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THE CUSTOMS UNION WILL EXPAND
Vestnik Kavkaza, Russia
Dec 26 2013
26 December 2013 - 9:50am
Viktoria Panfilova, observer of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, exclusively to
Vestnik Kavkaza
Several significant decisions were made at the session of the Supreme
Eurasian Economic Council, where the presidents of the member countries
of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space gathered - Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The decisions enable us to predict the
future development of the organization. Some contradictions between
the sides were discovered, and Vladimir Putin, Nursultan Nazarbayev
and Alexander Lukashenko will have to solve them quickly.
Different approaches to the CU became clear as well.
The Russian leader stands for quick enhancement of the organization.
Of course, he is ready to consider the recommendations and interests
of the partners. But he wants to fulfil them along the path without
putting a dot or elision marks at any stage. At the same time,
Lukashenko and to a larger extent Nazarbayev would like to eliminate
all the disadvantages in the CU before it starts working to the
full extent.
The view on the CU structure of the Belarus and Kazakhstan leaders is
also different. But both of them are most worried about the possible
dictat of Russia, as they don't want to pale into insignificance.
Therefore, Lukashenko suggest signing an agreement on the international
status of the organization and a definition of the union and its
participants' abilities.
Nazarbayev's position is more cautious. First of all, he is strictly
against politicization of the organization, as he sees it as a union
of equal states. Secondly, he believes that cooperation inside the
CU shouldn't reflect on relations between the organization members
and third countries. Finally, he is against enhancement of the
supranational structure's functions - the Supreme Council. As always,
Nazarbayev emphasized that there was no need for quick enlargement
of the CU itself.
The Kazakh leader doesn't want to see new members in the alliance
at this stage not only due to his position that "the alliance should
start working first and then we'll see who should be invited into it."
Nazarbayev is very concerned with Armenia's joining the CU because
of the unsettled Karabakh conflict. His doubts about Armenia are
practical - the point is in its borders. Nazarbayev appreciates his
relations with Azerbaijan, as Kazakhstan and Baku have joint energy
projects and projects on the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan
are members of the alliance of Turkic Speaking States, and Astana
sees great potential in it. Finally, the most important thing is that
Azerbaijan is one of the paths to Europe for Kazakhstan, and it would
be the only path if any problems appeared with Russia. Although it
is unlikely, Astana is working on the option as well.
As for the advantages from Armenia's membership of the CU, in
comparison with a worsening of relations with Azerbaijan there are
none for Kazakhstan. The Armenian market is small and limited, while
Armenian exports are not significant for huge Kazakhstan. Astana's
agreement to the integration of Yerevan is a curtsey to Moscow, which
made its Transcaucasia partner choose between integration with the
CU and the EU. At the same time, Russia promised Armenia to provide
effective membership in the Customs Union. And Kazakhstan agreed to
this, stressing its right to a special position toward Armenia.
Therefore, the question on Armenia's membership in the CU was resolved
positively - the road map of integration of the country into the
organization was signed in Moscow. A similar document will be signed
with Kyrgyzstan in May 2014. But there are differences between them.
Unlike Armenia, which is joining the CU under the direct control of
Moscow and gets certain benefits, Bishkek only tries to get them for
its agreement to join the CU. Kyrgyzstan tries to gain a status of
a free trade zone for its three major markets; benefits for 2,600
items for 10 years; it also wants to sign agreements on establishing
labour-intensive manufacturers and free movement of labour migrants.
>From time to time, Bishkek makes statements about attractive economic
and energy projects which are proposed to it by China in exchange
for rejecting CU integration. And it is true.
Washington also indirectly hinted to Bishkek that it should reject
the CU. While for Beijing economic interests are the most important,
Washington provides the well-known course on limitation of Moscow's
geopolitical interests and influence. If Kyrgyzstan rejects Eurasian
integration, Tajikistan will do the same or at least it will limit
Moscow's influence in Dushanbe significantly. At the same time, if
Kyrgyzstan joins the CU, the question of Tajikistan's membership will
be settled, as the Customs Union will come directly to Tajik borders
in case of Kyrgyzstan's membership.
And finally Ukraine is a special case. Its Premier Mikolai Azarov
took part in the session in Moscow as an observer. Kiev has frozen
integration with the EU and got a beneficial credit from Moscow
and low gas prices. Now it has begun to think over the prospects of
the CU. However, there are many unclear aspects in the question of
the membership of Ukraine. Some experts think that when Ukraine has
spent the Russian money, it will begin to flirt with Europe again,
and the result will be unpredictable.
Therefore, we can say that the CU enters 2014 in the following way:
3 (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan) +1 (Armenia) +1 (Kyrgyzstan) +1 (?)
