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Another Regional War in the Wings
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/another-regional-war-the-wings-8042
E. Wayne Merry
January 31, 2013
In the conflict zone stretching from Syria to Afghanistan lies another war
waiting to re-emerge: Nagorno-Karabakh. This dispute is likely to occupy
President Obama's new foreign-policy team whether they want it or not.
Two decades ago the newly independent states of Armenia and Azerbaijan
fought a bitter war over this remote area of mountains and valleys. Armenia
won the war, but nobody has achieved peace. A fragile ceasefire signed in
1994 remains the only tangible achievement of diplomacy.
Since then, a mediation effort led by Washington, Moscow and Paris has
sought a solution. Despite the best efforts of the three governments -
including presidential initiatives by all three - the parties to the
conflict do not and will not negotiate. This impasse has contributed
to a dangerous evolution of the dispute in recent years from post-war
to pre-war.
A major arms race is underway, fueled by Azerbaijan's oil and gas wealth
and by Armenia's support from Russia. Azerbaijan is acquiring a distinct
advantage in military technology and firepower, but Armenia retains major
advantages of terrain and operational skill. Azerbaijan has a patron in
Turkey, which feels a fraternal commitment, but Armenia has a treaty-based
security alliance and historical partnership with Russia.
A new war would likely be pyrrhic for both sides, but also dwarf the first
war in scale and destruction. The initial conflict was limited to Karabakh
and its surroundings, and was largely an infantry fight. The next war will
engage Armenia and Azerbaijan against each other directly, with greatly
expanded arsenals. Both sides plan on this basis and both threaten to
target civilian infrastructure, such as pipelines. Serious ceasefire
violations have recently occurred on their joint border, not just around
Karabakh.
The international mediation effort, though complex, envisions a final
settlement involving an exchange of land for peace. In earlier years,
diplomats and politicians in Baku and Yerevan privately acknowledged that a
settlement would involve Armenian withdrawal from lowland territories to
the east and south of Karabakh, as well as Azerbaijani acceptance of an
Armenian identity for Karabakh and a link with Armenia to the west. Today,
the land-for-peace concept is essentially dead on both sides. Armenia
demands `comprehensive security' in the captured lands around Karabakh,
while Azerbaijan believes its new weaponry and support from Turkey can
restore its full Soviet-era territorial control.
Political rhetoric on both sides dehumanizes the other. Each side exploits
its refugees and wallows in a cult of victimization. Each side outrages the
other: last year Baku lionized an officer who committed a vicious axe
murder of an Armenian in Hungary; Yerevan publishes maps of `Armenia' which
include large swaths of inherently Azerbaijani territory. Each believes war
will bring military triumph and historical fulfillment. Both cannot be
correct in their expectations, but both certainly can be wrong.
The broader danger lies in the patron-client relationships of the regional
great powers, Russia with Armenia and Turkey with Azerbaijan. Ankara and
Moscow would not actually come to blows in a new Karabakh war, but both can
be dragged into dangerous circumstances by their clients. The Azerbaijani
tail has already wagged the Turkish dog to prevent normalizing relations
between Ankara and Yerevan. (For the time being, Iran plays a marginal
political role, but provides vital energy and trade links to Armenia.
However, Tehran's relations with Baku are poisonous and, in a new Karabakh
war, Iran might seek to settle accounts.)
The parties to the conflict have demonstrated that a peaceful resolution
does not lie with them unaided. However, the international mediators have
been consistently abused, as Baku and Yerevan hide behind them to avoid
genuine negotiations. While mediation may have been appropriate for the
post-war environment of the 1990s, the present pre-war atmosphere calls for
a more direct and forceful approach.
The missing element in the diplomatic equation is Turkey, which needs to
play a political role comparable to Russia. Only Moscow and Ankara working
together can restrain their clients from renewed war and compel them to
real negotiations. This kind of traditional great power collusion may be
out of fashion, but it can work and is far preferable to another war.
Ankara and Moscow have differing priorities on Karabakh, but they share
broadly similar views on Black Sea, Caucasian and Caspian issues. They both
want to avoid a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan while not allowing their
clients to compromise their own wider interests.
Unfortunately, Turkey today is so bogged down on its southern frontier that
it pays inadequate attention to the looming danger to the east. The failure
of its previous effort to normalize relations with Armenia has made Ankara
both overly cautious and prone to excessive influence from Baku. However,
Karabakh is an opportunity for active Turkish diplomacy both to contribute
to a regional settlement and to regularize ties with Yerevan.
American diplomats have tried to be evenhanded toward Armenia and
Azerbaijan, but U.S. influence on this conflict is, candidly, inadequate.
Thus, Washington should encourage a more active Turkish role and welcome
collaboration by Russia and Turkey as Caucasian peacemakers.
E. Wayne Merry is Senior Fellow for Europe and Eurasia at the American
Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.
COMMENTS
Moses (January 31, 2013 -
7:09pm)
You say that `Political rhetoric on both sides dehumanizes the other.'
You
seem to imply that both are equally guilty of such dehumanization. I think
that is unfair because, it applies to Azerbaijan so much more than it does
to Armenia.You say Turkey is the missing link in the negotiations process
and must be included as a regional power, a mediator, or a patron. However,
as you also indicate, Turkey does not have a strong leverage on Azerbaijan
as one might think. The Turkish - Armenian normalization process is an
unmistakable example. Also, Armenia would never accept Turkey as a mediator
and not the least due to Turkey's official stance - officially and
explicitly - anti-Armenian. The political leadership in Armenia has
categorically ruled out such a role for Turkey. So, just as Israel has
refused Turkey's `mediation' in the Arab-Israeli conflict because of
Turkey's biases and, if I may add rightly so, Armenia also did the same.
In
any case, Nagorno-Karabakh is an unimportant as it stands but, has the
potential to create many far reaching upheavals.No one should forget that
Azerbaijan is a hereditary dictatorship and its President has just been
named corruption's person of the year. This must factor into any efforts
that aim to resolve this simmering conflict.
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David Boyajian (February
2, 2013 - 1:24pm)
Wayne Merry proposes that Turkey become a mediator (joining Russia, the
U.S., and France/Europe) in the Karabagh negotiations. Armenia and Karabagh
(the latter's ancient Armenian name is Artsakh) have made it clear that
that's not going to happen because Turkey has closed its border with
Armenia for nearly 20 years and has refused to even establish diplomatic
relations with Armenia. Moreover, Turkey denies the Armenian genocide and
mistreats its remaining Armenians. Mr. Merry's proposal is, therefore, a
non-starter. He also claims that `Ankara and Moscow =85 share broadly similar
views on =85 Caucasian and Caspian issues.' Not so. Turkey's aims in those
regions (and in Central Asia) are and have long been essentially
pan-Turkist, a policy that is obviously anathema to Russia. Russia also
knows that NATO and the U.S have been trying to penetrate the Caucasus,
partly by way of Turkey. On historical and demographic grounds, and due
to long-standing Azeri oppression of Karabagh's Armenians, Karabagh has as
a good a case as any territory in the world that has gained independence in
the past several decades. In contrast, Azerbaijan's case for ruling over
Karabagh is pathetically weak. Karabagh will not and should not allow
itself to be subject to Azeri rule again. It not clear whether Mr. Merry
understands that. Were it not for the greed of the mediators for
Azerbaijan's gas and oil, they would already have recognized Karabagh's
independence de jure. Such recognition remains the only solution to the
conflict. Let's be frank: The US and Europe foreign policy establishments
are nervous about a new war over Karabagh because it would probably result
in major damage to Azerbaijan's BTC and BTE pipelines, energy
infrastructure, and planned pipelines. If there is a new war, however, it
will be Azerbaijan that starts it. Armenia and Karabagh are in a purely
defensive military mode, despite Mr. Merry's depiction of Armenians and
Azeris as being equally at each other's throats. Those who remain open to a
non-pro-Turkish, non-foreign policy establishment perspective on Karabagh
(hopefully, this includes Mr. Merry) may wish to peruse my recent article,
`Preventing the Coming U.S. Disaster in the Caucasus,' widely available on
the Web (e.g.
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/12/22/preventing-the-coming-u-s-disaster-in-the-caucasus/
).
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/another-regional-war-the-wings-8042
E. Wayne Merry
January 31, 2013
In the conflict zone stretching from Syria to Afghanistan lies another war
waiting to re-emerge: Nagorno-Karabakh. This dispute is likely to occupy
President Obama's new foreign-policy team whether they want it or not.
Two decades ago the newly independent states of Armenia and Azerbaijan
fought a bitter war over this remote area of mountains and valleys. Armenia
won the war, but nobody has achieved peace. A fragile ceasefire signed in
1994 remains the only tangible achievement of diplomacy.
Since then, a mediation effort led by Washington, Moscow and Paris has
sought a solution. Despite the best efforts of the three governments -
including presidential initiatives by all three - the parties to the
conflict do not and will not negotiate. This impasse has contributed
to a dangerous evolution of the dispute in recent years from post-war
to pre-war.
A major arms race is underway, fueled by Azerbaijan's oil and gas wealth
and by Armenia's support from Russia. Azerbaijan is acquiring a distinct
advantage in military technology and firepower, but Armenia retains major
advantages of terrain and operational skill. Azerbaijan has a patron in
Turkey, which feels a fraternal commitment, but Armenia has a treaty-based
security alliance and historical partnership with Russia.
A new war would likely be pyrrhic for both sides, but also dwarf the first
war in scale and destruction. The initial conflict was limited to Karabakh
and its surroundings, and was largely an infantry fight. The next war will
engage Armenia and Azerbaijan against each other directly, with greatly
expanded arsenals. Both sides plan on this basis and both threaten to
target civilian infrastructure, such as pipelines. Serious ceasefire
violations have recently occurred on their joint border, not just around
Karabakh.
The international mediation effort, though complex, envisions a final
settlement involving an exchange of land for peace. In earlier years,
diplomats and politicians in Baku and Yerevan privately acknowledged that a
settlement would involve Armenian withdrawal from lowland territories to
the east and south of Karabakh, as well as Azerbaijani acceptance of an
Armenian identity for Karabakh and a link with Armenia to the west. Today,
the land-for-peace concept is essentially dead on both sides. Armenia
demands `comprehensive security' in the captured lands around Karabakh,
while Azerbaijan believes its new weaponry and support from Turkey can
restore its full Soviet-era territorial control.
Political rhetoric on both sides dehumanizes the other. Each side exploits
its refugees and wallows in a cult of victimization. Each side outrages the
other: last year Baku lionized an officer who committed a vicious axe
murder of an Armenian in Hungary; Yerevan publishes maps of `Armenia' which
include large swaths of inherently Azerbaijani territory. Each believes war
will bring military triumph and historical fulfillment. Both cannot be
correct in their expectations, but both certainly can be wrong.
The broader danger lies in the patron-client relationships of the regional
great powers, Russia with Armenia and Turkey with Azerbaijan. Ankara and
Moscow would not actually come to blows in a new Karabakh war, but both can
be dragged into dangerous circumstances by their clients. The Azerbaijani
tail has already wagged the Turkish dog to prevent normalizing relations
between Ankara and Yerevan. (For the time being, Iran plays a marginal
political role, but provides vital energy and trade links to Armenia.
However, Tehran's relations with Baku are poisonous and, in a new Karabakh
war, Iran might seek to settle accounts.)
The parties to the conflict have demonstrated that a peaceful resolution
does not lie with them unaided. However, the international mediators have
been consistently abused, as Baku and Yerevan hide behind them to avoid
genuine negotiations. While mediation may have been appropriate for the
post-war environment of the 1990s, the present pre-war atmosphere calls for
a more direct and forceful approach.
The missing element in the diplomatic equation is Turkey, which needs to
play a political role comparable to Russia. Only Moscow and Ankara working
together can restrain their clients from renewed war and compel them to
real negotiations. This kind of traditional great power collusion may be
out of fashion, but it can work and is far preferable to another war.
Ankara and Moscow have differing priorities on Karabakh, but they share
broadly similar views on Black Sea, Caucasian and Caspian issues. They both
want to avoid a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan while not allowing their
clients to compromise their own wider interests.
Unfortunately, Turkey today is so bogged down on its southern frontier that
it pays inadequate attention to the looming danger to the east. The failure
of its previous effort to normalize relations with Armenia has made Ankara
both overly cautious and prone to excessive influence from Baku. However,
Karabakh is an opportunity for active Turkish diplomacy both to contribute
to a regional settlement and to regularize ties with Yerevan.
American diplomats have tried to be evenhanded toward Armenia and
Azerbaijan, but U.S. influence on this conflict is, candidly, inadequate.
Thus, Washington should encourage a more active Turkish role and welcome
collaboration by Russia and Turkey as Caucasian peacemakers.
E. Wayne Merry is Senior Fellow for Europe and Eurasia at the American
Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.
COMMENTS
Moses (January 31, 2013 -
7:09pm)
You say that `Political rhetoric on both sides dehumanizes the other.'
You
seem to imply that both are equally guilty of such dehumanization. I think
that is unfair because, it applies to Azerbaijan so much more than it does
to Armenia.You say Turkey is the missing link in the negotiations process
and must be included as a regional power, a mediator, or a patron. However,
as you also indicate, Turkey does not have a strong leverage on Azerbaijan
as one might think. The Turkish - Armenian normalization process is an
unmistakable example. Also, Armenia would never accept Turkey as a mediator
and not the least due to Turkey's official stance - officially and
explicitly - anti-Armenian. The political leadership in Armenia has
categorically ruled out such a role for Turkey. So, just as Israel has
refused Turkey's `mediation' in the Arab-Israeli conflict because of
Turkey's biases and, if I may add rightly so, Armenia also did the same.
In
any case, Nagorno-Karabakh is an unimportant as it stands but, has the
potential to create many far reaching upheavals.No one should forget that
Azerbaijan is a hereditary dictatorship and its President has just been
named corruption's person of the year. This must factor into any efforts
that aim to resolve this simmering conflict.
- Login
or register
to
post comments
David Boyajian (February
2, 2013 - 1:24pm)
Wayne Merry proposes that Turkey become a mediator (joining Russia, the
U.S., and France/Europe) in the Karabagh negotiations. Armenia and Karabagh
(the latter's ancient Armenian name is Artsakh) have made it clear that
that's not going to happen because Turkey has closed its border with
Armenia for nearly 20 years and has refused to even establish diplomatic
relations with Armenia. Moreover, Turkey denies the Armenian genocide and
mistreats its remaining Armenians. Mr. Merry's proposal is, therefore, a
non-starter. He also claims that `Ankara and Moscow =85 share broadly similar
views on =85 Caucasian and Caspian issues.' Not so. Turkey's aims in those
regions (and in Central Asia) are and have long been essentially
pan-Turkist, a policy that is obviously anathema to Russia. Russia also
knows that NATO and the U.S have been trying to penetrate the Caucasus,
partly by way of Turkey. On historical and demographic grounds, and due
to long-standing Azeri oppression of Karabagh's Armenians, Karabagh has as
a good a case as any territory in the world that has gained independence in
the past several decades. In contrast, Azerbaijan's case for ruling over
Karabagh is pathetically weak. Karabagh will not and should not allow
itself to be subject to Azeri rule again. It not clear whether Mr. Merry
understands that. Were it not for the greed of the mediators for
Azerbaijan's gas and oil, they would already have recognized Karabagh's
independence de jure. Such recognition remains the only solution to the
conflict. Let's be frank: The US and Europe foreign policy establishments
are nervous about a new war over Karabagh because it would probably result
in major damage to Azerbaijan's BTC and BTE pipelines, energy
infrastructure, and planned pipelines. If there is a new war, however, it
will be Azerbaijan that starts it. Armenia and Karabagh are in a purely
defensive military mode, despite Mr. Merry's depiction of Armenians and
Azeris as being equally at each other's throats. Those who remain open to a
non-pro-Turkish, non-foreign policy establishment perspective on Karabagh
(hopefully, this includes Mr. Merry) may wish to peruse my recent article,
`Preventing the Coming U.S. Disaster in the Caucasus,' widely available on
the Web (e.g.
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/12/22/preventing-the-coming-u-s-disaster-in-the-caucasus/
).