Russia's Aims and Priorities in Nagorno-Karabakh: 10/1/12 - Transcri

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Russia's Aims and Priorities in Nagorno-Karabakh: 10/1/12 - Transcript

http://www.acus.org/event/russias-aims-and-priorities-nagorno-karabakh/transcript
October 01, 2012

The Atlantic Council of the United States

Panel Discussion:
*Russia's Aims and Priorities in
Nagorno-Karabakh*

Panelists:
Ross Wilson,
Director,
Atlantic Council Patriciu Eurasia Center;

Thomas de Waal,
Senior Associate, Russia and Eurasia Program,
Carnegie Endowment;

E. Wayne Merry,
Senior Fellow for Europe and Eurasia,
American Foreign Policy Council;

Sergey Markedonov,
Visiting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program,
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Location:
Atlantic Council Patriciu Eurasia Center,
Washington, D.C.

Date: Monday, October 1st, 2012

Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.

ROSS WILSON: We're pleased today to focus on one of the longest-lasting and
most painful conflicts in the former Soviet Union and in the Caucasus. The
fighting and continued stalemate over Nagorno-Karabakh have been drivers of
hardship and misery in the South Caucasus since at least 1988. The conflict
is an unwelcome cloud over the future of Azerbaijan. It has in substantial
measure isolated or led to the isolation of Armenia from its two neighbors
and could again engulf these countries and the region in a destructive war
whose consequences for the Caucasus are perhaps hard to predict but would
certainly not be good.

Today's conversation, as I noted, will be a little bit different than the
usual one about Nagorno-Karabakh. These usually began in other Washington
think tank events that I've been part of with a review of the complicated
history and geography and politics that divide Azerbaijan and Armenia over
this region. They work through the fighting that ravaged both countries in
the late 1980s and early 1990s and then through the inconclusive Minsk
Group-mediated negotiations that followed. And they conclude with a usually
depressing review of the recent negotiations toward a settlement that have
all, for one reason or another, fell just short of success.

Here we want to set aside just a little bit some of those local specifics
and examine instead the role, position and views of Russia on the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Soviet legacy in the South Caucasus still
weighs heavily in many ways. Some argue that the Karabakh conflict itself
stems at least in part from the Stalin-era map drawing and politics that
aimed to pit ethnic groups against one another for Moscow's benefit. That
of course - that Soviet legacy of course reflects - affects present-day
Russia in its approach to a position in the Caucasus.

Post-Soviet Russia has served, along with the United States and France, as
a co-chair in the Minsk Group Karabakh peace process. Russian President
Medvedev and Foreign Minister Lavrov in some ways led the Minsk Group in
2009 to 2011 by working very hard with the parties toward achieving
agreement on so-called basic principles of an agreed settlement that could
then form the basis of a more specific treaty to establish long-term peace
and aim toward a mutually acceptable arrangement on the status of Karabakh
itself.

In recent years and really over the last 20 or more, Russia's interest and
role in Nagorno-Karabakh have been a source of speculation. It's our hope
today that we might move away from the easy parlor game of speculation of
speculation and have a more informed and concrete conversation about this.

Among key questions that I hope we can address today are the following:
What are Russia's aims in Nagorno-Karabakh and on Nagorno-Karabakh? And how
do these fit into the broader foreign and security policy agenda that
Moscow has in the South Caucasus? How does Moscow see and calibrate its
approach on Nagorno-Karabakh as functions of its relationships with Baku
and Yerevan? How have Russia's aims evolved over time? What agenda were
President Medvedev and Foreign Minister (sic) Putin pursuing? How
effectively did they pursue it? Or what went wrong? And how much was their
work coordinated with the other co-chairs? Is Iran a significant factor
affecting Russia's strategies vis-à-vis Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and
Azerbaijan? And if so, why?

To look at these and other pertinent issues, the council is very pleased to
welcome three distinguished experts on the Caucasus and on Nagorno-Karabakh
and three close long-time friends of both the Atlantic Council's and of
mine.

Tom de Waal, in my opinion, is Washington's pre-eminent expert on
Nagorno-Karabakh and one of its most influential writers and observers on
the Caucasus as a whole. He has served since 2009 as associate - senior
associate at the Carnegie Endowment's Eurasia Program where he specializes
in this region. He's the author of what I think is the definitive book on
the Karabakh conflict, `Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace
and War,' which I believe came out recently in a new and updated edition.

THOMAS DE WAAL: Not yet.

MR. WILSON: Not yet. It will soon. Next year. So be looking for that.

Sergey Markedonov is a visiting fellow at the CSIS Russia and Eurasia
program and a prominent expert in Washington on NK and the Caucasus and on
Russia's - Russian policy there.

Wayne Merry served as an American diplomat many years ago with me and in
Moscow as well in assignments in East Berlin, Athens, New York and Tunis
over the course of 26 years in the U.S. Foreign Service. He's presently a
senior fellow for Europe and Eurasia at the American Foreign Policy
Council, and he traveled to the region earlier this year.

Today's event is on the record. Our format will be relatively simple. Tom
de Waal will begin the conversation, followed by Sergey and then - and then
Wayne Merry, after which we will have a discussion that - questions and
answers. I'll have some, but I'm sure many of you will have questions as
well.

So with no further ado, let me turn it over to Tom de Waal.

MR. DE WAAL: Thanks very much, Ross. Thanks for inviting me. And I
certainly agree that this is a fascinating issue which deserves to be
explored in a whole session. We hear some rather clichéd remarks on the
issue of Russia in the Karabakh conflict. So I think I hopefully will shed
a bit more light on this issue over the next hour and a half.

I suppose - might - (audio glitch) - make - going to make a central
statement is that Russia is both an indispensable player in the resolution
of this conflict, but one who is not trusted either. And this is - and
possibly this paradox is something which plays out - has played out over
the last 20 years, although I would also - I also want to make the case
that Russia's attitude to this conflict, role in this conflict, is
changing. Russia is both a player and a mediator. Russia simultaneously has
a military relationship with both countries and is also negotiating peace
with them. This conflict won't be solved without Russia, and yet I think
this conflict will not be solved exclusively by Russia either.

So let me just, Ross, kindly mention my book, which will be updated next
year. My personal title for it is `Even Blacker Garden,' I'm afraid -
(laughter) - because things have only got worse over the last 10 years. So
let me review some of - some of my - of the historical narrative about
Russia in this region, and Russia starting with Moscow in the late Soviet
period.

There's an Azerbaijani narrative that Moscow has consistently supported the
Armenian side. I would say Moscow has more supported the Armenian side, but
I think the whole picture of the last 20-plus years is very mixed of
different Russian actors at different times supporting both sides in this -
in this conflict. You know, we go right away back to when this conflict
broke out in February 1988, and Moscow's position was very firmly on the
Azerbaijani side supporting Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Soviet Azerbaijan.
At the same time Andrei Sakharov and others, the Russian intelligentsia,
more strongly supporting the Armenian side.

And that narrative then played itself out in the late Soviet period, in
which, as it were, the kind of - the hawks in Moscow were more on the side
of Baku and the doves on the side of Yerevan. You had at one point Ligachev
going to Baku with one message and Alexander Yakovlev to Yerevan with
another message. And then that, I think, reached its kind of peak in 1991
when the kind of hardline military establishment in Moscow supported
Operation Ring, a(n) operation in and around Karabakh, which was basically
to enforce Azerbaijani rule, involving the deportation of Armenian
villagers. At the same time Russian parliamentarians were there on the
ground trying to support the Armenians and trying to subvert Operation Ring.

