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IRAN IS WEAKER THAN IT APPEARS AND SAUDI ARABIA IS STRONGER THAN IT THINKS; A SENSE OF THREAT IS SOMETIMES USEFUL
Al-Hayat (in Arabic), Lebanon
Dec 16 2013
by Sa'ud Kabili
The Gulf media panicked after Iran and the five-plus-one countries
signed an agreement on Tehran's nuclear programme. Perhaps that feeling
reflected the Gulf political mood, with the Gulf states seeing the
agreement as a sign that the United States is redrawing the regional
map on new power bases where Iran will emerge as the key player thanks
to the cards of power it possesses, from Iraq to Syria to Lebanon
to regions in the Gulf, Yemen, and Sudan. From a Gulf perspective,
the agreement paves the way for US-Iranian rapprochement in a way
that gives Iran a new regional role similar to the role it played in
the past as "the policeman of the Gulf."
Saudi Arabia and Iran represent the two rival camps in the region. It
must be acknowledged, therefore, that the expected US-Iranian
rapprochement will directly affect the kingdom's interests, as it
will advance Iran as a regional power at Riyadh's expense. There are
various analyses on how this will affect the kingdom or its future
relations with the United States amid the current regional shifts. But
the more important question that has still not been asked is: Where
and how did Saudi Arabia lose its opportunities on this issue, and
how should we act today?
I believe it is easy to blame international forces for this situation.
But we must be brave enough to engage in some self-criticism. The
real problem lies in the lack of a Saudi political plan for the region.
Seeking to maintain the political status quo in the region is not a
plan; rather, it is political reaction. Iran won its cards in the
region not only through its groups and militias, but also through
a clear political plan based on an ideology, political geography,
and activities based essentially on equality with the other countries.
Iran, for example, gained a huge experience from its negotiations with
the world and from its sense that it is threatened. It managed to win
cards through its challenge, in the region, to the big powers. This
is something that we perhaps should carefully examine to benefit from.
Sometimes a sense of danger and challenge might be useful to countries
because it unleashes their political potential.
In its political plan, Iran does not rely only on the idea of Shiism.
It is in alliance with Christian Armenia against Shi'i Muslim
Azerbaijan. Iran adopts a political, economic, and social system,
from the cultural base - films and arts - to a diversified industrial
base - car industry and Iranian missiles - to a political base -
promoting itself as a regional power capable of imposing its influence
in the region.
Yet the situation must be evaluated with further objectivity. Saudi
Arabia did not fail to find a regional alternative to compensate for
the absence of its plan. Just like Iran, and perhaps more successfully,
it showed political confidence, as evident, for example, in the
decision to send Al-Jazeera Shield forces to Bahrain, or in its role
in Syria, or in its recent support for Egypt despite the lack of
international support in all those cases. This makes analysts of the
Saudi policy genuinely ask why Saudi Arabia is not decisive in setting
out a comprehensive vision and a clear political plan for the region.
At the end of the day, Saudi Arabia is not a weak country. It is not
unable to confront its regional rivals, whoever they might be. In fact,
Iran is weaker that it appears and Saudi Arabia is stronger than it
thinks. What the kingdom lacks is a political plan in the region.
Such a plan would turn Saudi Arabia into a regional player seeking
to impose a vision, not just to react to the events in the region.
Any political plan stands on three pillars: political, economic,
and social. We in the kingdom desperately need a serious and frank
dialogue on how our political plan should be. With all these huge
challenges in the region, which affect the future of the state,
we cannot just remain captives to marginal issues, whether social,
like women driving cars, or economic, like the housing crisis, or
delay addressing key issues like educational reform and the launch
of economic development by diversifying the industrial base.
The Saudi political vision about the region must also be clear, not
only with regard to important issues like Syria, but also with regard
to the shape of the region as a whole. Iraq is the best example. Our
vision regarding Iraq is still limited to the factors of the sectarian
conflict in that country; we are not considering factors related to
Iraq's larger role in the region and how we would like this role to
be in the future.
A sense of threat might be useful sometimes. That we feel threatened
by the recent nuclear agreement between Iran and the international
forces might be useful, as it draws our attention to the need to work
to come up with a clear plan for the region and promote and market it
to other countries. It might also increase our self-confidence. This,
in fact, is what we desperately need.
