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TURKEY'S KRG ENERGY PARTNERSHIP
Posted By Gonul Tol Tuesday, January 29, 2013 - 3:07 PM
Only a few years back, the idea of an independent Kurdistan bordering
Turkey would have had Ankara up in arms. Not anymore. Past tensions
have been supplanted by a new energy partnership and Turkey seems far
less worried about the prospect of an independent Kurdistan. In May
2012, Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) cut a deal to
build one gas and two oil pipelines directly from Kurdish-controlled
northern Iraq to Turkey without the approval of Baghdad, taking the
rapprochement started between the two in 2009 one step further. If
realized, the Kurdish pipelines will for the first time provide the
Kurds direct access to world markets, bypassing the Baghdad controlled
Kirkuk-Ceyhan (Turkey) pipeline bringing the KRG one step closer to
the long-held dream of Kurdish independence.
Some pundits have argued that for this very reason Turkish approval
of a Kurdish pipeline is a long shot. But the construction seems
to be underway. According to Turkish press, the KRG has already
begun construction on the oil and gas pipelines which are due to be
operational by early 2014.
A couple of factors account for the sea change in Turkey's KRG policy.
The first being Turkey's energy strategy. Turkey is an energy hungry
country with a six to eight percent annual increase in demand. In order
to sustain its economic growth, Ankara wants to strengthen its energy
security, ensure diversification of suppliers, and establish itself
as an energy hub between the energy-producing countries to its east
and the energy-consuming countries to its west. Currently, Turkey
relies heavily on imported energy from Russia and Iran. Recently,
however, Iranian sanctions have driven up Turkey's energy costs.
Moreover, the Syrian crisis has revealed that energy dependence on
Iran and Russia might restrict Turkey's room for diplomatic maneuver.
This is where the Iraqi Kurdish energy supply comes in handy. The
Kurdish region sits on significant, nearly untapped oil and gas
reserves. The KRG would offer Turkey a high quality low cost energy
alternative to Iran and Russia while Turkey might serve as a conduit
for KRG energy exports to Europe.
There are also geostrategic considerations behind Turkey's volte-face.
The Syrian uprising has strained Turkey's once strong ties with
Iran and Syria. In retaliation for Turkey's support of the Syrian
opposition, Bashar al-Assad has given the Democratic Union Party
(PYD), the PKK's Syrian offshoot, a free hand to establish itself
in the country's north. Turkish intelligence reports indicate that
Iran has been providing shelter and logistical support for the PKK
to launch attacks against Turkey as well. The KRG, on the other hand,
has banned pro-PKK political parties, arrested PKK politicians, closed
down PKK offices, and closely monitors pro-PKK activities. Against
the backdrop of shifting dynamics in Turkey's immediate neighborhood
and mounting PKK attacks, cultivating closer ties with the KRG has
become one of the most important components of Turkey's anti-terror
strategy and the government's most recent "Imrali process," the peace
talks with the PKK's jailed leader Abdullah Ocalan.
Yet another intricacy for Turkey's regional policy has been the face
off with Baghdad. An already strained relationship between Ankara
and Baghdad due to diverging stances over Syria came to a head after
the U.S. withdrawal. In an effort to consolidate his power, Iraqi
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki issued an arrest warrant for Sunni
Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi on terrorism charges. Turkey granted
refuge to Hashemi and refused to extradite him dealing yet another
blow to bilateral relations. The energy deals Turkey signed with
the KRG are the latest in the Baghdad-Ankara confrontation. Baghdad
is accusing Ankara of meddling in Iraqi affairs by "backing radical
Sunni elements" in the country and signing "illegal" energy deals
with the Iraqi Kurds, while Ankara is charging Maliki of provoking
sectarian tensions and leading Iraq into civil war. Maliki's growing
tilt toward Iran has only exacerbated the tension.
Facing a host of new challenges including an increasingly antagonistic
Maliki government, growing Iranian influence in Iraq, mounting PKK
attacks, and increasing energy demand, Turkey seems to have found an
unlikely ally in its ordeal.