When we - turning to independent Russia, we - obviously, we see breakdown
across the board, across the Soviet space. And so it becomes more difficult
to talk about a unified - even more difficult, shall we say, to talk about
a unified Russian attitude because there were so many Russian players. And
researching my book, I came to the conclusion that in the summer of 1992
you actually had elements of the former Soviet Fourth Army helping Rahim
Gaziyev, the Azerbaijani defense minister. And funnily enough, just a few
days ago he's confirmed this in an interview, very conveniently for us, he
- just a few days ago - an interview marking the death of Pavel Grachev. So
the Russian Fourth Army, or what was left of it, supporting Azerbaijani
side, and then other Russians actually helping the Armenian side. So an
offensive in Karabakh, very successful on the Azerbaijani side, in June
1992 repulsed by Russians, the Russians actually fighting on both sides in
the summer of 1992.

Later on definitely, particularly after the fall of the Popular Front
government, Russians providing more help to the Armenian side. And yet
Levon Ter-Petrossian told me that Yelstin was - I think his words were
`very strict' in the amount of weapons he would supply to the Armenian
side. He didn't want to see the Armenian side be defeated, but he also
didn't want to supply them with too many weapons. So Russia playing both
sides in that conflict if, I think, ultimately more in the Armenian side.

But another interesting fact from the cease-fire - negotiated, as you know,
by Vladimir Kazimirov, the Russia envoy - it was a Russian plan in two
parts: one, to have a cease-fire; and then, second, to have a Russian
peacekeeping force on the ground. Only the first part worked. And if you
look at the book of Tatul Hakobyan called `Green and Black,' he - we all
knew that the Azerbaijanis didn't want a Russian peacekeeping force in
1994. Interestingly, Hakobyan also gives evidence that the Armenian - the
Karabakh Armenians also didn't want a Russian peacekeeping force either.
And so both sides were, as it were, tacitly colluding to keep the Russians
from imposing a Pax Russica in 1994, which is one reason why we've ended
up with this strange cease-fire, which is a long cease-fire line of a
hundred-plus miles and no peacekeepers on the grounds.

Since then Russian strategy has evolved. And I would say that if in the
'90s there were many reasons for Russia to manipulate the conflict and want
to kind of keep it - keep the status quo, I think Russia has, at least
since Key West in 2000, had a much more constructive attitude. I think the
military was the main Russian foreign policy agent in the Caucasus in the
'90s. That's obviously no longer - no longer true from the late '90s, the
foreign ministry and other actors playing a more important role.

And then we see the initiative by Dmitry Medvedev and Sergei Lavrov which,
I think, was genuine. There is no way that it could not be genuine to
invest all that time and effort, 10-plus meetings, between the presidents
of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

When I've asked senior Azerbaijanis about what they thought was behind the
Medvedev-Lavrov initiative, they've said - and I don't think this is just
self-importance - Russia recognizes that we're a much more player important
player nowadays. Russia - and if you recognize that Azerbaijan is an
important player, you have to work - if you want to win the trust of
Azerbaijan, you have to work harder on the - to resolve the Karabakh
conflict. We saw that in the French treaty signed in 2008 between
Presidents Medvedev and Aliyev.

And I think we see also - and again the Azerbaijani government doesn't -
likes to play up its more pro-Western orientation, but let's - you know,
let's also pay attention to the fact that Azerbaijan still has very strong
relationship with Russia. And, you know, that comes through the president's
family, the president's wife's family, the son-in-law, the singer
businessman, Mr. Agalarov, who's, you know, as much Russian as he is
Azerbaijani.

And a couple of other reasons why I think Russia really does want to have
this conflict solved: One, it's the kind of communication - it opens up
communications to - right the way to Turkey, to the Persian Gulf through
the Caucasus if this conflict is solved, and, I think, most importantly,
the fear of another war breaking out, which is obviously very palpable.

But clearly, there are questions about Russian motives. And I think one
question that we will - we shall return to is the question, does Russia
want to dominate a peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh.

And secondly, there - I think there are also questions about whether this
was President Medvedev's personal initiative, something that he took on for
personal glory and got - and got dragged into, and whether, now that we
have Vladimir Putin back in the - in the Kremlin, there's a different sort
of attitude. I think there is certainly evidence that that is the case. I'm
told that in September 2004 President Putin wanted to have a meeting with
Presidents Kocharian and Aliyev, that they kept him waiting, that he
arrived at the meeting late, already in a bad mood, and then they started
arguing in his presence, and that put him off the idea of mediating between
the presidents over Karabakh. That's the story I've been told. We do know
that since 2006 the relationship with Ilham Aliyev has been poor when Putin
was asking Azerbaijanis to restrict gas supplies to Georgia, and they told
him no.

We also know - and I think this is something which isn't sufficiently
picked up in Washington, that the relationship with Serzh Sarkissian is -
and Putin is also poor. That dates back to June 2009 when President
Sarkissian gave Mikhail Saakashvili a medal of honor in Yerevan. It was a
very pointed gesture that the important - about the importance of a
relationship with Georgia. And I think since then the relationship between
the Armenian leader and Vladimir Putin has not been of the best.

There is also - I would also draw your attention - you can watch it on
YouTube - to a rather bizarre moment in February of 2007 when Putin was
asked at one of his marathon press - Kremlin press conferences about
Karabakh. And he started quite well, saying that, you know, it's up to the
parties to make their own decision. And then he veered off into a very
strange monologue about Agdamski Portvein (ph). For those of you who don't
know about Agdamski Portvein (ph), it's a kind of sickly, very sweet and
cheap red wine, which was a popular drink, for - particularly for
alcoholics in the Soviet era, made in Agdam in Azerbaijan, Agdam now under
Armenian occupation. And Vladimir Putin started saying, in a rather
flippant way, that wouldn't it be great if we could restore the Agdam
Portvein (ph) production, which suggested that he doesn't really have -
that conflict resolution in Karabakh is not, you know, his highest
priority, shall we say.

So just a few words in - from - in conclusion from me. I think we're
seeing actually Russia losing influence in both Armenia and Azerbaijan
progressively. Azerbaijan, I think that's been evident for some years. But
I think there's quite strong anti-Russian sentiment in Armenia as well at
the moment. I think Armenians reacted quite badly when the White House
reacted instantly to the Safarov case, and it took the Russians three days
to react. I think that was noted in Yerevan. And there is also suspicion
amongst the leadership in Yerevan that the Russians are plotting with
Robert Kocharian in some unspecified way. That may play out in the next
presidential elections.

I'll stop there, but I - just to - if I do have a thesis on Karabakh, it's
that - it's that it's not a chessboard. I always say that it's not a
chessboard. I say that the - if it's a chessboard, the pawns are pushing
the kings and queens around in the Caucasus. And I think this has generally
been true of the Karabakh conflict, that if it was up to the outsiders,
this conflict would have been solved long ago. It's really the locals'
resistance to resolution and to change which is the main reason it's not
being solved. And that paradox (clearly exists ?) with asking the question
whether we want to see - would welcome more geopolitics rather than less
in the - in the Karabakh conflict, a concerted push by three co-chair
countries to use some of the instruments of pressure that they haven't used
up until now.

MR. WILSON: Thank you. It's a very good - very good opener.

Sergey?

SERGEY MARKEDONOV: Yeah. Thank you.

First of all, let me thank Ross for having me here as a contributor. It's a
great honor for me to speak in the company of such distinguished expert -
experts.

Tom made detailed, very detailed historical observation of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Russia's engagement in it. This is why let me
concentrate more on recent tendencies. And I wish to start on registration
of differences between engagement of Russia in the Nagorno-Karabakh process
from the conflicts in Georgia.

I think there are three principal differences in the Russian position in
this conflict. The first one, Russia is not engaged in a relationship with
Nagorno-Karabakh de facto state. Even in the - in one of the first decrees
of Vladimir Putin, signed just the same day where his inauguration took
place, he mentioned Abkhazia and South Ossetia as entities - independent
entities and Transnistria as a part of the conflict, engaged in the
conflict resolution. Nagorno and Karabakh was not mentioned, completely.

