with
Armenia. It looks like sequencing is the main problem here. The
Turkish side is reportedly ready to open the border, establish
diplomatic relations and even provide financial support to Armenia
in return for an Armenian withdrawal from two of the seven occupied
regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. This proposal looks like the
same one Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a few years ago
to his Armenian counterpart at the time, Robert Kocharyan. Kocharyan
had refused the Turkish demand on the grounds that there should be no
linkage between Nagorno-Karabakh and normalization with Turkey. It is
hard to see why today the Armenian reaction to a very similar Turkish
proposal would be any different.
Therefore, this most recent Turkish attempt at rapprochement with
Armenia is also likely to fail in the absence of a unilateral Turkish
gesture such as the opening of the border without preconditions. On
the other hand, since Turkey is always in some kind of election season,
it is almost impossible to see the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
invest serious political capital in rapprochement by taking such
a courageous step. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising
that the Armenian media saw Davutoglu's Yerevan visit as nothing
more than a public relations campaign. If Turkey is really serious
about normalizing relations with Armenia, it will have to take some
risks in relations with Azerbaijan. The key will be to convince Baku
that only the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations will create
positive momentum in solving the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.
Turkey needs to open the border first and expect its diplomatic and
economic engagement policy with Armenia to pay off in the long run.
The alternative is to continue with the current policy. The current
Turkish policy has produced no change in Nagorno-Karabakh in the last
20 years. It is time to think more creatively.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/15-turkey-armenia-next-taspinar