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TURKEY'S BALANCING ACT IN SOUTH CAUCASUS
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Dec 19 2013
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
In advance of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's visit to
Yerevan last week for an Organization of the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation (BSEC) meeting, there were rumors about the possibility
that Turkey might revive its normalization process with Armenia.
Not surprisingly, the Armenian side -- both at the official and
expert level -- was anticipating the visit but labeled Davutoglu's
trip as more of a PR move rather than him bringing something new to
the negotiation table. Azerbaijan remains an interested party in the
Turkish-Armenian normalization process, which it believes should be
parallel to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Currently
Baku is not worried and does not perceive a threat to its interests
because, with regards to Armenian-Turkish relations, Ankara discusses
its steps with Azerbaijan in advance.
Further to this, given that the geopolitical conditions in the South
Caucasus are increasingly difficult, with Moscow's growing influence
on Armenian politics, Davutoglu's statement that Turkey aims to
take serious steps to resolve the conflicts in the South Caucasus,
including Abkhazian-Georgian relations, have come as a surprise.
Davutoglu has been attacked several times for his idealism. But there
are misperceptions among experts commenting on Davutoglu's visit.
His real motives are as follows:
First of all, Davutoglu would like to use Turkish-Armenians as a
bridge to the government in Yerevan and the Armenian diaspora abroad.
The aim of this strategy is two-fold: First, to reassure
Turkish-Armenians that the Turkish government has a fair agenda
towards Turkish-Armenians and to establish intellectual debates with
Armenians living in Armenia. This move could at least assuage the
frustration among intellectuals in Armenia who are still smarting over
the failure of the Zurich Protocols of 2009. It is hard for Ankara
to convince moderate Armenian intellectuals to take part in track two
initiatives because they don't want to be involved in a reconciliation
process that will bear no results (i.e., opening the Turkish-Armenian
border). Turkish-Armenians have more influence, and can help persuade
moderate Armenian intellectuals to get involved. Second, the more
difficult task is using Turkish-Armenians to build bridges with the
Armenian diaspora. On the eve of 2015, the anniversary of the tragic
events of 1915, this could indicate momentum in the eyes of the West,
and especially the US. Therefore, it is not surprising that Davutoglu
brought representatives of Turkey's Armenian intelligentsia with him
to Yerevan.
Second, Turkey is fully aware that Ankara alone cannot produce major
changes in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and that
this is not a question of how good the Moscow-Ankara relationship is.
The conflict is so complex that even Russia cannot generate a deal
that is mutually acceptable to Azerbaijan and Armenia. Therefore,
Ankara is looking at a resolution within the scope of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group work, but
with an additional dimension. The next OSCE chairmanship will be held
by Switzerland, which played a major role as a moderator during the
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement process. In this respect, the hope is
that Switzerland can arrange parallel discussions with Azerbaijan,
Armenia and Turkey.
Meanwhile, the first diplomatic contact a few months ago between
Switzerland and the Azerbaijan-Turkey-Armenia "triangle" was positive.
Swiss diplomats contacted each party separately and presented the
agenda, the details of which remain private. This was significant
because, after a pause of nearly two years, the Azerbaijani and
Armenian presidents met last month; the foreign ministers are now
preparing another presidential meeting for January 2014 with the
OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs. While there are no big expectations for
immediate progress, the ball is in Armenia's court; Yerevan can change
the trajectory of the conflict resolution by taking steps to withdraw
from the occupied territories.
The third issue is that Turkey is looking at its long-term solutions
for regional problems, including Abkhazian-Georgian relations. In
Georgia there is more interest in people-to-people contacts between
Abkhazians and Georgians, as well as contact between the de facto
authorities of Abkhazia and Tbilisi. Previously, the "engagement
without recognition" precluded contact with the de facto authorities.
Although Turkey has a big Abkhazian diaspora that wants Ankara to have
direct contact with Sukhumi, out of respect for Georgia's territorial
integrity Turkey has followed Tbilisi's official position. Rumors
have it that Tbilisi could soon give Turkey the green light to invest
in Abkhazia, which will open it to international trade -- Georgia
is seeking ways to break the deadlock, which could mean increasing
contact with Sukhumi.
However, the worry for Turkey is that a significant proportion
of intellectuals still blame Azerbaijan for the failure of
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, and believe that opening its
border with Armenia would be a major step in reconciliation. But
the conventional view that border opening could facilitate
Turkey's relations with the Armenian diaspora is wrong. This view
misinterprets the agenda of the Armenian diaspora, its expectations
and the importance of the border opening. Following the developments
in recent months, with Armenia becoming more dependent on Russia and
turning away from the EU, economic indicators now suggest that open
borders will not really change Turkey-Armenia trade relations. On
the contrary, by keeping the border closed, Turkey retains its minor
role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process and has
something to offer the Armenian government: trade and investment via
open borders in exchange for Armenia's withdrawal from the occupied
Azerbaijani territories.
Last but not least, Turkey, through the foreign minister's visit to
Yerevan, showed that Ankara is trying to bolster intellectual-level
contacts with the international Armenian diaspora with the help of
Turkish-Armenians. At the same time, it supports Switzerland's
chairmanship, with the hope of breaking the deadlock in
Azerbaijani-Armenian meetings.