The second point, Russian engagement in the resolution process is supported
both by Armenia and Azerbaijan, for very different reasons, but both
countries have a wide spectrum of topics for cooperation of Russia outside
of Nagorno-Karabakh agenda. Armenia is practically the only military ally
of Russia in the Caucasus. It's a CSTO member. As for Azerbaijan, don't
forget that Russia shares with this republic Dagestani part of this border.
It's one of the most turbulent region inside Russia. And Russia is
interested to cooperate on Azerbaijan on this direction.

Gabala Radar Station - some days ago source who is very, very close to
negotiation process said to RIA Novosti that two sides are very close to
begin. And Russia is interested in making this begin. It could help us to
explain why a Russian reaction on Safarov case was not so loud -
(inaudible) - the Western reaction, by the way, it could be compared.

And third point, last but not least, the Russian engagement, even special
engagement in the peacekeeping process, is supported by the West, unlike
situation in Georgia. Even in 2008 even Matt Bryza greeted Russian activity
for preparation in providing Meindorf conference. It was 2008 -
Russo-Georgian war and so on, so on. And then the West, both France and
U.S., two co-chairmen of the Minsk Group, supported another additional
format of negotiations. I mean here three-side format, between three
presidents, Medvedev, Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan. And even Vladimir Putin is
not against this format. But it's necessary to understand many restrictions
on the Russian side.

But before description of those restrictions, let me estimate briefly the
effectiveness of Russian special engagement since 2008 to Kazan meeting in
2011. On the one side, this engagement was not really effective because no
breakthrough. There were no breakthrough before 2008, and after also. But
first time after cease-fire agreement, signed in May 1994, two presidents,
president of Armenia and Azerbaijan, shared signatures after one document.
Even in May 1994, presidents didn't meet to put their signatures on the
cease-fire agreement. In Meindorf, 2008, it took place. In Sochi and
Astrakhan, sides made very, very minor compromises - I am not overestimated
them - but compromises concerning humanitarian aspects of the conflict. In
my mind, it's (maximum ?), but no breakthrough.

I think Russia has many, many limitations and restrictions to promote the
conflict resolution. First of all, the conflict resolution doesn't depend
on Russia's will or Washington's will. First of all, it depends on the
interests and motivations of two sides. (Inaudible) - Armenia - both
Armenia and Azerbaijan are not ready to real peacekeeping. Speaking about
peacekeeping, I am not here - I am not meaning here victory of one side,
loss-win strategy. I mean here a win-win strategy, compromises, from both
sides. For this scenario, both sides are not ready. It's not guilty of
Russia or the West. It's reality with which Russia really deals. And Russia
would not resolve this conflict without interest and engagement of Armenia
and Azerbaijan.

The second point: In 2008 Russia recognized independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia and lost its influence resources in the relationship with
Georgia. In this situation, final choice between Armenia and Azerbaijan
would be a real challenge for Russia. This is why Russia provides policy of
(scales ?), trying to have windows for maneuver with Azerbaijan and with
Armenia. On the one side, as I said, common border with Dagestan; on
another side CSTO, Eurasian military-political integration, which is
important not only for Russia but personally for Vladimir Putin. And this
is why it forces Russia to provide checks and balances policy, no final
choice.

I understand that both Baku and Yerevan are interested in this final
choice, not only in Russia's final choice but in the West final choice.
Both Russia and the West aren't ready to make such final choice. And in
this situation, status quo as an option, as the best option, is supported
by the West, maybe not openly. Openly, yes, representatives of the West,
Hillary Clinton and representatives of European Union countries, especially
France, repeat like mantra that status quo is not so good; it provokes
possibility for a new war and so on, so on. But in reality, no real
proposals, interesting offers which would be shared by two sides. In this
way, I don't see real differences between Russian attitude and the West
attitude. And Nagorno-Karabakh, unlike Georgia, could be considered as a
platform for cooperation in the Caucasus, in the South Caucasus. It's very
different from situation in Georgia.

This is why, making final conclusions, I could not overestimate the
resources of Russia or such rather artificial theories that Russia is not
interested to have a peaceful relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Why not? This situation would be much better for Russia, especially taking
into account situation around Georgia.

Now I would stop - (chuckles) - my introduction, and then I would ready - I
would be ready to answer any questions. Thanks.

MR. WILSON: Very good, Sergey. Thank you very much.

Wayne.

WAYNE MERRY: Thank you, Ross. Always nice to be back at the Atlantic
Council, where I was once a program director in the council's somewhat more
threadbare years. It's nice to see the positive impact that money has here.

I'd like to start by asking what seems to me a puzzling question: Why has
Russia not attempted to exclude the Western powers from an active
engagement in Nagorno-Karabakh? One could logically occupy that Moscow
would seek to do precisely that. I mean, this area is with its near abroad,
within an area that has been of - where there's been droit de regard not
just in Soviet times but in imperial times. It's an area of great
sensitivity, involving the Caspian and the Black Sea regions. One could
logically assume that Moscow would be - have been very hostile to the kind
of multilateral approach which has marked Karabakh for almost 20 years.

Indeed, in the early part of the conflict, in 1994, the Russian government
at that time was quite prepared to accept American participation in a
peacekeeping force which would have put active American ground forces for a
long term as part of a multilateral force in the region, and with a senior
American role in the management of a force that would have included
Russians. Now, since that time they've been an active part of the Minsk
Group, the co-chairs, and have not sought to sabotage initiatives either
from, say, the Americans at Key West or the French initiatives. And all of
my information is that the Kazan initiatives were very full coordinated
with both Washington and Paris.

I would argue that what seems to be contradictory, almost counterintuitive,
is explained by Russia's objectives and what I would say is the dilemma of
Russian policy towards Karabakh. Russia overtly, at least in the medium
term, has sought the preservation of the status quo. And that is not just
because it fears a renewal of conflict, but it fears having to make choices
between Armenia and Azerbaijan that would compromise Russian interests.

There's no question that Russia is closer to Armenia. It has a treaty-based
security alliance. It has long-term connections that are cultural and
political and historical and variety of other things, and some significant
economic ties. This does not, however, mean that Russia does not value its
relationship with Azerbaijan and that with - and it certainly does not want
to compromise a relationship with Baku, which has been very difficult and
very - sometimes very tortured in the last 20 years.

I think the one thing that Russia does not want is to be in a situation
where it essentially has to honor its commitments to Armenia at the expense
of significant losses in its relationships with Azerbaijan. It would like
to maintain a degree of balance and success in that. I think in Moscow,
people are very well-aware that in the patron-client relationship they have
with Armenia that you get this kind of situation that Tom referred to of
the pawns pushing the kings or, as it's sometimes said, the danger that the
Armenian tail will wag the Russian dog. I think this is particularly a
danger in a conflict - in an open conflict situation. That's something
that Russia would seek to avoid.

A consequence of that is that Russia has welcomed the multilateral Minsk
Group process as a vehicle, a mechanism to essentially spread out the
liabilities of the problem so that it does not end up essentially holding
the hot potato of Karabakh by itself. Now, while I would argue that this
has been an entirely reasonable policy for Russia in past years, I think it
no longer is viable, for two important reasons.

The first is that I think the Minsk Group process was perfectly appropriate
in a postwar environment. But as some of you from my previous writings and
public statements, I think that Karabakh is now a prewar situation, and I
think that creates a very different dynamic not just for the Minsk Group as
a mechanism but for Russian interests. And I think the failure at Kazan
demonstrates a turning point not just in the viability of the Minsk Group
but in the viability of existing Russian policy, this effort to preserve
the status quo. I think the potential for a renewal of armed conflict not
just over Karabakh but between the two republics, Armenia and Azerbaijan,
is becoming increasingly real. I'm not predicting that it's imminent or
inevitable, but I'm certainly not the only person who thinks that the
prospects for another war in the Central Caucasus are increasing.

