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China's Growing Political Role in the Caucasus
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 12
January 23, 2013 05:56 PM Age: 18 days
By: Paul Goble
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad construction (Source: trend.az)
China's economic role in the south Caucasus is expanding rapidly, with
Beijing's investments in Azerbaijan alone now approaching a total of
one billion US dollars and its bilateral trade with that country
exceeding that figure on an annual basis. But as impressive as those
figures are, China appears set to play an even larger political role
in the region not only because of its interest in the
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway as a land route to Europe, but also because
of its concerns about the ways in which instability there could have a
negative impact on China
(www.kavkazoved.info/news/2013/01/14/china-na-juzhnom-kavkaze-ekonomicheskaja-ekspansija-i-politicheskij-pragmatizm.html).
There are at least three reasons for this conclusion, which seems
counter-intuitive since in their public statements so far, Chinese
leaders have made it clear that the Caucasus - North and South - is not a
place that is central to their interests. Indeed, the absence of such
declarations and Beijing's apparent disinterest constitute the first
of China's advantages: Unlike the major powers, such as the Russian
Federation, the United States and France, China does not show itself
to be and is not viewed by others as being closely tied to one country
in the Caucasus and thus at odds with others. At a time when many in
the region are questioning the motives and actions of these other
powers, that gives Beijing an opening that - judging from its policies
elsewhere - it is likely to exploit.
Second, China brings to any discussions in this region two
extraordinary advantages arising from its own more general approach to
foreign affairs. On the one hand and in sharp contrast to some other
major powers, China's leaders are prepared to deal with the
governments in the Caucasus countries without challenging their
domestic arrangements or approach to democracy and human rights. They
focus exclusively on economic and geopolitical interests from a
realist perspective, something that governments in the region
appreciate especially as they have been stung by the criticism of
others.
And on the other, China brings to the south Caucasus and that region's
currently frozen conflicts - namely between Georgia and the Russian
Federation, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan - its unique experience
of working with Taiwan, a place that Beijing insists is de jure part
of China, but one that it interacts with as a de facto independent
country. For Tbilisi, Moscow, Baku and Yerevan, that experience is at
least suggestive of some of the possible ways forward in dealing with
the so-called `breakaway' republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Karabakh.
At the same time, the region is beset by growing anger in Baku about
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk
Group's failure to resolve the Karabakh conflict, ongoing fears in
Tbilisi that Moscow will continue to back Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
as well as the absence of any outside mediators for any of these
conflicts who are not viewed by someone as parti pris - Turkey, for
example, is unacceptable to Armenia. As a result, China is in a
position to promote itself or even to be asked to play a role in both
cases that few in the region - and quite possibly few elsewhere or even
in Beijing itself - now foresee.
And third, in the South Caucasus as in other regions, China takes a
long-term approach to all issues. Its leaders do not feel compelled to
show progress in this or that year but instead work to advance
Beijing's interests over decades or even longer. Others may seek to
exploit that approach especially if they are interested in maintaining
the status quo or oppose a resolution that would change it. But this
vision gives China some real advantages because it means that
Beijing's representatives can focus always on their own pragmatic
interests rather than on playing to the crowd.
What are Beijing's interests in the Caucasus? The most obvious are
the expansion of trade with the petroleum-rich Caspian basin
countries, the establishment of land-based transportation and
communication links between Asia and Europe (see EDM, January 10), the
recognition of China as a rising super power, and, above all else,
political stability and maintenance of the territorial integrity of
states. And its promotion of these interests over the longer term
means that China will seek to block the kind of border changes and
tectonic power shifts that some in the region and beyond appear
interested in.