Today's Zaman, Turkey
Dec 19 2013
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
In advance of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's visit to
Yerevan last week for an Organization of the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation (BSEC) meeting, there were rumors about the possibility
that Turkey might revive its normalization process with Armenia.
Not surprisingly, the Armenian side -- both at the official and
expert level -- was anticipating the visit but labeled Davutoglu's
trip as more of a PR move rather than him bringing something new to
the negotiation table. Azerbaijan remains an interested party in the
Turkish-Armenian normalization process, which it believes should be
parallel to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Currently
Baku is not worried and does not perceive a threat to its interests
because, with regards to Armenian-Turkish relations, Ankara discusses
its steps with Azerbaijan in advance.
Further to this, given that the geopolitical conditions in the South
Caucasus are increasingly difficult, with Moscow's growing influence
on Armenian politics, Davutoglu's statement that Turkey aims to
take serious steps to resolve the conflicts in the South Caucasus,
including Abkhazian-Georgian relations, have come as a surprise.
Davutoglu has been attacked several times for his idealism. But there
are misperceptions among experts commenting on Davutoglu's visit.
His real motives are as follows:
First of all, Davutoglu would like to use Turkish-Armenians as a
bridge to the government in Yerevan and the Armenian diaspora abroad.
The aim of this strategy is two-fold: First, to reassure
Turkish-Armenians that the Turkish government has a fair agenda
towards Turkish-Armenians and to establish intellectual debates with
Armenians living in Armenia. This move could at least assuage the
frustration among intellectuals in Armenia who are still smarting over
the failure of the Zurich Protocols of 2009. It is hard for Ankara
to convince moderate Armenian intellectuals to take part in track two
initiatives because they don't want to be involved in a reconciliation
process that will bear no results (i.e., opening the Turkish-Armenian
border). Turkish-Armenians have more influence, and can help persuade
moderate Armenian intellectuals to get involved. Second, the more
difficult task is using Turkish-Armenians to build bridges with the
Armenian diaspora. On the eve of 2015, the anniversary of the tragic
events of 1915, this could indicate momentum in the eyes of the West,
and especially the US. Therefore, it is not surprising that Davutoglu
brought representatives of Turkey's Armenian intelligentsia with him
to Yerevan.
Second, Turkey is fully aware that Ankara alone cannot produce major
changes in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and that
this is not a question of how good the Moscow-Ankara relationship is.
The conflict is so complex that even Russia cannot generate a deal
that is mutually acceptable to Azerbaijan and Armenia. Therefore,
Ankara is looking at a resolution within the scope of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group work, but
with an additional dimension. The next OSCE chairmanship will be held
by Switzerland, which played a major role as a moderator during the
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement process. In this respect, the hope is
that Switzerland can arrange parallel discussions with Azerbaijan,
Armenia and Turkey.
Meanwhile, the first diplomatic contact a few months ago between
Switzerland and the Azerbaijan-Turkey-Armenia "triangle" was positive.
Swiss diplomats contacted each party separately and presented the
agenda, the details of which remain private. This was significant
because, after a pause of nearly two years, the Azerbaijani and
Armenian presidents met last month; the foreign ministers are now
preparing another presidential meeting for January 2014 with the
OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs. While there are no big expectations for
immediate progress, the ball is in Armenia's court; Yerevan can change
the trajectory of the conflict resolution by taking steps to withdraw
from the occupied territories.
The third issue is that Turkey is looking at its long-term solutions
for regional problems, including Abkhazian-Georgian relations. In
Georgia there is more interest in people-to-people contacts between
Abkhazians and Georgians, as well as contact between the de facto
authorities of Abkhazia and Tbilisi. Previously, the "engagement
without recognition" precluded contact with the de facto authorities.
Although Turkey has a big Abkhazian diaspora that wants Ankara to have
direct contact with Sukhumi, out of respect for Georgia's territorial
integrity Turkey has followed Tbilisi's official position. Rumors
have it that Tbilisi could soon give Turkey the green light to invest
in Abkhazia, which will open it to international trade -- Georgia
is seeking ways to break the deadlock, which could mean increasing
contact with Sukhumi.
However, the worry for Turkey is that a significant proportion
of intellectuals still blame Azerbaijan for the failure of
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, and believe that opening its
border with Armenia would be a major step in reconciliation. But
the conventional view that border opening could facilitate
Turkey's relations with the Armenian diaspora is wrong. This view
misinterprets the agenda of the Armenian diaspora, its expectations
and the importance of the border opening. Following the developments
in recent months, with Armenia becoming more dependent on Russia and
turning away from the EU, economic indicators now suggest that open
borders will not really change Turkey-Armenia trade relations. On
the contrary, by keeping the border closed, Turkey retains its minor
role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process and has
something to offer the Armenian government: trade and investment via
open borders in exchange for Armenia's withdrawal from the occupied
Azerbaijani territories.
Last but not least, Turkey, through the foreign minister's visit to
Yerevan, showed that Ankara is trying to bolster intellectual-level
contacts with the international Armenian diaspora with the help of
Turkish-Armenians. At the same time, it supports Switzerland's
chairmanship, with the hope of breaking the deadlock in
Azerbaijani-Armenian meetings.