I think it's - one must face the reality that neither the United States nor
France is likely to be particularly effective in being able to prevent or
limit a renewal of conflict. France and the Europeans are obviously very
focused on their internal European problems. The United States is up to its
eyeballs in international problems. I doubt very much that anyone in
Washington would want more than a rhetorical political American engagement
in response to a new open conflict in the Caucasus.

This would mean that Russia would be faced with the responsibility, as a
regional great power, to try to exercise not only political suasion but
even more active instruments of influence both on its client state Armenia
and on its other neighbor Azerbaijan. It's almost impossible for Russia to
do that without suffering significant damage to its own interests vis-à-vis
both of those countries. And I think this is something that Russia would
very much like to avoid but, I fear, no longer is able to do so.

The second reason that Turkey's (sic) policy is going to have to change is
because of the increasing role of another regional great power, and that is
Turkey. Twenty years ago, at the time of the Karabakh war, Turkey's role
was largely peripheral. That's no longer true. At that time Turkey's
foreign policy towards its immediate neighborhood was Kemalist, which is
very conservative, very risk-averse. Today Turkey is a much more activist
power not only in the Middle East, in the Black Sea Region, in the Aegean,
but increasingly in the Caucasus.

And one has to expect that in a real crisis situation between Armenia and
Azerbaijan that Turkey will play a very influential role, in fact, I think,
almost certainly a more important role either than France or the United
States. They now have a patron-client relationship with Azerbaijan, in
which I think it's all too apparent that the problem of the tail wagging
the dog is a danger for Ankara's policy and interests. And obviously,
Turkey has a very, very delicate situation in its relationship or
semirelationship with Armenia, in which a renewed conflict in the Caucus
could stand to significantly damage Turkish interests.

Therefore, the two regional great powers have parallel, not identical, not
similar but somewhat overlapping and parallel concerns about the problems
of renewed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. I don't speak, in this
regard, about the third regional great power, Iran, partly because I think
the poisonous character of its relationship with Baku essentially rules it
out as a positive contributor either to conflict avoidance or conflict
resolution. But what I do think is true is that Moscow and Ankara both are
potentially facing a situation in which they are going to have to be much
more activist, much less passive, much more engaged in the problems of
Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, or they could be faced with a crisis which
would compromise their interests and willy-nilly drag them into situations
which could be very compromising to their interests and very risky.

Now, each of them has a patron-client relationship. Each of them has
borders with one or more of the two participants. Each of them is a weapons
supplier to one or the other of the adversaries. This is a situation in
which a conflict - in which a conflict, an active conflict, which, again,
would not just be about Karabakh but would be between Armenia and
Azerbaijan at a number of points on their common frontier, could easily
spill over into other parts of the Central Caucasus and compromise the
interests - and of necessity, each of the two client states will try to
engage its respective patron to the maximum it can to its own benefit in
this conflict.

Now, I think it's beyond imagination that Turkey and Russia would actually
come to blows with each other over this situation, but it is certainly true
that Turkey and Russia could stand to benefit by a higher degree of
coordination and mutual understanding of what their parallel interests are
than they have shown heretofore. I think there is simply a reality that
Turkey is still fairly low on the learning curve about the realities of the
Karabakh situation. The politics of Turkey vis-à-vis its cousins in
Azerbaijan have made it very difficult for Turkey to look at this problem
in a dispassionate way, and I think Moscow could actually play a
significant role in helping education policymaking levels in Ankara about
this problem because Turkey has significant potential benefits from a more
positive resolution of this problem, particularly in the normalization of
its relations with Armenia.

Now, it might sound here like I'm almost, as an American, advocating that
the Russians and the Turks engage in great-power collusion in the Caucasus,
almost to the exclusion of the United States. Let me say why I think that a
more activist role by Moscow and Ankara is in American interests.

First, I think the prospects that Armenia and Azerbaijan are going to
settle their differences by themselves is virtually zero. I think the
prospects for much positive contribution from the existing multilateral
prospect - mechanisms, the Minsk Group, is pretty low as well. I think the
prospects for renewed armed conflict, a war, are increasingly high. I think
a war in the Caucasus would, among other things, damage American interests.
I think the United States and France will have very little capacity either
to prevent or to limit that conflict if it happens.

Therefore, it's desirable that somebody do it. And it seems to me that the
two regional great powers, Turkey and Russia, are the logical, in fact, the
only candidates to play a restraining role in this conflict, and it is
therefore in the interests of the United States that they do so.

MR. WILSON: Great. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Wayne. I think
that is a very good and useful way to start off this discussion.

Let me take the moderator's prerogative just to ask a first question -Wayne
has introduced this idea of a sort of - that the Karabakh conflict is
settling in to a kind of prewar situation - and get the views of Tom and
Sergey on that proposition. And maybe more importantly, in your opinion
does Russia share that view? To the extent that Russia shares that view, is
that something that makes Russia as anxious as Wayne would portray it to
be, or would Russia see - would Russia see that it has other interests? And
how would Russia - maybe third, how would Russia's approach change to the
extent that it sees a prewar situation as opposed to a cease-fire that
needs to be managed and maintained?

MR. DE WAAL: I basically agree with Wayne. I'm slightly - I mean, it's just
a nuance, really - I'm slightly less worried about war, but I think the
situation is moving certainly more towards war than peace. I think the
pardoning of Ramil Safarov August 31st basically killed off the existing
peace process, which I think was pretty much on life support anyway. No one
has yet declared it dead, but I don't see the Armenians sitting down at the
table with Azerbaijan at the moment after the Safarov pardoning. And
therefore, there is therefore a trend line more towards war than peace.

And I would agree with Wayne that Russia definitely doesn't want - for many
reasons doesn't want conflict in the region. That would force Russia to
honor its military alliance with Armenia, to take sides - (inaudible) -
lose Azerbaijan, something that Russia could not tolerate.

Just - as Wayne mentioned Ankara, I was actually in Ankara a few weeks ago
and I got a slightly more sanguine view from a Turkish official who I won't
name when - because he was talking about this issue - he said we can
influence the Azerbaijanis on many issues, but Karabakh is one thing where
they will not listen to us, they will only listen to themselves, and that
makes sense. But he also said that he didn't think Azerbaijan was ready for
war, that he thought it was more bluster. And he said, and our military
advisers come back from Azerbaijan and they say there's no - that they
may have weapons, but there's certainly not a fighting spirit yet in the
Azerbaijani army. So that's a slightly - those of us who are afraid about -
of a war, I think that's a slightly more positive message.

MR. MARKEDONOV: Speaking about the official Russian position, we face a
real lack of interpretation made by Kremlin. I didn't hear any official
statements concerning prewar conditions around Nagorno-Karabakh. But being
generally pessimistic -- me personally; I'm not an official representative
of the Russian Federation, but as an expert -- I could not share alarmist
notes made by my distinguished colleagues, because a new war in
Nagorno-Karabakh was predicted many times, after Key West or, for example,
after failure of previous year Kazan meeting. Every time after failures of
the next round of negotiations or after absence of predicted or expected
breakthrough, the situation exists the same. No breakthroughs, status quo
is preserved, but no new war.

I think we need to have more prerequisites on the ground for new war. First
of all, it's military domination of one side. We are facing the arms
raising - conventional, of course, not nuclear - on the ground, but there
is no domination of one side. I think that first - fast victory in this
conflict is possible only due to blitzkrieg scenario, like Serbian Krajina
of 1995. For Serbian Krajina, Azerbaijani side must have military
superiority and absolute information superiority and support, (shadowed or
clear?), of the most important international actors. Those conditions,
those prerequisites don't exist right now. Yes, we could see attempts to
unfreeze the conflicts through engaged military component, military aspect
or elements of maybe risky game, but it's not prewar situation.

As for Safarov case, I think Armenian side could only dream about Safarov
case, because it's a brilliant argument to not be engaged in the
negotiations. Safarov case was not started today or yesterday. It's
prolonged, protracted history, which is why no admiration from my personal
side.

As for Russian position in the potential conflict, I see that some towers
of the Kremlin would follow different positions because there are different
groups of influence - oil, gas lobby, Armenian lobby and so on. I don't
believe - (inaudible) -- in the force and potential of CSTO. CSTO now is a
club of different interests. It has very, very, extremely strong Central
Asian dominant. And I'm not sure that Tajikistan or Kazakhstan would be
really engaged in the conflict on the Armenian side, taking into account
Kazakhstani relationship with Azerbaijan, a growing Tajikistani-Azerbaijani
relationship. Even Belarus. Even Belarus. Don't forget that Belarus in 2008
didn't support the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Nagorno-Karabakh case is much more controversial than situation in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia.

This is why situation on the one side is not so simple, but I think that
maybe cross of different interests and necessity to keep balanced
relationship within Kremlin would help to preserve status quo. Honestly
speaking, not as a Russian but as an expert, I think that status quo is the
worst scenario even you would have no other scenarios. Without jokes,
keeping status quo, preserving the status quo is better if you wouldn't
have now compromise between two sides engaged in the conflict.

MR. MERRY: Ross, if I might just clarify one point, Sergey has described a
scenario for resumption of war which is essentially based on a policy
choice by one side or the other to initiate war. I think that's rather - I
agree that's rather unlikely. I'm inclined to see a new conflict resulting
from a deteriorating situation between the two republics along their
borders in which there's a failure of rational policy on one or both sides
to control that deterioration and in which there would be an almost
simultaneous eruption of violence on both sides. Among other things, I no
longer share the view that a new war would only - could only come from the
Azerbaijani side. I think it could come almost simultaneously at various
points along the common frontiers by both sides. This would not - I'm not
predicting rational choice; I'm predicting the failure of rationality.

MR. DE WAAL: The research - (inaudible).

MR. MERRY: 1914.

MR. WILSON: That's encouraging.

MR. : Yes. (Laughter.)

MR. WILSON: Let me open it up to our audience for some questions. When I
recognize you, a microphone will come. I would ask that you please identify
yourself. Please state a question that our group can respond to. And
remember the topic here is Russia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The focus is sort
of the Russian aspects that relate to this terrible and long-lasting
problem.

Back here, please.

Q: Thank you. Astan Karajan (ph) from Voice of America's Armenian Service.
Thank you. It's one of the rare occasions where you have such a
distinguished panel where people actually honestly spoke their mind on a
lot of points, and that's a pleasure to have this kind of afternoon.

I have a question which is - we're not going to be able to basically keep
the big elephant in the room, which is Safarov, which probably changed the
dimension of the conflict the most since, I don't know, maybe the
cease-fire, even. You mentioned, Mr. Markedonov, that it was a present for
Armenians, in a way, to do that because now the Armenians have a good
reason to withdraw from the negotiations. And I agree with that. Why do you
think Aliyev decided to do this?

And the question is for everyone. I mean, why do you think the Azerbaijani
authorities went after the Safarov extradition?

MR. MARKEDONOV: Do we have to answer right now or -

MR. WILSON: Why don't we - why don't we answer this question, and let me
just expand it a little bit, if one of you could speak a little bit more
about the Russian reaction - the Russian reaction to the pardoning.

MR. MARKEDONOV: Now it's time to answer. You know that Russian reaction was
not so fluent. I touched on the Nikolay Bordyuzha statement. It's not
completely Russian official; it's general-secretary of CSTO who blamed
Azerbaijan and the decision of Ilham Aliyev. Why did he do this decision?
Don't forget that, first of all, Ilham Aliyev thought about domestic
audience, not for his partners in the West, because due to some projects or
programs of so-called energy alternatives, there are no such fluent
reactions from the Western side, and no prerequisites for agitation, for
worrying on this side.

The next year, presidential elections would be in Azerbaijan. I think this
reason was very decisive because domestic dimension of Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict is very important for both societies. It's the central element of
post-Soviet identity of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is why I think
this reason was decisive for Ilham Aliyev.

MR. WILSON: Tom or Wayne, anything you want to add on why this pardon was
given?

MR. DE WAAL: Yeah. I'm at a bit of a loss. It certainly had something to do
with domestic politics, but I think the international backlash has been far
more damaging to Azerbaijan than any domestic benefits that the president
would receive from this. And I would echo that this was certainly Dash
Maksatun's (ph) best day in years, the pardoning of Safarov.

The Russian reaction, again I do just reiterate, was this just slowness or
whatever, but I think this went down badly in Armenia, the fact that it
took Russia several days to react when there had already been statements
out of Washington and out of Brussels. And I think this confirms a sort of
slow but palpable estrangement between the authorities in Yerevan and those
in Moscow. Clearly this relationship is one that will endure, but it's not
nearly as strong as it was a few years ago.

MR. MERRY: I'd like to relate the Safarov affair to Kazan because I see
them as parallel. And what I found most disturbing in both cases was the
evident premeditation of Baku's policy. The Safarov affair was not a matter
of the government in Azerbaijan having been presented with this guy
returning from Budapest and they overreacted. This whole thing had been in
preparation for many months and was clearly - whatever its domestic
political component, was understood to have - would have a negative impact
on the potential for a bilateral relationship with Yerevan.

I think the same is also true in a multilateral context at Kazan, where the
Russian government, the Russian president, the Russian foreign minister had
invested enormous amounts of their own time and prestige and essentially
had the rug pulled out from under them at Kazan. I think that was not only
really a quite extraordinary act for Azerbaijan to do to its neighboring
great power Russia, but it essentially represented a premeditated decision
to abandon any prospect for multilateral progress. So I tend to see those
two things in parallel.

MR. WILSON: Here in the front.

Q: Thank you very much. I'm Darna Kovansa (ph) from the Embassy of Armenia.
I would like also to thank the distinguished panel for very insightful
presentations.

I have a question, actually, but I would like also to comment on the last
discussed issue about the Safarov case and its possible implication on the
negotiations. Actually as an Armenian diplomat and I haven't heard anything
coming from the Armenian side that Armenia will in any way exploit this
issue on the negotiations table. And just to share with you very fresh news
coming from New York, my minister earlier today delivered a statement at
the UNGA saying that Armenia is remaining committed to the Minsk process,
and even more, that the Minsk process views are in line with that of
Armenia's prospect and - position on the conflict resolution. Of course,
Safarov case was a serious blow to trust between parties and to the
people-to-people contacts, but I don't like to have for the audience
impression that it will somehow influence Armenia to change its position
around the negotiating table.

My question will go to Mr. Merry regarding the Turkish possible involvement
in the peace process. Don't you think, Mr. Merry, that there is a
contradiction between the Turkish involvement and the Minsk Group peace
process as a whole? I haven't heard you avert to a question of the
prospects of a peace negotiated under the Minsk process. On the contrary,
in the previous articles you supported the Minsk process. However, Turkey
wholeheartedly backs only Azerbaijani position on the negotiations, on the
peace prospect. That is quite different from what the co-chairs are
proposing on the table, the basic principles.

And this is where the contradiction starts. I'm not talking about the
Armenian-Turkish relations, which are very difficult, as you know, the
genocide denial, borders, but there is an actual contradiction on the
Nagorno-Karabakh field. Turkey backs only one position and not the whole
peace process. How can it be worked out, or you are advocating for a change
of the format?

Thank you.

MR. MERRY: Well, I might note that Turkey is part of the Minsk Group. It's
not one of the co-chairs, but the Minsk Group is substantially larger than
just the three co-chairs. I think people tend to forget that.

What I was indicating was that in a renewed regional crisis, a new renewed
series of small-scale conflicts potentially leading to an open war between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, that Turkey, as a country which borders both, a
country which has a patron-client relationship with Azerbaijan, which has a
difficult nonrelationship with Armenia, is definitely going to play an
important role. It is therefore important that that role be a positive one.
And it is therefore important, I think, that Turkish understanding and
thinking about the nature of the conflict and the problem be more
sophisticated than it has been shown to be in the past, and that its role
as a regional great power be carefully coordinated with the other regional
great power, Russia, so that the two of them can hopefully make a positive
joint contribution rather than as regional great powers losing control.

Now, if I thought that other external powers were likely to be able to do a
better job, I would advocate it, but I think it is highly improbable that
either the Europeans or the Americans, given everything else that they've
got to deal with for the foreseeable future, are likely to be able to do
so. I mean, for example, the United States has positive relations with both
Armenia and Azerbaijan, but it has no actual commitments to either. And
exactly what would we do in a conflict situation? We are not a weapons
supplier to either. We could not do the kinds of things we did in the 1973
Middle East war of exercising suasion on Israel. Exactly, other than strong
words, what would the United States or France be able to do in a real
crisis situation? Whereas I think both Moscow and Ankara are inevitably
countries that, whether they wanted to or not, because they are regional
powers, will be forced to react, and it is therefore important that that
reaction be a positive one.

MR. WILSON: I think I would add, just to take my moderator's priority, just
to add a little bit to Wayne's point, I think it would be important not to
perceive Turkey or Turkish policy in the region in black and white,
although it's easy to do that and in particular it's easy to do that from
the point of view of Yerevan. It was clear in the aftermath of the
Russia-Georgia war in 2008 that the Turks looked at what happened and they
were horrified by it and, in particular, were - saw rising instability or
this very sharp and obvious instability that the Russia-Georgia war
represented as something threatening to their interests and in - and
created a circumstance in which that for a period they looked at more
creative avenues to involve - to involve Turkey constructively in Caucasus
affairs.

One was the Turkey-Armenia normalization process, which had been - the
negotiations had been going on for some time but, on the - on the Turkish
side, got a significant kick in the pants by this - by this circumstance.
Another was the resurfacing of the Caucasus - I've forgotten the exact
name, but the Caucasus stability platform, which I think was seen in the
United States as a somewhat ham-handed effort, but it was to provide a
framework for a different kind of Turkish role.

The other point, I think, as events play out over the coming couple of
years, you'll see - we are likely to see a further change or evolution in
Turkey's role and its interests in Caucasus stability as Turkey becomes
more and more dependent on Caspian gas. That will be a - quite a different
situation from something that exist 10 or 20 or even one or two years ago.
Currently very small volumes of Azeri gas reach Turkish markets. Within
five or seven years, it would be very substantial volumes. It - and I think
then the imperative for Turkish policy to find more constructive roles in
preserving stability will go up really quite substantially and lead to some
different - certainly leads to a context in which Turkish policy may be
quite different.

A question over here.

Q: Thank you, Ambassador. My name is Fahrad Ismalaban (ph) from Embassy of
Azerbaijan. I will also certainly have a question to ask, but before asking
question, I would ask ambassador's indulgence to say a few words about - a
few comments on the - what has been said previously.

Actually, I didn't felt any - in the presentation of the - of the
panelists, any - much of urgency of solving this conflict. And - but from
point of view Azerbaijan IDP situation - (inaudible). They are victims of
the occupation. They are waiting to return back for more than 20 years. And
then when actually they - (sorry to say ?) that we need to listen to expert
presentation and sometimes from (the best encounters ?). And the situation
is described, and position of the countries are described in the same
terms. And then the people in Azerbaijan don't feel that really this
negotiation made between the country of occupiers and the country of
sufferers and that at this point it creates more frustration.

And even the reaction to the so-called Safarov case didn't get - actually,
people in Azerbaijan didn't get this reaction - overreaction to this matter
because the issue was dead in 2004, and then it's only the - for several
years the - and then when the - this - (inaudible) - in history are played
up in Yerevan, it serves to prove the audience - this audience statements
made in 2003 by former President Kocharian saying this, the Azerbaijanis
are - and Armenians are ethnically incompatible and that they can't live in
the - in the same country or on the side by side. And we believe that this
policy at the end will complicate the peace and will not bring the peace
and probably will bring new elements to the conflict because in Azerbaijan,
never at any point this conflict was seen through the point of ethnicity.
This was a - clearly a territorial conflict and one country taking another
country's territory. And this was the - but unfortunately, this - all this
- (inaudible) - played up the Ramil Safarov case will not probably help the
- this peace. And I can't really - also, I agree with the - with Tom de
Waal saying that this also a blow to the negotiations, which probably
aren't existing for several months, actually. This is some comments.

But also, the - you know, the reaction also is not the - now Armenia and
Yerevan - actually, it's trying to announce to - imminent flight from
Yerevan to Khojali airport. And then they try to prepare, you know, to send
in something - (inaudible) - international community. For a time we
wouldn't hear any reaction from the countries. And then would they wait for
this flight to try to enter Azerbaijan's space and then to something
happen? What would reaction of the experts to this announcement? Is it a
real provocation to start the war or was give the reason to start the war?
Thank you very much.

MR. WILSON: Thank you. Just to answer one part of what you - of the
comments that you've made, the purpose of this event was not really to look
at the conflict per se, not to look at the particular painful issues that
you have referred to. Our Armenian colleagues could - they have their own
painful narrative as well. It was, rather, to look at Russian policy in
this region and on this conflict, how that has changed over time. So the
purpose was just a little bit different.

At least from what I heard, I thought Wayne Merry in particular talked
about the urgency of this conflict in raising the specter of a sort of
prewar situation and the urgency of trying to find ways to head that off.

I don't know, do any of the rest of you want to comment on other points
that were made there?

MR. MARKEDONOV: (Off mic) - and purpose of our event today was to consider
to analyze the position of Russia. Of course, every ethnic political
conflicts, be conflicts in Georgia or Nagorno-Karabakh, have such elements
like refugees, IDPs and so on. It's impossible to imagine any
ethno-political conflict without such elements. But we analyze the position
of Russia.

As for airport, you raise the question of airport opening in Stepanakert,
close to Khojali, the place which is connected in their opinion of Azeris
like tragedy and so on. But this question is multidimensional, in my mind.
On the one hand, yes, we could speak that it's kind of quasi-recognition
of Nagorno-Karabakh and so on. But on the other side, we could speak about
engagement of this territory. Is it possible to discuss the fate of
territory, its perspectives, without people living on the ground? I am not
sure.

Yes, now negotiations are done between - are provided between Azerbaijan
and Armenia. But the future status would concern not people from Yerevan,
Dilijan or Abovian. It would touch people living in Stepanakert, Mardakert,
Gadruten (ph) and so on, so on. OK, we could ignore their opinion of
Nagorno-Karabakh. We could ignore this entity, considering it like
nonexistent. But would it be productive? Because without people living on
the ground, it's impossible to resolve the conflict itself because the
conflict, the core of this conflict is disputed area and population living
on this area, in my mind. It's necessary to understand - it's not bad; it's
not good.

MR. MERRY: On the airport, let me address an issue that's not directly -
not related to Russia but is related to the future of Azerbaijani policy,
which is with the opening of this airport, there are going to be a lot more
people from the outside world going to Karabakh. And it's - this full page
in The New York Times' travel section on Sunday a week ago is emblematic
of that. The recent visit by two former astronauts, one American, one Swiss,
to some space-related event in Stepanakert is representative of that. When
you had to go in through the Lachin corridor, I can tell you it's kind of a
long schlep to get into Karabakh. But with the airport open, Karabakh is
going to become a tourist destination.

And this creates a choice for Azerbaijan. If you just automatically
publicly declare persona non grata everybody that goes in, you get some
gratification; you accomplish nothing. For example, in the case of the two
astronauts, what Azerbaijan should have done is to immediately invite them
to Azerbaijan, to show them your side, to let them meet with some of the
IDPs, to let them see your side of the line, to let them see the new Baku.
You should have reached out and engaged them, not basically told them that
they were not welcome, something of which they were no doubt entirely
unaware when they went to Stepanakert. The opening of the airport - this is
going to be a recurrent issue for Azerbaijan. You can either make this into
a potential benefit for yourself by engaging people, or you can simply take
the view that anyone who goes on a tourist holiday because they read
something in the Sunday New York Times travel section is therefore a leper.
That's not to your advantage.

MR. WILSON: Here in the front.

Q: Alex van Oss, Foreign Service Institute. The word `suasion' has come up
a number of times. And getting back to Russia, what forms of `suasion'
could Russia take that are being footed, and what other forms might they
take that are more delicate and sophisticated? This is all speculative, I
realize.

MR. : (Chuckles.)

MR. DE WAAL: I mean, Russia, obviously, does have influence in Armenia. But
I think it pretty much used up - you know, we're told that Russia pretty
much twisted the arm of Serzh Sarkissian before, the Kazan meeting. He
basically signed up to that agreement, what was on the table. He gave
himself a let-out clause that had to be approved by the - what he agreed
had to be approved by the Armenians of Karabakh. But, you know, Russia does
have a certain amount of influence with the Armenian side.

But I think this is one issue where both Armenia and Azerbaijan, you know,
push back. They - it's - they regard this as one hundred percent in their
national interest to maintain a position on this issue. And it's only ever
going to be 5 (percent) or 10 percent or whatever in interests of Turkey or
Russia or the United States to apply pressure. And I think that's why local
resistance has always been stronger than external pressure. That I think
would only change if it's not just Russia but Russia, the United States,
the Europeans, maybe Turkey, all pushing at the same time, and that's
obviously something we haven't yet seen.

MR. MARKEDONOV: And speaking about Russian influence and pressure, as well
as external pressure as a whole, we have lost that updated Madrid
Principles themselves are very contradictory. They don't contain concrete
mechanisms of realization, of step one, step two. The first step,
liberation of five districts - what about 12 districts - (inaudible)? No
clarifications. What about referendum? Would it be compulsory or
recommendation? Many, many questions. (Precise ?), but no mechanisms, no
real clear steps how to realize those brilliant ideas contradictory to each
other.

We really believed that signatures under updated Madrid Principles would be
the end of the story. No. It would be start of the new story. What about
interpretation of these signatures? Presidents of both Armenia and
Azerbaijan thinks first of all about their future - (inaudible) - after the
signature and their homes. In their situation, that could - they could
ignore any pressures from outside, both Russian and the West. The document
(basement ?) for the future peace is very, very contradictory, and many
points are unclear - seven points, but most of them are unclear, and here -
first of all mechanisms of realization. It's necessary to take it into
account, first of all.

MR. MERRY: Well, I think for any great power to actually exercise suasion
is a dicey business. I mean, look how much difficulty the United States has
getting people in Iraq or Afghanistan to do what we want.

I think this actually illustrates my point, is that for Russia actually to
use the significant influence it has in both Armenia and Azerbaijan will
come at a significant cost. I mean, great powers like to have influence
without actually having to use the resources. You know, the last thing
Armenia would want to have is for the Russians sort of to have technical
difficulties in delivering military supplies or spare parts. But these
things can be done. But it will cause some damage to the relationship.
Anything that Moscow would do with Baku that would be effective will have
some lasting damage on the relationship and therefore would be not - you
know, a net negative to Moscow's interest. I think this is why Russia would
like not to be in a situation where it has to do that kind of thing.

MR. WILSON: We're getting to the end. Let me just take here - take a couple
of different questions. If we could please make it a question more than a
comment. Over here, please.

Q: Thank you. Adil Baguirov from the U.S. Azeris Network. I've got three
short questions.

Number one, why is Russia opposed to the conflict mediation moving to the
U.N. Security Council from the OSCE Minsk Group? Number two, why do you
think Azerbaijan is not joining the CSTO or rejoining it? And number three,
why didn't we hear from Russia or any other big power, co-chairs, anything
in 2001, for example, when the French court released a terrorist, Varoujan
Garabedian, and he was taking (sic) to Armenia where he was promptly given
citizenship. The mayor of Yerevan provided him an apartment and salary and
a bunch of other benefits and really glorified a guy who was born in Syria,
not even in Armenia. He was a convicted terrorist who killed eight people,
including two U.S. citizens - and several other such examples of -
Melkonian and, you know, many other convicted terrorists who killed
civilians as opposed to military targets. Thank you.

MR. WILSON: Three good questions. Back in the back here, there was someone
- yes.

Q: Hi. Will Englund, with The Washington Post. Just following up on
something that Mr. Markedonov has said a little bit earlier. There has been
a lot of talk today about - some talk today about tails wagging dogs. And
of course, Nagorno-Karabakh itself is kind of a tail that wags the Armenian
dog. And I'm wondering in - if we're entering a period of increased danger
of something irrational happening. Has Russia been too reliant on Yerevan
as the - as the authority, as the director of the - what you might call the
larger Armenian side?

MR. WILSON: OK.

MR. DE WAAL: There's - are we going to take one more, or -

MR. WILSON: I think we're about out of time, but maybe here in the back.
But last - the last question, then we'll wrap it up.

Q: Thank you very much. This is - (inaudible). I'm from the Turkish
embassy, and I have a very small comment and - (inaudible) - small question.

I would like to - I think I have the right here to underline that Turkey
has a constructive and positive approach concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh
issue, and - because it's our immediate neighborhood, and as Mr. Merry has
mentioned, we are a member of the Minsk Group, although we are not part of
the three co-chairs. So we know it is very - it is very difficult and
complicated. It's a very difficult problem.

But it is unfortunate to hear that representatives of Armenia would be
against any kind of positive initiative that may come from Turkey just
because it's coming from Turkey, just because it's coming from a country
that is not part of the co-chairs. I have difficulty in understanding this
approach of Armenia because we all know that any positive step in
Nagorno-Karabakh issue can contribute to other problems in our
neighborhood, in our region, including Turkish-Armenian bilateral
relations. So this is my comment.

And my question concerns Russia. As Mr. Merry mentions, Turkey and Russia
can play a role. Yes, it can - we can - we can think about that. But I
wonder how Russia and other co-chairs would be - would think about that and
would stay - would they welcome it, or they just say we don't want any
other player in this area, we are OK? Thank you.

MR. WILSON: Gentlemen. Maybe Tom go first, then Sergey.

MR. DE WAAL: Sure. Adil's questions - I think it's not just Russia. The -
all the three co-chairs seem to be opposed to moving to the U.N., maybe not
on principle, but simply that really, the - changing the format I don't
think changes the substance of the problem. You would just sort of -
changing the frame - the picture frame, but you're not changing the
picture. I think if anyone thought it could make a significant difference,
they probably would favor it.

Why does Azerbaijan not join the CSTO? I think you can probably answer that
just as well as we can. It's - you know, Azerbaijan has a different
geopolitical orientation.

The Garabedian case is an interesting one. I certainly have started reading
up on it myself since people have been mentioning it. And it's just - I
think - and, you know, I think it's - it was certainly an outrageous thing
to do to give this man citizenship. I suppose he did serve full 17 years in
a - in a - in a French jail and was released. But still, it was a very
provocative gesture. I suppose it was done with much less fanfare; it was
done more quietly. But it certainly deserved some condemnation the way he
was treated. And I'm happy to add - (chuckles) - you know, my criticism of
that. But certainly, two wrongs don't make a right. The idea that you can
sort of say, the Armenian side behaved badly, therefore, we're going to
behave badly too, it doesn't stand up as an argument.