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Vestnik Kavkaza, Russia
Dec 26 2013
26 December 2013 - 9:50am
Viktoria Panfilova, observer of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, exclusively to
Vestnik Kavkaza
Several significant decisions were made at the session of the Supreme
Eurasian Economic Council, where the presidents of the member countries
of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space gathered - Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The decisions enable us to predict the
future development of the organization. Some contradictions between
the sides were discovered, and Vladimir Putin, Nursultan Nazarbayev
and Alexander Lukashenko will have to solve them quickly.
Different approaches to the CU became clear as well.
The Russian leader stands for quick enhancement of the organization.
Of course, he is ready to consider the recommendations and interests
of the partners. But he wants to fulfil them along the path without
putting a dot or elision marks at any stage. At the same time,
Lukashenko and to a larger extent Nazarbayev would like to eliminate
all the disadvantages in the CU before it starts working to the
full extent.
The view on the CU structure of the Belarus and Kazakhstan leaders is
also different. But both of them are most worried about the possible
dictat of Russia, as they don't want to pale into insignificance.
Therefore, Lukashenko suggest signing an agreement on the international
status of the organization and a definition of the union and its
participants' abilities.
Nazarbayev's position is more cautious. First of all, he is strictly
against politicization of the organization, as he sees it as a union
of equal states. Secondly, he believes that cooperation inside the
CU shouldn't reflect on relations between the organization members
and third countries. Finally, he is against enhancement of the
supranational structure's functions - the Supreme Council. As always,
Nazarbayev emphasized that there was no need for quick enlargement
of the CU itself.
The Kazakh leader doesn't want to see new members in the alliance
at this stage not only due to his position that "the alliance should
start working first and then we'll see who should be invited into it."
Nazarbayev is very concerned with Armenia's joining the CU because
of the unsettled Karabakh conflict. His doubts about Armenia are
practical - the point is in its borders. Nazarbayev appreciates his
relations with Azerbaijan, as Kazakhstan and Baku have joint energy
projects and projects on the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan
are members of the alliance of Turkic Speaking States, and Astana
sees great potential in it. Finally, the most important thing is that
Azerbaijan is one of the paths to Europe for Kazakhstan, and it would
be the only path if any problems appeared with Russia. Although it
is unlikely, Astana is working on the option as well.
As for the advantages from Armenia's membership of the CU, in
comparison with a worsening of relations with Azerbaijan there are
none for Kazakhstan. The Armenian market is small and limited, while
Armenian exports are not significant for huge Kazakhstan. Astana's
agreement to the integration of Yerevan is a curtsey to Moscow, which
made its Transcaucasia partner choose between integration with the
CU and the EU. At the same time, Russia promised Armenia to provide
effective membership in the Customs Union. And Kazakhstan agreed to
this, stressing its right to a special position toward Armenia.
Therefore, the question on Armenia's membership in the CU was resolved
positively - the road map of integration of the country into the
organization was signed in Moscow. A similar document will be signed
with Kyrgyzstan in May 2014. But there are differences between them.
Unlike Armenia, which is joining the CU under the direct control of
Moscow and gets certain benefits, Bishkek only tries to get them for
its agreement to join the CU. Kyrgyzstan tries to gain a status of
a free trade zone for its three major markets; benefits for 2,600
items for 10 years; it also wants to sign agreements on establishing
labour-intensive manufacturers and free movement of labour migrants.
>From time to time, Bishkek makes statements about attractive economic
and energy projects which are proposed to it by China in exchange
for rejecting CU integration. And it is true.
Washington also indirectly hinted to Bishkek that it should reject
the CU. While for Beijing economic interests are the most important,
Washington provides the well-known course on limitation of Moscow's
geopolitical interests and influence. If Kyrgyzstan rejects Eurasian
integration, Tajikistan will do the same or at least it will limit
Moscow's influence in Dushanbe significantly. At the same time, if
Kyrgyzstan joins the CU, the question of Tajikistan's membership will
be settled, as the Customs Union will come directly to Tajik borders
in case of Kyrgyzstan's membership.
And finally Ukraine is a special case. Its Premier Mikolai Azarov
took part in the session in Moscow as an observer. Kiev has frozen
integration with the EU and got a beneficial credit from Moscow
and low gas prices. Now it has begun to think over the prospects of
the CU. However, there are many unclear aspects in the question of
the membership of Ukraine. Some experts think that when Ukraine has
spent the Russian money, it will begin to flirt with Europe again,
and the result will be unpredictable.
Therefore, we can say that the CU enters 2014 in the following way:
3 (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan) +1 (Armenia) +1 (Kyrgyzstan) +1 (?)
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress