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The Georgian and Azerbaijani Elections: A Postmortem
Richard D. Kauzlarich | December 23, 2013 12:12pm
It's a fair question to ask: what was all the fuss about last October?
The elections in Georgia and Azerbaijan came and went and the results
were no surprise. Azerbaijani incumbent Ilham Aliyev won and Georgia's
Mikhail Saakashvilli did not. The Azerbaijani elections were bogus;
the Georgian elections were not. So what? Life goes on.
But perhaps it is not that simple. Most outside observers saw these
elections as a barometer of democratic progress in a region where the
West - and the U.S. in particular - has invested time, resources and
effort over more than 20 years to help these countries to build a
better future for themselves. As stakeholders in the democratic
process in the South Caucasus since Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia
gained their independence in 1991, Europe and the U.S. must fuss over
the outcomes of the Azerbaijani and Georgian elections.
Beyond Election Day
Evaluating these elections and their impact on the domestic social and
political landscape as well as foreign relations requires, however, a
focus on more than just election day. The excellent report from the
European Stability Inititive on the election observation mission to
Azerbaijan makes a strong case for not judging democratic progress
based only on how the elections may appear to be conducted on election
day.
The Georgian elections proved that post-Soviet governments could
change, politicians could change and a European path be chosen. The
Azerbaijani elections proved that a regime could `buy' favorable
reports from short-term observers imported for election day, carry on
with election rigging, continue human rights violations and ignore
international criticism, whether from the Department of State or the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's long-term
observer mission.
Why the difference between the two neighboring countries? There are
several reasons. First, Georgia's generally free and fair 2012
parliamentary elections set a strong example for the 2013 presidential
elections, and Georgia welcomed outside involvement and observation.
Azerbaijan, on the other hand, prevented the visit of U.S. Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Democracy and Human Rights Tom Melia before
its elections. Second, Georgian political parties, including the
opposition, agreed on electoral ground rules. Third, the Georgian
population demanded leadership change. Fourth, the outcome of
elections in Georgia was accepted as a transparent way to - for the
first time in modern Georgian history - transfer political legitimacy.
Test of Democratic Evolution
The real test of democratic evolution has to do with actions - over a
period of months before and after election day - as well as rhetoric
that affect the integrity of the elections. The pre- and post-election
environments in Azerbaijan consist of continuing intimidation of the
political opposition and independent NGO leadership, suppression of
freedom of expression and official dismissal of any need to change.
While Georgia had a pretty good pre-election period, the post-election
period remains fraught with challenges to the effectiveness of
Parliament and other fragile institutions, and whether the current
government will pursue criminal charges against former President
Saakashvili.
Is it Our Business?
There are different views regarding whether democratic evolution - in
its broadest sense - is our (e.g. the West, U.S.) business at all. Who
are we - despite our support for democratic change - with all our
defects to establish standards for others to follow? At least for the
short-term the Maidan events in Ukraine put this point into practical
focus. If a country wants to be part of the West there are certain
standards of economic and political reform that must be met as part of
that association. In other words values matter. The traditional
excuses of geopolitical importance or interests of energy security for
failure to accept even the minimal international norms for treatment
of a country's own citizens are gone.
A major issue for the post-election period has become the choice
between closer association with the EU or Vladimir Putin's Eurasian
Union. This choice really is about values that countries choose to be
identified by. Armenia and Georgia made clear choices at Vilnius
summit for the Eastern Partnership: Georgia and Moldova for the EU;
Armenia for Eurasian Union. Ukraine was asked to make a decision but
chose to walk the line between short-run financial expediency and a
long-term commitment to a European future. Azerbaijan decided to
choose none of the above; `neutrality' the regime called it. All the
while proclaiming - along with its apologists in the West - the
strategic importance of Azerbaijani energy for Europe's future.
These countries can no longer talk their way around this or employ
foreign surrogates to do this for them. Arguments for overlooking
bogus elections, corruption and human rights abuses based on
overriding strategic importance to the U.S. (e.g. war against terror,
Northern Distribution Network, energy security) are excuses for
inaction on the fundamental values that must be at the core of our
relationships in the 21st century.
When countries like Azerbaijan fail to live up to these standards we
do not walk away. Rather we continue to insist on solid, value-based
behavior by those who profess they are partners with us. That means
economic and political reforms to complete the transition from
post-Soviet to 21st Century status. This requires observance of human
rights, respect for freedom of expression, and release of political
prisoners. It also requires a pattern of increasingly democratic
elections. That's why we need to care about elections in the south
Caucasus.
We must congratulate Tbilisi on its accomplishments in the October
electoral process. At the same time we must encourage the Georgian
government to move along with strengthening institutions like
Parliament and the judiciary so Georgia can avoid a political justice
system.
Richard D. Kauzlarich
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States
and Europe
Richard Kauzlarich served as national intelligence officer for Europe
from September 2003 to April 2011. Formerly, he was director of the
special initiative on the Muslim World at the United States Institute
of Peace. Kauzlarich joined the Institute in 2002 after a 32-year
career in the Foreign Service.
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/12/23-elections-georgia-azerbaijan-kauzlarich
From: A. Papazian
Richard D. Kauzlarich | December 23, 2013 12:12pm
It's a fair question to ask: what was all the fuss about last October?
The elections in Georgia and Azerbaijan came and went and the results
were no surprise. Azerbaijani incumbent Ilham Aliyev won and Georgia's
Mikhail Saakashvilli did not. The Azerbaijani elections were bogus;
the Georgian elections were not. So what? Life goes on.
But perhaps it is not that simple. Most outside observers saw these
elections as a barometer of democratic progress in a region where the
West - and the U.S. in particular - has invested time, resources and
effort over more than 20 years to help these countries to build a
better future for themselves. As stakeholders in the democratic
process in the South Caucasus since Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia
gained their independence in 1991, Europe and the U.S. must fuss over
the outcomes of the Azerbaijani and Georgian elections.
Beyond Election Day
Evaluating these elections and their impact on the domestic social and
political landscape as well as foreign relations requires, however, a
focus on more than just election day. The excellent report from the
European Stability Inititive on the election observation mission to
Azerbaijan makes a strong case for not judging democratic progress
based only on how the elections may appear to be conducted on election
day.
The Georgian elections proved that post-Soviet governments could
change, politicians could change and a European path be chosen. The
Azerbaijani elections proved that a regime could `buy' favorable
reports from short-term observers imported for election day, carry on
with election rigging, continue human rights violations and ignore
international criticism, whether from the Department of State or the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's long-term
observer mission.
Why the difference between the two neighboring countries? There are
several reasons. First, Georgia's generally free and fair 2012
parliamentary elections set a strong example for the 2013 presidential
elections, and Georgia welcomed outside involvement and observation.
Azerbaijan, on the other hand, prevented the visit of U.S. Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Democracy and Human Rights Tom Melia before
its elections. Second, Georgian political parties, including the
opposition, agreed on electoral ground rules. Third, the Georgian
population demanded leadership change. Fourth, the outcome of
elections in Georgia was accepted as a transparent way to - for the
first time in modern Georgian history - transfer political legitimacy.
Test of Democratic Evolution
The real test of democratic evolution has to do with actions - over a
period of months before and after election day - as well as rhetoric
that affect the integrity of the elections. The pre- and post-election
environments in Azerbaijan consist of continuing intimidation of the
political opposition and independent NGO leadership, suppression of
freedom of expression and official dismissal of any need to change.
While Georgia had a pretty good pre-election period, the post-election
period remains fraught with challenges to the effectiveness of
Parliament and other fragile institutions, and whether the current
government will pursue criminal charges against former President
Saakashvili.
Is it Our Business?
There are different views regarding whether democratic evolution - in
its broadest sense - is our (e.g. the West, U.S.) business at all. Who
are we - despite our support for democratic change - with all our
defects to establish standards for others to follow? At least for the
short-term the Maidan events in Ukraine put this point into practical
focus. If a country wants to be part of the West there are certain
standards of economic and political reform that must be met as part of
that association. In other words values matter. The traditional
excuses of geopolitical importance or interests of energy security for
failure to accept even the minimal international norms for treatment
of a country's own citizens are gone.
A major issue for the post-election period has become the choice
between closer association with the EU or Vladimir Putin's Eurasian
Union. This choice really is about values that countries choose to be
identified by. Armenia and Georgia made clear choices at Vilnius
summit for the Eastern Partnership: Georgia and Moldova for the EU;
Armenia for Eurasian Union. Ukraine was asked to make a decision but
chose to walk the line between short-run financial expediency and a
long-term commitment to a European future. Azerbaijan decided to
choose none of the above; `neutrality' the regime called it. All the
while proclaiming - along with its apologists in the West - the
strategic importance of Azerbaijani energy for Europe's future.
These countries can no longer talk their way around this or employ
foreign surrogates to do this for them. Arguments for overlooking
bogus elections, corruption and human rights abuses based on
overriding strategic importance to the U.S. (e.g. war against terror,
Northern Distribution Network, energy security) are excuses for
inaction on the fundamental values that must be at the core of our
relationships in the 21st century.
When countries like Azerbaijan fail to live up to these standards we
do not walk away. Rather we continue to insist on solid, value-based
behavior by those who profess they are partners with us. That means
economic and political reforms to complete the transition from
post-Soviet to 21st Century status. This requires observance of human
rights, respect for freedom of expression, and release of political
prisoners. It also requires a pattern of increasingly democratic
elections. That's why we need to care about elections in the south
Caucasus.
We must congratulate Tbilisi on its accomplishments in the October
electoral process. At the same time we must encourage the Georgian
government to move along with strengthening institutions like
Parliament and the judiciary so Georgia can avoid a political justice
system.
Richard D. Kauzlarich
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States
and Europe
Richard Kauzlarich served as national intelligence officer for Europe
from September 2003 to April 2011. Formerly, he was director of the
special initiative on the Muslim World at the United States Institute
of Peace. Kauzlarich joined the Institute in 2002 after a 32-year
career in the Foreign Service.
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/12/23-elections-georgia-azerbaijan-kauzlarich
From: A. Papazian