From: Baghdasarian
Al-Hayat (in Arabic), Lebanon
Dec 16 2013
by Sa'ud Kabili
The Gulf media panicked after Iran and the five-plus-one countries
signed an agreement on Tehran's nuclear programme. Perhaps that feeling
reflected the Gulf political mood, with the Gulf states seeing the
agreement as a sign that the United States is redrawing the regional
map on new power bases where Iran will emerge as the key player thanks
to the cards of power it possesses, from Iraq to Syria to Lebanon
to regions in the Gulf, Yemen, and Sudan. From a Gulf perspective,
the agreement paves the way for US-Iranian rapprochement in a way
that gives Iran a new regional role similar to the role it played in
the past as "the policeman of the Gulf."
Saudi Arabia and Iran represent the two rival camps in the region. It
must be acknowledged, therefore, that the expected US-Iranian
rapprochement will directly affect the kingdom's interests, as it
will advance Iran as a regional power at Riyadh's expense. There are
various analyses on how this will affect the kingdom or its future
relations with the United States amid the current regional shifts. But
the more important question that has still not been asked is: Where
and how did Saudi Arabia lose its opportunities on this issue, and
how should we act today?
I believe it is easy to blame international forces for this situation.
But we must be brave enough to engage in some self-criticism. The
real problem lies in the lack of a Saudi political plan for the region.
Seeking to maintain the political status quo in the region is not a
plan; rather, it is political reaction. Iran won its cards in the
region not only through its groups and militias, but also through
a clear political plan based on an ideology, political geography,
and activities based essentially on equality with the other countries.
Iran, for example, gained a huge experience from its negotiations with
the world and from its sense that it is threatened. It managed to win
cards through its challenge, in the region, to the big powers. This
is something that we perhaps should carefully examine to benefit from.
Sometimes a sense of danger and challenge might be useful to countries
because it unleashes their political potential.
In its political plan, Iran does not rely only on the idea of Shiism.
It is in alliance with Christian Armenia against Shi'i Muslim
Azerbaijan. Iran adopts a political, economic, and social system,
from the cultural base - films and arts - to a diversified industrial
base - car industry and Iranian missiles - to a political base -
promoting itself as a regional power capable of imposing its influence
in the region.
Yet the situation must be evaluated with further objectivity. Saudi
Arabia did not fail to find a regional alternative to compensate for
the absence of its plan. Just like Iran, and perhaps more successfully,
it showed political confidence, as evident, for example, in the
decision to send Al-Jazeera Shield forces to Bahrain, or in its role
in Syria, or in its recent support for Egypt despite the lack of
international support in all those cases. This makes analysts of the
Saudi policy genuinely ask why Saudi Arabia is not decisive in setting
out a comprehensive vision and a clear political plan for the region.
At the end of the day, Saudi Arabia is not a weak country. It is not
unable to confront its regional rivals, whoever they might be. In fact,
Iran is weaker that it appears and Saudi Arabia is stronger than it
thinks. What the kingdom lacks is a political plan in the region.
Such a plan would turn Saudi Arabia into a regional player seeking
to impose a vision, not just to react to the events in the region.
Any political plan stands on three pillars: political, economic,
and social. We in the kingdom desperately need a serious and frank
dialogue on how our political plan should be. With all these huge
challenges in the region, which affect the future of the state,
we cannot just remain captives to marginal issues, whether social,
like women driving cars, or economic, like the housing crisis, or
delay addressing key issues like educational reform and the launch
of economic development by diversifying the industrial base.
The Saudi political vision about the region must also be clear, not
only with regard to important issues like Syria, but also with regard
to the shape of the region as a whole. Iraq is the best example. Our
vision regarding Iraq is still limited to the factors of the sectarian
conflict in that country; we are not considering factors related to
Iraq's larger role in the region and how we would like this role to
be in the future.
A sense of threat might be useful sometimes. That we feel threatened
by the recent nuclear agreement between Iran and the international
forces might be useful, as it draws our attention to the need to work
to come up with a clear plan for the region and promote and market it
to other countries. It might also increase our self-confidence. This,
in fact, is what we desperately need.
From: Baghdasarian