And I would - to Will's - I'd also like to comment on Will's question. I
think we have an interesting election in Karabakh this summer, when - which
the opposition candidate, Vitaly Balasanyan, got, I think, 32 percent of
the vote. That was a pretty impressive vote in a post-Soviet territory like
Karabakh, and that does suggest that we shouldn't take for granted the fact
that the Karabakh Armenians will automatically do what Yerevan says.

MR. WILSON: Sergey.

MR. MARKEDONOV: OK. Now it's my turn. The answer on the first question
would be very simple. Russia is not interested to lose its monopoly, as
well as USA and France. I think that engagement of U.N. would mean
inflation of OSCE Minsk Group in the conflict resolution, which is why not
only Russia but USA and France are not so lucky from the U.N. engagement.
And maybe this thing would be not so politically correct, but I'm not sure
that some other reasons besides populist would be really discussed in the
framework of U.N., you know.

As for the second question, we spoke that Russia tries to provide balanced,
nuanced or - (inaudible) - policy in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan also. I know
that in 2005 Azerbaijan really discussed the joining CSTO. Ilham Aliyev
publicly said that he studied the documents - (inaudible) - some years
before, studied documents. Why? Context of 2004-2005, colored revolutions -
(inaudible) - movement on the streets of Azerbaijan Azadlig, and so on and
so on. In 2006 Azerbaijan was called as the Islamic ally of the United
States. It was second country after Turkey which was named by this honorary
title. And problems of CSTO were taken away. It's a balance.

I think that geopolitical configuration over Azerbaijan is not so - is not
completely definite. I could not completely agree with Tom thesis that
Azerbaijan geopolitical configuration is rather different. Azerbaijan has
restrictions in its movement, both to the Russian direction and to the
Western direction, to the Western also, problems of democracy, elections
and so on and so on. There are many (hooks ?) from the Western side which
are not so appropriate in Azerbaijan. In contrast, Russia could recognize
results of any elections before central committee of Azerbaijan, central
electoral committee, would recognize them as legitimate. Remember
experience of 2005 parliamentary elections. This is why Russia is also very
good as a counterbalance because Russians in Gabala would be very effective
for Azerbaijan because Russians in would be maybe guarantee from the
Iranian engagement, which is very risky and dangerous for Azerbaijan. This
is why maybe in a couple of months, we would discuss here or in other think
tank of Washington - at CSIS, for example - prospects of prolongation of
Russian-Azerbaijani cooperation for Gabala.

The question about tails and dogs. (Chuckles.) Of course, Russia relies on
the official at Yerevan. It's usual - it's habitual for Russia to rely on
official position, not only in Yerevan but in Azerbaijan. Russian
authorities ignores many other factors. And this is why they are not really
ready for new challenges. Before my contribution here, I analyzed the first
results of the Georgian exit polls, very interesting. Georgian Dream_ maybe
would be more successful. (When I was speaking ?), I predicted such
results, and it was necessary to argue with somebody. But Russia now is not
ready to this scenario. OK, if everybody instead of Saakashvili would be in
Tbilisi, what Russia would really propose, what topics? This is why, yes,
it's necessary to be more attentive to different actors in Yerevan, in
Baku, in Tbilisi. It's a problem of the Russian foreign policy, I
understand.

But - yeah, and last but not least, comment about the Turkish policy. It's
a very interesting and controversial topic. I think this problem is twofold
in the Caucasus. We discussed readiness of another co-chairs for the
Turkish engagement, readiness of Armenia. But what about readiness of
Turkey itself? Nowadays Turkey is engaged more actively in the Middle East
agenda, and it takes much more energy from the Turkish side. I'm not sure
that Turkey itself really ready to be the fourth co-chair of the Minsk
Group. I'm not sure.

And Karabakh conflict is very important for Turkey, but in the context of
Armenian-Turkish relations, first of all. It's impossible to abandon the
principles of national egoism. OK, we have Turkey brothers in Azerbaijan,
but first and foremost our national interests. As for the Armenian and
Turkey dialogue, now it's frozen, but it's not completely stopped because
we have request for this normalization both in the Turkish society and in
Armenian society. Unlike situation five, six years ago, we have discourse
of discussion between not only Turkish people and Armenians about the
normalization, about the rapprochement, but between Turks and Turks,
between Armenians and Armenians about the cost of this rapprochement, about
the price of it, about tempos, about many, many other aspects.

And this request was - were not due to so-called soccer diplomacy. It was
born in 1991 after the - (inaudible) - and sometimes this process was
frozen and then was revitalized. Karabakh factor is a factor of not only
Turkish foreign policy but domestic also. Don't forget about some millions
of Azeris in Turkey. It's domestic factor. Those people are engaged in the
elections, they vote, and it's a very important factor. But first and
foremost in the bilateral relations between Turkey and Armenia.

MR. WILSON: Wayne, briefly.

MR. MERRY: OK, three points. One of the reasons why the Minsk Group was
created was because the U.N. Security Council didn't want to touch Karabakh
at all from the beginning. I've seen no indication that that has changed.
In fact, in the fall of 1994 in New York, I personally set up a meeting
between Levon Ter-Petrossian and Heydar Aliyev, and I can assure you that
the people in the U.N. secretariat, the secretary-general's office, were
perfectly happy to stay far away from that and not have anything to do with
it. I see no indication that anybody in New York wants to add Karabakh to
their - to their docket.

A point about the Safarov case that is unique is that the crime took place
in the context of a program in the Partnership for Peace. And this was a
problem for NATO, for all the Partnership for Peace countries and for the
country that was hosting the event, Hungary. I actually was partially
involved in that because I was the person in the Pentagon who found the
money for Armenia and Azerbaijan to send military officers to programs like
that, and I argued in favor of doing that on the notion if you got the two
people - military officers from the two sides together in a neutral venue,
they might establish some kind of personal relationship. Well - (laughter)
- the fact remains that the crime involved was one which violated a program
of an important multilateral venture of the alliance, and so it offended a
lot of people in that context.

And finally, the question from the representative of the Turkish embassy,
well, I might note your Russian embassy colleague is here. You could just
sort of set - you know, settle it right here. (Laughter.) But my point was
not that Turkey should be a fourth co-chair of the Minsk Group, not at all.
My point is that Turkey is an objective reality as a Caucasian regional
great power with a much more activist and involved foreign policy, with a
patron-client relationship with one of the two participants in this
conflict and with a very important semirelationship with the other one, and
in any crisis, Turkey is going to be important. As difficult as reality can
be for people at Foggy Bottom or the Quai d'Orsay or Smolenskaya Ploshchad
to deal with, they will deal with the reality of Turkey because it is a
reality. Two of those countries are allies of Turkey, for crying out loud.

And while there are still some difficulties in the relationship between
Moscow and Ankara, I think the Turkish-Russian relationship is actually one
of the most positive aspects of the post-Cold War world. I see no reason to
believe that a Turkish involvement that is seen as being more than just
serving Azerbaijan is one that would not be welcome to the other
participants, partly because it's part of the - if it's part of the
solution rather than contributing to the problem.

MR. WILSON: As a former American ambassador to Turkey, it's interesting
that the conversation that started about Russia ends up with Turkey.
Seriously, I think this helped, for me at least, and, I hope, all of you in
understanding a little bit more clearly what is Russia's role, what is
Russia seeking, how have things evolved, how - what are some of the
interests that come more directly into play as far as Russia is concerned
on issues of Nagorno-Karabakh and, for that matter, the broader Caucasus.

I want to thank all of you for being an excellent audience and having some
good questions. I want to thank the Atlantic Council staff and, in
particular, Anna Borshchevskaya, our assistant director of the Eurasia
Center, for the arrangements here. And please join me in thanking our three
panelists. (Applause.)

(END)