Strange as it may sound, the United States is not happy about Turkey's
courtship with Iraqi Kurds. Since the first Gulf War, Turkish-U.S.
relations suffered multiple crises over the latter's support for Iraqi
Kurds. This time, however, it is the other way around. Last week,
Feridun Sinirlioglu, Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, had a meeting with the State Department in which the United
States reiterated its opposition to the energy deals directly between
Ankara and the KRG fearing that closer energy ties might push Baghdad's
Shiite government closer toward Tehran and threaten Iraqi unity.
Despite opposition from Baghdad and the United States, there seems to
be little that can stop the ball from rolling on energy cooperation
between Ankara and the KRG. In an interview with Turkish daily Hurriyet
on January 8, Namik Tan, Turkey's ambassador to the United States,
made it loud and clear: we will not turn our back on the KRG's energy
resources.
The energy deals foreshadow a major shift in Turkey's Iraq policy.
Gone are the days when the KRG was seen as part of the problem; it
is now viewed as part of the solution. Turkey cannot only tolerate
an independent Kurdistan but also benefit from it, as long as it
remains dependent economically on Turkey. An independent Kurdistan
could offer a source of energy, a buffer against a hostile Baghdad
and Iran, and an important ally in Turkey's fight against the PKK.
Yet it is not all roses; risks abound for both parties. The oil
pipeline deal will allow the Kurds to export up to one million barrels
per day, but it might also make reconciliation between Erbil and
Baghdad harder to achieve. If the KRG does not find a constitutional
solution to its dispute with Baghdad over its contentious hydrocarbon
law, the conflict will become regionalized inviting further meddling
in Iraqi politics by neighboring powers. Ensuing instability carries
the risk of scaring away badly needed foreign investment.
Additionally, by bypassing Baghdad in its bilateral agreements with
the KRG, Turkey risks losing investment in southern Iraq which holds
the country's largest explored oil and gas reserves.
Regardless, Turkey seems ready to take the risk. In light of Turkey's
long tortured history with the Kurds, such a radical shift seems
nothing short of astonishing.
Gonul Tol is the founding director of the Center for Turkish Studies
at the Middle East Institute.
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/29/turkey_s_krg_energy_partnership
Posted By Gonul Tol Tuesday, January 29, 2013 - 3:07 PM
Only a few years back, the idea of an independent Kurdistan bordering
Turkey would have had Ankara up in arms. Not anymore. Past tensions
have been supplanted by a new energy partnership and Turkey seems far
less worried about the prospect of an independent Kurdistan. In May
2012, Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) cut a deal to
build one gas and two oil pipelines directly from Kurdish-controlled
northern Iraq to Turkey without the approval of Baghdad, taking the
rapprochement started between the two in 2009 one step further. If
realized, the Kurdish pipelines will for the first time provide the
Kurds direct access to world markets, bypassing the Baghdad controlled
Kirkuk-Ceyhan (Turkey) pipeline bringing the KRG one step closer to
the long-held dream of Kurdish independence.
Some pundits have argued that for this very reason Turkish approval
of a Kurdish pipeline is a long shot. But the construction seems
to be underway. According to Turkish press, the KRG has already
begun construction on the oil and gas pipelines which are due to be
operational by early 2014.
A couple of factors account for the sea change in Turkey's KRG policy.
The first being Turkey's energy strategy. Turkey is an energy hungry
country with a six to eight percent annual increase in demand. In order
to sustain its economic growth, Ankara wants to strengthen its energy
security, ensure diversification of suppliers, and establish itself
as an energy hub between the energy-producing countries to its east
and the energy-consuming countries to its west. Currently, Turkey
relies heavily on imported energy from Russia and Iran. Recently,
however, Iranian sanctions have driven up Turkey's energy costs.
Moreover, the Syrian crisis has revealed that energy dependence on
Iran and Russia might restrict Turkey's room for diplomatic maneuver.
This is where the Iraqi Kurdish energy supply comes in handy. The
Kurdish region sits on significant, nearly untapped oil and gas
reserves. The KRG would offer Turkey a high quality low cost energy
alternative to Iran and Russia while Turkey might serve as a conduit
for KRG energy exports to Europe.
There are also geostrategic considerations behind Turkey's volte-face.
The Syrian uprising has strained Turkey's once strong ties with
Iran and Syria. In retaliation for Turkey's support of the Syrian
opposition, Bashar al-Assad has given the Democratic Union Party
(PYD), the PKK's Syrian offshoot, a free hand to establish itself
in the country's north. Turkish intelligence reports indicate that
Iran has been providing shelter and logistical support for the PKK
to launch attacks against Turkey as well. The KRG, on the other hand,
has banned pro-PKK political parties, arrested PKK politicians, closed
down PKK offices, and closely monitors pro-PKK activities. Against
the backdrop of shifting dynamics in Turkey's immediate neighborhood
and mounting PKK attacks, cultivating closer ties with the KRG has
become one of the most important components of Turkey's anti-terror
strategy and the government's most recent "Imrali process," the peace
talks with the PKK's jailed leader Abdullah Ocalan.
Yet another intricacy for Turkey's regional policy has been the face
off with Baghdad. An already strained relationship between Ankara
and Baghdad due to diverging stances over Syria came to a head after
the U.S. withdrawal. In an effort to consolidate his power, Iraqi
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki issued an arrest warrant for Sunni
Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi on terrorism charges. Turkey granted
refuge to Hashemi and refused to extradite him dealing yet another
blow to bilateral relations. The energy deals Turkey signed with
the KRG are the latest in the Baghdad-Ankara confrontation. Baghdad
is accusing Ankara of meddling in Iraqi affairs by "backing radical
Sunni elements" in the country and signing "illegal" energy deals
with the Iraqi Kurds, while Ankara is charging Maliki of provoking
sectarian tensions and leading Iraq into civil war. Maliki's growing
tilt toward Iran has only exacerbated the tension.
Facing a host of new challenges including an increasingly antagonistic
Maliki government, growing Iranian influence in Iraq, mounting PKK
attacks, and increasing energy demand, Turkey seems to have found an
unlikely ally in its ordeal.
Strange as it may sound, the United States is not happy about Turkey's
courtship with Iraqi Kurds. Since the first Gulf War, Turkish-U.S.
relations suffered multiple crises over the latter's support for Iraqi
Kurds. This time, however, it is the other way around. Last week,
Feridun Sinirlioglu, Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, had a meeting with the State Department in which the United
States reiterated its opposition to the energy deals directly between
Ankara and the KRG fearing that closer energy ties might push Baghdad's
Shiite government closer toward Tehran and threaten Iraqi unity.
Despite opposition from Baghdad and the United States, there seems to
be little that can stop the ball from rolling on energy cooperation
between Ankara and the KRG. In an interview with Turkish daily Hurriyet
on January 8, Namik Tan, Turkey's ambassador to the United States,
made it loud and clear: we will not turn our back on the KRG's energy
resources.
The energy deals foreshadow a major shift in Turkey's Iraq policy.
Gone are the days when the KRG was seen as part of the problem; it
is now viewed as part of the solution. Turkey cannot only tolerate
an independent Kurdistan but also benefit from it, as long as it
remains dependent economically on Turkey. An independent Kurdistan
could offer a source of energy, a buffer against a hostile Baghdad
and Iran, and an important ally in Turkey's fight against the PKK.
Yet it is not all roses; risks abound for both parties. The oil
pipeline deal will allow the Kurds to export up to one million barrels
per day, but it might also make reconciliation between Erbil and
Baghdad harder to achieve. If the KRG does not find a constitutional
solution to its dispute with Baghdad over its contentious hydrocarbon
law, the conflict will become regionalized inviting further meddling
in Iraqi politics by neighboring powers. Ensuing instability carries
the risk of scaring away badly needed foreign investment.
Additionally, by bypassing Baghdad in its bilateral agreements with
the KRG, Turkey risks losing investment in southern Iraq which holds
the country's largest explored oil and gas reserves.
Regardless, Turkey seems ready to take the risk. In light of Turkey's
long tortured history with the Kurds, such a radical shift seems
nothing short of astonishing.
Gonul Tol is the founding director of the Center for Turkish Studies
at the Middle East Institute.
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/29/turkey_s_krg_energy_partnership