Chinese activities in the South Caucasus are beginning to attract
attention. But quite clearly, this country's moves deserve to be
followed closely now that Beijing has shown that it is more than
prepared to be a new player in the complex geopolitical game in the
South Caucasus.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40355&tx_ttnews[backPid]=620
From: A. Papazian
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 12
January 23, 2013 05:56 PM Age: 18 days
By: Paul Goble
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad construction (Source: trend.az)
China's economic role in the south Caucasus is expanding rapidly, with
Beijing's investments in Azerbaijan alone now approaching a total of
one billion US dollars and its bilateral trade with that country
exceeding that figure on an annual basis. But as impressive as those
figures are, China appears set to play an even larger political role
in the region not only because of its interest in the
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway as a land route to Europe, but also because
of its concerns about the ways in which instability there could have a
negative impact on China
(www.kavkazoved.info/news/2013/01/14/china-na-juzhnom-kavkaze-ekonomicheskaja-ekspansija-i-politicheskij-pragmatizm.html).
There are at least three reasons for this conclusion, which seems
counter-intuitive since in their public statements so far, Chinese
leaders have made it clear that the Caucasus - North and South - is not a
place that is central to their interests. Indeed, the absence of such
declarations and Beijing's apparent disinterest constitute the first
of China's advantages: Unlike the major powers, such as the Russian
Federation, the United States and France, China does not show itself
to be and is not viewed by others as being closely tied to one country
in the Caucasus and thus at odds with others. At a time when many in
the region are questioning the motives and actions of these other
powers, that gives Beijing an opening that - judging from its policies
elsewhere - it is likely to exploit.
Second, China brings to any discussions in this region two
extraordinary advantages arising from its own more general approach to
foreign affairs. On the one hand and in sharp contrast to some other
major powers, China's leaders are prepared to deal with the
governments in the Caucasus countries without challenging their
domestic arrangements or approach to democracy and human rights. They
focus exclusively on economic and geopolitical interests from a
realist perspective, something that governments in the region
appreciate especially as they have been stung by the criticism of
others.
And on the other, China brings to the south Caucasus and that region's
currently frozen conflicts - namely between Georgia and the Russian
Federation, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan - its unique experience
of working with Taiwan, a place that Beijing insists is de jure part
of China, but one that it interacts with as a de facto independent
country. For Tbilisi, Moscow, Baku and Yerevan, that experience is at
least suggestive of some of the possible ways forward in dealing with
the so-called `breakaway' republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Karabakh.
At the same time, the region is beset by growing anger in Baku about
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk
Group's failure to resolve the Karabakh conflict, ongoing fears in
Tbilisi that Moscow will continue to back Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
as well as the absence of any outside mediators for any of these
conflicts who are not viewed by someone as parti pris - Turkey, for
example, is unacceptable to Armenia. As a result, China is in a
position to promote itself or even to be asked to play a role in both
cases that few in the region - and quite possibly few elsewhere or even
in Beijing itself - now foresee.
And third, in the South Caucasus as in other regions, China takes a
long-term approach to all issues. Its leaders do not feel compelled to
show progress in this or that year but instead work to advance
Beijing's interests over decades or even longer. Others may seek to
exploit that approach especially if they are interested in maintaining
the status quo or oppose a resolution that would change it. But this
vision gives China some real advantages because it means that
Beijing's representatives can focus always on their own pragmatic
interests rather than on playing to the crowd.
What are Beijing's interests in the Caucasus? The most obvious are
the expansion of trade with the petroleum-rich Caspian basin
countries, the establishment of land-based transportation and
communication links between Asia and Europe (see EDM, January 10), the
recognition of China as a rising super power, and, above all else,
political stability and maintenance of the territorial integrity of
states. And its promotion of these interests over the longer term
means that China will seek to block the kind of border changes and
tectonic power shifts that some in the region and beyond appear
interested in.
Chinese activities in the South Caucasus are beginning to attract
attention. But quite clearly, this country's moves deserve to be
followed closely now that Beijing has shown that it is more than
prepared to be a new player in the complex geopolitical game in the
South Caucasus.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40355&tx_ttnews[backPid]=620
From: A. Papazian